

Frameworks and Partnerships

Improving HA/DR in the Asia Pacific



THE JAPAN-U.S.-PHILIPPINES
CIVIL-MILITARY
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE



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Improving HA/DR in the Asia Pacific

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**The Japan-U.S.-Philippines
Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative**

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Front cover photo: Volunteers near Ormoc unload relief supplies from a helicopter of U.S. Navy Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 25 on 16 November, 2013 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Mackenzie P. Adams/Released).

Back cover photos from left to right: A doctor with the Japan Disaster Relief Team examines a patient in Tacloban (© 2014, JICA); A mother and her children wait for registration at an evacuation center in Estancia, Iloilo on 23 November, 2013 (International Organization for Migration, (c) 2013, used under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 license); and U.S. Marine Brig. General Paul Kennedy, second from right, with counterparts from the Armed Forces Philippines and Department of Social Welfare and Development at the reopened Tacloban airport, 24 November 2013 (U.S. Department of Defense, Cpt. Caleb Eames/Released).

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
NATIONAL DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Center, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines

June 2015

Disaster response remains a major challenge to achieving disaster resiliency. The Philippines continues to face disasters such as tropical cyclones, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions.

Over the past four years, successive large-scale disasters devastated areas in the Philippines – Tropical Storm Washi in December 2011, Typhoon Bopha in December 2012 and Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013.

As Typhoon Haiyan made its way through the Philippines, it became clear that all the preparations undertaken were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the typhoon. Upon making landfall over the Eastern Visayas, it produced a 5-7 meter-high storm surge in Samar and Leyte and resulted in the death of at least 6,000 people, damaged over a million houses, and brought about property damage amounting to over USD 2.14 Billion.

In the aftermath, one of the many challenges faced by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) was managing the surge of assistance and outpouring of support from different countries and organizations. The governments of Japan and United States were among the earliest responding countries. Their initial response operations enabled the Philippines to transition to early recovery and rehabilitation.

Typhoon Haiyan brought to fore a realization that there is a need for the country to revisit and improve its disaster risk reduction and management policies, programs and activities. The Office of Civil Defense recognized the importance of putting in place a resilient system which could respond to unprecedented disasters.

It is in this light that the Philippines has strengthened its National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) for Hydro-Meteorological Hazards. The Plan outlines the processes and mechanisms to facilitate a coordinated response by the departments and agencies in the national and local level. Moreover, the Pre-Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA) was institutionalized in August 2014 to ensure that hazard specific, time-bound and area-focused assessment will ensure better decision making that will correspond to appropriate and immediate actions both at the national and local levels. Both tools have aided the Government in its execution and represent a huge improvement in disaster response, particularly in coordinated response.

Peace Winds America's conduct of study of the lessons learned during the Typhoon Haiyan HA/DR operation is a milestone as it provides an opportunity to share the importance of connectivity and coordination mechanisms among governments and humanitarian responders. May this book serve as a tool to strengthen the ties of all society towards continuous improvement in disaster management.

My heartfelt gratitude and congratulations for this initiative.

Admiral Alexander P. Pama
Administrator, Office of Civil Defense
Executive Director, NDRRMC
Manila, Philippines

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The Peace Winds America 2013-2015 Japan-U.S.-Philippines Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative has achieved its goals due to the support, encouragement, and contributions of our many partners. Without them PWA could not have written this Report, held training workshops/exercises/forums, or completed the research and review. We offer them our sincere gratitude.

This Initiative was made possible by the generous support of our benefactors. We are indebted to the *Sasakawa Peace Foundation* and wish to extend our appreciation to Executive Director Junko Chano and Program Officer Aya Murata. We hope this Initiative marks the start of an enduring partnership to improve disaster preparedness and strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance. We also deeply appreciate the opportunity to work again with the *Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership*, aided by Associate Program Officer Lisa Wong and Chief Officer Takashi Imai. To both these donors we trust our efforts have helped demonstrate the pivotal role Japan plays in preparing for and responding to natural disasters.

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We have been fortunate to engage the National Bureau of Asian Research for their services formatting, laying out, and publishing our Report. Our special thanks go to Jessica Keough.

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Executive Summary

Peace Winds America (PWA) is committed to strengthening humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) in the vulnerable Asia Pacific. PWA has focused on the capabilities of Japan and the United States, who anchor disaster preparedness and response in the region. Together, these two nations can demonstrate leadership in this vital area and offer best practices to strategic partners.

With the support of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PWA has implemented the **2013-2015 Japan-U.S.-Philippines Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative**. With the full support of the three partnering countries, PWA held workshops, trainings, policy forums, and interviews with over 450 participants. In the midst of the Initiative, Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines. The response of the three nations to this devastating event lies at the core of PWA research and analysis in the Initiative.

PWA has presented findings and recommendations to help improve HA/DR capabilities. All three partners have been victims of natural disasters; all three have responded overseas to assist Asia Pacific nations. This Japan-U.S.-Philippines Initiative will lead to improved preparedness and response within each country, among the three partners, and for others in the Asia Pacific.

POLICY AND TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

Philippines

- The Philippine 2011-2028 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan provides an excellent preparedness and response framework, now further strengthened with the 2014/2015 National Disaster Response Plans. They are collectively a model for locally-led, nationally-augmented disaster management.
- The core of the Philippine framework, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) should

be strengthened by strong and committed leadership from its member departments.

- The NDRRMC, through the Office of Civil Defense, should place an emphasis on implementing the national Plan in local and provincial governments as speedily as possible.
- The NDRRMC should develop, expand, and refine procedures for selecting regional Incident Commanders, co-locating coordination centers, utilizing the cluster system, and implementing the Incident Command System nation-wide. Analysis of the Typhoon Haiyan case should help guide this task.
- The Office of Civil Defense and partner departments should place a priority on instructing local leaders how to liaise and coordinate with provincial, regional, and national DRRM Councils and how to engage in “worst case scenario” planning.
- The Department of National Defense should further institutionalize and refine its Multinational Coordination Center activities for military coordination in major disasters.
- OCD, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and other partners should review and revise policies for warehousing, relief good distribution, disaster telecommunications, mutual aid agreements, and logistics.
- Philippine military and civilian departments active in HA/DR should review procedures for disaster operations alongside Japanese, U.S., and UN responders.

Japan

- The disaster risk reduction research and training offered by JICA to Southeast Asian countries is outstanding. Japan should provide capacity-building assistance to help incorporate DRR into host nation policies and procedures.
- JICA should take steps to disseminate local country knowledge and frameworks to partners in the JSDF, Japan Platform, and private sector.

- Japan should continue efforts to reduce “silos” during response. A unified coordination and information sharing platform for all JSDF branches, JICA/MOFA, and Japan Platform NGOs would be a great asset in future responses.
- Japan should increase liaison officer exchange among its civilian and military responders, with U.S. partners, and with countries in the region. Joint trainings should also be expanded.
- JICA and the JSDF should review their unique and most needed disaster capabilities and appropriateness for the host nation. The JSDF should review how and whether it renders medical assistance, and how its engineering expertise can be further used in immediate relief.

U.S.

- The U.S. military continues to use its forward deployed forces and in-country presence to achieve commendable disaster response. In its Pacific “rebalance” it should maintain an active focus on HA/DR.
- The U.S. military should increase its ability to share assessments and disaster reconnaissance and to distribute information via unclassified channels.
- USAID should leverage its extensive presence in the region to boost training for local NGOs, and to prepare local responders for international partnership in major disasters.
- The U.S. has achieved great results with a USAID-led response strategy, with the military as a supporting player. It should codify these procedures for the benefit of partner nations.

Japan-U.S. and Multilaterals

- Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines should jointly study the formal networks, agreements, and *ad hoc* actions that made joint Typhoon Haiyan response a success. They should codify these lessons and explore how best to use them to strengthen preparedness in ASEAN neighbors.

- Japan and the U.S. should increase interoperability through training in preparedness and response. These efforts should include the major civilian and military responders.
- Japan and the U.S. should create new information sharing platforms and protocols for combined operations in HA/DR.
- The two nations should continue to reaffirm the importance of HA/DR within the context of the Strategic Alliance.
- The two nations should share approaches and strategies for writing bilateral Terms of Reference with Southeast Asian nations. These documents would specify unique HA/DR capabilities, assets, and timeframes and would further cement the centrality of Japan and the U.S. to Asia Pacific disaster response.
- ASEAN and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus should help members understand the resources available from Japan/U.S. and means of procuring them, such as Terms of Reference. Japan should use its leadership in the HA/DR Experts' Working Group to advance this objective.
- The AHA Centre should study its areas of comparative advantage, such as helping members solicit and accept international assistance.
- The UN should maintain its worthwhile focus on empowering sovereign nations to manage their own disasters. Its lead responders – particularly OCHA and the World Food Programme – should emphasize augmenting but not supplanting local leaders. UN agencies can expand training on disaster coordination, civil-military interaction, and best practices for preparedness.

ピースウィンズ・アメリカ(PWA)では、自然災害において脆弱なアジア太平洋地域における人道支援、災害救援活動(HA/DR)の強化を掲げている。PWAは同地域のHA/DRにおいて重大な役割を担う日米両国の能力に焦点を当ててきた。同両国が共に、この重要な地域においてリーダーシップを発揮することによって、範例や戦略的協働を役立てることが可能となる。

笹川平和財団をはじめ、国際交流基金日米センターやカーネギー国際平和基金からの支援を受け、PWAは「2013年度 - 2015年度 日・米・フィリピン民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブ」を実施してきた。協働関係にあるこの三国の全面的な支援によって、PWAは、ワークショップ、訓練、ポリシーフォーラム、対談を開催し、450名以上の参加者を集めた。また、本イニシアチブを実施しているなか、フィリピンに台風ハイエン(平成25年台風第30号)が上陸し大きな被害をもたらした。この災害に対する同三国の対応は本事業におけるPWAの調査と分析の根幹となっている。

PWAでは調査結果や提案を公表することによりHA/DRの能力向上に役立てている。同三国は共に自然災害の被災国としての経験があるだけでなく、国外での災害時にも対応しアジア太平洋諸国の支援をしている。この日・米・フィリピン間によるイニシアチブは、同各国内、同三国間、その他アジア太平洋諸国における支援対策や対応の改善や向上につながるだろう。

方針および訓練の含意

フィリピン

- 2011年度 - 2028年度におけるフィリピン国家災害リスク軽減管理計画には災害支援対策や災害対応に関する優れた枠組みが策定され、「2014年度および2015年度の災害対応計

画」をさらに強化する結果となった。両計画は総合して、国家レベルに発展した地域主導型災害管理の模範となる。

- フィリピンが策定した枠組みの中心となるフィリピン国家災害リスク軽減・管理評議会(NDRRMC)は、その加盟部局の徹底した揺るぎないリーダーシップによって強化される必要がある。
- NDRRMCは、民間防衛局を通じて各自治体にして同国家が掲げた計画の実施の強化をできる限り早急に行うべきである。
- NDRRMCは、災害現場指揮官の選定、活動調整センターの共同設置、クラスター・システムの運用、災害現場指揮システムの実施にかかわる手順を全国的に展開した上で、それらを拡大し、より確実にしていかなければならない。台風ハイエンに関する分析がこの課題への取り組みに役立てられる必要がある。
- 民間防衛局(OCD)と関連部局は、地方および国家のDRRM委員会との連携や調整、また、各地域の指導者たちを対象とした「最悪の事態」に備えた計画の実行に関する教育を優先していかなければならない。
- フィリピン国防省は、大きな災害が発生した場合に軍隊を調整する多国間調整所(MCC)の活動のさらなる制度化の向上を行うべきである。
- 国防省民間防衛局、社会福祉開発省、その他提携部局は、備蓄・保管場所、災害時の情報通信、相互応援協定、ロジスティクスの見直しと改訂を必要とする。
- HA/DRで活動するフィリピンの民・軍各部局は日本、米国、国連からの支援要請によって派遣された国々との協働による災害時の対応手順を見直す必要がある。

日本

- 国際協力機構(JICA)による東南アジア諸国に対する災害リスク軽減調査と訓練は非常に優れている。日本は能力向上支援を役立てて被災国の方針や手順に災害時リスク軽減を組み入れられるようにすべきである。
- JICAは、自衛隊、ジャパン・プラットフォーム、民間セクター内の支援機関に被災国の情報や枠組みを広く伝える対策を講じる必要がある。
- 日本は、支援対応中に「互いに連携が取れなくなるサイロ化」を軽減するよう、継続的な努力が必要である。今後の対応として、各自衛隊、JICA、外務省、ジャパン・プラットフォーム加盟NGOの全機関の間において、プラットフォームを共有した統一の調整や情報は非常に有用である。
- 日本は、連絡担当官による民軍の災害時支援機関、米国の提携機関、活動地域の国々との情報交換を拡大すべきである。さらに合同訓練の拡大も必要である。
- JICAと自衛隊は、被災国が最も必要とする独自の災害対策能力や被災国での適切な対応について見直すべきである。自衛隊は、医療支援をすべきかどうか、すべきであればどのように支援すべきなのか、また、緊急事態において技術面での専門知識をどのように活用できるかという点を見直す必要がある。

米国

- 米軍は前線に配置された軍隊と国内配置の軍隊を継続的に利用して災害時における優れた対応を達成している。太平洋地域の「バランスの再調整」で、HA/DRに焦点を絞った積極性を維持する必要がある。

- 米軍は災害に関する判断や調査結果の共有を拡大し、機密扱いされていない(unclassified)通信網を介して情報を配信すべきである。
- 米国国際開発庁は各地域における影響力や存在感を活かし、大きな災害が発生した際に被災地のNGOが国際支援機関とパートナーとして活動できるよう、地元NPOを対象とした訓練の促進を行うべきである。
- 米国は、米軍を支援体制の1プレイヤーとして位置付けしたことにより、米国国際開発庁主導の災害対応機関戦略において目覚ましい結果を出している。このような連携体制はその他国へのメリットとしてこれら手順を体系化すべきである。

日米と国際機関

- 日本、米国、フィリピンは、公式のネットワーク、合意、台風ハイエンによる災害対応で共に実施したような緊急活動を共同で学ぶ必要がある。同三国は、そこで学んだことを東南アジア諸国連合地域での災害対応活動準備の強化に最も効率よく利用できる方法として体系化すべきである。
- 日本と米国は災害準備と対応の訓練を通して相互運用性の増大を図る必要がある。このような試みには主要民軍対応機関を含むべきである。
- 日本と米国は、HA/DR時に情報を共有できるプラットフォームや協同活動用プロトコルを設ける必要がある。
- 日米両国は、戦略的提携の一環でHA/DRの重要性に関する再確認を継続的に行う必要がある。
- 日米両国は二国間の東南アジア諸国における考慮事項を文書化するためのアプローチや計画を共有すべきである。この書類には、HA/DR独特の能力、利点、期間が明示され、アジア太平洋地域における災害対応に対する日本と米国の中心的な役割をさらに確固たるものにする。

- 東南アジア諸国連合(ASEAN)と東南アジア諸国連合拡大防相会合(ASEAN Plus)は、加盟国が日米両国から提供された資料や考慮事項の取り入れ方法を理解できるよう支援する必要がある。日本は、HA/DRにおける専門家会合でのリーダーシップを活かしてこの目的を推進する必要がある。
- 東南アジア連合諸国防災人道支援調整センター(AHA Centre)は、加盟国が国際社会からの支援を求めること、その支援を受け入れられるようにするなど、比較優位性の分野において調査すべきである。
- 国連は、主権国家諸国が災害時に自国で対応できるようになるような価値ある支援に着目し続ける必要がある。特に国連人道問題調整事務所(OCHA)や世界食料計画(WFP)のような指導的立場にある災害対応機関は、各国の主導者から権限を奪うのではなく、その活動権限の拡大に焦点を置くべきである。国連の機関は、災害時の活動調整、民軍相互活動、準備に向けての最善策に関する訓練を浸透させることが可能である。

List of Acronyms

AADMER	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
APAN	All Partners Access Network
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BFP	Bureau of Fire Protection
BIHC	Bureau of International Health Cooperation
BOC	Bureau of Customs
CCC	Combined Coordination Center
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CCF	Christ Community Fellowship
CENTCOM	Central Command
CIQ	Customs-Immigration-Quarantine
CMC	Civil-Military Coordination
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CRS	Civil Relations Service
CTF	Combined Task Force
CUSW	Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water
DANA	Damage and Needs Assessment
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DFAT	Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFID	U.K. Department for International Development
DND	Department of National Defense

DOF	Department of Finance
DOH	Department of Health
DOST	Department of Science and Technology
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction Management
DRRMC	Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council
ERAT	Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications Cluster
FAiTH	Foreign Aid Transparency Hub
FMF	Foreign Military Force
FMT	Foreign Medical Team
FRF	Fuel Relief Fund
GIS	Geographic Information System
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HuMA	Humanitarian Medical Assistance (Japan NGO)
IASC	UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICP	Incident Command Post
ICS	Incident Command System
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IPSP	Internal Peace and Security Plan
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

LGU	Local Government Unit
LNO	Liaison Officer
MCDA	Military and Civil Defense Assets
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MIRA	Multi-Sector/Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment
MMDA	Metro Manila Development Authority
MNCC	Multinational Coordination Center
MNF	Multinational Forces
MNF SOP	Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NDCC	National Disaster Coordinating Council
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OFDA	USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Relief and Rehabilitation
OSS	One-Stop Shop
OSOCC	On-site Operations Coordination Center
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PDRRMC	Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
PHP	Philippine peso
PINGON	Philippine International Non-Governmental Organization Network
PNP	Philippine National Police
PRC	Philippine Red Cross

PRDCI	Panay Rural Development Center, Incorporated
RAY	Recovery Assistance on Yolanda Plan
RDC	Reception/Departure Center
RDANA	Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
RC/HC	UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
RDRMC	Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
RMT	Regional Management Team
RORO	Roll-On/Roll-Off
SASOP	ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements
SOVFA	Status of Visiting Forces Agreement
TG	Task Group
TMG	Technical Management Group
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VFA	Visiting Forces Agreement
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Introduction

This Report culminates the Peace Winds America (PWA) **2013-2015 Japan-U.S.-Philippines Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative**. The Initiative aimed to bolster the disaster preparedness and response of civilian and military responders within and among the three nations. Through hands-on workshops, policy forums, and original research, the Initiative assessed how disaster managers could improve their policies and procedures. With analysis of the lessons of actual responses and a focus on sharing capabilities and areas of comparative advantage, the Initiative created a platform for a wide diversity of disaster stakeholders to improve their practice.

Since its founding, PWA has maintained that civil-military cooperation is vital to Asia Pacific disaster response, and one accorded too few resources. Military units and their civilian or NGO counterparts too often do not interact at all during preparedness, and only *ad hoc* during response. Changing this paradigm therefore offers great possibilities for improving future responses. PWA has focused heavily upon Japan-U.S. disaster cooperation. The strategic alliance between the two nations and their stated commitment to improving disaster response have made them a natural focus for civil-military research and training.

From 2011 to 2013, Peace Winds America designed and conducted the **Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative**. This Initiative, sponsored by the Japan Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation, aimed to assess and to enhance the cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) between the two nations and in cooperation with partners in the region.

Early into that Initiative, a major earthquake and tsunami struck Japan on 11 March 2011. In the ensuing disaster response, civilian and military units from both countries came together to mount the largest relief operation in modern Japanese history. Working through bilateral coordination centers in Tokyo and in the affected areas of

Japan, Japan led and the U.S. assisted the response, sharing information, coordinating, and managing tasks such as the reopening of the airport at Sendai.

Peace Winds America devoted significant time to studying the joint response and the lessons it engendered. While some of these lessons were unique to disasters in Japan, many more had wider applicability to the Japan-U.S. Strategic Alliance writ large, and to overseas responses. Drawing on six past examples of successful HA/DR cooperation – such as in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2010 Pakistan floods and 2010 Haiti earthquake – PWA asserted that Japan and the U.S. were logical disaster partners. Opportunities for improving joint responses were plentiful. In its assessment and final report, PWA found that its broad “whole of society” civil-military training had had a measurable impact on the HA/DR response.¹ Military officials and assistance agency leaders stated that contacts, relationships, and trainings held by PWA and others had empowered them during the tsunami relief operation.

The finding that the civil-military trainings were effective was encouraging, but much work remained. Both Japan and the United States were susceptible to “stove piping” within their respective response agencies, and mechanisms for information sharing and joint operations were lacking. In both countries the interface between military units, NGOs, businesses, and civilian government departments needed to be bolstered. Peace Winds America stressed it was imperative its trainings, case study analyses, and workshops be maintained and expanded.

THE 2013-2015 JAPAN-U.S.-PHILIPPINES CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE

Peace Winds America took to heart its own findings, namely that opportunities for joint Japan-U.S. HA/DR collaboration should be increased. PWA held that an ideal HA/DR Initiative would pair Japan and the United States with a regional partner. While the partnership and alliance of Japan and the U.S. would remain at the core, the next Initiative would be broadened to include a willing host nation. Such

¹ The full text of the final Japan-U.S. Initiative report is available at http://peacewindsamerica.org/nbr/NBR_upload/FINAL%20PDF%20files/Full%20volume/Strengthening%20the%20Alliance_fullvolume.pdf.

an approach dovetails with the outward-looking HA/DR posture of both the U.S. and Japan. Indeed, at the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, Japan Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani stated, “Natural disasters are a common challenge that we face in this region. In addition to the bilateral cooperation in enhancing such a capability, Japan attaches great importance to enhancing disaster response capability of the region as a whole.”²

The Philippines proved the natural choice as an alliance partner for the Initiative. It is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, sitting atop active fault lines, studded with volcanoes, and directly in the path of up to two dozen typhoons a year. Compounding its significant exposure to natural hazards is the fact that it is an archipelagic nation, making response to outlying areas much more difficult. Its exposure will only increase due to climate change, which will bring more intense, frequent typhoons. Sea level rise may also constitute a major threat to the Philippines: it has over 22,000 miles of coastline. Cities in the Philippines – particularly Manila – are highly dense and continuing to urbanize, posing another challenge to disaster managers.

The Philippines was also a logical partner for geopolitical reasons. It is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and an increasingly close partner with the United States and Japan. Although the United States does not maintain military bases in the Philippines, the two nations enacted a Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999. This agreement makes possible the permanent Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group that lays the groundwork for numerous yearly military-to-military exercises, most notably *Balikatan* (“shoulder-to-shoulder”). In Southeast Asia, the Philippines remains among the closest allies of the United States.

Japan and the Philippines have close and steadily strengthening political, economic and cultural ties. They do not have the equivalent of a Visiting Forces Agreement. Through a combination of Official Development Assistance, direct support from the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and military and paramilitary assistance, Japan-Philippine partnerships have been increasing. Particularly in the realms of disaster risk reduction (DRR) and military support the two

² Gen Nakatani, “New Forms of Security Collaboration in Asia,” (remarks at Second Plenary Session, 14th Asia Security Summit: The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore: 30 May 2015).

nations are tightly bound. JICA has a permanent presence in Manila and has worked closely with the Philippine Office of Civil Defense on DRR projects including its new National Disaster Response Plans (see Chapter IV). Defense activities between the two have also grown: the Japanese Coast Guard is providing cutters to the Philippines, and the two have announced future military capacity-building programs.³

For reasons of disaster vulnerability as well as closer political ties, Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral cooperation is desirable. Such cooperation – particularly civil-military – would not only maintain the patterns of HA/DR cooperation extant between Japan and the U.S., it would also bolster trilateral ties. Speaking at a Peace Winds America disaster preparedness workshop in Manila, Japan Ministry of Defense Councilor Masayoshi Tatsumi made this argument:

The trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Philippines in the area of HA/DR is especially important. In addition to strengthening the Japan-U.S. bilateral alliance and the U.S.-Philippines bilateral alliance, by promoting the Japan-Philippines friendly relations, the trilateral cooperation should also be further deepened in this area. Just as important is the promotion of the civil-military relationship. Since both civil and military actors engage in HA/DR activities in real situations, it is vitally important that we clarify civil-military cooperation frameworks as well as the assignment of their roles. By doing so, I believe that we will be able to conduct HA/DR activities more smoothly and effectively in the future.⁴

Councilor Tatsumi ably summed up the core objective of the Initiative: to bolster through civil-military HA/DR cooperation the Japan-U.S. alliance while extending best practices to a key regional partner.

Fundamental to the earlier Japan-U.S. Initiative, PWA ensured host nation sovereignty was built into this 2013-2015 Initiative. Regardless of development status, capability, or resources, it is imperative that the host nation be empowered to direct, plan, and lead its own disaster response. This principle was strongly demonstrated in the response to the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. Despite deploying nearly 20,000 military responders, the United States leadership clearly recognized and acknowledged their role as supporting the host nation. This was a major factor in the success

³ Prashanth Parameswaran, “Japan, Philippines Boost Defense Ties,” *The Diplomat*, 4 February 2015.

⁴ Masayoshi Tatsumi, “Typhoon Haiyan – Challenges, Recommendations, and Regional HA/DR Engagement,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Implementing Lessons Learned,” Tokyo, 2 October 2014).



Japan Ministry of Defense Councilor Masayoshi Tatsumi presents at a Peace Winds America workshop at the Asian Development Bank in Manila. (Photo credit: Peace Winds America.)

of the response. In the Japan-U.S.-Philippines Initiative, PWA emphasized this same principle. The workshops, trainings, exercises, policy forums, meetings—all were designed to emphasize the leaderships and abilities of the Philippines as the sovereign host nation. PWA explored assistance and partnership from Japan and the U.S. with the proviso that they complement, not supplant the host nation.

The 2013-2015 Japan-U.S.-Philippines Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative was enabled by support from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) and from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP). Both grantors have extensive track records supporting civil society, the Japan-U.S. strategic alliance, and disaster preparedness in Japan and the Asia Pacific. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation with its focus on promoting Japan's international contributions, resolving global issues, and cooperation in priority regions (such as Southeast Asia) was an ideal partner for this Initiative. SPF also has a lengthy history of support for peace building and non-traditional security issues, both which dovetail with disaster preparedness and response.

Peace Winds America has cultivated an excellent working relationship with the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, built around many similar areas: strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, assessing Japan's international contributions, enhancing local partners, and providing policy and procedural analysis of pressing geopolitical issues such as HA/DR. CGP was a major supporter of the prior Japan-U.S. Initiative and PWA looks forward to continuing what has been a fruitful partnership.

In the present Japan-U.S.-Philippines Initiative, PWA has maintained and expanded upon a methodology proven and validated through prior experience. It revolves around several key themes: a “whole of society” focus, serial training exercises, and in-depth research.

The concept of “whole of society” disaster response is fundamental to good preparedness, relief, and recovery. One of the most important lessons of the major Asia Pacific natural disasters – including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and the 2011 Tohoku tsunami – is that no single stakeholder or responder can singlehandedly mitigate a mega-disaster. A broad coalition is a necessity, comprising government departments, multilaterals such as the United Nations, NGOs (local and international), communities, volunteer groups, and, increasingly, the private sector. To these must be added domestic and international military forces, which have proven indispensable for nearly all recent major responses. Particularly in the Asia Pacific, where military involvement in HA/DR is routine, their inclusion in HA/DR planning is a must.

The Peace Winds America Initiative is reflective of “whole of society” response. Accordingly training workshops and discussion forums are limited not just to the large assistance agencies, military commands, and major UN agencies, but also to local NGOs, business leaders, and academics. This approach rests on the assumption that to improve “whole of society” response, the individual stakeholders must first know each other and be provided with a forum to discuss HA/DR issues as equals and partners. Only in this venue can they share joint response strategies, discussing capabilities, operational limitations, and areas for future cooperation. In numerous workshops and tabletop exercises, participants at PWA events have lauded the opportunity to meet counterparts they would not otherwise have met in training. In future responses, these disaster managers will not lose precious time by having to acquaint



From left, JICA Vice President Kae Yanagisawa, Department of Defense Colonel Jeff Wiltse, National Defense Academy Colonel Shutaro Sano and National Bureau of Asian Research Vice President Abraham Denmark at a Peace Winds America forum. (Photo credit: Peace Winds America.)

themselves with the policies, procedures, mandates, as well as capabilities and limitations of other responders.

The “whole of society” emphasis also informed the Initiative’s research and case study analysis. In the section on Typhoon Haiyan (see Chapter III), PWA made extensive use of interviews with local leaders. These interviews spanned Armed Forces of the Philippines generals, Office of Civil Defense regional chiefs, doctors, local NGO executives, business owners, and civil society leaders. Where other case studies tend to rely heavily on published situation reports from major stakeholders (e.g., the UN or USAID), the PWA analysis stands out through its focus on host nation responders. The end result is a picture of the Typhoon Haiyan relief efforts that is broad, inclusive, and provides lessons and insights based upon the actual experiences on the ground.

Peace Winds America relied upon serial workshops and forums for its Initiatives. At the senior-level policy forums, PWA and partners presented major themes in bi- and trilateral HA/DR and selected appropriate focuses for upcoming workshops. The workshops themselves

were broad, operations-level trainings that maintained a focus on diverse participation and networking among the trainees. By tying these events together thematically, PWA was able to build patterns of cooperation and new relationships among our partners and participants.

Peace Winds America conducted comprehensive research throughout the course of the Initiative. The primary areas of focus were Japan and U.S. disaster assistance to the Philippines, the disaster management system of the Philippines, and areas for future collaboration within the Japan-U.S. alliance. Just as in the last Initiative, case studies proved of great benefit. The timing of the Typhoon Haiyan disaster was such that PWA was able to glean insights and lessons from a wide diversity of responders. (The January 2014 after-action workshop in Tokyo was also the first major trilateral assessment of the response to the disaster.) Through the cases of Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit, and drawing upon knowledge of prior disasters, PWA has been able to illustrate best practices using topical real-world examples.

At the conclusion of the earlier Japan-U.S. Initiative, Peace Winds America published and disseminated its final report to partners, and also held launch events in Tokyo and Washington, D.C. In this 2013-2015 Japan-U.S.-Philippines Initiative, Peace Winds America also plans broad distribution of this Report. The Report presents lessons, insights, and recommendations for a wide array of regional stakeholders: Philippine, U.S. and Japanese civilian and military HA/DR leaders, NGOs, UN agencies, ASEAN, and regional partners.

Particularly for ASEAN and its member-states, this Report is designed to offer useful disaster preparedness and relief findings. It is the hope of Peace Winds America that nations will profit from the Report. The capabilities and unique assistance of Japan and the United States were ably demonstrated in the response to Typhoon Haiyan. The frameworks, the capabilities, and the resilience of the Philippine people also were demonstrably confirmed. These all should be studied and reviewed by the Asia Pacific nations. So too should the mechanisms of bi- and trilateral disaster coordination, tasking, and logistics. Typhoon Haiyan – a tragedy of enormous proportions – resulted in many lessons. With strong preparedness measures, the Asia Pacific nations need not similarly suffer.

The Disaster Management Framework of the Philippines¹

This Report presents findings and lessons learned on domestic disaster response in the Philippines and the assistance provided by the United States, Japan, and the UN. It does so based heavily upon the experience of the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan and also the 2014 Typhoon Hagupit. To fully understand these analyses, an understanding of the Philippine system of disaster management is necessary.

In this chapter Peace Winds America presents a generalized background to disaster management in the Philippines, surveying frameworks and measures for domestic and international response.

THE PHILIPPINE FRAMEWORK FOR DOMESTIC DISASTER RESPONSE

The Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Law (Republic Act 10121, signed into law on 27 May 2010) provides the framework that outlines the primary roles of state, non-state, and international actors during major disasters. The Law mandates and underpins the 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan, which assigns responsibilities for the Law's requirements. The Republic Act 10121 succeeded a prior law enacted by President Ferdinand Marcos in 1978, which established the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). The NDCC was a secretariat body, with representation from the major departments active in disaster, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The NDCC's role was to inform the President of disaster preparedness, relief, and recovery activities.

¹ Prof. Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. authored the full draft of this chapter, which is based on her original research and interviews.

The 2010 Republic Act 10121 established a central body for the coordination of disasters—the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). Similar to the NDCC, the NDRRMC is a secretariat organization with representation from all major government departments of the Philippines, plus the Philippine Red Cross, and a selection of private sector and civil society representatives such as the League of Cities, an advocacy group. Its Chairman is designated as the Secretary of the Department of National Defense. Yet the NDRRMC in its functions and mission far exceeds its predecessor. The NDRRMC is tasked with developing an all-hazards, multi-agency framework that encompasses the whole disaster spectrum from mitigation through long-term recovery. The NDRRM Council is charged with monitoring implementation and adoption of the national disaster plan, ensuring agency compliance, and encouraging participation of all stakeholders. This Council is fundamentally a strategic body for preparedness and relief tasks. Its mission is to provide broad oversight and direction in the implementation of response and mitigation plans, and advises its members accordingly.²

The NDRRM Council is importantly furnished with an *Operations Center*, run by the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) at its Manila headquarters. (The Office of Civil Defense is a civilian-led branch of the Department of National Defense.) The Operations Center, through the NDRRMC's technical management group, is the tactical arm of the Council. The Operations Center is designed to aid coordination during disasters, to house early warning and emergency alert offices, and to provide disaster-time communications. The Operations Center has the following functions: to facilitate multi-agency and multi-government level coordination, resource mobilization, information management, and response. To carry out these functions, the national DRRMC Operations Center can utilize the following support systems: the incident command system, rapid damage and needs assessments (RDANA), emergency

² Among the mandates of the NDRRMC set out in Republic Act No. 10121 is to, "Advise the President on the status of disaster preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response and rehabilitation operations being undertaken by the government, CSOs, private sector, and volunteers; recommend to the President the declaration of a state of calamity in areas extensively damaged; and submit proposals to restore normalcy in the affected areas, to include calamity fund allocation." Congress of the Philippines, *Republic Act No. 10121: An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, Providing for the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and Institutionalizing the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes* (Manila: GRP, 27 July 2009), 15.

logistics management, and public-private partnerships for emergency and humanitarian assistance coordination. At all levels (national, regional, provincial, municipal, and *barangay*), there are to be Councils with similar operations centers.³

The 2010 Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) Law provided the *framework* that includes the roles of state, non-state, and international actors in reference to disasters. Section 12 Paragraph 20 encourages the establishment of linkages and networks among local government units (LGU) for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and emergency response.⁴ Under Section 13, the local government units are also tasked to build a roster of disaster volunteers, national service reserve corps, civil society organizations, and the private sector to provide personnel and logistical augmentation. While the national DRRM Council sets the nation-wide policy, disaster management in the Philippines still ultimately devolves to the local governments: *barangays*, towns, and cities.


The Law retained the earlier emphasis on inter-agency and inter-office coordination as well as disaster activities financing. The Law requires that five percent of the LGU annual budget must be set aside for DRR activities. Under the Law, the Local Legislature (*Sanggunian*) has the power to declare a state of calamity within its locality, which triggers the release of response funds from the five percent of its budget set aside for DRR. Section 16 allows the President to declare a cluster of villages, municipalities, provinces and regions under a state of calamity.

To empower local government units to manage disaster and coordinate with national departments, the NDRRM Law created intermediary bodies: the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (RDRRMC). The Regional Councils “convene regional line agencies, institutions and authorities in the event of emergencies and are responsible for disaster sensitive regional development plans.”⁵ The designated Chairperson of a Regional RDRRMC is to be from the Office of Civil

³ The *barangay* is the smallest unit of government in the Philippines, equivalent to a ward or neighborhood in cities or a village in rural areas. There are 17 regions and 81 provinces in the Philippines.

⁴ Congress of the Philippines, *Republic Act*, 25.

⁵ Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, *Philippines Disaster Management Reference Handbook*, (Honolulu: CFE, 2015), 39.



Defense. The local or *barangay* Councils are headed by their local chief executive. The 17 Regional Councils perform a critical function: they synthesize needs and damage reports from a wide geographic area and direct response accordingly. Notionally the Regional Councils have a disaster picture more specific than the National Council in Manila has, yet more comprehensive than any local Council. The Regional Councils can fill a deeply important role in managing large-scale disasters.

The primary mandate for all the Councils is thus one of coordination. Under the leadership of OCD, they provide a platform for all other

government units and departments to implement the national, regional, and local response plans. In the Philippines the National DRRMC can be activated if two or more regions declare a disaster, while the Regional DRRM Councils can declare disaster if two or more of a region's provinces are affected.⁶

One long-term goal under the 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan has been the establishment of functional Operations Centers at all levels. The plan designates “establishment of local DRRM Councils and Offices and their operations centers as prescribed by RA 10121” as a priority project.⁷ The Philippines’ foremost challenge has been to institutionalize Disaster Risk Reduction and Management policies, structures and coordination mechanisms as well as budget appropriations at the local level. As coordination platforms, the local DRRMCs are to mobilize and draw resources from the private sector, volunteers, and civil society organizations for various DRRM activities. The NDRRM Plan projected the completion of national level efforts by 2013, while local institutionalization was expected to be 60 percent completed by 2016, and 100 percent completed by 2028. The relatively long timeframe of localization takes into account the varying local DRRM capacities.

The 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan has anchored the Philippine disaster framework on risk reduction management and climate change adaptation. The 16-year timeline (divided among short, medium and long term goals) has outlined the expected outcomes, activities, indicators, lead agencies, and partners in four overarching thematic areas. The lead government departments for the thematic areas are: (1) prevention and mitigation—Department of Science and Technology (DOST); (2) preparedness—Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG); (3) response—Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD); (4) rehabilitation and recovery—National Economic Development Authority (NEDA).⁸

⁶ Ibid., 41

⁷ Office of Civil Defense, *National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011-2028* (Manila: OCD, 2011), 6.

⁸ Following the lessons of Typhoon Haiyan, the revised National Disaster Response Plan made Search, Rescue & Retrieval (SRR) a separate area from response. The lead role for SRR is the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). See chapter IV for further details.

In this Report, Peace Winds America presents and reviews the thematic areas of preparedness and response. While mitigation and recovery are presented, the assessment of the Philippine disaster management system in a major recent disaster is viewed through the lens of preparedness and response. This document focuses heavily upon military contributions to response; it is generally in preparedness and response that the armed forces are expected to contribute.

The 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan has focused heavily on preparedness by setting outcomes that targeted increasing the capacity of local DRRM Councils and Operations Centers, as well as the formulation of specific plans, policies and systems at all levels. Because local government units and communities are at the frontline of disaster preparedness, these focused outcomes and activities have included: formulation of local DRRM plans, risk assessment and contingency planning; inventory of resources; accreditation of NGOs; stockpiling and prepositioning of resources; and at times of disaster, the establishment of an Operations Center. Under the leadership of DILG, a major priority is the “increased DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation capacity of Local DRRM Councils, Offices and Operation Centers.”⁹

The 2011-2018 NDRRM Plan has mandated the development of coordination and disaster management systems. These include coordination mechanisms such as the Incident Command System and communications protocols such as integrated information systems. According to the NDRRM Implementation Plan, the Office of Civil Defense is to, “Establish an incident command system (ICS) as part of the country’s existing on-scene disaster response system.”¹⁰ The Incident Command System is a tool designed to facilitate command, control, and coordination of major incidents. ICS is based around the notion of “unity of command,” which streamlines decision-making authority. ICS features common terminologies and is scalable from local incidents up through national catastrophes. Implementation of ICS in the Philippines falls to OCD and to local executives, who head the provincial, municipal, and *barangay* Councils. Although OCD is tasked

⁹ OCD, *Plan 2011-2028*, 3.

¹⁰ National Disaster Coordinating Council, *Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Republic Act No. 10121*, (Quezon City: NDCC, 2010), 18.

with implementing ICS, it is incumbent on all other departments active in disaster management to understand and be able to utilize the system.

The Office of Civil Defense is also charged with maintaining standard operating procedures for communication, for Damage and Needs Assessment (DANA) teams, and for inter-agency information sharing. With respect to non-state actors, OCD is to maintain an updated directory and database of private sector and civil society organizations within localities, as well as coordination guidelines and partnership arrangements with these actors. In the Philippines, civil society organizations may include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based groups, local parishes, community groups, and volunteer organizations.

The 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan laid out the following response activities and corresponding implementing partners: needs assessment (performed by DRRMCs, LGUs, OCD and DSWD); search, rescue and retrieval (Department of National Defense, DILG and the Department of Health); evacuation (LGUs); temporary shelter (DSWD); basic social services (DOH); psychosocial needs (DOH); and, early recovery (DSWD). The outcomes identified include: (1) activation of a functional on-site Incident Command System that exercises command-control-coordination (C3) and which provides timely and accurate information, issues public advisories, and activates relief distribution centers; (2) conduct of needs assessments (rapid, needs analysis, and integrated); (3) safe evacuation of affected residents; and, (4) provision of temporary shelter and basic health services.

Within early recovery activities, the NDRRM Plan included: (1) conduct of post-damage and needs assessment (post DANA, led by OCD); (2) developing partnership mechanism with utility providers; and, (3) providing livelihood or income-generating activities to affected residents. It is important to note that the Plan's maximum timeline for disaster relief is three months, after which point relief transitions to early recovery. Early recovery under the Plan is still thematically within the response category. Only after one year does the recovery and rehabilitation thematic area, led by the National Economic Development Authority, enter force. Within the disaster rehabilitation and recovery thematic area, priorities include further post-disaster assessments, a

recovery Strategic Action Plan, livelihood programs, disaster-resilient housing, and restoration of infrastructure.

Within each of the four thematic areas, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has a role. Under the NDRRM Plan (2011-2028), the AFP under the Department of National Defense (DND) is one of the implementing partners for preparedness and response. The Plan does not provide specific tasking details aside from search, rescue, and retrieval. However, the AFP has historically been used as follows: (1) in preparedness—use of military mobility for the prepositioning of food and non-food items in disaster-prone areas; (2) in response—use of military units to disseminate early warnings and advisories as well as evacuation of residents, use of personnel and assets for search and rescue operations, road clearance and relief delivery and transport.

While not explicitly mentioned in the 2011-2028 Plan, the AFP can play a role in other thematic areas.¹¹ AFP humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities in the prevention and mitigation theme may include constructing dikes and other flood control structures by military engineering units. In rehabilitation and recovery AFP military engineering units can participate in rebuilding public infrastructure (roads and bridges) and houses. The AFP has performed these roles in past disasters such as during and following the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption. The AFP historically has also assisted with pre-disaster evacuation.

Prior to the 2010 Law, the Philippines under the National Disaster Coordinating Council Memorandum Circular no. 5 s. 2007 adopted the *cluster approach* in disaster management in 2007. The cluster approach established thematic inter-agency coordination nodes or clusters to address the major needs, such as logistics, during and immediately after disaster relief. The cluster approach was premised on the need to harmonize the efforts of UN agencies, international humanitarian organizations, and national and local stakeholders to address the needs of disaster victims. The Philippine rationale was to synchronize its

¹¹ Lucky Amor Dela Cruz, OCD, personal communication, 24 January 2014.

domestic cluster system with the UN's similar system, streamlining the process by which aid is rendered.¹²

The 2007 NDCC circular established the cluster system, presented clear guidelines for each, set expectations at the national, regional, and local levels, and instituted a platform for inter- and intra-cluster coordination. The reform was “aimed at improving the effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability and accountability, while at the same time strengthening partnerships between NGOs, international organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and UN agencies.”¹³ The circular authorized a “twinning” system, whereby each cluster had a Philippine lead department as well as a UN agency co-lead. Implicit in the NDCC's implementation of the system was the recognition of the high likelihood of disasters requiring assistance from the international community.

In the 2007 NDCC circular, the 11 revised Philippine clusters overlapped considerably with the UN clusters. In 2008, NDCC circular 12 s. 2008 amended the clusters, streamlining them into eight: food and non-food items, camp management and protection, shelter and livelihood, water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and health, emergency telecommunications and logistics, education, agriculture, and early recovery.¹⁴ The 2008 NDCC Memorandum maintained the practice of twinning. For example, in the Food and Non-Food cluster, the DSWD was designated the co-lead alongside the World Food Program (WFP) and UNICEF. For the Emergency Telecommunications and Logistics cluster, the co-leads were the Office of Civil Defense and WFP.

In the Philippine domestic management system, the clusters were designed to complement and enhance the activities of the local, regional, and national coordination centers. They are not decision-making bodies,

¹² There are 11 primary UN clusters, each with a UN family or NGO lead agency: logistics (World Food Programme), nutrition (UNICEF), emergency shelter (UNHCR and the IFRC), camp coordination and management (UNHCR and IOM), health (WHO), protection (UNHCR), food security (FAO and WFP), emergency telecommunications (WFP), early recovery (UNDP), education (UNICEF and Save the Children), and water, sanitation, and hygiene (UNICEF).

¹³ National Disaster Coordinating Council, *Circular 05 s.2007, “Institutionalization of the Cluster Approach in the Philippine Disaster Management System, Designation of Cluster Leads and their Terms of Reference at the National, Regional, and Provincial Level.”* (Quezon City: NDCC, 10 May 2007), 1.

¹⁴ National Disaster Coordinating Council, *Circular 12 s.2008, “Amendment to the NDCC Circulars Nos. 5, s. 2007, and 4, s.2008,”* (Quezon City: NDCC, 6 October 2008), 1.

but rather forums for departments involved in similar relief activities to share information, communicate, and present needs. They provide a venue for a cross-section of government, civilian, military, and international responders to streamline response to specific needs. The assessments, tasks, and findings of the clusters are then to be provided to the appropriate Council which determines decision-making tasks and coordination.

The AFP is an implementing partner with DSWD under the response cluster, specifically for search and rescue, logistics, and communications activities. Based on a 1995 AFP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), the military had pre-designated disaster risk reduction task groups (both active duty and reservists) in every line unit (division/brigade/battalion). The 1995 AFP SOP also provided for the establishment of an Advance Command Post by the line unit within whose area of responsibility the disaster occurred. These disaster risk reduction task groups are plugged into the co-located civilian-led disaster Operations Centers. Each disaster risk reduction task group was required to provide communication linkages with the Operations Center; to assist the local police; and, to provide transportation of relief goods and personnel. The military was also tasked to ensure peace and order in support of the police and provide force protection to foreign military forces, when a disaster transpired within a conflict zone.¹⁵

The AFP role in disaster risk reduction must be understood within the context of the 2011 Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), termed *Bayanihan*. This Plan anchored the armed forces' activities in support of the government's peace efforts. With more emphasis on non-combat operations, *Bayanihan* made it imperative for the military to engage civilians (local authorities, departments, NGOs and civil society organizations) in all its mission areas (providing assistance to disaster victims was one of these mission areas). Premised upon whole-of-country effort, the military is to be seen as *not* taking the lead, but rather *providing support to civilian efforts* undertaken by the government and civil society organizations. In terms of national disaster response, the military has been tasked *to engage all stakeholders—government, local authorities, local and*

¹⁵ Raymund Quilop, "Responding to Disasters: Frameworks, Challenges and Prospects for the Philippines" in *Civil-Military Cooperation in Emergency Relief*, ed. Rosalie Arcala Hall (Quezon City: Central Book Supply, 2009), 119-120, 126.

international NGOs, the UN agencies, and also the foreign military forces when present. In localized disasters, the local military unit's disaster risk reduction task group attaches itself to the local DRRMC and receives tasking from the local Operations Center.

The 2010 NDRRM Law has provided the framework and mechanisms of international humanitarian assistance. The President, upon the recommendation of the Chairman of the NDRRMC, may declare a warrant calling for international humanitarian assistance when the extent or magnitude of damage and destruction exceeds national capacity.¹⁶ Because the Philippines is “party to the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the request for assistance can be sent directly to the other ASEAN Member States or through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre in Jakarta.”¹⁷ The Law tasks the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to facilitate calls for international assistance through its embassies. The DFA has the lead role in accepting and processing bilateral government offers as well as those from international private organizations and individuals. The Law does allow the importation and donation of food, medicines, equipment and related supplies for relief and recovery. (Under Philippine law, DFA may process requests for international assistance that come directly from local DRRM Councils.)

To facilitate import of relief goods, the One-Stop Shop (OSS) mechanism was designed to provide an expedited system for clearance processing. Under 2009 Executive Order 831, the One-Stop Shop is to be a mechanism available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The OSS includes in one location representatives from the Bureau of Customs (BOC), Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Energy, Department of Health, Department of Agriculture, and the Department of National

¹⁶ Once the government requests international assistance, the UN issues a flash appeal to the international community. This appeal usually states target amounts needed, and UN OCHA tracks progress towards reaching that target amount.

¹⁷ NDCC, *Implementing Rules*, 23.

Defense. An Executive Order further empowered the Secretary of Finance to exempt foreign relief goods from taxes and tariffs.¹⁸

MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL CIVIL-MILITARY AND MILITARY-TO-MILITARY HA/DR FRAMEWORKS

The Philippines has been a signatory to several agreements (bilateral and multilateral) that provide templates for engagement with foreign civilian and military actors providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). The agreements detailed below overlap to a considerable extent. In a given disaster the Government of the Philippines may engage international assistance under several or all simultaneously.

As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines is party to its agreements on mutual disaster assistance within the region. The 2005 ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) provided a framework for the establishment of regional standby arrangements and the creation of the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Action on Disaster Management (AHA Centre). Within this framework, member states on a voluntary basis identify and earmark assets and capabilities (both military and civilian) and mobilize for disaster response to another ASEAN member state.

The Standby Arrangements Standard Operating Procedures (SASOP, 2009) outlined the mechanisms and procedures for the regional standby arrangements. These covered the facilitation of trans-boundary movement and use of earmarked assets (personnel, transportation, communication, equipment, facilities, goods and services) from assisting country to receiving/requesting party.¹⁹ The 2009 SASOP outlined the coordination of joint disaster response. The requirements for each ASEAN member state included two major responsibilities. The first was the designation of a *National Focal Point* authorized to receive assistance, to be the single point of contact for assisting states, and to coordinate with in-country authorities the approval of requests and processing of assistance. The host

¹⁸ Gloria M. Arroyo, *Executive Order No. 831, s. 2009, "Authorizing the Department of Finance, for the Duration of the Current Emergency, Complete Discretion in Authorizing Tax and Tariff Exemptions for Relief Goods Donated from Abroad,"* 1 October 2009, 1.

¹⁹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *SASOP: Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations*, (Jakarta: ASEAN, 2009).

nation was also tasked with designating and deploying official *Operational Focal Points* at points of entry with pre-arranged Customs-Immigration-Quarantine (CIQ) procedures to facilitate transit or entry.

The ASEAN member states are required by the AADMER agreement laid out in the Standard Operating Procedures to submit to the AHA Centre a biannual inventory of assets and capabilities for disaster response. This biannual inventory is to include: (1) a directory of key government, private and civil society organizations with emergency response and search and rescue capacities; (2) data on expertise and technological resources and available technical support; (3) a description of the capability, quantity and specifications of military assets and capabilities; (4) a description of the capability, quantity and specifications of disaster response item stockpiles (materials, equipment, or consumables) directly supplied or pre-positioned in storage facilities; and, (5) pre-designated areas of entry points for personnel and supplies of assisting countries. Countries receiving assistance are requested to extend exemptions on taxes, duties and importation charges on goods and use of equipment brought in by assisting ASEAN member states. The 2005 AADMER agreement also requested exemption from requirements for transit, in-stay or departures of personnel. The receiving country was to provide local facilities and services and to extend force protection to personnel, equipment and materials brought in by assisting ASEAN member states.

The 2009 AADMER SASOP invested key roles and responsibilities in the first responders to a disaster. The ASEAN AHA Centre was tasked with facilitating cooperation and coordination among assisting and receiving/requesting countries, and through on-site liaison personnel with the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination/UN Humanitarian Coordinator and international organizations. The AHA Centre was also furnished with an Emergency Rapid Assessment Team for joint assessment and advance party coordination. The SASOP also covered the deployment of Urban Search and Rescue teams dispatched bilaterally from assisting states.

The 2009 AADMER SASOP has a four-step procedure for extending assistance. First, the AHA Centre is notified of the disaster. Second, the National Focal Point in the affected country requests bilateral assistance directly to member states or through the AHA Centre. Third, the assisting member state initiates an offer of assistance by proffering assets, earmarked

or not previously earmarked for disaster response, directly to affected country or through the AHA Centre. Finally, the National Focal Point in affected country reviews the offer and decides whether and how to accept it.²⁰ The SASOP emphasized the need for joint needs assessments, conducted by both host nation and assisting country.

The SASOP adheres to the principle of sovereignty—the overall direction, command, control, coordination and supervision of the response is to be exercised by the receiving country (host nation). The assisting country conforms to the receiving country's disaster management system. Assistance is withdrawn once the Incident Manager of receiving country declares the end of critical disaster situation or when assisting country resources have been depleted.²¹ The assisting country is required to submit an exit strategy or debriefing report specifying tasks to be turned over to the receiving country.

The Philippines is in addition a signatory to a non-binding agreement in the Asia Pacific region regarding the deployment and operation of Multinational Forces (MNF) for humanitarian assistance and disaster response. This agreement is focused on military operations other than war, and on small-scale contingencies. The Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (version 2.9a, December 2014) has provided a template for military-to-military cooperation as well as corollary civilian-military cooperation in HA/DR. The SOP is based on the assumption that HA/DR activities take place in a permissive security environment. (The MNF SOP was spearheaded and managed by the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team of the United States Pacific Command.) The MNF SOP is premised on the primacy of sovereign considerations of the affected country; the idea that a productive multinational effort involves the entire governmental civilian and military efforts of the participating countries; and the imperative of linking up with the international humanitarian community to achieve effective disaster response.

The MNF SOP included the following principles:

²⁰ Ibid., 11

²¹ The SASOP uses Incident Manager as a blanket term for the national-level official or organization responsible for disaster management. In the Philippines, this corresponds to the NDRRMC.

1. the affected country is responsible for HA/DR provision and coordination, and the foreign military force (FMF) must coordinate with the affected state departments/agencies and the supporting humanitarian community through existing coordination mechanisms;
2. the focal point for coordination is the affected country national disaster management office;
3. foreign military forces are part of a larger universe of community and relief aid organizations;
4. the separation between roles of military and humanitarian actors;
5. the use of foreign military resources only for short periods, limited to emergency response (not for long-term recovery and rehabilitation), and for support of relief operations of the affected country government and humanitarian community;
6. support activities include indirect assistance (e.g., transporting relief goods and personnel) and infrastructure support (e.g., air space management);
7. use of foreign military resources is based on request of affected country or humanitarian community along sector/cluster lines, and the capability of contributing foreign military forces; and,
8. once pre-agreed indicators and measures of effectiveness have been met, foreign military forces begin transition to the affected country's government and relief agencies and initiate exit/withdrawal.

The MNF SOP has several important structures. It provides a framework for the establishment of a Combined Task Force (CTF), *led by the host nation* and augmented by foreign military forces. Among the many strategic, operational, and tactical tools placed at the disposal of a CTF, several are notable in the context of disasters in the Philippines. The SOP provides for the creation of a Multinational Coordination Center, or MNCC. The MNCC “coordinates multinational military planning and execution among participating nations within the CTF command,” providing a single point of coordination for many MNFs.²² In most

²² United States Pacific Command, *Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP)*, (Camp H. M. Smith: USPACOM, December 2014), B1B3.

disaster situations, contributing countries respond on a bilateral basis. As such, it is likely that initial arrangements for HA/DR missions will be bilateral. Once these arrangements are made, participating countries can have representation in the MNCC whose role is to share information, deconflict various military HA/DR operations and coordinate *all* multinational forces. The MNCC is expected to facilitate coordination among foreign military forces with the national disaster management agency of the affected country.

The MNCC in turn is to be organized along functional lines, with FMF representation in cells, boards or committees. These cells reflect the MNCC's primary role in logistics and operations, and include ground, maritime and air specialists, logistics, communications and information sections, and a political-military specialist.²³ The SOP lays out a robust exchange of liaison officers between the FMFs and the host military, and with UN agencies.

The SOP additionally provides guidance on the establishment of a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). If the host nation deems it necessary, the host nation can create a CMOC in order to enhance coordination and collaboration among civilian and military responders. The CMOC is the linkage between the military Combined Task Force and the civilian humanitarian community. The host nation may create a standalone CMOC, or can integrate it into a national Multinational Coordination Center. With an integrated Civil-Military Operations Center, an MNCC could provide a single hub for foreign military forces to coordinate with all the affected country's responders, whether government, military, or civilian.

The Philippines also has several bilateral agreements in place in addition to these Southeast Asia-wide protocols. The Philippine Government has standing HA/DR procedures for the integration of U.S. forces deployed to a disaster, in line with the Republic of the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Most notable is the RP-U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted in 2009. Under this HA/DR mechanism, the Philippine Government can request military assistance from the U.S. The RP-U.S. HA/DR Concept of Operations

²³ Ibid., B2B5-4.

emphasizes the importance of placing operations within the broader Philippine disaster framework and puts a premium on coordinating with ASEAN, the UN, humanitarian organizations, and other assisting states. Coordination is of particular importance due to the fact that the HA/DR CONOPS calls for “two-tier command and control.” Under this system, AFP and U.S. military forces each report to their own leadership, who must coordinate between themselves for maximal effect.²⁴ The CONOPS notes that the prompt exchange of liaison officers is therefore a requisite for ensuring effective coordination.

Under the CONOPS, a Philippine request for assistance is made to the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Ambassador makes a disaster declaration. This declaration begins the U.S. Government response, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance as the lead implementer. At USAID’s request, elements of the U.S. Pacific Command or other military forces may assist. Under both the CONOPS and its own policies, the U.S. military’s task is to assist USAID, the Government of the Philippines, the international humanitarian community, and ASEAN member states as appropriate.

Within the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement are provisions for the creation of Joint Task Forces (JTF) (brigade level and up) and the exchange of liaison officers. These JTFs are designed to provide a single framework of coordination for forces from the two militaries. The military-to-military coordinating mechanisms can further be upgraded by the Philippines to a Multinational Coordination Center to connect the JTFs with military units of other assisting countries. The Philippine-led MNCC is designed to “prioritize, coordinate and deconflict non-RP-U.S. military assistance and support” including that provided by the AHA Centre and international humanitarian community.²⁵ The JTF or MNCC in turn are linked to the NDRRMC for coordination of tasks. The HA/DR Concept of Operations reinforces the notion of civilian leadership of disaster response, as well as establishes “Government of the Republic

²⁴ Government of the Philippines, *RP-US Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Concept of Operations 2009*, (Quezon City: GRP, 2009), 22.

²⁵ The MNCC established under the Philippines-U.S. CONOPS would be created along the lines set forth in the MNF SOP, thus providing congruence between these two protocols.

of the Philippines lead and international community support as a major strategic communication theme.”²⁶

The Visiting Forces Agreement requirements of the Philippine Government are very similar to those under the MNF SOP, i.e., to facilitate entry requirements for personnel, equipment and supply, to waive or provide tax/duty exemption, to extend local facilities for base of operations and forward deployment base, and to provide force protection. The U.S. military assistance for HA/DR missions is to be based on several criteria. These include the military providing a unique capability and as a last resort; its ability to support civilian efforts in relief operations; its focus on a limited range of tasks (infrastructure support); and transport of relief goods and personnel based on approved requests for assistance by the USAID/OFDA. Finally, U.S. military assistance is to have clear disengagement parameters established by the National Disaster Coordination Center (NDCC) and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).

In several cases, the U.S. military has provided disaster response assistance to the Philippines. In Typhoon Frank (2008), 13 cargo aircraft and helicopters from the USS *Ronald Reagan* carrier strike group flew 316 sorties, delivering close to half a million pounds of relief supplies to affected areas in Panay island. In Typhoon Ondoy (Ketsana, 2009) U.S. military assets (bulldozer, forklift, helicopters, trucks and cargo Humvees) were used to clear road debris and to deliver relief supplies in Metro Manila.

The Philippines also has a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with Australia, enacted in 2007. Although the Australia-Philippines SOVFA had no concept of operations specific to HA/DR at the time of typhoon Haiyan, the agreement generally does provide for disaster operations. Under the article pertaining to entry of Australian forces, the SOVFA states that in times of disaster, the entry notification period may be reduced to 48 hours from the normal 15 days.²⁷

International or bilateral assistance has utilized varying coordination platforms and mechanisms in several disasters. One was the response to Typhoon Sendong (Washi, 2011), which devastated the northern

²⁶ Government of the Philippines, *Concept*, 18.

²⁷ Government of Australia, *Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the Status of Visiting Forces of Each State in the Territory of the Other State*, (Canberra: Government of Australia, 31 May 2007).

Mindanao cities of Iligan and Cagayan de Oro. Reports pointed to the following gaps in response operations: disconnect between cluster meetings and field operations; rapid rotation of UN personnel; lack of NGO accountability under the cluster system; little or no assistance in remote/conflict-affected areas; and, the lack of managed transition from emergency relief to early recovery.²⁸ Typhoon Pablo (Bopha, 2012), which severely affected the Mindanao communities of Davao del Sur and Compostela Valley provinces triggered a considerable international response. A One-Stop Shop (OSS) was established in Davao for relief assistance coming from the AHA Centre and ASEAN countries. The ASEAN AHA Centre and the UN deployed teams for rapid needs assessment, field coordination, and field operations management. Assessments, however, pointed to the flaws of focusing on early recovery, and insufficient focus on long-term livelihoods and permanent shelter requirements. Complications arising from the government's "no build-zone policy" made rebuilding tasks especially difficult.²⁹

In sum, the Philippines Government has a very robust national disaster framework. This framework places local response at the forefront of HA/DR activities, while providing for complementary efforts and assistance from national and international stakeholders. The plans and policies establish leading and supporting roles across the spectrum of humanitarian tasks. The framework has been inclusive, recognizing the role of non-government actors such as volunteers, private sector businesses, and civil society groups. The framework has also provided a legal basis for the Philippine military's role in preparedness and response.

The national framework has clear mechanisms for accepting and implementing international assistance such as Presidential declaration, the OSS system, and the cluster approach. The disaster frameworks of the Philippines acknowledge the possibility of requiring international assistance, whether from the UN family, ASEAN and its member states, or bilateral partners such as the United States, Australia, and Japan. The summary below presents the key features of major multilateral and bilateral frameworks under which disaster response may be provided to the Philippines:

²⁸ Joint presentation of the GRP and UNHCR, Symposium on Humanitarian Coordination, 9-11 April 2011.

²⁹ Elizabeth Ferris, Daniel Petz and Chareen Star, *The Year of Recurring Disasters: A Review of Natural Disasters in 2012*, (Washington: Brookings, 2013), 14.

SUMMARY TABLE Key Features of Bilateral and Multilateral Frameworks

Feature	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Standby Agreement and Standard Operating Protocol (SASOP)	Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedure (MNF SOP)	Philippines-U.S. HA/DR Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
Mechanism for mobilizing foreign resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covers both civilian and military resources Standby arrangement- earmarked assets Request for assistance by affected member state or offer of assistance (bilateral or through ASEAN AHA Centre) Affected member state can refuse or accept offer of assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existing or <i>ad hoc</i> bilateral arrangement by diplomatic channels Request for assistance by affected country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Philippine government declared state of national calamity; Disaster declaration by U.S. Ambassador; Request for military assistance and acceptance of U.S. offer of foreign military assistance Contingent mobilization of U.S. military assets (USPACOM) based on need and availability
Affected host country requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Designated National Focal Point; Operational Focal Points at entry sites Facilitate entry requirements for personnel, equipment and supply; Waivers and tax/duty exemptions Prior arranged CIQ procedures at entry site Provide force protection to personnel, equipment and supply; Extend local facilities and services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identification of need for multinational forces Establish Multinational Coordination Center National Disaster Management Office to undertake rapid Damage and Needs Assessment Clear exit and transition/ disengagement parameters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Grant overflight, landing and basing clearances Facilitate entry requirements for personnel, equipment and supply; Waivers and tax/duty exemption Extend local facilities for base of operations and forward deployment base Activate Joint Task Force Provide force protection
Primary coordination mechanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Focal Point (national disaster management office) Incident Manager on-site 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MNCC; Link to National Disaster Management Office Exchange of liaison officers with host military forces and with UN agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint Task Force (JTF) Exchange of liaison officers Possible upgrade to MNCC to: coordinate AFP and US military JTF military-to-military efforts; Aviation coordination; Civil-military coordination; Provide NDRRMC liaison.

SUMMARY TABLE CONT.

Feature	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Standby Agreement and Standard Operating Protocol (SASOP)	Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedure (MNF SOP)	Philippines-U.S. HA/DR Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
Terms of utilization of foreign resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provide operational briefings• Transition, exit, and withdrawal based on indicators/timeframe set by affected country• Independent withdrawal due to exhaustion of foreign resources• Submission to AHA Centre of Report of Status of Provision of Assistance Form	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Short duration• Emergency response only• Support to relief operations of affected country's government and humanitarian community• Process-based request for foreign military resources (tasks validated by affected government National Disaster Management Office); Cluster/sector processing of requests by humanitarian community; Last resort; Unique capability• Exit/disengagement included in timeline	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Unique capability of US military and as last resort provider• Support to relief operations of Philippine government lead agencies and US Embassy/USAID/OFDA• U.S. military tasks: (primary) infrastructure support; (secondary) indirect assistance - transport of relief goods and personnel to disaster locations, delivery of relief goods by disaster personnel; (last resort) face-to-face distribution of goods• Cooperation with humanitarian community and ASEAN• Process-based request for assistance from Philippine government and humanitarian community (validated by USAID/OFDA)• Transition and disengagement included in timeline; Based on NDRRMC and U.S. Embassy/USAID/OFDA assessments that GRP meeting relief demand; Transfer responsibility from JTF (crisis mode) to Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (normal conditions)

Though the framework is robust, the Philippines has yet to see all its elements activated during a major disaster. The 2010 NDRRM Law and the implementing rules and regulations of the NDRRM Plan mandated localization, but these efforts have occurred sporadically and are not yet country-wide. Scenario-based and large-scale event-tailored response activities have not fully been planned, nor have these plans been disseminated down to the local level. Philippine domestic disaster management plans all establish coordination platforms: the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils, the response clusters and the Incident Command System. Still, how these platforms relate to each other was often unclear when Typhoon Haiyan struck (discussed in Chapter III). Finally, the interface among the NDRRMC, RDRRMC and local DRRMCs and procedures for scaling up response operations were not fully articulated in the 2010 Law or Plan. Since then, subsequent National Disaster Response Plans have partially addressed these gaps (see Chapter IV).

The international frameworks discussed above have also not yet been fully tested in the Philippines. Within the ASEAN frameworks, the AHA Centre remains in infancy, having just been organized in 2012. The regional standby arrangements under SASOP are not expected to be operational until 2016. Prior to Typhoon Haiyan, no major disaster has sufficiently tested the Incident Command System, OSS system, and cluster approach to allow insights and lessons for how these systems function together. The HA/DR response mechanisms under the bilateral military forces agreements that the Philippines has with the U.S. and Australia have also had few opportunities to be tested in a major disaster.

The Response to Typhoon Haiyan¹

NATIONAL RESPONSE, COORDINATION, AND LOGISTICS


Preemptive Action, Prepositioning and Response

In anticipation of the landfall of Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda), government, non-government and international actors in the Philippines undertook a number of preemptive and prepositioning activities at the strategic level. These included the issuance of advisories to line agencies and local government units, preparedness meetings with local, national and international actors, as well as the prepositioning of goods, equipment, transportation, and assessment and response teams both in Manila and in the localities within the typhoon's projected path.

On 5 November 2013, *day minus 3*, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) Operations Center run by the Department of National Defense's Office of Civil Defense (OCD) began issuing advisories to local government units within the typhoon's expected impact areas, directing local authorities to monitor the situation, take precautionary measures, and disseminate early warning information to communities. On 6 November the NDRRMC held a special meeting at the NDRRMC headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo in Manila to assess the government's response capacity. The NDRRMC, under Office of Civil Defense Executive Director and Defense Under Secretary Eduardo del Rosario, placed all government line agencies on full alert in order to respond to the potential effects of the typhoon.

On 6 November the Office of Civil Defense met with the United Nations Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), represented by the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and

¹ Prof. Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D. and Prof. Juhn Chris Espia authored the full draft of this chapter, which is based on their original research and interviews.



The path of Typhoon Haiyan and the most affected regions of the Philippines. (Photo credit: Based on OCHA/ReliefWeb.)

the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in order to apprise the UN of the preparations conducted by the NDDRMC. This provided a degree of congruence in terms of the common operational picture and the necessary contingencies to be undertaken. OCD also discussed the need for a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team to help conduct rapid assessments.²

² Agnes Palacio, National Disaster Response Advisor, OCHA Philippines, personal communication.

On 7 November, *day minus 1*, the Philippine Red Cross (PRC), a standing member of the NDRRMC, placed its chapters on full alert, and ordered inventories of supplies and equipment in its regional hubs (Leyte, Negros Occidental, Cebu and Albay). In the PRC-Cebu regional warehouse, goods and equipment consisting of 2,000 tins of ready-to-eat food, 4,000 blankets, 4,000 plastic mats, 2,000 hygiene kits, 2,000 jerry cans, ten units of health emergency tents, and 5,000 units of food and non-food items were prepositioned with support from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Aside from food and non-food items, water and sanitation, shelter and emergency health services, the PRC also placed its rescue and assessment teams on standby.³

By 7 November 2013, the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) prepositioned about 89,260 family food packs worth around PHP 178.3 million both in Manila warehouses and in regional depots in Regions IV A and B (Southern Luzon and MIMAROPA), V (Bicol), VI (Western Visayas), VII (Central Visayas), and VIII (Eastern Visayas). The Department of Health (DOH) prepositioned assorted drugs, medical supplies, cots, etc., and issued a Code Blue alert memorandum for DOH Regional offices in Region IV-B, V, VII, VIII and CARAGA. Government quick response teams (Philippine National Police, DSWD and Bureau of Fire) were mobilized at the national and regional level. Also on 7 November 2013, the UN RC/HC *ad interim* extended an offer for international assistance to the Philippine Government, which was accepted by the Under Secretary Eduardo del Rosario on behalf of the NDRRMC.

Pre-emptive evacuation began several days prior to landfall. Led by local executives and leaders from DSWD and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the pre-storm evacuation across the entire affected area moved 125,604 people to 109 evacuation centers in 22 provinces.⁴ Although local leaders in Tacloban made plans to

³ Norwina Eclarinal, Philippine Red Cross, personal communication, 4 July 2014.

⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Action Plan*, 22 November 2013. By 22 November the total number of evacuees had risen to 673,042.

shelter much of the city's population of 220,000, prior to landfall only 15,300 people made use of these evacuation centers.⁵

Prior to the disaster, the Secretaries of National Defense (DND) and Interior and Local Government met with Governor Leopoldo Dominic Petilla of Leyte Province and Mayor Alfred Romualdez of Tacloban, along with member agencies of the local DRRMCs in Tacloban Airport to conduct a briefing on the local and national level preparations.⁶ Starting on 6 November, *day minus 2*, the DILG leadership in Manila began alerting local government units and DRRM Councils in the projected storm path, placing them on alert. The Department of Health began prepositioning medications, medical supplies, cots, and other equipment in the warning zone. On 7 November the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) placed a total of 4,500 troops on red alert and prepositioned helicopters at Mactan Air Base, while the Philippine National Police (PNP) alerted 6,450 officers, primarily in the Eastern Visayas.⁷ From its headquarters in Manila, the Citizens' Disaster Response Network, an affiliation of HA/DR NGOs, alerted its members and began packing relief kits and marshalling transport vehicles.

The NDRRMC Executive Director del Rosario welcomed the UN offer of technical assistance for conducting a joint rapid needs assessment. An UNDAC team and ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) team arrived in Manila on 7 November to provide additional capacity to the HCT to support the Philippine Government. The UN office in Geneva sent a multinational UNDAC Team whose members had to be flown-in to Manila from their stations abroad. Given the anticipated path of the typhoon, the NDRRMC invited the HCT to deploy to Tacloban City at the earliest possible time to participate in a joint rapid needs assessment, and to provide information and communications technology. On 7 November, the UN HCT convened

⁵ Te-ping Chen, James Aredy and James Hookway, "Typhoon Haiyan: How a Catastrophe Unfolded," *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 November 2013.

⁶ Testimony of Philippine Department of National Defense Secretary Valtair Gazmin, *Post-Disaster Management Briefing/ Review: Hearing before the Congressional Oversight Committee on Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010* (Joint Session, 16th Congress, 23 January 2014).

⁷ Government of the Philippines, "RescuePH: A detailed list of government rescue and relief efforts before and immediately after Yolanda," accessed at <http://www.gov.ph/rescueph-a-detailed-list-of-government-rescue-and-relief-efforts-before-and-immediately-after-yolanda/>, 15 April 2015.

a special preparedness meeting with UN member agencies in order to organize a multi-cluster initial rapid needs assessment.

An ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) deployed to Tacloban on 7 November 2013. The ERAT personnel were equipped with emergency telecommunications equipment such as satellite phones and Broadband Global Area Network devices, whose satellite linkup allowed users to send emails and documents. The first messages coming out of Tacloban were sent using the ASEAN ERAT's equipment.⁸ Due to flight cancellations from Manila to Tacloban City, an assessment and communications team composed of the UNDAC team, Asia Pacific Humanitarian Partnership, Télécoms Sans Frontière, MapAction and the ASEAN ERAT deployed by road from Manila on 8 November 2013. The Red Cross began deploying assessment teams with Cebu as their base of operations.⁹

November 8, *day 0*, the storm struck. Prior to landfall, Typhoon Haiyan was measured by numerous meteorological agencies as the strongest cyclonic storm ever recorded. While still in the Pacific, winds on November 6 were recorded at 200 mph (320 kph), with gusts of 225 mph (360 kph). At 4:30 a.m. on November 8 Haiyan made landfall at Guiuan on Samar Island, pushing ahead of it a storm surge that topped 23 feet. The storm devastated the city of Tacloban on Leyte Island as it passed, moving on to northern Cebu, Panay Island, and the islands of Region IV-B north of Palawan.

Typhoon Haiyan left devastation in its wake. Nearly 90 percent of the infrastructure in Tacloban city was destroyed. Roads, bridges, the Tacloban Airport, the seaport, and city government offices were rendered unusable. Across the Philippines, 6,300 people lost their lives in the storm, 28,689 were wounded, and over 16 million were affected. Over one million houses were destroyed or severely damaged. The total direct costs of the storm were estimated by the NDRRMC at USD 2.05 billion, with indirect costs far higher. On 11 November President Benigno Aquino issued Presidential Proclamation 682 declaring a state of national calamity.

⁸ Arnel Capili, ASEAN, personal communication, 19 June 2014.

⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 3 (as of 9 November 2013)*, (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 2.

In the early morning of 9 November, *day 1*, teams deployed by C-130 from Villamor Air Base to Tacloban City in support of the NDRRM Council's rapid assessment. These OCD and DSWD assessment teams were joined by representatives from OCHA, World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization of Migration (IOM), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The DSWD brought with them four pallets of food packs, knowing that the 5,000 relief packs prepositioned by DSWD Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) had all been washed away. These four pallets were brought to Tacloban City Hall. DSWD repacked 600 food packages and began distributing them in Sagkahan District in the afternoon of 9 November with the help of the Tacloban City Social Welfare and Development Office and Tacloban City Councilor Cristina Gonzales.

The Department of National Defense Armed Forces of the Philippines responded immediately. Within a month of the disaster the AFP had fielded 23,789 troops, over 400 trucks, seven ships, and 24 helicopters in response.¹⁰ On November 9, *day 1*, the AFP dispatched two C-130 transport planes to deliver food, water, and relief supplies. DSWD began distributing these supplies on 10 November 2013. The relief packs contained three kilograms of rice, canned goods, noodles, coffee and sugar which can feed a family of five for two to three days.¹¹

The OCD and DSWD assessment teams and the UN cluster representatives conducted the rapid assessments in Tacloban based on an agreed-upon checklist. This assessment was largely done without support from the local DRRMCs as many of the local bodies were incapacitated by the typhoon. The OCD and the cluster representatives shared observations and damage/needs assessments which were sent back to Manila using the emergency telecommunications equipment. The NDRRMC Operations Center used this information to create a picture of the needs and challenges on the ground. The OCD and key NDRRMC members departments identified emergency food, sanitation and hygiene, logistics and emergency shelter facilities as the most pressing

¹⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) Deployed Assets (as of 28 November 2013)*, (Manila: OCHA, 2013).

¹¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 4 (as of 10 November 2013)*, (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 3.

relief priorities. The NDRRMC used this as basis for determining the volume and magnitude of help required from Manila and as the basis for the declaration of a state of calamity.

The national telecommunications system and services in-country were destroyed in the affected areas. The first assessments conducted in Tacloban, Cebu and Roxas City confirmed gaps in radio, landline, internet, and cellular telecommunications in these locations. The availability of reliable and independent data and voice communications services became a priority area for successful conduct of relief operations. In response, OCD sent a mobile communications van in one of the first three C-130s to Tacloban City.¹²

To address these glaring communications shortfalls, the UN Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) activated and deployed to the Philippines on 9 November with basic equipment to assess damage and provide critical IT and telecommunications services to the humanitarian community. The ETC responders provided secure telecommunications, voice and data connectivity services to the humanitarian community in Cebu, Guiuan, Tacloban, Borongan, Estancia and Roxas City.¹³ Throughout its deployment, the ETC focused on restoring data connectivity, delivering power to communications hubs, training NGO staff on communications tools, and coordinating telecoms services.

On 9 November, the Philippine Red Cross (PRC) headquarters in Manila mobilized 11 trucks of relief goods as well as ambulances to travel by land to Leyte. The next day the PRC began distributing relief goods at evacuation centers and provided hot meals to 450 evacuees in Leyte. The PRC also provided hot meals to an additional 3,365 affected individuals in Masbate, San Pablo and Capiz. In the hardest-hit areas, the PRC established welfare desks in the affected areas to assist affected individuals with tracing inquiries and restoring family links. At its national headquarters, the PRC coursed subsequent mobilizations of goods and personnel from Manila to Leyte through the DSWD and the AFP in

¹² Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.

¹³ OCHA, *Situation Report No. 4*, 2013.

Villamor Air Base. Aside from mobilizing emergency response units, the PRC also set up field hospitals in Ormoc, Tacloban and Cebu.¹⁴

On *day one* the NDDRMC opened a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) hub at Villamor Air Base under the leadership of the AFP. Relief goods and personnel incoming from overseas and from elsewhere in the Philippines were routed through this hub to the regional hubs or directly to the affected area. The U.S., Japan, Singapore and Swedish military forces went through this hub as well. By 25 November, *day 17*, a total of 177 sorties had been deployed through Villamor Air Base. These sorties carried a total of 3,887 personnel and 1,279 tons of relief goods and equipment.

The hub at Villamor Air Base became the center for processing and resettlement of evacuees from 16-23 November. DSWD was in charge and dubbed the operation “Oplan *Salubong*.” For individuals and families displaced from Tacloban, DSWD provided hot meals, psychosocial support services, food packs, financial assistance, transportation assistance, referrals to hospitals, and temporary shelters at DSWD-managed facilities.¹⁵ A group of volunteers organized “Oplan *Hatid*” and provided free transportation for 2,376 evacuees from the Villamor Air Base to their families in Metro Manila and the neighboring provinces. By 23 November 3,496 families totaling 13,684 individuals had been processed through the hub at Villamor Air Base. Volunteers and charitable organizations (e.g., the American Chamber of Commerce Foundation, Inc.) were present to aid these operations.

On 10 November, *day two*, the Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Enrique T. Ona along with Health Department and OCD personnel conducted a rapid health assessment in Tacloban City in order to apprise the NDDRMC of the health situation. A 32-man DOH health assessment team followed shortly afterwards in order to prevent and help prepare for the possible outbreak of disaster-borne diseases.¹⁶ On 10 November, the PRC flew in assessment, search and rescue, and first-aid teams to augment government efforts in Leyte.

¹⁴ Eclarinal, personal communication, 4 July 2014.

¹⁵ Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.

¹⁶ Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.



Evacuation in Tacloban was led by DILG and DSWD, and assisted heavily by the AFP. Above, nearly 400 evacuees from Tacloban fill the cargo hold of a U.S. C-17 cargo plane. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Peter D. Blair/Released.)

Among the key priorities identified in the initial health damage/needs assessment were the needs for medical treatment for the injured, medication for the sick, health kits, and psychosocial support for those experiencing trauma. A German medical team (Humedica) was among the first to respond. The team arrived in Manila on 10 November transporting 23 tons of medical supplies. A total of 151 Foreign Medical Teams (FMTs) were deployed through the Health Cluster throughout the disaster. The majority of these teams were deployed in Region VIII (Leyte, Eastern Samar), while a handful of teams were deployed in Region VI (Capiz, Roxas, and Iloilo) and Region VII (Cebu).

Three types of FMTs arrived in the Philippines. Type 1 FMTs are mobile teams that cater to public health and perform minor surgery. Type 2 teams are those with surgical capability and have a field hospital for the necessary surgical equipment. Type 3 teams are those that render specialized medical services. Because the local governments (LGUs) were still unable to fulfill their mandates in many areas, the Office of the President issued Memorandum No. 61 s. 2013 directing the DOH

to temporarily assume direct supervision and control over health and sanitation operations of LGUs affected by the typhoon.¹⁷

On 11 November, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos arrived from Geneva to Manila. She arrived to personally assess the situation and to relay information to the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the UN's forum for decision-making on humanitarian affairs. The information she sent was used as the basis for declaring a Level 3 disaster and for ascertaining which and how many resources were needed for response.¹⁸ Four days after her arrival, Amos made headlines when she frankly acknowledged the limitations and delays of the international community's response, saying, "I do feel we have let people down because we are not able to get in more quickly."¹⁹

By 13 November, *day 5*, 18 national roads, bridges and other transport linkages in Haiyan-affected areas had been cleared by the AFP and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), allowing for the deployment of more relief assistance. Because of the increasing need for food items, DSWD in coordination with OCD spearheaded mass repacking efforts manned by government personnel and volunteers across several centers in Manila and Cebu. On the average, these centers produced 150,000 food packs per day.

Local and international NGOs attempted to conduct their own assessments of on-the-ground needs, both in Manila and on site. Those with disaster relief experience readily expected the items of greatest need would be food, water, shelter, health and sanitation. Yet it was problematic for the NGOs to assess accurately the specific needs by geographic area. Many arrived on site to Tacloban ready to deliver assistance but without needs assessments in hand. Many were not self-sufficient, the NGOs themselves requiring assistance with transport, fuel, or shelter. In spite of these difficulties, the local NGOs and volunteers delivered food, water, and provided health and psychosocial assistance that proved invaluable.

¹⁷ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council-Office of Civil Defense (NDRRMC-OCD), *Typhoon "Yolanda" (Haiyan) Experience*, ([PowerPoint Slides] NDRRMC: Manila, 2013).

¹⁸ Level 3 is the highest level of emergency as defined by the UN Inter Agency Standing Committee. See *INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA REFERENCE DOCUMENT*, "2. Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Activation: definition and procedures" at <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloadDoc.aspx?docID=6459>

¹⁹ Sara Susanne Fabunan, "UN Exec Frustrated Over Late Assistance," *Manila Standard Today*, 15 November 2013.

On 15 November, *day 7*, the Philippine Red Cross (PRC) received a shipment of non-food items from other national Red Cross societies. From Berlin, the German Red Cross flew 500 family tents, 500 kitchen kits, 1000 hygiene kits, 1000 tarpaulins and 500 shelter tool kits. The Spanish Red Cross sent 6,000 jerry cans and mosquito nets. Both donors flew the goods to Cebu Airport, with the goods processed and stored in the PRC warehouse in Cebu City. These goods were eventually distributed to affected areas in the Visayas. Also on 15 November the PRC deployed a 61-person relief and rehabilitation team to Tacloban City. In coordination with the OCD, DSWD and the AFP, the PRC team was transported by plane from Villamor Air Base.²⁰ Tracked through the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), total Red Cross Assistance in Haiyan comprised 388,000 households reached for food aid, 170,000 reached for non-food items, over 150,000 provided shelter assistance, and a total of \$357 million raised worldwide.²¹

On 17 November, *day 9*, the AHA Centre deployed its ASEAN District Stockpile to Tacloban from its Subang, Malaysia warehouses. The PRC brought in pre-fabricated offices, generators and mobile storage units based on an OCD request. These temporary offices were considered a priority since OCD offices in Region VIII were damaged by the typhoon. The AHA Centre also facilitated the deployment of six C-130s from Indonesia to Cebu and two naval ships filled with relief items from Brunei to Tacloban. The AHA Centre coordination with local authorities (DOH, OCD) was also responsible for deploying a Malaysian military medical team to *barangays* in the Sagkahan District in Tacloban. This team set up a field hospital and rendered medical assistance to affected individuals.

Overseas and domestic private sector contributions for typhoon relief were significant. Indeed, according to one study, fully half of all humanitarian assistance during Haiyan originated from the private sector.²² As of 9 January, 2014 U.S. businesses combined to send at

²⁰ Eclarinal, personal communication, 4 July 2014.

²¹ International Federation of the Red Cross, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan – One-year progress report*, (Geneva: IFRC, 2014).

²² Steven Zyck and Randolph Kent, *Humanitarian crises, emergency preparedness and response: the role of business and the private sector*, (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2014), 5.

least USD 59.1 million in cash and in-kind supplies.²³ Tracked by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, this assistance ranged from cash and medicine from Bayer to USD 2.5 million in cash and in-kind support from Coca-Cola to USD 1 million in cash and in-kind logistics and transportation assistance from UPS. From its Japan branch, Procter & Gamble donated USD 1.6 million worth of supplies, including seven tons of diapers. Of total pledges of USD 150 million made to OCHA, the organization reported that approximately one quarter derived from individuals and the private sector. Domestically, the private sector was extremely active as well. Business aid ranged from the San Miguel Corporation, which contributed heavily to relief and early recovery (including shelter and housing) to consortiums of smaller businesses, such as the 3,000-member Cebu Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Business contributions spanned cash donations, in-kind contributions, and provision of volunteer hours to local NGOs, the Philippine Red Cross, and international teams.

Coordination, Linkages and Networks

At the national level, there were two critical coordination platforms for Philippine and international actors: (1) the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), and (2) the military Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC). The Office of Civil Defense Operations Center under the NDRRMC was based at Camp Aguinaldo. The OCD held coordination meetings for preemptive and prepositioning activities prior to the typhoon landfall and took charge of national-level civilian coordination once the disaster struck.

The NDRRM Council, whose members are at the Department Secretary level, was hamstrung from the outset by the lack of appropriate secretary-level representation. Many of the critical department secretaries – Gazmin of DND, Roxas of DILG, Soliman of DSWD, and del Rosario of OCD – were in Tacloban, thus creating a vacuum at the NDRRMC. The NDRRMC Technical Management Group (TMG) worked alongside the OCD-led Operations Center, but senior leadership at the highest echelons was markedly absent for the first few days of the disaster. The

²³ U.S. Chamber of Commerce Foundation, “Typhoon Haiyan Corporate Aid Tracker,” <http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/site-page/typhoon-haiyan-corporate-aid-tracker>

full executive functions only began at the NDRRMC upon the return of the secretaries or upon the provision by OCHA of satellite phones. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, OCD Deputy Executive Director Romeo Fajardo, and Presidential Secretary Jose Rene Almendras frequently provided assistance and guidance in the interim. However, without the presence of the key secretaries, it was difficult for the NDRRMC to direct the tasking and cluster assignments. From the outset, the failure of the NDRRMC to fulfill its leadership role of tasking and strategic vision resulted in individual departments bypassing the Council. Once this pattern became prevalent, still more departments followed suit, exacerbating the problem.

Prior to Haiyan the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) had not had a prominent role in the NDRRMC. However, on 9 November, *day 1*, the DFA decided to form its own task force, the Yolanda Action Center, with 12 officers attending meetings both at NDRRMC and at the MNCC. The need for this enhanced liaison with the two main coordinating bodies quickly became apparent to DFA. As international offers of civilian, military, and NGO assistance streamed in, DFA was tasked with managing those offers alongside the other NDRRMC members and the respective embassies of the countries proffering assistance.

The 2010 NDRRMC law allows local government units (*barangay*, municipal/city and province) to mobilize independently for disaster preparedness and response, utilizing their own resources. Accordingly, national government agencies like the DSWD had prepositioned stockpiles of family packs at regional offices to augment local efforts where needed. The DILG also has provisions for staff surge (police and firefighters) according to regional and mutual aid arrangements. Yet despite the preparedness mandates of individual departments, the local DRRMC remains the body in charge of disaster response operations.

In large-scale disasters, the principle of local disaster management remains theoretically in force. Republic Act 10121 does allow local DRRMCs to submit direct requests for international assistance. Yet in such disasters national coordination is virtually a given. Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated that the mechanisms by which authority passes from localities to national leaders remained unclear. (For a discussion of the new assumption scenario in Philippine disaster planning, see Chapter IV.)

Typically local chief executives, as head of the LDRRMC, have tended to accept ad hoc arrangements and work alongside national government leadership. This has not, however, always been the case.

In previous large scale disasters (e.g., the 2006 Solar I oil spill and the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption), the national government formed inter-agency task forces on an ad hoc basis for response. In the 2006 oil spill, the regional task force created by the national government eclipsed the provincial government's task force and the Philippine Coast Guard-led response. National resources and international assistance were instead channeled to the national task force.²⁴ This historical example explains the presumption by many local leaders that the national government would simply take over operations. It also demonstrates that the process by which this takeover occurs remained opaque to many. In Tacloban City, the friction between Mayor Alfred Romualdez and national department secretaries is understandable in this context.

At the outset of the disaster, DFA Assistant Secretary for the Office of the UN and International Organizations Jesus Gary Domingo well knew the international humanitarian system and the twinning system that paired Philippine response clusters with their UN agency or IFRC partner. DFA Secretary Domingo was aware that the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) composed of UN, IFRC and international organizations would meet collectively for macro-level decisions but that operational or tactical decisions would be made at the cluster level. Secretary Domingo observed, however, that other than the relief delivery and health clusters, the NDRRMC clusters did not meet nor were they operational until much later.²⁵ With informed leadership, DFA effectively tracked and coordinated incoming offers of military assistance, UN agencies, NGOs, and country teams.

Immediately after landfall, the World Food Programme took the helm of the logistics cluster without co-lead OCD's prompting. At both the national and local level, OCD did not initially have the resources or ability to constitute the cluster. The WFP therefore shouldered the majority of the cluster logistics tasks at the local and regional levels. Once

²⁴ Rosalie Hall, "Governance during Disaster: Intra-governmental and Non-governmental coordination in the 2006 Guimaras Oil Spill," *Philippine Political Science Journal*, (Volume 51, Number 54, 2010), 122.

²⁵ Jesus Gary Domingo, Department of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 23 and 26 January 2015.

international humanitarian assistance began, bilateral assistance and aid from the larger NGOs was coursed through the DFA and clusters. The job of DFA was to be a gatekeeper for foreign military, governments, and NGOs, with the DFA relaying offers and interests to the appropriate cluster. It was the DFA that accepted or rejected offers of assistance, whether they were search and rescue teams, food, or medicines. In this task the DFA was seriously hampered by the lack of a common operating picture from the NDRRMC, and by the absence of Philippine cluster representation at the national level.

To expedite customs clearance of incoming international assistance, the Philippine Government established a One-Stop Shop (OSS) at Villamor Air Base in Manila and at the Mactan-Cebu International Airport in Cebu on 29 November 2014. The OCD had no recorded guidelines for the One-Stop Shop from its last implementation, the 2012 Typhoon Pablo (2012). Guidelines had to be constituted from scratch for Typhoon Haiyan.²⁶ The OSS was a mechanism to facilitate customs, immigration, and quarantine. The OSS brought together in a single location key staff from six selected agencies, which included the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Bureau of Customs (BOC), the Department of Finance (DOF), the DSWD, the DOH and the Department of National Defense (DND). The general responsibility of the OSS was to verify whether goods could come in duty free, earmarked for DSWD or DOH, or for the use of the UN system and DSWD-accredited NGOs.

Under the OSS setup, international NGOs and donors needed to coordinate with the DFA even before arriving in the Philippines so that necessary proceedings could begin even before the cargo arrived. Donors were also required: (1) to submit a letter of intent to donate the goods to DSWD or to any DSWD-registered relief organization, (2) to secure a letter of acceptance from the DSWD, (3) to obtain a bill of lading, as well as an inventory of goods or commercial invoice, and finally (4) to have an approved request for release from the BOC.²⁷ The OCD recommended

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 6* (as of 12 November 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 8.

areas or sites for relief operations for organizations, donors and agencies that did not have preferred sites/recipients.

While there was no blanket tax exemption granted for donations that went through the OSS, donors could request exemptions bilaterally through their line ministries by utilizing normal procedures. Many international NGOs that brought relief goods with them (but were not DSWD accredited) had their goods consigned to DSWD. The DSWD for the most part agreed to this arrangement, but required NGOs to provide lists of recipients and where the goods were delivered. Many of these NGO consignees failed to submit reports to DSWD, and the DSWD was further saddled with demurrage payment (for storage) owed to customs.²⁸

The OSS altered another aspect of donations—the conditions of acceptance of medicines and medical equipment. Formerly, medicines and medical equipment needed to be inspected by DOH personnel. However, for the Haiyan operations, all medical donations were accepted, despite the fact that some donations did not meet the one-year minimum expiration date criterion set by the DOH and the Food and Drug Administration.²⁹ The Department of Health struggled with being bypassed, as incoming medical donors often did not check in with DOH representatives at the airports.³⁰ As a result, DOH guidelines on issues such as drug donation or medical waste disposal often went unheeded.

As most people can enter the Philippines without a visa, the personnel component of international assistance was also not much of a problem to the DFA. However, this was an issue to DOH, particularly with regard to the practice of medicine. The DOH was responsible for registering the incoming medical teams (with the exception of military medical teams), issuing permits for practice and performing screening of what type of medical service was needed, presumably with the option to accept or deny the offered assistance. Foreign military assistance (medical service, logistics or personnel) was not cleared through the OSS, but was coordinated

²⁸ Thelsa Biolena, “Strengthening Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Management,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Implementing Lessons Learned,” Manila, 2 October 2014).

²⁹ Dr. Joel Buenaventura, Department of Health, personal communication, 13 June 2014.

³⁰ Discussion, Peace Winds America, Policy Forum, 19 March 2014.

separately through the MNCC. The OSS and DFA did make requests to incoming foreign militaries to submit lists of personnel, military aircraft and vessels, but with little compliance.³¹

The coordination hub at Villamor Air Base (HA/DR Mission Hub), established on 9 November 2013, *day 1*, was led by OCD in coordination with the AFP. The hub served as the only jump-off point by air from Manila to Haiyan-affected areas in the early stages of the relief operations, as commercial flights to all affected areas were cancelled. Villamor Air Base served as the coordination hub for the logistics of relief goods and personnel from Manila to Haiyan-affected areas not only for Philippine government assets and personnel, but also for military assets from overseas. The U.S. military had a permanent liaison officer present at Villamor to help with logistics operations.

Due to the AFP's limited airlift capability (three C-130s), coordination with foreign military forces became necessary to transport of goods and personnel. Civilian access to these logistical capabilities was facilitated by the OCD. While NGOs and private sector donors coordinated with OCD for endorsement and logistical support, foreign military forces went through the AFP's Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC).

The AFP Chief of Staff created the MNCC as an arm of Joint Task Force (JTF) Yolanda, i.e., the Philippine armed forces combined response. The MNCC was created as a military-to-military coordination system, overseeing at the national level the regional military task forces. Conceptually, the MNCC arose from the previously existing bilateral Philippine-U.S. Combined Coordination Center (CCC). The CCC had been the concept of operations in place in 2009, and since 2012 joint exercises had been conducted to test HA/DR contingency plans. Initially AFP Joint Task Force Yolanda was the coordinating mechanism with the U.S. command team (JTF-505).³² The initial coordination with non-VFA countries was embassy-to-embassy through their military attaché, and military-to-military through the Department of National Defense and its foreign equivalent. To move from bilateral to multilateral coordination meant multiplying each functional cell (staff, logistics, force

³¹ Domingo, personal communication, 23 January 2015.

³² AFP and U.S. liaison officers began exchanging information one week prior to landfall.

protection, transportation) for inclusion in planning and execution. The transition to a multinational center occurred as Terms of Reference and Memoranda of Agreement were inked with non-VFA countries.³³ The setting up of MNCC-Cebu was likewise *ad hoc*. Individual embassy representatives contacted Brigadier General Rodolfo Santiago, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations, about placing assets in Cebu. So the MNCC-Cebu grew out of a significant demand for military logistics there.³⁴

While the MNCC-National was officially set up on 15 November, *day 7*, multinational cells were already in place as early as *day 3*, and increased further after the release of the initial damage assessments on *day 5*. The MNCC-National set up an *ad hoc* office at AFP headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo, where the AFP Joint Task Force Yolanda, the U.S. command team (JTF-505), and JTFs of other countries were co-located. MNCC-Cebu was set up at the unified command level (AFP Central Command), given its proximity to the affected areas and the presence of suitable facilities (airport, parking space, and warehousing). The MNCC-Cebu base of operations was initially established at the Mactan airport and later moved to a hotel near the airport.

According to Commodore Rafael Mariano of the AFP J-5 (Plans), who served as Director of MNCC-National, initial military-to-military coordination was conducted bilaterally with each contributing country. Once deployed, foreign militaries worked in the multinational environment of the MNCC. The JTF of each country (e.g., JTF Australia, JTF Canada) had its advance command posts at Camp Aguinaldo. Because other countries were not familiar with the Philippine operational environment, the key tasks of the MNCC were: (1) to provide a common operational picture for foreign military troop activities; and (2) to deconflict flight schedules. The MNCC recommended that individual countries direct their assistance to areas which were not yet served. However, final decisions on where and what to deliver rested with each country's discussion with the NDRRMC.³⁵

³³ Commodore Rafael Mariano, personal communication, 14 January 2015.

³⁴ Technically, Brig. Gen. Santiago's assignment as head of the MNCC-Cebu meant he reported directly to General Velarmino, head of the AFP Central Command.

³⁵ Mariano, personal communication, 14 January 2015.

The MNCC meetings covered discussion of assets and personnel commitment, and on a day-to-day basis, determined deployment prioritization, execution, and monitoring. The MNCC tasking (key tasks for militaries providing capabilities, except the U.S.) emanated from the NDRRMC. In addition, foreign militaries liaison officers reported to the MNCC and to the AFP on the ground a picture of what they did that day and would do tomorrow and the day after. Most military assets were used to transport DSWD goods. Only after week four were goods from NGOs transported. The greatest volume of outside assistance was directed straight to Cebu and therefore was not handled by the Villamor hub.

Except for the United States, with whom the AFP already had a concept of operations (CONOPS), mission-specific Terms of References (TOR) were worked out with each of the militaries either through the foreign embassy in Manila or through the Philippine Department of National Defense. The TORs addressed such concerns as carrying firearms, medical practice, drug dispensation, quarantine, force protection, use of liaison officers, diplomatic clearances, overflight and landing.³⁶ The Philippines wrote a statement of intent with Japan, while it signed a Memorandum of Agreement with South Korea. In execution of relief activities, Brigadier General Santiago found no difference between VFA and non-VFA countries—all operated as if under Philippine law.³⁷ Principally, the U.S. military helped with deconfliction/air traffic control which allowed opening of the Villamor, Tacloban and Guiuan hubs. Japan filled gaps in deliveries to remote islands in Leyte and Samar while the Australian forces serviced the Ormoc area.

The MNCC reported to JTF Yolanda, then to AFP-DND and finally to the NDRRMC. It was very clear that the MNCC-National was subordinate to the NDRRMC for policy guidance. As standard practice, Commodore Mariano said he was very careful not to preempt the NDRRMC when it came to decisions of deployment of assets and personnel. In the end, the MNCC “products” were air tasking orders,

³⁶ According to Commodore Mariano, the AFP had no concept of operations with Australia for HA/DR even though the Philippines has a SOVFA with them. However, he observed that the Australians were not worried about this lack of formality.

³⁷ Brig. General Rodolfo Santiago, Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff J-7, personal communication, 13 January 2015. Having not experienced any untoward incidents during the typhoon Haiyan operations, this assumption was not tested.

common operational picture, coordination of force protection, weather updates, and status of assessments on relief deliveries made.

Individual country contributors also relayed information to the NDRRMC through their liaison officers. Often there were separate sets of liaison officers to the NDRRMC and the MNCC. Liaison officers from OCHA, USAID, and PACOM had a presence in the MNCC. Other Philippine departments or agencies (Department of Foreign Affairs, PNP, and Coast Guard) were also present in MNCC meetings. The civil-military coordination officers were assigned to link with international NGOs, and correspondingly, Civil Relations Service officers on the ground. AFP line units (brigade, battalion) have Civil Relations Service officers tasked to liaise with civilian Philippine agencies, LGUs and NGOs within their area of operations. They serve as the line unit's point-of-contact with civilian players.

The Manila and Cebu MNCCs had differing roles and responsibilities, tailored to avoid overlap. The two maintained an active communications link to ensure smooth operations. In Manila, the MNCC-National provided tentative flight schedules and situational overviews. Once arrived at the MNCC-Cebu, the AFP had full control over incoming relief resources. The MNCCs notified incoming air assets that second and later flights were subject to change, pending operational requirements. The MNCCs also decided that Philippine C-130s could accommodate un-palletized (mostly DSWD) cargo while the foreign C-130s would prioritize palletized cargoes.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set up a Civil-Military Coordination Center at the Cebu hub to provide assistance to the international NGOs (INGOs) for their transport needs. Brigadier General Santiago, who headed the MNCC-Cebu, was able to convince participating countries with military assets in Cebu to agree that the UN logistics cluster co-led by the World Food Programme would determine the prioritization of UN and INGO cargo and personnel, provided that the participating countries had a veto (i.e., priority of their own government relief goods). With respect to the Philippine government, MNCC-Cebu received tasking/priorities from the Regional DRRMC. Like Commodore Mariano, General Santiago was careful to present the MNCC-Cebu activities as under the RDRRMC,

although candidly admitting that for the most part, the military and the UN lead agency worked things out. According to General Santiago, the system in Cebu was very efficient, enabling local NGOs to coordinate with DSWD regarding their cargo (which went directly on Philippine C-130s), while INGO palletized goods could proceed on a different logistics track.

In after-action reviews, officers identified several gaps in the operation of the MNCC. Perhaps most critically there was a shortage of qualified personnel with CCC or MNCC experience, which was compounded by a lack of suitable office space and equipment. Officers at the MNCC were hindered by insufficient information sharing processes and procedures (the U.S. APAN system was not accessible to other countries), leading to the use of social networks and regular email. Operational planning suffered significantly due to the absence of timely data on humidity, temperature, supply routes, and other critical information. Finally, the MNCC suffered from a pronounced lack of geospatial capabilities for damage and needs assessments that could be shared quickly with other countries.³⁸

In preparation for the typhoon's eventual landfall and during relief operations, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs coordinated extensively through meetings with its relevant Philippine government counterparts, particularly the OCD. This working relationship had been established in previous engagements as OCHA had been operating in the Philippines since 2009 in response to the armed conflict in Mindanao. The following year, in 2010, OCHA established a Philippine office after Typhoon Ondoy. In 2013, OCHA was part of several disaster response operations before Haiyan: flooding in Luzon due to the *Habagat* monsoon, the armed conflict in Zamboanga, and the Bohol earthquake in October.

The primary mandate of UN OCHA is the coordination of humanitarian action. OCHA supports humanitarian response coordination among local, national and international actors through the UN clusters. The UN clusters are composed of UN and non-UN operational agencies, and can serve as a “bridging mechanism” to ensure

³⁸ Mariano, personal communication, 14 January 2015.

humanitarian activities are coordinated with the government and with the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). In the Philippines, the UN introduced the UN cluster system in 2006, and the Philippine NDCC institutionalized the cluster system in 2008.³⁹

During Typhoon Haiyan operations, the Philippine Government departments set up 11 clusters: Education, Camp Coordination/Camp Management, Early Recovery and Livelihood, Emergency Shelter, Emergency Telecommunications, Food Security and Agriculture, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection (divided into Child Protection, Gender-Based Violence Housing, Land and Property) and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. The clusters were led by the Philippine departments, with their UN counterparts as co-leads. These 11 clusters had been adopted permanently in the DRRMCs and had replaced the original eight. During Typhoon Haiyan operations, OCHA was responsible for leading a series of general coordination meetings as well as inter-cluster coordination meetings during assessment, planning, response and monitoring and evaluation. The first inter-cluster coordination meeting was held in the UNICEF office in Manila on 13 November, *day 5*, and another one was held on 18 November 2013, *day 10*. The majority of the general coordination meetings were held in Tacloban and Roxas.⁴⁰

Under the cluster system, the co-lead UN agencies play a *supporting* role and are advised to follow the lead of the government. Inter-cluster coordination during Haiyan was in the hands of the OCD.⁴¹ Coordination among actors varied across different clusters.

One of the earliest activated clusters (9 November, *day 1*) was the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), with OCD as lead agency and the WFP as the co-lead agency. ETC partners included: Emergency. Lu (Luxembourg Government), Ericsson Response, MSB/Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Irish Aid, Save the Children, Plan International, OCHA, Global VSAT Forum, and NetHope. The purpose was to provide

³⁹ National Disaster Coordinating Council, Circular 12 s.2008, "Amendment to the NDCC Circulars Nos. 5, s. 2007, and 4, s.2008," (Quezon City: NDCC, 6 October 2008), 1. See Chapter II for overview of the Philippine cluster system.

⁴⁰ Palacio, personal communication, 17 June 2014.

⁴¹ Rey Gozon, Office of Civil Defense, *Task Force Yolanda* (Presentation at UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Consultative Group, March 2014).

secure telecommunications, voice and data connectivity services to the humanitarian community on the ground (Cebu, Guiuan, Roxas City, Tacloban, Borongan and Estancia) and to the strategic coordination centers in Manila. The ETC also liaised with local authorities for importation of emergency telecoms equipment (through the OSS) and approval of required licenses. The ETC shared support services in terms of providing personnel, equipment, information and office space to ensure effective deployment in required common operational areas.

The Health Cluster, led by DOH and co-led by WHO, was activated on 11 November, *day 3*. The initial cluster meeting set up a coordination and deployment system for Foreign Medical Teams (FMTs), which was lacking within the country's coordination system. The special temporary permit required to practice medicine in the Philippines was waived by the Professional Regulations Commission to allow teams to deploy swiftly where needed. Under the Health Cluster set-up, coordination, tasking and assessment were done through daily cluster meetings. These intensive daily meetings in Manila continued for almost a month. Teams were deployed based on the type of capabilities they possessed (Type 1, 2 or 3) and where they were needed. Information was drawn from the regional hubs in Tacloban, Cebu, and Roxas. FMTs had to demonstrate their ability to be self-sustaining in terms of logistics, food, and water.⁴²

In major disasters, the OCHA standard operating procedure includes the establishment of On-site Operations Coordination Centers (OSOCC) for international actors in the affected areas. An OSOCC is a physical facility established in a humanitarian operations center to support coordination. At an OSOCC, international relief teams are registered and receive basic information about the situation, the operations of in-country and international responders, as well as logistical arrangements. While it has similarities with an Incident Command Post, an OSOCC is different in the sense that it is a coordination hub that *operates on consensus*, as opposed to the command-and-control nature of an ICP. The OSOCCs are established and run by UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination, which falls under OCHA.

⁴² Dr. Joel Buenaventura, Department of Health, personal communication, 13 June 2014.

In the Haiyan disaster, international organizations and agencies could obtain information regarding existing needs, required responses, and schedules of meetings from the OSOCC. OCHA, together with WFP, IOM and UNICEF were able to secure approval from the Secretaries of National Defense and Interior and Local Government for an OSOCC to be set up, first in Tacloban and later in Roxas. The Tacloban OSOCC was near the government's operations center in Tacloban, while the one in Roxas was co-located with the government Emergency Operations Center. An OSOCC was established early in Cebu, although it functioned more as a logistics hub. The strategy of co-locating the OSOCC near the government's Operations Center greatly eased OCHA coordination with other actors.⁴³

As part of its mandate to assist coordination of humanitarian response and information systems, OCHA began to establish information management tools for the Typhoon Haiyan operations. First, an online information sharing-platform, the Philippine Humanitarian Response website, was created (www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/philippines). Information updates and assessment data for the platform were received from each cluster and posted daily.

On 24 November, *day 16*, partners started their regular reporting cycle with the OSOCC. This facilitated the creation of Who Does What Where (3Ws) mapping, which showed operational partners and the cluster presence in the affected areas. Aside from the physical OSOCCs, OCHA created a Virtual OSOCC for Typhoon Haiyan Operations as another means of information-sharing. In practice, the Virtual OSOCC served primarily to foster coordination among UN agencies and national relief teams. It remains unclear to what extent this tool was used or understood by domestic Philippine responders. The bulk of Virtual OSOCC discussions and rosters were posted by UN organizations and foreign country teams.

The OSOCC, established near the government Operations Center, had selective participation as only the cluster leads met for assessment and tasking on a daily basis. Neither were the weekly general coordination meetings for all partners widely attended. In actuality, many international

⁴³ Palacio, personal communication, 17 June 2014.

medical teams determined independently their own area for field operations through prior contacts. For example, the Japanese medical NGO Humanitarian Medical Assistance (HuMA) had a prior partnership with the Davao DOH and expressed little need for the cluster. Some international NGOs, e.g., International Medical Corps, did find the cluster meetings useful for identifying potential areas of service or for finding partners. Given that their priority was field operations, the relief providers admitted they were short of personnel to attend these and other parallel daily meetings by Task Force Yolanda. The UN OSOCC and the Philippine Task Force Yolanda presented dual coordination tracks with different participants and with perhaps dissimilar information. At some point, the need for information declined as the relief providers settled into their field operations. The Japan military medical team, although invited, did not attend the cluster meetings run by the Philippine DOH or those coordinated by the OSOCC.

On 10 November, *day 2*, OCHA established at the Tacloban airport its Reception/Departure Center (RDC) next to the Philippine government (combined OCD, DSWD, DOH) liaison and coordination center, which processed incoming international humanitarian assistance. However, the OCHA Reception/Departure Center received little traffic for registration, briefing and logistical arrangements from incoming international humanitarian organizations in its early days of operation. International organizations preferred to go directly to the Philippine government liaison and coordination center. The UNOCHA RDC was used primarily for incoming bilateral country teams.

OCHA linked up with DFA for information sharing and for facilitation of clearances for its international response teams. This link was important as one of the initial challenges that OCHA faced was facilitating the 9 November deployment via AFP C-130 of foreign UNDAC team members to Tacloban. The OCD, DFA, the AFP J-3, and the Office of the Secretary of National Defense quickly facilitated one-night processing to enable foreign members of the UNDAC team to make the morning flight to Tacloban.

The Philippine Red Cross (PRC) relied heavily on personnel and volunteers from its local chapters. The PRC coordinated extensively with the NDRRMC in Camp Aguinaldo and DRRMCs at the local level as

well as through the Philippine-UN cluster system. However, the PRC's independence as an "auxiliary" to public authorities and its status as the first point of contact for ICRC and IFRC meant that it undertook some relief activities independently. Initially the PRC independently deployed to Leyte, distributed goods from its partner societies, and conducted medical missions with local partners.⁴⁴

For ASEAN, the AHA Centre is the first point of contact for ASEAN member-states during disasters. It coordinates directly with the National Disaster Management Offices of member states. In the case of the Philippines, this point of contact was the OCD. As a matter of protocol, the AHA teams deployed within a member-state receive instructions from its National Disaster Management Office and are embedded in this structure as a means of supporting member-state needs.

ASEAN limitations in terms of resources and personnel had an impact on the extent and location of its coordination during the Haiyan operations. While AHA initially coordinated with the national government in Manila the day before typhoon landfall, the AHA team subsequently based itself in Tacloban. The lack of resources was a major reason why they chose to coordinate on a tactical (Tacloban) rather than on a strategic level (Manila). The AHA Centre additionally was responsible for briefing the ASEAN Secretary General and ASEAN Country Permanent Representatives for the purpose of deciding on how to best help the Philippines. While the AHA team had coordination lines with the OSOCC in Tacloban and the various UN Clusters, their main client was the OCD. The few AHA representatives had to prioritize which meetings of many meetings to attend. While they were present in UN general coordination meetings, they were not able to attend the cluster meetings. These coordination meetings were useful for apprising the AHA team of what was going on in the other hubs.

As its coordination was confined to Tacloban, AHA Centre response priorities were based on information from local actors as well as its local partners. In deploying its ASEAN District Stockpile from Malaysia, the AHA based its priorities on which type of materials to bring on the request made by OCD for pre-fabricated offices, generators, and mobile

⁴⁴ Eclarinal, personal communication, July 4, 2014.

storage units. The logistics from the warehouse to the airport as well as the necessary clearances from the Malaysian Office of the Prime Minister were resolved by the World Food Programme (WFP). The Malaysian Air Force airlifted the materials directly to Tacloban City. The AHA team on the ground was also notified when relief goods were deployed from Indonesia and Brunei and the team readied equipment and personnel for fast offloading. Landing opportunities in Tacloban airport were very limited and delays frequently hampered offloading operations of other relief actors. Upon arrival in Tacloban, volunteers and the AFP helped unload the goods. After obtaining the required clearances from the airport authorities, the AHA team oversaw the logistics of transferring the goods from airport to the DSWD warehouse or to the OCD warehouse in Palo, Leyte. When deploying the Malaysian military medical team, the AHA team prioritized the needs of the *barangays* based on information from local authorities.⁴⁵

Coordination among these different players varied significantly based on the coordination systems present on the ground. The actors themselves determined tasking, logistics, and communication. One of the key elements of civil-military coordination was task division. Coordination varied across the hubs in Tacloban, Cebu and Roxas. For OCHA, the role of the OSOCC was to simply provide information and a venue for actors to meet talk and discuss. OCHA followed the lead of the government; in the cluster approach, the clusters themselves knew what the gaps and the needs were. The cluster leads knew how to make the best use of the assets available, including military support for logistics and reconstruction.

On 12 November, *day 4*, OCHA issued guidelines titled “Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) for Typhoon Haiyan Operations,” based on the *Oslo Guidelines*. OCHA instructed bilateral deployments of foreign MCDA to support humanitarian operations to consult the NDRRMC or notify the Government of the Philippines through OCHA of their availability.

One of the most important aspects of civil-military coordination is the role of information provided to the clusters, enabling them to utilize assets

⁴⁵ Arnel Capili, ASEAN, personal communication, 19 June 2014.

effectively. This was the case in Haiyan, but not always through OCHA platforms. While OCHA deemed important the information-sharing platform it set up, the foreign militaries had a different set of contingencies. In the case of the U.S. military, the willingness to share information such as flight details was paramount. The Japanese military, on the other hand, had to deal with the issue of their ability to make decisions on the ground, as they needed approval from Tokyo to act on particular requests. The Canadian military in Roxas did not wait for an order from headquarters, and acted upon what was needed on the ground.

The Philippine Red Cross and the AHA Centre had their own set of rules for dealing with the military and with other actors, such as NGOs. The AFP was the PRC's primary logistics partner in the Haiyan operations. In dealing with the military, the PRC abided by international Red Cross standards for Red Cross-military interaction. The PRC followed a strict "no weapons policy" as well as the protection of the Red Cross emblem. All military vehicles used for the relief had to be properly labeled and identified as part of the Red Cross relief operation.

The AHA Centre's interaction with the military was guided by the ASEAN Standby Arrangement Standard Operating Procedure (SASOP), agreed upon by the ten member states. However, the SASOP chapter on civil-military coordination (Chapter VI-Facilitation and Utilization of Military Assets and Capacities) still remained a work in progress when the typhoon hit.⁴⁶ The importance of such guidelines are recognized, as military forces are considered first responders in the ASEAN context, as opposed to them being used as a last resort under the *Oslo Guidelines*. In dealing with NGOs, AHA was guided by the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER, see Chapter II). Coordination was done through the AADMER Partnership Group. The Partnership Group was composed of international non-government organizations whose focus is disaster risk reduction (DRR). These included the Global Movement for Children, Help Age, Mercy Malaysia, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children, and World Vision. AHA's engagement with the AADMER Partnership Group has been informal. During the Haiyan operations, their engagement

⁴⁶ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *SASOP: Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations*, (Jakarta: ASEAN, 2009).

was focused on information sharing and requests for purchase of some resources that were not available in Tacloban. For example, AHA requested that Oxfam purchase gasoline from Cebu.⁴⁷

During Haiyan, the Philippine government launched the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH) on 18 November, *day 10*, in order to track contributions from foreign governments, international relief organizations, multilateral and bilateral organizations and from private donors. FAiTH is a web-based platform which tracks both bilateral in-kind and financial contributions as well as pledges. FAiTH was coordinated by the Department of Budget and Management. The FAiTH Task Force charged with gathering and updating information of foreign assistance, including amount and where sent, was made up of the OCD, DFA, DSWD, DOF, DBM, DOH, National Economic and Development Office (NEDA), Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Management Staff, the Presidential Communications Development & Strategic Planning Office, and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas.

As of 9 April 2015, 18 months after Typhoon Haiyan's landfall, the Philippine Government had received USD 386,084,529.63.⁴⁸ An assessment of the impact of FAiTH has been difficult. The foreign donor pledges reflected on FAiTH were intended to serve as the basis for recovery allocations made by Office of the Presidential Assistant for Relief and Rehabilitation (OPARR).⁴⁹ Pledges made under FAiTH by and large have not been effectively collected. Out of the USD 1,643,038,277.66 pledged, a meager 23 percent had been collected by 9 April 2015. Of the pledges, 38 percent were in-kind and 62 percent were cash.

Insights and Lessons

1. At the national level, two host country coordination platforms existed: the top disaster body in the Philippines, the NDRRMC, and the military MNCC. The NDRRMC had overall control of the civilian and military response, while the MNCC was dedicated to military

⁴⁷ Capili, personal communication, 19 June 2014.

⁴⁸ Government of the Philippines, "Foreign Aid Transparency Report," accessed at <http://www.gov.ph/faith/full-report>.

⁴⁹ Jenny Rose D. Manalo, Writer, Communication and External Affairs Department, Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR), personal communication, 19 June 2014.

coordination. The NDRRMC's coordination role was to be replicated at the lower levels of government (regional, provincial and municipal) and its decisions supported by sustained and timely information inputs from these lower levels of government.

In practice, the NDRRMC's coordination role did not provide sufficient strategic guidance where assistance could be channeled among the various regions. The Regional Incident Commanders and coordinating bodies like MNCC-Cebu made operational decisions concerning foreign resources and assets present in their respective area.

2. At the national level, the disaster management system of the Philippines was tested by Haiyan, particularly in the realm of civilian coordination.

The lack of top-level leadership at the NDRRMC quickly became a painful liability. The individual departments bypassed the coordination of the NDRRMC and Office of Civil Defense (OCD), and worked independently in response. In this disaster, the limitations of a coordinating council such as the NDRRMC were made apparent. Civilian departments at all levels lacked the tight coordination and seamless communications of the military.

3. The inability of the OCD to assume many of its core functions (such as establishing a logistics cluster) led other actors to fulfill these functions.

Although the NDRRMC Operations Center in Camp Aguinaldo continued to collect assessments and disseminate situation reports, this activity was sporadic and insufficient for the tasks at hand. The OCD Operations Center was not able to direct its regional and local OCD counterparts, nor able to augment their capacities in terms of manpower or communications. The Department of Foreign Affairs shouldered the burden of vetting and accepting international offers. Yet the OCD offices in Manila and at the regional levels did not always utilize this information optimally.

4. As coordinating bodies, the NDRRMC and MNCC varied. The NDRRMC's theoretical role was to be apex of bilateral coordination (foreign country assistance of cash, in-kind or personnel deployment). Decisions were to be made by the NDRRMC, informed by the

departments, and passed down to the regional and municipal DRRMCs. In actuality, decisions were made directly by the DFA and the OSS system, by the UN, or via DND bodies such as the MNCC. The NDRRMC gatekeeping role was inherently weak. Practically no offer of bilateral assistance was screened for matching the needs quickly unfolding on the ground, nor was any offer of assistance rejected.

5. Clusters at the regional and local level generally performed as intended, but with little national input.

Although UN and international NGOs were to connect first with the NDRRMC through the cluster system, the national-level clusters had uneven records of functionality and utilization. It was unclear when each cluster was established and by whom. Some, such as the logistics and emergency telecommunications clusters, were set up even without NDRRMC oversight or direction. The Health Cluster experienced contention among national (DOH), WHO and international medical personnel on the issue of waivers of license to practice, medicines and the registration of military medical teams.

6. Although the NDRRMC is organized at the secretary level, the NDRRMC had difficulty providing top-level strategic direction.

In the early stages of the response most of the key players of the NDRRMC (Secretaries Roxas, Gazmin, and Solíman) were in the field, directing operations from Tacloban. More junior staff left in Manila were not sufficient to empower NDRRMC decision-making. Of note is the finding that OCHA discussed and obtained permission to open OSOCCs directly from Secretaries Gazmin and Roxas while they were both in Tacloban. This decision should have been made at the headquarters level. Ultimately, too few decision-makers remained in Manila incapacitating the National DRRM Council in the early days of response.

7. The MNCC was a multinational body devoted to *tactical* operations.

While the MNCC fostered multinational coordination, military assistance to the Philippines was made on bilateral bases. The foreign military representatives were ultimately accountable to their home country civilian principals. On top of the bilateral arrangements, OCHA issued guidelines, instructions and notices to member countries about the MCDA

and the *Oslo Guidelines*, but it was unknown whether such information had an added value to bilateral donors. Overall, military-to-military coordination and the MNCCs functioned well.

The paradigm for foreign military operations during Haiyan was bilateral negotiation of terms, but multilateral coordination of activities. The foreign militaries contacted the DFA (through their embassies) and the DND directly to establish the parameters of foreign military asset and personnel deployment. Joint task forces (military-to-military) were set up at the MNCC. Although the UN established a Civil-Military Coordinating Center in Manila, it did not see the same level of coordination activity as found in the MNCC, even though co-located at Camp Aguinaldo.

8. Civil-military coordination at the national level was often carried out through the use of liaison officer system.

The MNCC reported to the NDRRMC through the DND, and was careful not to issue information without the NDRRMC's clearance and guidance. The MNCC only took tasking from the NDRRMC (although operationally it was capable of running self-sufficiently). The UN CMC liaison attended MNCC meetings, although it was unclear what added value it provided.

9. The military logistic system was flexible and adapted to operational needs. The use of military assets flowed along bilateral lines at the MNCC, accounting for differences in approach and mandate of each foreign military force.

MNCC-Cebu was able to negotiate a common task order and flight tracking system with individual FMFs. These assets were consequently pooled, and bilateral issues were diminished, with some allowance made for individual country priorities. Civil-military coordination became of particular importance at the MNCC-Cebu hub because assets were pooled. Here the MNCC-Cebu worked closely with the UN logistics cluster (co-led by WFP).

In contrast, there were few pooled assets at Villamor Air Base. Most assets from the U.S. and Japan followed their own country priorities and deployment. At Roxas, there were no civil-military coordination centers set up as there was only two foreign military forces (Canada and the

UK) present in the area. The Canadian unit in particular proved to be highly flexible and accommodating of international requests for logistical support. The process of bilateral negotiation for military assistance in Manila as well as multilateral operations at the hubs worked well in practice and should be retained as a model for future responses.

10. Key actors such as the AHA Centre and the Red Cross coordinated with the NDRRMC or the regional DRRM Councils, and only marginally with the UN cluster system.

The AHA Centre worked exclusively with the OCD as a matter of protocol, and direct coordination was done in Tacloban rather than in Manila. AHA Centre teams coordinated delivery of relief goods provided by Indonesia and Brunei, as well as for the Malaysian military medical team.

The PRC also tended to act independently; as the point of contact for the ICRC and IFRC, it had access to more resources and assets than any other local NGO. The PRC was also able to preposition goods more effectively than other local government agencies due to these assets. Both the AHA ERAT team and the Red Cross utilized military assets, however with restrictions based on their organizational policies.

12. Except for the Philippine Red Cross, which is a member of the NDRRMC, few local or international NGOs appear to have fully utilized the national coordination platforms.

The interface of international NGOs with national government agencies and platforms was limited to the OSS (at Manila and Cebu-Mactan airports). The NGO personnel had to register and submit their equipment, goods and materials to customs, immigration, and quarantine requirements. Where registration required going to offices not located at the airports, such as the DOH Bureau of International Health Cooperation (BIHC), many INGOs bypassed the registration process and proceeded directly to their field operations. Many local NGOs in particular had little use for coordination platforms based in Manila because most of their personnel were assigned to field operations.

13. The private sector of both the Philippine and the international community contributed significantly to Haiyan relief and recovery.

Many of these contributions consisted of cash grants to major organizations such as the NDRRMC, OCHA, or the Philippine Red

Cross. In a number of instances, however, companies gave commodities and relief goods directly. Several international companies arranged to send needed items directly to Philippine consignees. For instance, Procter & Gamble Japan provided pallets of diapers to a local Japanese government consortium to ship via the Japan Air Self-Defense Force directly to DSWD. Such arrangements were valuable as they ensured the goods in question were needed and would flow through a Philippine logistics hub such as the One-Stop Shop. In this case P&G was aided by its local branches in-country, which connected P&G Japan with an appropriate consignee.

Similarly, the American Chamber of Commerce provided relief goods directly to evacuees arriving at Villamor, which they coordinated with the national DSWD station at the airport. Throughout, effective private sector contributions in relief were made in partnership with or via local partners. Many businesses recognized as well the value of cash donations, opting to send money to facilitate purchase of relief goods in-country.

14. The Typhoon Haiyan response featured new programs in terms of information-sharing and in the creation of new offices and coordination systems.

These included the on-line portal FAiTH, which provided updated information to donors, beneficiaries and the general public about foreign assistance received or pledged. FAiTH has been described as a pioneering effort in making the Philippine Government accountable for international calamity aid and assistance. It is still too early to determine whether FAiTH provides the Philippine public with a system that clearly holds its national and local officials and departments accountable for wise fiscal management in the use of disaster relief and recovery funds.

Despite the newness of the One-Stop Shop (OSS) system and the issues surrounding departmental representation at the Manila and regional One-Stop Shops, the system has significant merit. The OSS operations did reveal fundamental gaps in the system of accepting international assistance consigned through the DSWD and the issue of demurrage payments. Future tasks for OSS leadership will involve ensuring adequate departmental representation, functional civil-military lines of communication, and proper staffing of sub-OSS branches at regional and local levels.

The system for registering Foreign Medical Teams (FMTs) by the DOH Bureau of International Health Cooperation was also a new disaster management system. The system requires FMTs to inform the Bureau of International Health Cooperation of their capabilities, number of personnel, logistical requirements and planned duration of the intervention. The registration system enabled BIHC to determine the type of capabilities that they had and where they might be deployed.

These three new systems also experienced challenges. FAiTH did not provide mechanisms for following up with pledges, potentially yielding false expectations regarding the volume of overseas assistance. More critical was the FAiTH reporting of actual expenditures toward relief and recovery. Medical services were duplicated because many medical teams proceeded to Cebu where no registration system was in place. Many of the 151 total medical teams ended up in Tacloban, especially small volunteer groups without liaison officers or offices in Manila. While the U.S., Japan and Malaysian military medical teams at least registered with the Health Cluster-DOH, other military teams who utilized Villamor, Cebu and Tacloban as their point of entry did not register and deployed wherever they deemed fit.

The Philippine Red Cross also created a system dedicated to Haiyan operations, the Typhoon Haiyan Operations Office. This allowed for Haiyan-related operations to continue without impinging upon the PRC's other daily operations. Other new features of this office included purchasing vehicles and equipment for clearing operations, a first for the Philippine Red Cross. The Office will be terminated in 2016-2017, when the Haiyan recovery and rehabilitation efforts are completed.

EASTERN SAMAR/LEYTE (TACLOBAN) — REGION VIII

Typhoon Haiyan made its first landfall at Guiuan in Region VIII on Samar Island, resulting in heavy damage. A second landfall occurred soon thereafter in Tacloban, which was devastated by high winds and catastrophic storm surge. As much as 35 percent of the total geographical areas and people affected by the storm came from this region. A total of six provinces, seven cities, and 137 municipalities that comprised 4,387 *barangays* were hit hard by the typhoon in this region. A total of



A Philippine Air Force crewman assists as an injured evacuee from Tacloban is unloaded at Villamor Air Base. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Caleb Hoover/Released).

850,080 families or around 4,271,726 individuals were affected within Region VIII, and a 17 April 2014 NDRMMC situation report put the death toll at 5,877, with 1,005 missing and 26,186 injured. Houses destroyed or heavily damaged numbered 497,000.⁵⁰ Vast damage to roads, major infrastructure, telecommunications, power generation, and water supply was recorded throughout the region. As of 23 November, fully half of all citizens on Samar and Leyte Islands had no access to functioning markets.

Tacloban City alone suffered a total of around PHP 13 billion in damages, while the rest of the province of Leyte suffered losses amounting to around PHP 30 billion. Eastern Samar ranked third, with PHP 11.1 billion in damages, while losses in Samar and Southern Leyte amounted to PHP 5.1 billion and PHP 1.084 billion respectively. Of the PHP 60.5 billion total damage suffered by the region, PHP 16.1 billion was lost in terms of infrastructure and PHP 17.3 billion in livelihoods.⁵¹

⁵⁰ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, *NDRMMC Update re the Effects of Typhoon "Yolanda" (Haiyan)*, 17 April 2014, 1.

⁵¹ As of April 2015, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to 44 Philippine pesos.

Preemptive Action, Prepositioning and Response

In Leyte and Eastern Samar, the local government units (LGUs), the national departments, and the AFP prepared for the landfall of Typhoon Haiyan. Their preparations were based on advisories and directives from the national government. Key activities included preparedness meetings with national officials, preemptive evacuation in some areas, and the prepositioning of quick response teams and relief goods.

Local government units (LGUs) assisted by troops of the AFP 8th Infantry Division stationed in the area began preemptive evacuation in varying scales beginning on 6 November in Catbalogan, Salcedo, Guiuan and Oras in Eastern Samar, and Tacloban City and Tolosa in Leyte. The 19th Infantry Brigade and 802nd Engineering Battalion evacuated approximately 1,308 families in Palo, Matag-ob, Tanauan, Babatngon, Burauen and Kananga in Leyte. Also on 6 November, the AFP Battle Staff Charlie (“C”) and HA/DR Crisis Action Team were activated. The regional and provincial staff of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) prepositioned 5,000 relief packs on 7 November while the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) placed their personnel on red alert.⁵²

The city of Tacloban and neighboring coastal communities bore the brunt of Typhoon Haiyan. The death toll and damage to property and infrastructure were exceptionally high due to the storm surge, which inundated low-lying coastal areas. Damaged roads, fallen trees and the closure of sea and airports limited access to affected areas. Communication between the affected areas and Manila was cut off. In Palo, Leyte, the DILG and DND team on the ground used a satellite phone from the ASEAN (AHA Centre) team, and reported to the Philippine President on 8 November afternoon.⁵³ The Governor of Leyte reported that power lines were down and roads were impassable and immediately flashed an appeal to the NDRRMC and humanitarian community. He appealed for food, flashlights and other non-food items.

In the first 24 hours after the typhoon’s landfall, the local response teams were incapacitated. The initial tasks of assessment, search and

⁵² Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.

⁵³ Ibid.

rescue, and relief distribution had to be done by teams coming from Manila by C-130 or by slow overland routes.

With the Philippine Air Force's Tactical Operations Group at Tacloban destroyed, a key AFP priority was establishing communications on the ground. The DND Central Command (CENTCOM) directed the 8th Signal Battalion to establish communications in Tacloban while the 2nd Air Division was ordered to conduct air reconnaissance.⁵⁴ On 9 November, *day 1*, three C-130 cargo planes from Villamor Air Base landed at the newly reopened Tacloban airport carrying relief goods, personnel and communications equipment. The first team included AFP member Captain Roy Trinidad of the Philippine Navy who was designated Incident Commander for Tacloban Airport. AFP personnel were the first responders to arrive and were tasked to determine the extent of the damage and create an inventory of needs necessary to make the airport operational.

Other military tasks were to facilitate cargo offloading and to provide security for relief items. Additionally, the AFP was tasked with devising a system for getting members of the affected population on board aircraft bound for Manila and Cebu.⁵⁵ The 8th Infantry Division, a Philippine military unit based in Samar/Leyte, was tasked to secure airports/seaports and warehouses serving as staging areas and logistical hubs in coordination with DSWD/PNP.⁵⁶ The AFP was also tasked to retrieve cadavers in coordination with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) and to clear debris in coordination with the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA). While its primary area of responsibility is Metro Manila, the MMDA was the first civilian agency to arrive and conduct clearing operations. MMDA with its necessary equipment, skills and personnel headed the Task Group (TG) on Debris Clearing under TF Yolanda in Tacloban. By 20 November, *day 12*, the Task Group reported that Tacloban City debris had been 41 percent cleared.

⁵⁴ The Philippine Air Force Tactical Operations Group stationed at Tacloban Airport was supposed to be the military's foothold in Tacloban City. Three military personnel were killed and 12 went missing while 31 were wounded when their base was inundated by the storm surge.

⁵⁵ Captain Roy Vincent Trinidad, Philippine Navy, personal communication, 14 August 2014.

⁵⁶ General Jet Velarmino, Commanding Officer, 8th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, personal communication, 26 August 2014.



Colonel Emmanuel Cacdac (left), deputy commander of JTF Yolanda, Captain Roy Trinidad (middle), commander of Task Group Airport JTF Yolanda and Rear Admiral Cindy Thebaud, JTF-505 Maritime Liaison Officer at the Tacloban Airport. Swift action by the AFP, aided by the U.S. military, restored the functionality of the airport. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonah Z. Stepanik/Released.)

The AFP conducted the daily morning briefings from the Incident Command Post, which were attended by heads or representatives from responding departments. The AFP 8th Infantry Division was augmented for these tasks by troops coming from the 2nd, 5th, 7th, and 9th Divisions of the Philippine Army based in Luzon. Additional PNP personnel and assets from nearby provinces were also deployed to augment the AFP troops in Tacloban.⁵⁷

The confusion in the local response efforts was further increased by an overwhelming influx of external responders. Tensions between the DILG secretary Mar Roxas and Tacloban City mayor Romualdez were noted over reports of local government “failure” in disaster response and a national government “takeover” of the entire operation.⁵⁸ The Executive Director

⁵⁷ Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.

⁵⁸ Testimony of Department of Interior and Local Government Secretary Mar Roxas and Tacloban City Mayor Alfred Romualdez, *Post-Disaster Management Briefing/ Review: Hearing before the Congressional Oversight Committee on Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010*, (Joint Session, 16th Congress, 2014).

of the NDRRMC, Under Secretary Eduardo del Rosario, announced the establishment in Tacloban of a regional task force for emergency relief and rehabilitation, i.e., Task Force Yolanda or TF Yolanda.⁵⁹ From the Incident Command Post established on 8 November at the Tacloban Police Station, the Incident Commander-designate Brigadier General Jet Velarmino of the 8th Infantry Division began execution of response operations in the area.

Task Force Yolanda's initial directives were: to begin the clearing of roads and airports to allow assessment and relief operations to proceed, to establish communications, to clear cadavers, and to maintain peace and order in the area.⁶⁰ As the Regional Incident Commander, General Velarmino said he had authority to determine the deployment of foreign forces and the utilization of their assets in close coordination with the concerned Philippine government departments (DPWH, DOH, DSWD, etc.), as well as with the recipient local government units and DILG. General Velarmino wished to ensure assessed needs were met.⁶¹ As Incident Commander, General Velarmino reported directly to the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) and to the AFP Central Command in Cebu, as well as to the NDRRMC.

In Tacloban, three command posts were established: (a) the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), DSWD, and the Department of Health liaison and coordination center were located at the airport; (b) OCD Region VIII coordination center at the city police station; and, (c) DSWD was at the city hall which was designated the central relief distribution center. The OCD regional and coordination center at the airport was tasked to liaise and coordinate with incoming local and international relief teams, and to provide information briefings. The OCD personnel at the police station ran secretariat and operations support for TF Yolanda.⁶²

Once coordination was established, the AFP began relief operations. The AFP began airlifting 6,200 DSWD food packs to communities in and

⁵⁹ Similar regional task forces were established for Panay and Cebu.

⁶⁰ Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.

⁶¹ Five Task Groups (TG) were created under TF Yolanda, headed by lead agencies: TG Food and Water Distribution (DSWD), TG Logistics (PNP and OCD), TG Debris Clearing (MMDA), TG Peace, Law and Order (AFP and PNP) and TG Cadaver Collection (Bureau of Fire Protection-BFP).

⁶² Gozon, *Yolanda*, 2014.

around Tacloban. On 12 November, *day 4*, DSWD began distributing relief goods which included food to feed a family of five for two to three days. Thirteen evacuation centers serving 15,000 people were set up around Tacloban. The MMDA and Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) undertook road clearing operations, with the MMDA deploying an additional 20 heavy equipment units, such as forklifts, dump trucks and payloaders to complement the DPWH efforts.

AFP and PNP personnel were deployed to establish checkpoints to address reported incidents of looting, provide general security in Leyte and to secure land-based supply routes to Tacloban and the towns of Leyte. Additional police personnel were flown in from Manila and other regions to augment security. Of these, 162 Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) personnel and 508 police officers were deployed in Tacloban. Upon the recommendation of the Tacloban city government, a curfew was imposed beginning on the evening of November 10, *day 2*.

The UN deployed two UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams to Tacloban City on 11 November, *day 3*. One UNDAC assessment team was based at Tacloban Airport while the second was at Tacloban City Hall. The UNDAC Reception/Departure Center (RDC) at the airport was tasked to brief and coordinate incoming international responders.

The OCD and the World Food Programme (WFP) co-leads set up the Logistics Cluster which mobilized 16 additional trucks to increase the food distribution capacity in Tacloban and surrounding areas to 400 metric tons per day.⁶³ In the first two weeks, supplies and relief food items were primarily shipped or airlifted from Manila or Cebu. In order to address the congestion of relief goods at Tacloban airport, WFP installed a mobile storage unit at the airport.

With funding and fuel support from USAID, the Philippine Local Water Utilities Administration, DOH and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reestablished the water system in Tacloban on 17 November, *day 9*. Additional recorded efforts included the DOH

⁶³ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan, Factsheet No. 6, Fiscal Year 2014*, 16 November, 2013.

and UNICEF installing 76 latrines in Tacloban City evacuation centers.⁶⁴ The Fuel Relief Fund (FRF), a U.S.-based non-profit, provided free fuel to UN agencies and NGOs from two Petron gas stations in Tacloban from 17 November to 9 December, and also provided free fuel in the towns of Palo, Tanauan Pastrana, Alangalang and Marabut.⁶⁵

Bilateral assistance poured into Tacloban and surrounding vicinities. Of note were three medical teams from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) which provided level 2 medical facilities at Rizal Park in Tacloban, provided support to Tacloban City Hospital and Basey District Hospital in Samar, and provided mobile services around Tacloban. JICA's first medical team began operations in Tacloban on 15 November, *day 7*, while the two additional teams followed on 20 November and 29 November. To support health-related relief operations, the hospital ship *Daishandao* (Peace Ark) from China's People's Liberation Army Navy dropped anchor off Tacloban on 24 November.⁶⁶

Relief supplies from the U.S. military began arriving on 11 November, *day 3*. Two weeks later, on 26 November, the U.S. military completed its critical airlift and relief support. The U.S. military assistance component, the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB), began operating on 11 November, *day 3*. Together with the AFP, the 3rd MEB helped facilitate the re-opening and 24-hour usage of Tacloban Airport. On 12 November, the U.S. Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (Combined Task Force CTF-70) was deployed in support of the 3rd MEB operations in Leyte, Samar and Guiuan. With the 13 November, *day 5*, opening of the Guiuan airstrip that allowed C-130s to land, the U.S. military transported USAID/OFDA-provided relief supplies from Villamor Air Base (Manila) to typhoon-affected communities in Guiuan and surrounding areas for onward distribution.⁶⁷

The USS *George Washington* carrier strike group arrived off the coast of Samar, close to the Guiuan airstrip, on 13 November, *day 5* and

⁶⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Philippines: *Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 12 (as of 18 November 2013)*, (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 6.

⁶⁵ Fuel Relief Fund, "Super Typhoon Haiyan," 9 December 2013, accessed at <http://fuelreliefund.org/haiyan-relief>.

⁶⁶ Chiu, *Lessons*, 39.

⁶⁷ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan, Factsheet No. 13, Fiscal Year 2014*, 27 November, 2013.

began operations on *day 6*. Aside from providing airlift capabilities for the relief operations, CTF-70 was also tasked to produce and distribute bulk potable water in Guiuan and vicinity. U.S. military forces also provided fuel support to the AFP in Tacloban, and assisted in road clearing operations and in transporting victims from affected areas to Manila.

The naval units from the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) arrived in Leyte Gulf and commenced operations on 24 November, *day 14*. JSDF activities during the Typhoon Haiyan operations included medical care services, vaccination campaigns, and epidemic prevention activities. The military of Japan also utilized JSDF air assets to transport relief goods and people.⁶⁸ An overlap in the deployment timelines allowed JSDF to provide logistics and personnel support for the JICA medical team's vaccination campaign and Tacloban air surveillance. The JSDF ended operations on 13 December 2013, *day 35*.

Coordination, Networks and Linkages

The region-wide Task Force Yolanda established by the NDRRMC provided and tested the platform for coordinating inter-Philippine agency activities. Apart from Tacloban, TF Yolanda also coordinated responses at the two other sub-hubs in Guiuan (Samar Island) and Ormoc (Leyte Island). TF Yolanda followed the Incident Command System, with General Velarmino as its Regional Incident Commander. The Incident Command System established at Tacloban played a very significant role in the first few weeks of emergency operations as TF Yolanda practically ran the response effort in the area.

The initial Incident Command Post meetings were instrumental in informing the other actors of the Philippine Government's three major objectives for early relief: (1) clearing the roads to allow relief operations to proceed; (2) clearing the roads of the cadavers which were causing psychological issues among survivors as well as humanitarian actors, and; (3) maintaining peace and order. Tasking, coordination and assessment meetings were initially held at the Tacloban Police Headquarters, which

⁶⁸ Mannami, Manabu, "JSDF Disaster Relief Activities for the Republic of the Philippines," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

served as the command center for the first three days, until it was moved to the Tacloban City Sports Complex on 12 November, *day 4*.

Regular coordination meetings between the Task Force and the clusters were held at 4 p.m. daily. These meetings were called to provide a means of updating the daily Haiyan disaster situation reports, assessing needs, and planning relief and distribution operations. TF Yolanda also coordinated operations with international humanitarian aid partners. For instance, the ASEAN Centre for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) participated in the TF Yolanda meetings within the first 48 hours after the storm's landfall. OCHA's OSOCC established on 9 November, on the other hand, liaised directly with the OCD Regional DRRM Council in Tacloban and the NDRRMC in Manila.⁶⁹ At the Incident Command Post, nightly briefings at 8:00 p.m. took place with foreign military forces, NGOs, and local and national government officials.

The Philippine Government relief distribution became more systematic beginning 14 November, *day 6*. At this stage the hub-and-spoke model of relief became fully operational, run by Philippine civilian and military leaders and by international partners. The relief goods transported to the three major sub-hubs in Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan were then distributed to outlying areas using ground vehicles or air assets. The AFP unloaded goods at destination points where mayors, village leaders (or "persons of authority") were in charge of the distributing the goods to affected residents in their respective communities. Gaps in this process were noted, however, and included failure of the mayors or village leaders to distribute the goods, and a tendency to implement excessive bureaucratic requirements for receiving goods.⁷⁰

On 9 November, *day 1*, the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) set up its On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) near the Philippine TF Yolanda Operations Center. This UN OSOCC served as a physical facility where international relief teams were registered and were briefed about operations and logistical arrangements. The OSOCC was a central coordination point for the clusters. The following UN clusters were active in Tacloban: Food and Non-food Items; Camp Coordination

⁶⁹ Palacio, personal communication, 17 June 2014.

⁷⁰ Gazmin, *Briefing*, 2014.

and Camp Management (CCCM); Emergency Shelter; Protection; WASH; Health and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support; Logistics and Emergency Telecommunications; and Education.⁷¹

The UN OSOCC held its own assessment and tasking review during the coordination meetings held daily at 4:00 p.m. The OSOCC held a general coordination meeting for all partners on Fridays each week. The OSOCC requested the UN cluster lead agencies send one representative to these meetings. Within each of the different clusters, coordination meetings between partners were also held on a daily basis. OCHA additionally sent a representative to TF Yolanda's daily 4:00 pm coordination meetings.

The UN Humanitarian Country Team members held meetings at the Tacloban City Hall. The OCD chaired the first inter-cluster coordination meeting on 14 November, *day 6*. A U.S. civil-military liaison officer also began operating at the OSOCC on 13 November. At least four coordination meetings per day were held in Tacloban.

Logistics was one of the critical areas for engagement and coordination among HA/DR actors in Tacloban. The OCD and the PNP, primarily charged with logistics under TF Yolanda, were able to access AFP's land mobility and airlift assets. These assets were utilized in both government-led operations as well as by other humanitarian actors. To assist with international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the Logistics Cluster civil-military coordination expert liaised with the AFP to manage the limited landing slots at the Tacloban airport. The Logistics Cluster, led by OCD and WFP, mobilized a dedicated fleet of 30 trucks to operate in Leyte and also contracted a large cargo vessel from Cebu to Tacloban. The vessel assisted with humanitarian operations for one month. The PNP separately activated its Disaster Incident Management Task Groups, which included a Directorate for Logistics.

With the Philippine Port Authority's reopening of the Tacloban seaport on 14 November *day 6*, ships were able to deliver food and relief commodities directly to the city, which eased some congestion from the region's air transportation network. The Mindanao–Tacloban

⁷¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 9* (as of 15 November 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 7.

and Manila–Tacloban routes were also opened by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) around that time. WFP operated 60 cargo trucks along the Manila to Tacloban route via Matnog and Sorsogon in Luzon and Allen in Samar.⁷² Goods from Luzon traveled through this route, with security and some of the logistics provided for by the Philippine Army's 8th Infantry Division.

UN OCHA set up a Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMC) at its office in Tacloban, as well as at the humanitarian hubs in Guiuan and Ormoc, but not until 30 November, *day 22*. The first CMC coordination meeting was on 2 December in Tacloban.⁷³ While many foreign military force (FMF) assets were present in Tacloban and Eastern Samar, these were largely directed bilaterally, with tasking orders emanating from their civilian principals or from MNCC-Manila. The Japan and Australia FMFs, for instance, used liaison officers to coordinate with the Philippine military. As such they tended to bypass the OCHA CMC, which was utilized far less than the Philippine military coordination systems.

The U.S. and Japan militaries illustrated different patterns of military-to-military coordination. While coordination with U.S. military forces in the early stages of the operation was done through the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (the lead for the tactical mission), this changed from 16 November onward when the U.S. Joint Task Force 505 (JTF-505) was activated and began operating on 18 November under the command of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. Command and control for JTF-505 were largely executed from the MNCC.⁷⁴ The close military relationship between the Philippines and the U.S. resulted in tightly linked coordination architecture.

In contrast, the JSDF activities in Tacloban were coordinated through the JSDF Joint Task Force Tacloban Liaison Officer, who directly linked to the AFP Central Command (CENTCOM) in Cebu and the MNCC in Manila. The AFP dispatched Philippine Navy Officers to JSDF vessels

⁷² United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan, Factsheet No. 8, Fiscal Year 2014*, 19 November, 2013, 2.

⁷³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 17* (as of 25 November 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 8.

⁷⁴ Chiu, *Lessons*, 44.

deployed for the Haiyan operations.⁷⁵ So while Japan participated in the MNCC and facilitated liaison office exchange, the JSDF was not as closely linked with the AFP as were U.S. forces.

The AFP Headquarters of the 8th Infantry Division required all land-based relief convoys to register and inform the military of their deployment area. The Headquarters in turn gave them a briefing of the security situation of the area and provided guides and security escorts.⁷⁶ Several local NGOs also engaged with the AFP in the Leyte and Eastern Samar operations. These NGOs included the Philippine Red Cross, Free Electrification Organization, The Rotary Club, and a number of religious groups. During the early phase of the relief operations, these NGOs requested military escorts as convoys were being harassed by affected individuals requesting food and assistance along the convoys' routes.

Insights and Lessons

1. Local authorities and the general population underestimated the impact of the storm surge. The surge was inadequately predicted by meteorological authorities and insufficiently explained to residents in clear and accessible terms.

While there were directives issued by the national government and by local government units (LGUs) ordering people to evacuate the vulnerable areas along the coast, many refused to do so. This accounted for the tremendous loss of lives.

The majority of these individuals, including some local government officials, failed to grasp key early warning terminologies, particularly what “storm surge” means and the danger it represents. In addition, a subset of the population (particularly the poorer and more vulnerable) did not receive adequate warnings prior to the storm.

2. Because the first responders stationed in the area were themselves victims, there was a vacuum during the first 24 to 48 hours in terms of response and security in the affected areas.

⁷⁵ Manabu, 2014

⁷⁶ Lt. Colonel Cirilo Balaoro, G3, 8th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, personal communication.

The local response teams (DILG, OCD, DSWD) were incapacitated. Also in these first few hours, very few of the 6,453 personnel of the Region VIII Philippine National Police (PNP) were able to perform their functions. Looting and insurgent activities in Tacloban and surrounding areas were reported in the relief operations but were swiftly addressed with additional personnel at checkpoints and with curfews.⁷⁷ The police personnel surge came from Manila and neighboring regions, which helped greatly.

Security was a key concern for some international teams such as the JICA Japan Disaster Response medical team.

3. The paucity of local government personnel limited rapid assessments.

With power and communication facilities impaired and roads blocked or damaged, assessments and situational awareness for relief operations were difficult to obtain.⁷⁸ Even the AFP admittedly could not conduct its Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDANA). The difficulty obtaining needs assessments was compounded by difficulties in coordination. Particularly in rural areas, the absence of coordinating bodies meant that assessments were performed piecemeal and often not shared among other departments in the field.

4. Logistics was a major issue for both Philippine civilian departments and the AFP.

The initial shipment of relief items had to be flown from Manila since the 5,000 food packs prepositioned by the DSWD in Region VIII were all destroyed. Even when AFP deployed land, sea, and air assets, the Philippine military was short of strategic transport. It had to rely on planes and ships from bilateral and multilateral partners to transport goods from Cebu and Manila, and from Tacloban to the sub-hubs and the communities. Civilian vessels only became operational later in relief operations.

The UNDAC team situated at Tacloban Airport had to deal with the lack of transportation to Tacloban City, power outages and unexpected

⁷⁷ Roxas, *Briefing*, 2014.

⁷⁸ Testimony of Philippine Congressional Oversight Committee for DRRM and Party List Representative (Magdalo) Francisco Acedillo, *Post-Disaster Management Briefing/Review*, 2014.

heavily-laden incoming teams.⁷⁹ Not all of these teams were self-sufficient in terms of power, transport, or shelter. Fuel for vehicles, generators, and water purifying equipment were also in short supply in Tacloban and surrounding areas. While two Petron pumping stations became operational with help from the Fuel Relief Fund, these were not sufficient to cover the fuel needs in the region. Fuel had to be sourced from the U.S. military for AFP use and from fuel depots in Cebu.⁸⁰

5. The coordination platforms in Tacloban – the Philippine ICS/DRRMC, the UN OSOCC, the clusters – were operational relatively early in the emergency phase but had little interface.

Mobility challenges in the first two weeks of operations meant heavy reliance on military air assets for relief deliveries. These military air assets proceeded largely through bilateral channels (government-to-government and military-to-military), rather than multilateral tracks (i.e., UN OSOCC). For example, USAID moved its own relief items or those of its partners (e.g., WFP and UNICEF) using U.S. military assets, while also responding to tasks channeled by the Office of Civil Defense through the AFP. It is not clear from after-action reports how and to what extent the ICP under General Velarmino interfaced with the UN OSOCC. While a UN civil-military coordination expert liaised with the AFP at Tacloban airport, it not certain whether foreign military liaison officers attended the various cluster meetings or attended general partner coordination meetings. Both the Philippine and UN-led clusters were present in this region, but questions of leadership, tasking, and interface with the Regional DRRM Council persisted.

6. Many international humanitarian organizations initially chose to proceed and start field operations where they (or the media) had assessed significant needs. In many cases they relied on networks other than those provided by the Philippine coordinating platforms, or did not meaningfully participate in coordination. The sheer number and diversity of teams operating in Tacloban led to serious disparity in assistance to other equally devastated areas in Samar and Leyte.

⁷⁹ Tsukasa Katsube, “UNDAC Mission in Tacloban: Response to Typhoon Haiyan,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan,” Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

⁸⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 6* (as of 12 November 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013).

7. In Tacloban, many of the U.S. military personnel were unfamiliar with longstanding command, control, and coordination tactics employed by the AFP. Also, few U.S. military were familiar with the procedures and processes established in the Multinational Forces Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) and the RP-U.S. Military Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Fortunately, U.S. military assistance in this region was aided greatly by longstanding Marine-AFP linkages and a history of joint trainings and exercises.

8. All Haiyan relief operations featured very limited exchange of liaison officers (LNOs) among participating organizations. The LNOs exchanged among the militaries of the Philippines, Japan, the U.S., Great Britain, and Australia were the exception to the rule during Haiyan.

On the ground, coordination platforms, particularly UN Civil-Military Coordination Centers, were not set up until after the U.S. troops completed their tasks and were pulling out. Throughout, interface with UN civil-military coordinators was limited. UN information sharing portals were deemed to be problematic by U.S. military forces during the relief operations and the deployed MEB units utilized classified expeditionary communications, which were not accessible to the humanitarian community.⁸¹

9. The local and international NGOs gave mixed reviews concerning the utility of the Incident Command System and the cluster system.

Many NGOs bypassed both the cluster system and the Incident Command Posts, opting instead to work independently in the field. Others found that information on unmet needs was shared unevenly, yielding areas uncovered by relief operations or areas with too many NGOs on site. While some domestic and international NGOs praised the coordination of the Philippines and the UN *post hoc*, many lacked the resources to participate in coordination meetings or to learn systems new to them.

OCHA realized belatedly at the end of November the need to integrate local and national NGOs in operational planning and created

⁸¹ Lt. Colonel Rodney Legowski, "OPERATION DAMAYAN: 22 Jan 13," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

a separate platform in Tacloban. As a result on 4 December the platform began holding information sessions.⁸²

10. Volunteers were critical to DSWD operations and to the operations of the Philippine Red Cross.

DSWD reported a steady stream of volunteers for the repacking and delivery of relief goods. The volunteers were handled by their Central Office. That DSWD was able to distribute over one million food packs by 22 November is a testament to the robust mobilization of volunteers in and around Manila. While this was a successful aspect of the operation, DSWD officials noted the difficulty of training a huge cadre of new volunteers, and the tendency of new volunteers to quickly overwhelm the core DSWD staff.

The Philippine Red Cross operations in Region VIII mobilized 8,244 volunteers coming from 29 local chapters, mostly from Manila.⁸³ The volunteers assisted in the assessment and delivery of relief goods. The Philippine Red Cross had a dedicated unit (Typhoon Haiyan Operations Office in Manila) that handled volunteers for Haiyan operations.

11. Because of extensive media coverage, Tacloban City received the bulk of initial assistance from the Philippine government, foreign governments, and INGOs. Consequently, many hard-hit areas in outlying Samar and Leyte waited up to one week for their first contact with any relief teams, whether domestic or international.

The sheer number of local and international humanitarian actors present on the ground meant that many relief activities went unreported to national coordination platforms. Many INGOs were not self-sufficient (they lacked independent logistics provisions), thus creating further pressure on already scarce local resources.

12. Preemptive evacuations and evacuations following Haiyan landfall were executed in the coastal areas of Tacloban.

Many people refused to evacuate because of insufficient warnings or fear of displacement. The local evacuation centers were inadequate

⁸² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 22* (as of 10 December 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013), 7.

⁸³ Eclarinal, personal communication, 4 July 2014.

given the strong winds and the effect of the storm surge and many were inundated or cut off. The second set of evacuees had survived the typhoon and wanted to leave Tacloban. They were transported by military air assets to Manila, and by land/sea through roll-on/roll-off ferries via Ormoc to Cebu. Had initial evacuation measures been more effective it is unlikely this highly resource-intensive second evacuation would have been as large.

Many of the Manila-bound evacuees were housed temporarily in a tent city at Villamor Air Base. There was no tent city in Cebu for evacuees. Nor were there were planned or dedicated assets for transporting evacuees. Rather the C-130s that delivered relief goods and personnel to Tacloban returned to Manila with the evacuees. The U.S. military was given an authorization by USAID/OFDA to accept evacuees for their air assets' return trips from Tacloban.

WESTERN VISAYAS (ROXAS, PANAY ISLAND) — REGION VI

Thirty percent of the geographical areas and people affected by Typhoon Haiyan were in the Western Visayas, Region VI. Sixteen cities and 117 municipalities in the region were affected by the typhoon, as were 801,660 families comprising 3,673,721 individuals. Compared to Tacloban the human toll was significantly lower, with 294 recorded dead and 2,068 injured. At least 123,627 houses were destroyed or damaged.

Region VI suffered an estimated PHP 33 billion in damages. The provinces of Capiz and Northern Iloilo bore the brunt of the storm, with damages of PHP 13.1 billion and PHP 11.9 billion respectively. The infrastructure and social sectors suffered the most, with losses for the entire region amounting to PHP 8.9 billion and PHP 19.5 billion respectively.

Preemptive Action, Prepositioning and Response

Typhoon Haiyan traveled across the northern part of Panay Island, which forms part of Region VI. The devastated areas transcended all four provincial boundaries east to west, and included coastal areas and inaccessible central Panay highlands communities bordering Capiz and Iloilo, as well as Aklan and Antique. Iloilo, the region's biggest city and government center located 150 kilometers south of the typhoon's

path, was largely unaffected. Roxas City (the capital of Capiz province) sustained severe damage and was geographically more proximate to other affected areas. The critical transport infrastructure (airport and ports in Iloilo City) were unaffected, although the major highway from the south (Iloilo City) to the north towards affected towns in Iloilo and Capiz provinces took several days before it was opened for traffic. Secondary roads off the highway took much longer to be cleared. The island villages in Concepcion and Ajuy were particularly isolated as boats and crucial fishing vessel docks were destroyed by the typhoon.

The Regional DRRMC issued orders on 6 November 2013, *day minus 2*, for various local government units to undertake preemptive and forced evacuation of people along coastal and other hazardous areas. The Philippine Armed Forces 3rd Infantry Division, whose area of operations covers Panay Island, pre-deployed its disaster risk reduction team units, including the 12th Infantry Battalion which assisted in the evacuation of thousands of people from northern Aklan. All uniformed personnel reported to their units' regional headquarters two days before landfall and remained with their units until their mission was completed.⁸⁴ Goods and vehicles were also prepositioned in the DSWD Field Office in Iloilo City.

Just hours after landfall, the military, DPWH, and provincial public works personnel undertook clearing operations on major highways on 8 November, *day 0 evening*. The roads were not completely opened for land traffic until 36 hours following storm landfall. Because the Regional DRRMC was based in Iloilo City, the relief goods and personnel initially travelled from the Iloilo City staging area northwards.

The Philippine DRRMC system includes a procedure for conducting a Damage and Needs Assessment report (DANA). The procedure calls for local government units down to the *barangay* level to conduct their own assessment, which is then submitted to and collated by the municipal government and in turn forwarded to the provincial government. OCD Region VI came up with a consolidated DANA for Typhoon Haiyan from the Panay provinces. The military also performed an independent DANA based on land and aerial surveys. When the assessments were put on a geographic information system (GIS) map at the Regional DRRMC

⁸⁴ Brigadier General Arnold Quiapo, Commanding Officer, 301st Brigade, Philippine Army, personal communication, 10 March 2014.

level, some discrepancies were noted. For example, the central Iloilo towns of Bingawan, Sara and Lemery initially had no reported damage, an assessment that later changed. The assessments were counter-checked by Office of Civil Defense (OCD) teams.

According to Eligio Calaor, Deputy OCD Regional Director, there was a tendency for some municipal governments to overstate the extent of damage in their locality so as to justify a declaration of state of calamity.⁸⁵ This declaration would make them eligible for outside assistance. Apart from these host government efforts, the UN humanitarian community also conducted a Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), which began for the Western Visayas on 20 November 2014, *day 12*.⁸⁶

In addition, a joint Philippine government inter-agency team and Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) also conducted an assessment on 6 December 2014, *day 30*, which identified food security and health concerns in remote mountain communities in southern Aklan, Western Capiz and central Antique. This joint Philippine-Canadian assessment became the basis for helicopter-based relief deliveries by partners.

A UNDAC team arrived in Roxas City on 11 November, *day 3*. On 14 November, *day 7*, the UNDAC team set up an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC), an international humanitarian hub facilitating and coordinating relief. OCHA identified the worst affected communities in northern Iloilo (Carles, Bilasan, Estancia, Batad, San Dionisio, Sara and Concepcion) and Capiz (Pontevedra, Pan-ay, Batan, Pilar, Pres. Roxas and Ma-ayon), and highlighted information gaps on the state of mountainous areas of Aklan and Antique provinces.⁸⁷ Various humanitarian organizations started their operations for Panay Island

⁸⁵ Eligio Calaor, Assistant Regional Director, Region 6, Office of Civil Defense, personal communication, 27 May 2014.

⁸⁶ MIRA findings were rolled out on 29 November 2014. The report identified the following priority needs: food assistance and access to water; extensive shelter requirements; livelihood recovery and restoration of WASH, education, health, protective services and management of the displaced. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 19* (as of 29 November 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013).

⁸⁷ A Tier 2 oil spill from the typhoon-induced shoring of a National Power Corporation barge displaced about 5,000 people in the northern Iloilo town of Estancia on 22 November 2014. A two-member Japan Disaster Response (JDR) Expert Team assisted the Philippine Coast Guard in addressing the oil spill. The cleanup was declared completed by 15-16 December 2014. However, despite the provincial government's order for evacuees to return to their homes, many families remained in temporary shelter well until the end of December because of reported foul smell. OCHA, *Situation Report 22*, 10 December 2013.

even though the Philippine coordination among various government agencies was still lodged at the Capiz Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council.

The transition towards a more unified regional effort (under Task Force Panay) did not happen until the Philippine Region VI Incident Command System (ICS) was set up by the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council on 22 November, *day 15*. The Incident Commander was Major General Aurelio Baladad, concurrently commanding officer of the AFP 3rd Infantry Battalion. The Incident Command Post was initially located in Iloilo City but was later transferred to the provincial capital in Roxas City, and co-located with the OSOCC.⁸⁸

Philippine government representation in the Region VI clusters was uneven owing to a shortage of personnel. In Capiz province, more representatives attended the local cluster meetings than sent staff to the clusters at the regional hub. Despite the varying level of participation, however, the clusters were an important coordination tool for sharing information and for partnering. While there was some level of NGO representation in the clusters, they tended to make their operational decisions independently of the cluster process.

The logistics hub at the Roxas airport was set up on 18 November, *day 10*, with the World Food Programme (WFP) as Logistics Cluster co-lead. This followed the creation of the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, which took charge of daily military-to-military coordination, information facilitation, and updated tasking among the AFP and the foreign troops. At the national level, the UN assigned its own Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMC) officers to liaise with the Philippine military.

In the OCHA situation reports, the OCHA CMC coordinators were assigned to coordinate with the AFP and foreign militaries in Tacloban and Cebu, but not in Roxas. In principle, the CMC coordinator liaises with

⁸⁸ According to General Baladad it took some time to convince the various regional offices to co-locate the ICP in Roxas City. His argument was that if regional office personnel would not send their staff to these coordinative meetings, the Capiz provincial offices would de facto assume the post. This would potentially deny other provinces equal opportunity to relief or rehabilitation resources from humanitarian and UN agencies that were already operating in Roxas. In his view, the regional offices provide crucial representation of other provinces in the ICP and therefore would create more equitable representation vis-à-vis the UN cluster system. Personal communication, 30 May 2014.

various armed forces, partner NGOs, and the DSWD on logistics and transportation requirements. For Panay, however, the WFP coordinator took on the task of civil-military coordination. According to Fiona Lithgow, WFP Coordinator for Panay, civil-military coordination was critical given that: (1) at the early stage of relief operations (until 18 December) the humanitarian community in Panay relied heavily on military air assets for deliveries from Cebu and from Iloilo City; and (2) the absence of heavy lift capabilities to unload goods also required early reliance on military assets.⁸⁹

Humanitarian civil-military coordination was also important as NGO partners typically observed guidelines regarding the use of military assets for relief deliveries. These rules included: designated landing points, cut off points for deliveries, and proscription against the military handing food to beneficiaries. The UN World Food Programme opted not to use Philippine military assets for its relief deliveries, and instead worked with the Canadian DART team, which in turn had a liaison officer to the WFP



UK Royal Navy light carrier HMS *Illustrious* prepares relief goods for delivery around Panay. (PO(Phot) Ray Jones/MOD).

⁸⁹ Fiona Lithgow, WFP, personal communication, 26 May 2014.

logistics cluster. According to Lithgow, the WFP opted for the Canadian team for three reasons. First, the Canadians offered their services given that their service areas overlapped. Second, WFP was concerned about rebel activities in some areas and using Philippine military assets might not have been perceived as neutral. Finally, the Canadian team understood and abided by the *Oslo Guidelines*. Philippine military assets (ground and air) for the most part were used to move government (DSWD) goods from the Roxas hub.

Panay Island was almost exclusively serviced by Philippine, Canadian, and British military assets. The UK light aircraft carrier HMS *Illustrious* transferred operations from Palawan to Panay islands on 26 November, replacing the frigate HMS *Daring* which had previously delivered relief goods to Roxas from Cebu.⁹⁰ The Canadian DART team of 300 personnel in Roxas/northern Panay conducted engineering (clearing debris, camp construction), medical relief, and water purification activities beginning 24 November until their departure on 16 December 2014. The Canadian DART area of operations was diverse, with activities posted in northern Iloilo (Lemery, Sara, Concepcion, Estancia); Capiz (Dumarao, Dumalag, Sigma, Jamindan, Dao, Manapan, Jaena Norte, Cuartero); and Aklan (Mambusao, Kalibo) and Antique (Barbaza).⁹¹

OCHA found that Philippine and foreign military assets played important roles in damage assessment, delivery of relief supplies, and providing engineering/medical support in the first weeks following the disaster. Relief good deliveries to Roxas using foreign military assets started with two C-130 flights on 25 November, just one C-130 flight on 29 November, four flights on 5 December, and none by 16 December. Sub-hub deliveries and ground activities by the Canadian and UK troops eased down accordingly. By early December many foreign military forces were winding down their deployments as roads were opening, civilian transportation options were increasing, and civilian relief communities were stepping up activities.

In addition to Roxas City, the Armed Forces of the Philippines also used airfields where C-130s could land, such as Iloilo City, Kalibo (Aklan),

⁹⁰ Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) Updates, ([PowerPoint Slides], 29 November 2013).

⁹¹ Ibid.

and San Jose (Antique) as staging areas for forward distribution. Most of the goods and personnel coming into Roxas and Iloilo airports came from Cebu and Manila, respectively. The One-Stop Shop (OSS) in Manila or Cebu airports had already cleared the shipments. The Philippine military and police moved the goods from the planes and helicopters to tents set up within the airport vicinity and to warehouses identified by the LGU recipients or to hospitals/medical facilities.⁹²

Primarily it was the AFP that offloaded and delivered goods from private donors to the school gymnasiums that served as evacuation centers by the Capiz Provincial Government. In addition, the AFP/PNP teams conducted joint security patrols in and around the airport. Except for one reported looting case in Estancia, the police and the military did not encounter serious security issues during the relief operations.⁹³

Coordination, Linkages, and Networks

Roxas was an excellent example of civil-military coordination. Because the two coordination centers – the OSOCC and the Incident Command Post (ICP) – were co-located, the international actors (UN, humanitarian agencies, Canadian DART) gravitated towards the Philippine Incident Command Post, which became the platform for international-local civil-military coordination. According to Josie Cambel of DSWD Field Office VI, although her primary task was to attend the protection cluster meetings for which DSWD was co-lead, she also attended the ICP meetings because the Philippine military had the most updated data.⁹⁴

Deputy OCD Region VI Director Eligio Calaor also voiced high regard for the implementation of ICS and for Major General Baladad as Incident Commander. Calaor noted that the Incident Command Post recorded all arrivals and dispatch of goods, personnel and responders, including international contingents. The ICP also provided information

⁹² Calaor, personal communication, 27 May 2014; Josie Cambel, Training Specialist II, Institutional Development Division, DSWD Region VI, personal communication, 31 May 2014.

⁹³ Providing food to the military and police personnel detailed to the airport hub for the purpose of moving goods proved controversial. The feedback from the national government was that OCD and the DSWD could not assume these food costs and expenses because these security forces already had meal allowances. However, DSWD personnel had a standard practice of setting aside extra rice and sardines from their repacking to give to the military. The Capiz provincial government picked up the tab for most of the security forces' food expenses, as well as those of the Incident Command Post and the humanitarian hub staff at the capital.

⁹⁴ Cambel, personal communication, 31 May 2014.

to all actors. The Incident Commander was an important focal point for reporting. In an atmosphere of openness and transparency, the local military, Canadian DART, government and UN humanitarian actors shared vital information including movement of relief items and personnel, air transport activity and availability and updates on density mapping (affected area and deliveries). Although the activities of the UK Royal Navy were coordinated with the Incident Command Post, it was unclear whether those assets were shared at all with the Roxas logistics cluster.

Both the Incident Command Post and the clusters conducted daily briefings. ICP briefings were held in the morning; the RDRRM Council held an afternoon meeting with all local government agencies; evening meetings were held with international organizations under the cluster system. The ICP held daily meetings in the first few weeks; later on they tapered to every other day and then weekly meetings. The ICP was deactivated by the Regional DRRMC on 8 December 2014, *day 30*, after which the AFP had its disaster relief units withdraw from the area. The AFP troops returned to parent units and to previous functions, and their responsibilities were transferred to civilian agencies.⁹⁵ It was the first time an Incident Command System was established in Region VI for disaster response.⁹⁶

The AFP 3rd Infantry Division officers noted confusion in the first three or four days as to who would handle incoming international goods. Initially DSWD only handled its own items sent from Manila. Only after a few days did a system for consigning and delivering international goods emerge. In the first two weeks the AFP and foreign militaries made the bulk of relief deliveries (both for government and other goods) using air and land assets. The military used a hub-and-spoke system for deliveries, enabling short helicopter hops to designated sub-hubs (including Culasi and San Jose Antique ports and the 3rd Infantry Division headquarters) or

⁹⁵ According to General Baladad, the majority of the 3rd Infantry Division troops shifted to disaster response following Typhoon Haiyan. However, in line with the terms of the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP), the Philippine military was cognizant of the timed transfer of responsibilities to the local government and its eventual exit from this type of mission. Baladad conveyed to the RDRRM that clear exit parameters were necessary and must be tracked as basis for troop withdrawal. The agreed parameters were: all affected families provided relief items; electricity restored in town centers; commercial activities had started. Correspondingly, after 8 December 2014, a majority of the troops deployed for Typhoon Haiyan returned to their stations.

⁹⁶ Calaor, personal communication, 27 May 2014.

for air drops. At each of the sub-hubs, the 3rd Infantry Division created an organizational parallel to the ICS, designating officers for foreign liaison, local liaison, information, and security

It is noteworthy that these sub-hubs were staffed entirely by military personnel, rather than the supposed inter-agency staffing required under the Incident Command System. The 3rd Infantry Division received only one company from Luzon as personnel augmentation and received vehicle support from units located in Negros provinces.⁹⁷ The local military provided force protection (one company) to the Canadian troops.

Situation reports consistently pointed to areas in Panay not regularly assessed or serviced by relief assistance. These included the islands off Capiz and northern Iloilo and later, the interior upland communities for Aklan and Antique.⁹⁸ The observations were consistent with those of the Philippine military's density mapping for Panay where remaining gaps in shelter response as well as relief deliveries to indigenous communities were noted.

The speed by which Region VI transitioned from relief to recovery was notable. USAID reported recovery activities in the Western Visayas had begun by the end of November. OCHA reported the switch to cash handouts and cash-for-work from general distribution of food for the region's affected areas by end of January 2014.⁹⁹

NGO involvement during the emergency response was illustrated by the example of three local NGOs that delivered relief goods in northern Iloilo. The NGOs were Panay Rural Development Center, Inc. (PRDCI), Christ Community Fellowship (CCF), and the Philippine Red Cross-Iloilo Chapter. PRDCI and CCF are part of larger networks, the Philippine Network of Government Institutes and the Philippine Council for Evangelical Churches, respectively. These NGOs had implemented projects related to community-based disaster preparedness in Panay Island.

⁹⁷ General Baladad stated that this was a matter of personnel availability. Regional agency personnel were not available for said postings on a prolonged basis. The General said the AFP Chief of Staff offered him additional troops but he declined in favor of the Eastern Visayas units which had greater need for force augmentation given their greater security concerns. General Leo Baladad, personal communication, 30 May 2014.

⁹⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 14* (as of 20 November 2013), (Manila: OCHA, 2013).

⁹⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 31* (as of 2 January 2014), (Manila: OCHA, 2014).

PRDCI and CCF have previously undertaken relief operations following Typhoon Frank (2008) and the flash flood in northern Iloilo (2000). They also have prior linkages with international NGOs (Christian Aid, ECHO) and overseas donors for these activities. The PRC-Iloilo Chapter was organized as a provincial chapter and during Haiyan it received direction from PRC-National with regard to regional deployment. The PRC-Iloilo Chapter has done community (*barangay*-based) disaster risk reduction and management trainings throughout Iloilo. The Chapter has distributed relief goods (food and non-food items locally sourced as well as donations) in prior disasters. The Chapter also ran a mobile kitchen.

PRDCI and CCF did not prepare or preposition goods or personnel prior to the Haiyan landfall. Once the typhoon made landfall, however, they were able to mobilize volunteers, food and non-food donations as well as their own logistics (vehicles and drivers) for their respective relief operations. PRDCI's network had a built-in arrangement for an emergency response unit that could mobilize an assessment team closest to the affected area. The results from this initial assessment became the basis for response planning, which was largely funded by Christian Aid.¹⁰⁰ (Christian Aid is a faith-based NGO from Great Britain that has extensive humanitarian involvement in the Philippines.)

The CCF also swiftly mobilized its own faith-based network for donations. It had an advance team in northern Iloilo that worked with local church contacts for damage assessment (ready by *day 6*), on the basis of which they made plans for relief delivery.¹⁰¹ PRDCI's network had arranged to parcel out northern Iloilo towns and island *barangays* as "exclusive areas of operations," with PRDCI getting all 26 *barangays* of Ajuy. PRDCI worked with the DSWD office of the Ajuy LGU to determine the list of beneficiaries which their own staff validated on the ground, before undertaking a five-week long distribution (from 19 November to the end of December).

CCF's list was provided by their church network among the affected towns of Barotac Viejo, Sara, San Dionisio, Badjangan,

¹⁰⁰ Andres Tionko, Executive Director, Panay Rural Development Center, Inc. (PRDCI), personal communication, 28 January 2015.

¹⁰¹ Edwin Arana, Executive Director, Christ Community Fellowship (CCF), personal communication, 6 January 2015.

Estancia, Concepcion, Carles and Roxas. CCF made its first delivery of 2,000 family packs on 15 November, *day 7*, via rental trucks. It followed that with a two-month operation with ten million PHP funding from overseas church donations.¹⁰² Both organizations procured their relief goods and contracted vehicles from Iloilo City and from Manila.

The PRC-Iloilo Chapter operations included prepositioning supplies/ingredients for its mobile kitchen, with the assumption of feeding three to four thousand persons. By early 8 November, the mobile kitchen was already traversing Iloilo City and Dumangas serving meals by the roadside. When Haiyan made landfall, PRC-Iloilo had no stockpiling capacity as they had no warehouse; they also had only one truck.¹⁰³ The closest regional PRC warehouse was in Cebu. Upon the provincial government's request, PRC-Iloilo was able to have Sun Yat Sen high school help with the repacking and temporary warehousing, eventually producing 5,000 packs which were distributed using the provincial government vehicles over 11-15 days in northern and central Iloilo.

The PRC-Iloilo chapter relied on volunteers and was able to mobilize 20-30 persons per municipality, providing critical manpower for repacking, distribution, and accompanying delivery runs. Despite not having goods stockpiled, PRC-Iloilo Chapter had a standard target of providing packs to 30 percent of affected households.¹⁰⁴ Of the 41,000 packs PRC-Iloilo was able to produce, 90 percent were sourced locally (from donated funds), and it received 5,000 packs from the national PRC. Further donations came in from the International Federation of Red Cross, including the Korean Red Cross, which provided medical service in northern Iloilo. The PRC-National also had separate and concurrent activities in the area. The PRC-Iloilo Chapter received walk-in/fly-in donations from private individuals, companies and foreign entities. Its emergency response lasted from November 2013 to March 2014, primarily because *barangay* residents close to PRC-Iloilo emergency response unit camps kept lining up for food.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Gilbert Paul Valderama, Chapter Administrator, Philippine Red Cross Iloilo Chapter, personal communication, 25 February 2015.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

All three NGOs interfaced with the local military and police in the course of their relief distribution. Both PRCDI and CCF cited the looting in Leyte and the government policy regarding security in relief good distribution as their rationalization for interface with the military and police. For both NGOs it was their first time being escorted by the military and the police in this type of activity. While CCF limited the military's role to providing peace and order during the distribution [*gabantay lang*, lit., “keeping watch only”], PRDCI actually requested military vehicles to transport their goods.¹⁰⁵

Neither organization had any rules regarding the military/police during their relief operations and seemingly did not mind detailed officers being armed. PRDCI stated that they purposely de-linked the issue of human rights abuses purportedly committed by military troops and their involvement in disaster response. PRDCI also argued that they had to claim services from the military because they are a government institution; as tax-paying entity, PRDCI staff felt that the military's provision of vehicles constituted public service. PRDCI used military vehicles and personnel throughout their five-week operations, but CCF did so only for a week.

Although PRC chapters were not supposed to work with the military on grounds of maintaining political neutrality, the Iloilo Chapter chose to do so because of security concerns. According to Gilbert Valderama, of the PRC-Iloilo chapter administration, the PRC tapped the military to provide outside perimeter security during cash distribution. Previously, the PRC had also worked with the military in joint medical missions, although they insisted that only unarmed personnel provide direct service while those armed provided outside perimeter security. The PRC-Iloilo Chapter had a protocol not to ride in military vehicles, or for uniformed personnel to ride in PRC vehicles.

The NGOs' preferred platform for conducting relief activities was the provincial DRRMC. Given the great diversity in LGU capacities, PRDCI Executive Director Andres Tionko stated that Iloilo province could have made a difference by investing in common standards for emergency response and immediate recovery across municipalities. A

¹⁰⁵ A. Tionko, personal communication, 28 January 2015; Arana (CCF), personal communication, 6 January 2015.

serious gap PRDCI identified was the lack of a common operational picture regarding which areas were underserved or where they could make deliveries. The DSWD provincial leaders did not give them guidance on this.

PRDCI Director Tionko also mentioned that there was no provincial effort to gather together all the INGOs that arrived to provide emergency assistance and recovery efforts, nor were there established protocols for the INGOs' engagements with the communities. This led to the INGOs and local NGOs viewing the requirement for them to "pass by the LGU" as only the mayor's attempt at political positioning. PRDCI was fortunate it has social capital with the Ajuy mayor and also had a prior Memorandum of Agreement with the Batad LGU, requiring the LGU to commit an LGU staff for PRDCI activities.¹⁰⁶ Still, the NGOs had to negotiate with the LGUs one by one.

For some NGOs, the lack of top-level direction led to fragmentation at the tactical level. The PRC-Iloilo chapter attended shelter cluster coordination meetings mainly in Estancia and Iloilo, while the PRC-Roxas Chapter had representation at the Roxas RDRRMC. The PRC-Iloilo staff attended meetings if the PRC-Roxas Chapter were unavailable to attend. In Valderama's experience, there were many more INGOs representatives in Roxas than were at Estancia. Reportedly it was difficult to follow up on developments and tasking as quickly as needed. For Valderama, the key issue was the lack of a regionally-focused PRC leader who could attend regional meetings.

Neither PRDCI nor CCF viewed the OCHA platforms as helpful. For PRDCI, OCHA served primarily the INGOs, and thus it was up to Christian Aid to send representatives to the cluster meetings in Capiz. CCF was not aware of OCHA coordination until the CCF staff was reprimanded by the UN while delivering goods in Sigma, Capiz. According to Brother Edwin Arana, Executive Director of CCF, their deliveries were stopped. He made inquiries and was told to report to Roxas using an email address provided. CCF was called afterwards for meetings in Roxas but they could not attend any of these meetings due to a shortage of available staff. Both NGOs did not find it worthwhile to

¹⁰⁶ Tionko, personal communication, 6 January 2015.

attend meetings as they were pressed for time and manpower. For Tionko, coordination meetings at the cluster level served no purpose. CCF only later attended the OCHA training on standards for relief operations, but found the training less engaging and highly abstract [*puro man lang istorya nanda*, lit., “they just told stories”].¹⁰⁷

Insights and Lessons

1. Locating the coordination platform close to the most damaged areas rather than in designated regional government centers invited greater participation from international actors and local responders.

Iloilo City is Panay Island’s regional center and major transportation hub. It has an airport of international standards as well as roll-on/roll-off port facilities. However, its relative distance from Haiyan-affected areas meant that any type of coordination would be far removed from relief in northern Iloilo, Capiz and Aklan. The decision to physically move the Regional DRRMC to Roxas City and to co-locate with the UN OSOCC and the Logistics Cluster was critical in ensuring international assistance from UN agencies and that INGOs would utilize the regional coordination platform.

Coordination at the regional level also ensured representation and awareness of other affected provinces in the island (not just Capiz). While coordination across provincial boundaries still did present difficulties, the setup allowed for international actors to address to the needs of under-served island and interior communities. The day-to-day operational situations were well integrated by knitting together the Roxas logistics hub with the sub-hubs in Concepcion, Kalibo and San Jose, plus the helicopter drops and Royal Navy deliveries to the islands.

Having only two foreign military forces assigned in Panay (the Canadian DART and the British Royal Navy) meant easier direct reporting to the MNCC-National rather than to MNCC-Cebu. There was also no CMC coordinator assigned to Roxas as the WFP chose not to use Philippine military assets. Instead a liaison officer system was used between WFP and the Canadian DART.

¹⁰⁷ Tionko, Arana, personal communication, 6 and 28 January 2015.

2. Co-locating the Regional DRRMC and OSOCC enhanced cross-attendance in meetings and information sharing by government and international humanitarian actors. Yet this carried little significance for local NGOs who had not the staff to send to these meetings.

The merits of co-location had obvious limits. Local NGOs with operations in northern Iloilo were neither aware of meetings nor had inclination to attend coordination meetings in Roxas. Some of the NGOs confined coordination to the municipal LGUs; some were under the impression that the Roxas hub was primarily for the international NGOs. Regional agencies also experienced serious difficulties in sustainably posting personnel in this remote location (from their Iloilo office), leading to shortages in manpower for the OSS and for the sub-hubs.

3. Relief decisions were negotiated, and often made *ad hoc* by the relief providers.

That the regional DRRMC did not laterally connect with the provincial DRRMCs meant negotiations took place between responders on one hand and governors and mayors on the other hand. In each case the parties determined whether or what assistance could be given. As such, relief operations in this region had a substantially more local character than in Samar/Leyte. This proved a double-edged sword. Relief providers could quickly meet needs stated by local leaders, but the process was also subject to manipulation and misstatement of actual needs.

4. The LGUs' self-reported damage assessments were not always accurate, which led to inappropriate relief distribution. The military assessments and GIS mapping services proved highly useful and allowed them to overlay needs and damage assessments on maps.

The OCD was dependent on LGU reports from affected areas, whereas the military was dependent upon its locally-posted troops and the UN Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment. Damage assessments were conducted during different periods and served as independent decision-making tools for each respective agency. These damage assessments neither related to each other chronologically nor were they cross-referenced or shared. Only in one case was a damage assessment conducted jointly by the Canadian DART and the Philippine government.

Given the delay of local government (LGU) information filtering up the formal OCD channels, the AFP 3rd Infantry Division generated its own GIS map which overlaid the location of severely affected areas identified by various local agencies and relief deliveries on a daily basis. This map and information were used in the Incident Command Post daily briefings that were shared with local and international agencies.

According to the officers interviewed, this map enabled them to identify areas that were over- and underserved. Early on, AFP officers noted that the pattern of DSWD relief distribution included areas not heavily affected (e.g., southern Antique), but whose distributions were made in line with politicians' requests or partisan considerations [*Kapartido kaya binigyan; contra partido sa Tibiao, Antique kaya hindi binigyan*, lit., "They were given relief items because they belong to the same party. The leaders from Tibiao, Antique were from the opposition parties so they were given minimal relief assistance"]. AFP officers also observed that deliveries of non-DSWD goods were preferentially distributed to coastal and populated areas, rather than to the central Panay hinterland communities.

Some Philippine regional department officers confirmed the utility of this military-generated GIS map in terms of an updated operational picture. It was used extensively by General Baladad and by General Quiapo, the deputy Incident Commander, as a tool to persuade the international aid community to enter and deliver relief to interior communities of Tapaz, Jamindan and Libacao of Capiz province. These deliveries called attention to the presence of the marginalized indigenous populations in these areas. The local military used this assessment information to guide its own decisions regarding troop deployment and to negotiate its phased exit strategy vis-à-vis the regional civilian principals.

5. The Incident Command System functioned well for the Panay hub.

The Incident Command System was initially unfamiliar to many Philippine government departments in the context of a typhoon response. Yet the use of a hybrid Incident Command System (ICS) and the appointment of a uniformed officer as Regional Incident Commander

is not unusual for Philippine typhoon response operations.¹⁰⁸ What made the ICS work in Roxas/Panay was, according to OCD Regional Director Eligio Calaor, the leadership and personality of General Baladad. The local AFP already had standing linkages with LGUs given its counter-insurgency mission and the AFP assets became highly valuable for disaster response. General Baladad was well regarded by his civilian principals, that is, OCD Regional Director Rose Cabrera and President-designated Under Secretary Austere Panadero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.¹⁰⁹

Most importantly, the AFP understood the need to defer to civilian authorities and that updated field reports (situational updates) needed to be presented to the civilian authorities for them to decide when to terminate military operations. The case of Panay coordination was an argument for flexible Incident Commanders who well understood both ICS and the civilian counterparts with which Incident Commanders must work.

Even General Baladad pointed to his own personal confusion about his role and tasks as Incident Commander, such as who decided the distribution of relief goods and personnel. General Baladad stated that he did not “command” per se, but only liaised with all other actors, including the DSWD who made their own decisions concerning deliveries. Absent a national assessment to guide strategies for deployment of personnel, goods, and equipment, strategic decisions followed the “CNN Effect” resulting in Panay being of secondary importance compared to Tacloban. Finally, the preponderance of military officers in staffing the ICS was only a matter of convenience [*ikasi madaling mautusan*, lit., “it is easy to order them around”] particularly given that civilian personnel were unwilling to conduct hardship posts. As such, General Baladad could

¹⁰⁸ In previous incidents, such as the response to the *barangay* Guinsaugon, St. Bernard, Southern Leyte mudslide (2010) and Typhoon Pablo operations at Campostela Valley (2012), uniformed officers were also designated as incident commanders. Rosalie Hall and Anita Cular, “Civil-military relations in disaster rescue and relief operations: Response to the mudslide in southern Leyte, Philippines,” *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* (Volume 38, Issue 2, 2010), 62-88 and Saya Kiba and Rosalie Hall, “Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response – Crisis or Opportunity?” in Jennifer Santiago-Oreta, ed. *Modern Defense Force Book* (Manila: Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Ateneo de Manila University Working Group on Security Sector Reform, 2014).

¹⁰⁹ General Baladad had more latitude given that he only had to report to an Under Secretary. By contrast, no less than three Secretaries were keeping watch on General Velarmino as Incident Commander in Samar/Leyte.

use his authority as Division Commander to pick up the slack where DSWD or OCD personnel were insufficient.

6. Local military assets were almost exclusively used to move DSWD goods. Procedural regulations slowed delivery.

Some tensions arose regarding the DSWD relief distribution protocols requiring a person of authority to receive deliveries in writing (signed form), and requiring DSWD personnel to be present for any government relief turnover.¹¹⁰ The military found these procedures too inflexible, particularly when they were doing air drops. The military aviation personnel had to spend time explaining to DSWD about timely and fuel-efficient flight routes (e.g., Estancia to Iloilo islands), as these logistics matters were not very clear to DSWD. The military shouldered all fuel costs relating to relief goods deliveries.

7. The military and the NGOs had little interface, limiting their engagement to practical needs such as security during cash distribution, and vehicle transport.

Military-NGO interface was minimal on the ground owing to the fact that most of the local military assets and personnel were committed to moving DSWD goods. Even so, local military commanders noted they were quite burdened by requests from small NGOs for vehicles and escorts for their relief runs.

8. None of the local NGOs interviewed had established policies for engaging the military, yet did not object to the security details being armed during their relief operations.

The experience of military-NGO engagement during the response revealed differing stances regarding such activities. The NGOs interviewed felt that security and force protection were a “required” military assistance mission due to the looting in Leyte. The PRDCI went further, opining that their requests for military vehicles and security detail were something due them as taxpayers. The CCF thought they only had to make requests, but would have preferred not.

9. Military-to-military interface at the Roxas hub was smooth since the Canadian DART effectively executed HA/DR protocols for

¹¹⁰ The Philippine Commission on Audit required this paperwork as a matter of accountability.

military deployment, including an advance party with whom local troops conducted joint assessments.

The Canadian troops consulted with the provincial governors for deliveries and with the Canadian Embassy in Manila. Many of the Canadian military personnel were deployed with AFP engineering units tasked with road clearing and building temporary shelter.

Local troops had little or no engagement with the UK naval forces (which made deliveries to northern Iloilo island communities). The UK forces were also perceived by the senior local officers as following more closely the UN protocols by coordinating directly with OCHA, but neither with the local troops nor the local government units nearby.¹¹¹

10. The timing of the military and civilian efforts was complementary. In the early response, the military had the capability for widespread relief actions. As military units withdrew, NGOs and LGUs were able to continue relief operations.

In the first few weeks, there was heavy reliance on AFP air and ground assets to move relief goods and personnel throughout Panay. The international humanitarian community did step up activities in week three onwards and used civilian assets accordingly. By mid-December, coinciding with the pullout of Canadian and UK military assets, local humanitarian efforts began filling in the gap.

CENTRAL VISAYAS (CEBU) – REGION VII

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in Region VII in the municipalities of Daanbantayan in Cebu mainland and Bantayan in Bantayan Island, both on the northernmost tip of Cebu province. Haiyan affected a total of 15 municipalities (out of 44) and one component city (out of four). These included Sogod, Borbon, Tabogon, Medellin, Daanbantayan, San Remigio, Tabuelan, Tuburan, San Francisco, Poro, Tudela, Pilar, Santa Fe, Madrideojos, Bantayan, and the City of Bogu. About 31 percent of the *barangays* within these local government units were affected by the

¹¹¹ In General Baladad's words, "The UK troops had many goods, but they insisted to go wherever they wanted." He offered coastal northern Antique to the Philippine Navy liaison officer (who was assigned by the AFP GHQ), but the UK troops insisted on northern Iloilo islands instead. Personal communication, 30 May 2014.

typhoon, with impacts on infrastructure, agriculture, tourism, education, health, and housing.

Typhoon Haiyan impacted a total of 152,746 families or an estimated 610,984 displaced individuals. According to the NDRRMC, 74 people in Region VII lost their lives in the storm, and 348 were injured. As of 27 December 2013, 122,482 houses were listed as damaged, 62 percent of which were totally destroyed.

Preemptive Action, Prepositioning and Response

The Cebu Provincial Government carried out its own preparatory efforts. The Provincial Government called a meeting with municipal DRRMCs to carry out evacuation prior to landfall. Two days prior, the DSWD and DILG prepositioned relief goods at the evacuation centers. Cebu-based military units did their own pre-emptive evacuation, moving personnel and equipment away from danger zones where they were the first responders.

Typhoon Haiyan hit the northern portion of Cebu Island and Bantayan Island. Unlike Panay, the damaged areas were contained inside the administrative boundaries of Cebu province, so the majority of the response operations were conducted at the provincial level.

The Cebu Governor and Vice Governor spearheaded road clearing operations leading north from Cebu City on 8 November, *day 0*. For government relief goods, logistics was a critical problem. The provincial government had no central warehouse; its standard 3,000 family packs were scattered in diverse locations. In addition, the family packs were sufficient only for two days.¹¹²

According to Major General Roy Deveraturda and UN OCHA representative Jean-Luc Tonglet, the relative inaccessibility of Bantayan Island communities meant the response operations were more *ad hoc* and minimally coordinated by the provincial government.¹¹³ In comparison, the response to northern Cebu Island was better, since the road network

¹¹² Evalyn Senajon, Staff Member, Social Welfare and Development Office Region VII, personal communication, 14 July 2014.

¹¹³ Major General Roy Deveraturda, Commanding Officer, AFP Central Command, personal communication, 9 July 2014 and Jean-Luc Tonglet, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer for Roxas/Capiz, OCHA, personal communication 29 May 2014.

from Cebu City had been cleared and opened shortly after the landfall. On Bantayan Island, international humanitarian organizations made their own internal arrangements with each municipal DRRMC, with an end result of unevenness in terms of the international assistance footprint.¹¹⁴ Many local civil society organizations (e.g., Cebu Chamber of Commerce, Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water) also undertook their own relief operations going directly to the municipalities, bypassing the Provincial DRRMC.¹¹⁵

The provincial DSWD office quickly ran out of its prepositioned family packs but received private relief donations (from individuals, businesses, and NGOs) and volunteer packers. The Region VII DSWD office provided additional relief goods but DSWD-VII admitted that it ran out of relief supplies quickly and had to procure goods from Manila. Since supply ships could not dock at the congested Cebu port, supply and distribution were further delayed. DSWD-VII had five packing centers but was only able to distribute two-thirds of the 150,000 packs produced daily because the DSWD did not have sufficient vehicles, and had to scramble to hire vans.

Moving shelter kits to the island municipalities was especially difficult given the long queue for roll-on/roll-off (RORO) boats. No prior arrangements existed for warehousing, volunteer management, appropriately sized vehicles, or for logistics arrangements to avoid traffic congestion.¹¹⁶

DSWD personnel assigned to the One-Stop Shop noted initial confusion concerning international goods.¹¹⁷ From November 2013 to February 2015, DSWD gave instructions to waive the requirements for donors to be registered with DSWD. By March 2015 however, the system was being “abused,” i.e., goods no longer intended for relief were being coursed through the OSS, ostensibly to avoid customs fees.

¹¹⁴ According to OCHA representative Jean-Luc Tonglet, Bantayan Island was over-served by humanitarian organizations well into the early recovery and rehabilitation phase, whereas some municipalities in mainland northern Cebu struggled for lack of partners.

¹¹⁵ Senajon and Tonglet, personal communication, 14 July and 29 May 2014.

¹¹⁶ Grace Subong, Social Welfare Officer II and Point Person for Haiyan Relief Operations, Social Welfare and Development Office Region VII, personal communication, 15 July 2014.

¹¹⁷ Ananisa Aviso, Staff Member, Social Welfare and Development Office Region VII, personal communication, 15 July 2014.



Philippine Red Cross and IFRC staff and volunteers distribute relief goods in the aftermath of the storm. (Photo credit: IFRC, (c) 2013, used under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 license).

This led to a DSWD-National memorandum which lifted this waiver. Many organizations that had been issued prior waivers did not turn in their reports indicating the distribution of goods. The OSS staff at Cebu was also at a loss how to treat some of the equipment that passed through, such as goods brought by the South Korean military en route to Tacloban. The staff was unsure whether these goods were humanitarian. UN OCHA noted that by January 2014, the OSS, although still active, had a dwindling number of agency representatives which resulted in clearance delays.¹¹⁸

Because the Cebu Provincial Government was fully functioning, the province did not require AFP military coordination. The civilian authorities could move resources from the south to the north.¹¹⁹ In short, Cebu followed the “normal” procedures where the military simply

¹¹⁸ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 32 (as of 14 January 2014)*, (Manila: OCHA, 2014).

¹¹⁹ Cebu also was not an active insurgency zone, hence there were no on-the-ground local military units in affected areas unlike in Panay, Samar and Leyte. The AFP Central Command, which General Deveraturda headed, is an area command (not a line unit) with headquarters in Lahug, Cebu City.

attached itself to a working DRRMC, which in this case was the regional DRRMC.¹²⁰ Given this, the military did not need to engage in planning for transition (phased exit with LGU turnover). Because Cebu was home to the AFP Central Command, the focus of the military was to direct regional hub operations. The AFP set up a hub-and-spoke logistical operation, with Cebu as regional hub, and with airports and seaports in Ormoc, Tacloban, Guiuan and Roxas City as sub-hubs.

The AFP Central Command coordinated deployment and positioning of incoming assets (including foreign military) and provided command-and-control. Major General Roy Deveraturda received direct orders from the Chief of Staff in Manila while at the same time empowering subordinate commanders in Panay (Brig. General Baladad) and Samar/Leyte (Brig. General Velarmino). General Deveraturda opined after the operation that they “were given considerable latitude by the MNCC to do the right thing.”

As *de facto* leader of the regional logistics hub, General Deveraturda was able to direct the bulk of air deliveries towards Tacloban and vicinity, in line with the military’s assessment that this area sustained the heaviest damage from the storm surge and was cut off from land or sea assistance coming from Cebu province’s unaffected areas. In contrast, relief goods delivery in northern Cebu and Panay could be sustained by sea and by land.

Numerous local relief and early recovery organizations quickly mobilized in the Central Visayas. The Yolanda Operations Coordination and Support Linkages Group established by local church groups and NGOs also delivered relief goods to affected areas. This was not surprising given many Cebu-based NGOs have had prior experience in community-based disaster risk reduction as well as relief provision. These NGO leaders were well networked with businessmen, logistics providers, and local community leaders in the affected areas. For instance, Roberto Ybanez, President of Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water (CUSW), tapped relatives and a cousin who was Vice President for Smart Telecommunications to provide radios. Through friends, they delivered goods by boat, including chickens from nearby poultry farms. May

¹²⁰ General Deveraturda contended that before the start of relief operation, he had gone to the Capitol and spoken with Cebu Governor Davide to offer the military services of AFP Central Command if needed.

Elizabeth Segura-Ybanez, Executive Director of the Cebu Chamber of Commerce, exhibited the same independent streak, generating funds for relief operations and tapping businesses and logistics providers (including warehouses) to move goods.

Both government agencies and NGOs in Cebu interfaced with the military for logistics operations. The Philippine police and navy personnel provided security for goods being transported due to concerns of pilferage, and army trucks were used to haul relief goods. CUSW reported working with the Coast Guard for deliveries to Bantayan Island.

The province shifted to early recovery by the end of November, although evacuee arrivals to Cebu from Region VIII (Samar/Leyte) continued after that. In terms of outcomes, UN OCHA reported gaps in food assistance to islets in northern Cebu as late as 29 November. By 24 December 2013, Cebu province had shifted to rehabilitation and reconstruction as basic health services and water supply had been reestablished by local authorities and partners in affected areas.¹²¹

Coordination, Linkages, and Networks

No Regional Incident Commander for Central Visayas was appointed, as compared to Panay and Samar/Leyte. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and OCD activated the Humanitarian Operations Center at the Cebu-Mactan International Airport on 14 November, *day 6*, making Cebu a regional logistics hub. The Department of Foreign Affairs, the Bureau of Customs, and other One-Stop Shop (OSS) partners set up the OSS facility for international humanitarian assistance on 12 November, *day 4*.¹²² Cebu was an evacuation area for those fleeing Tacloban and Guiuan. These evacuees were largely transported utilizing military air assets.

Cebu was the main staging area for logistical support to Tacloban/Samar/Leyte, through the barges and roll-on/roll-off facilities

¹²¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 26 (as of 24 December 2013)*, (Manila: OCHA, 2013).

¹²² Minda Morante, "Typhoon "Yolanda" (Haiyan) Experience," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

at Ormoc.¹²³ The World Food Programme, the co-lead of the UN Logistics Cluster, had a mobile storage unit installed in Cebu for incoming food and non-food items. However, the availability and transport of trucks between the Cebu airport and seaport remained problematic for several more weeks. OCHA assigned a dedicated UN Civil Military Coordinator for the Cebu hub on 20 November, *day 12*.

Major General Deveraturda, head of the AFP Central Command, transferred from Lahug, Cebu to the Mactan airport in the anticipation that the bulk of relief goods would be coming in by air and that the AFP would be used for transport. In this capacity, Major General Deveraturda was in charge of all military assets of the logistics hub, working closely with Region VII of the Office of Civil Defense. On paper, the Region VII Haiyan response more closely followed what was considered the “regular” engagement between OCD Region VII and the Incident Command System, as General Deveraturda was technically not the Incident Commander. General Deveraturda ostensibly took orders from OCD Region VII Director Minda Morante as his direct civilian principal. In actuality, however, as military commander of the Mactan Air Base command post, General Deveraturda was assigned the tasking of logistics required for relief operations after the necessary clearances had been issued by civilian authorities in the One-Stop Shop. Logistics tasking involving military assets were handled by MNCC-Cebu in coordination with the WFP-led Logistics Cluster for the international humanitarian community operating out of Cebu. Thus the AFP in Region VII, as in Samar/Leyte and Panay, enjoyed considerable autonomy.

The system established at the Mactan airport was a *military command post working alongside the OSS*. This military command post at the logistics hub was separate from the clusters lodged at the Cebu provincial DRRMC, which had its post at the provincial capital.

As the primary logistics hub, the Mactan airport was extremely laden with incoming and outgoing C-130, C-17 and MD-83 cargo plane flights to Tacloban, Guiuan, and Roxas. The foreign air assets

¹²³ UN Humanitarian Air Service helicopters commenced flights on 18 November 2014 and transported mainly relief goods personnel. Later UNHAS C-130 flights transported relief goods to the Cebu hub. The WFP mainly utilized sea and ground transport. For instance, the WFP rented a RORO vessel for deliveries to Tacloban for a month as well as a barge for relief deliveries from Cebu to Tacloban and Ormoc (both in Leyte province).

dedicated to the Mactan hub arrived from South Korea, Sweden, UN, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, and Spain. In terms of ship disposition, two vessels (Australian and UK) were in Cebu compared to ten (U.S., Japan) stationed at Leyte Gulf.¹²⁴ From a peak of 15 flights per day at the Mactan air logistics hub on 25 November, the flights started winding down to eight by 6 December.¹²⁵ Accordingly, dedicated air assets went from nine on 29 November to six by 6 December. By 16 December, there were no more humanitarian military flights to the Mactan airport. The air assets stationed in Mactan remained on standby or were in maintenance.

The international military and humanitarian footprint in affected Cebu areas was more modest than at Tacloban, and primarily targeted the Bantayan Island communities. Military medical teams from Japan, Italy, and Israel worked in Tabugon and Bogo, and Swiss, German, Israeli, and Australian teams were at Daanbantayan, Bogo, Santa Fe and Bantayan Island. Numerous IFRC, NGO, and UN teams deployed alongside these country teams. The AFP provided force protection to each of the teams.

Approximately ten civilian medical teams were in Cebu, including the Japan Red Cross, Corps Mondial de Secour, Canadian Medical Assistance, and International Medical Corps. No German military troops were deployed, but the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief and the German branch of World Vision and Red Cross carried out water purification and relief goods delivery in Santa Fe. These activities by foreign military medical teams and those by various international NGOs were coordinated at the municipal level, but not province-wide as the PDRPMC was not set up until much later.

The UN activated a civilian regional cluster coordination system on 6 December, *day 28*. The Cebu Provincial DRRMC had already activated a cluster coordination system with inter-cluster coordination managed by the Office of Provincial Governor/PDRPMC. The Cebu Provincial cluster coordination system included representatives from the regional offices of OCD and held its meetings at the Cebu Provincial Capital. The UN cluster system (overlaid with the PDRPMC cluster system) featured twinning, i.e., each cluster was set up with representatives

¹²⁴ Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) *Updates*, ([PowerPoint Slides], 29 November 2013).

¹²⁵ Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) *Updates*, ([PowerPoint Slides], 5 December 2013).

from provincial and regional agencies and the UN agencies present at Cebu. Cluster leadership was sorted out early between provincial and regional offices. Given the dearth of UN representation in Cebu City, some local civil society organizations, such as Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water and Cebu Chamber of Commerce, were respectively given lead roles for WASH and livelihoods. The logistics cluster featured the Provincial Transport Office as lead, but it was not clear whether this cluster liaised with the military representatives at the regional logistics hub at Mactan airport.

Task Force *Pagligon*, created on 15 December, *day 37*, through an executive ordinance of Cebu Provincial Governor Hilario Davide, had the task of coordinating early recovery and rehabilitation efforts. Task Force *Pagligon* consisted of various provincial offices and local NGOs planning and spearheading provincial recovery and rehabilitation. In Cebu province there was a clear transition from the relief phase to the recovery phase. Task Force *Pagligon* undertook joint assessment missions with the local clusters to affected Cebu municipalities with an end goal of affecting an early buy-in/commitment from the various UN organizations for rehabilitation.

The local cluster members who represented various provincial and regional agencies admitted to their unfamiliarity with the cluster coordination system. According to one interviewee, “we hadn’t quite gotten used to operating in a cluster system.” The cluster coordination system for Typhoon Haiyan was the first such operation in Cebu province. The local staff was simply ill-prepared for the demands of coordinating the sheer number of NGOs covering nine municipalities for three to six months.¹²⁶ The local actors were unfamiliar with the cluster system, with the exception of Cebu provincial administrator Baltazar Tribunalo whose previous work exposed him to the cluster system. OCHA coordinator Jean-Luc Tonglet admitted that UN agencies for the most part took the lead in establishing the clusters and running the meetings.

Most department or office heads also attended their own department’s regular programs and meetings. Thus the coordination clusters had difficulty ensuring sustained commitment of the members.

¹²⁶ Tonglet, personal communication, 29 May 2014.

The Cebu City-located clusters did not communicate well with the affected municipalities. In addition to the physical distance and ongoing shortage of reliable telecommunications, the strong demands for documentation were burdensome to municipal social workers and discouraged cluster participation.

In interviews NGO representatives stated that they found the Cebu provincial government to be “a little too late in the attempt at coordination.” They pointed out that in spite of the emergency situation, the provincial government remained too slow and too bureaucratic. The NGO representatives attributed the province’s slow response to the fact that Governor Davide was a first-termmer with little prior experience leading operations at that scale. There was healthy skepticism about government accountability when it came to disaster response. According to Segura-Ybanez of the Cebu Chamber of Commerce, “when you work with the government, there’s already news of goods being stuck at the mayor’s office...some given only to political friends, so we have to make sure it [the relief goods] also goes to the church.”¹²⁷ She related how she was called by Department of Foreign Affairs to help move the goods that had arrived from Indonesia and were sitting at the airport as DSWD had not decided where they would be sent. She commandeered some of these relief goods for Cebu and executed a plan to move them out of the airport. Ybanez separately noted that “the government did no checking on rehabilitation project assessments. It was just too weak in monitoring rehabilitation projects.”

Insights and Lessons

1. The province did not have sufficient, pre-packaged relief goods, nor did it have a comprehensive logistics plan. This left the province dependent on emergency volunteer repacking and on relief goods arriving from Manila or from international donors.

Neither the province nor the regional DSWD had developed procurement arrangements after local supplies ran out. Even though repacking was eventually done at five centers, vehicles (trucks and boats)

¹²⁷ May Elizabeth Segura-Ybanez, Executive Director, Cebu Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc., personal communication, 15 July 2014.

were unavailable for delivery. An end-to-end logistics system, spanning DSWD warehouses out to hinterland affected communities, was needed but not present.

2. While the roads connecting Cebu City and the northern municipalities affected by the typhoon were opened early, serious logistic gaps hampered the delivery of government relief goods. Rural roads took far longer to open, and islands off the northern coast of Cebu waited days for relief.

3. The distance between the coordination platforms and the affected areas in northern Cebu Island and Bantayan Island resulted in coordination being carried out at the *tactical* level, or at the municipalities.

The regional DRRMC coordination platform was situated in Cebu City and the regional logistics platform was located at the Mactan airport. Many international NGOs went to Bantayan Island communities directly, bypassing both coordination platforms altogether. While the NGO footprint was modest and more targeted (compared to Tacloban), the international NGOs were still able to distribute their activities evenly across the Bantayan municipalities. This physical distance engendered independent mobilization of local NGOs outside of the DRRMC platforms. Local civil society groups were able to tap their networks for donations (food and non-food items) and for vehicles.

4. Province-wide and region-wide coordination under the UN cluster system for disaster response was late (activated 6 December 2014) yet mattered little, given that both local groups and international humanitarian organizations were already on the ground in Bantayan Island and northern Cebu. As in Panay, many of the smaller domestic NGOs were unfamiliar with the UN cluster system and lacked the resources to send representatives or to learn on-site how to engage with the coordination platform.

5. Ultimately the experience in Cebu indicated the need for an effective coordination platform at the site of the greatest damage.

The geographical divide between Cebu City and Bantayan Island rendered coordination at the latter tardy and ineffective. That many local NGOs and even international teams bypassed the regional and provincial DRRM Councils and UN coordination is unsurprising. As was the case

in other regions, the OCD's coordinating activities were hampered by several obstacles. These problems included a dearth of communications devices (satellite phones and radios) and insufficient staff to be present at both the regional DRRMC and the affected areas in adequate numbers. This ultimately left a vacuum that was filled piecemeal by independent departments and NGOs.

6. Little civil-military interface took place in this region as no local military units were stationed in northern Cebu and Bantayan Island.

Some interface existed between local NGOs and the Philippine military, with the latter tapped to provide security and vehicles for goods distribution (originating from Cebu City). Military involvement was largely confined to the airport logistics hub.

7. Typhoon Haiyan highlighted the geographic importance of Cebu as the regional hub for relief deliveries and logistics in the Visayas region.

As General Deveraturda pointed out, the Mactan hub serviced the entire Visayas region and was the most logical staging area of choice, as opposed to Manila. It was of sufficient capacity, run by senior AFP leadership, and able to take many of the international flights that would have severely congested Villamor in Manila.

The Cebu-Mactan airport had more runways and parking space for large aircraft such as C-130s and C-17s than any of the sub-hubs. The Cebu seaport could handle sea cargo with sufficient warehousing facilities and loading capacities. The Cebu role as a regional logistics hub for international humanitarian assistance pointed to more adaptive future responses based on decentralization (i.e., regional and outside of Manila).

Despite evident deficits in warehousing and storage facilities, and a shortage of pre-arranged heavy lift, ground transportation, and distribution, the Cebu hub operations generated valuable insights for the humanitarian community, for AFP, and for the DSWD. The successful operation of the Cebu-Mactan hub was due in part to the successful civil-military collaboration between OCD and the AFP.

8. Gaps in One-Stop Shop operations were noted at the Mactan hub, including confusion over responsibility for distribution of international relief goods as well as accountability for DSWD-consigned goods for which no distribution reports were submitted. The OSS suffered the

same malaise of declining agency representation during its three-month operation. As with the military hub, however, the need for a civilian logistics hub was apparent from the outset.

9. Few of the international relief shipments that passed through Cebu were delivered to Cebu affected communities. They were rather routed to sub-hubs elsewhere, primarily Region VIII. The international relief organizations did not concentrate on Cebu province, even though Cebu was used as the regional logistics hub. Although the need in the Tacloban region was undoubtedly greater, this also exacerbated somewhat the ongoing deficits in northern Cebu.

10. There was a disconnect between the UN organized cluster system and the military-led logistics hub, with the exception of the WFP co-led logistics cluster.

This disconnect emerged in part from the differing timetables of the two main logistics operations. The AFP- and OCD-led air logistics hub was operational on 14 November, *day 6*, while the cluster system was established late (6 December, *day 28*). By the time the UN cluster system was operational, the military assets were being drawn down and logistics were moving towards sea and ground civilian assets. By this point most relief actors had become committed to given areas and activities and did not always transition to the new logistics coordinator.

The Regional Incident Command Post led by General Deveraturda was linked to the UN logistics cluster through MNCC-Cebu, which in turn was run by General Santiago. General Santiago said they followed the UN cluster system and understood the imperative for WFP (as co-lead) to decide the prioritization of UN and INGO cargo and personnel, with veto from military asset-contributing countries.¹²⁸ However, except for the UN logistics cluster, none of the other UN clusters appeared to have been notified of their arrangements, or understood the relationship with the Philippine coordinators. That local organizations such as Cebu Uniting for Sustainable Water were given Philippine cluster lead roles is indicative of the UN cluster system's poor representation in this region.

In addition, the Philippine provincial clusters did not interface with the regional clusters or with the logistics hub at Mactan. Throughout

¹²⁸ Santiago, personal communication, 13 January 2015.

the Central Visayas region, operations were fragmented and marked by a distinct lack of top-down coordination and decision-making. The regional DRRMC in Cebu, physically far from the affected areas, had a difficult time providing a clear common operating picture to DRRMCs and responders in northern Cebu and Bantayan Island.

11. Provincial-level efforts did finally emerge with the 15 December formation of Task Force *Pagligon*. During relief, smooth coordination and unity of action eluded the Cebu region. However in early recovery, coordination was notable. The region's pioneering rehabilitation framework preceded the national government Recovery Assistance on Yolanda Plan (RAY of the National Economic Development Agency).

This provincial rehabilitation initiative was noted even by OCHA Coordinator Jean-Luc Tonglet, stating that Task Force *Pagligon* engaged the international humanitarian community to commit to rehabilitation of the Cebu municipalities by inviting them to Task Force meetings and assessment visits. In this regard the Cebu region was a model for a prompt and directed transition from relief to early recovery.

INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORTS

United States

The United States was well situated to render assistance to the Philippines Government. The U.S. maintains a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) office at its embassy in Manila and the Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement allows for a deep level of military-to-military cooperation. The presence in Manila of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) greatly aided the task of HA/DR, as did the many annual joint exercises the two nations have conducted, e.g., *Balikatan*.

At USAID offices in Manila, Bangkok, and Washington, storm tracking and monitoring prompted preparedness measures prior to landfall. So on 9 November, *day 1*, the Charge d'Affaires in Manila, Brian Goldbeck, declared a disaster, which freed up USAID funding and personnel. Prompted by the storm tracking, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) was able to establish and deploy

a Disaster Assistance and Response Team (DART) on the same day. Concurrently, USAID/Washington stood up a Regional Management Team (RMT) with the task of supporting the Disaster Assistance Response Team field operations, as well as information gathering, liaisons, and interagency coordination. The U.S. Department of State additionally created a Crisis Response Task Force in Washington to augment the task of coordination and to be a focal point for Americans inquiring about relatives or disaster updates.

The primary objective of the USAID/OFDA DART is to assess needs and requirements on the ground and to coordinate the provision of monetary aid, relief goods, and technical assistance to the host nation. USAID relies heavily on its constellation of local NGO, international NGO, UN, and private sector partners to provide the actual relief goods and services. The DART also tracks and coordinates relief goods provided directly by USAID and oversees mission tasking for any U.S. military forces deployed to assist. During Haiyan the main DART deployment began operations on 9 November, *day 1* out of Manila, with an operating base in Tacloban established 16 November, *day 8*.

In its final Haiyan factsheet of 21 April 2014, USAID recorded a total of USD 90,864,627 of assistance to the Philippines. Of this total, USD 35 million funded the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USD 20 million went to Food for Peace (USAID's food assistance agency), USD 34.5 million funded Department of Defense activities, and USD 1.2 million directly supported the USAID mission in the Philippines. The OFDA funding breakdown indicated the relative priorities of relief activities: 31 percent funded relief goods and logistics, 28 percent allocated for shelter and settlements, 23 percent funded water, sanitation, and hygiene, and 10 percent went to economic recovery and market systems.¹²⁹ The remaining eight percent was spent on protection, coordination, and risk management policy and practice.

To meet critical relief needs, the USAID DART worked through a wide variety of operational partners. Among the major DART partners were Catholic Relief Services (logistics, relief goods, shelter, and WASH in Leyte), Plan International (logistics, relief goods, protection,

¹²⁹ United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Philippines: Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan, Factsheet No.22, Fiscal Year 2014*, 21 November, 2013.

WASH, shelter, and risk management in Samar/Leyte), the World Food Programme for logistics, food assistance, relief goods and cash-for-work, and Oxfam for protection and WASH in Leyte. Once USAID and U.S. military presences were established in Samar/Leyte, the region became the focus of nearly all U.S. government assistance. Assistance to Cebu, Roxas, Panay, and other regions fell to the Philippine Government, relief providers, and to other international partners. However USAID and the U.S. military provided aerial damage assessments for Cebu.

The deployment of U.S. military forces, called Operation *Damayán*, was a major aspect of the U.S. government response to Haiyan. The lead actor for Operation *Damayán* was the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), through its 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The overall path of the III MEF deployment was presented by Lt. Colonel Rodney Legowski at the January 2014 PWA Haiyan after-action workshop. The deployment comprised five steps: (1) establishing a forward command element; (2) deploying a Humanitarian Assistance Support Team for assessments; (3) establishing coordination with the AFP, Government of the Philippines, and USAID; (4) determining tasks; and (5) setting conditions for transition/exit.¹³⁰

The U.S. military provided direct relief services as well as support to operational partners. Military tasks included transporting relief goods and evacuees, water purification, surveillance and reconnaissance, coordination, logistic support, airport operations at Tacloban, and rapid assessments. The U.S. military had significant prior warning of the typhoon, allowing it to begin operational planning before landfall. On 7 November, *day minus 1*, the U.S. 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) in Okinawa, Japan submitted a concept of operations to its parent unit, the III Marine Expeditionary Force.¹³¹ The Force stood up a Crisis Action Team on 8 November, *day 0* and prepared to deploy the MEB. Simultaneously, staff at the JUSMAG prepared to conduct survey and assessment operations on 8 November, the day of Haiyan's landfall. Thus, when the AFP formally submitted a request to the United States

¹³⁰ Lt. Colonel Rodney Legowski, "OPERATION DAMAYAN: 22 Jan 13," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

¹³¹ Ibid.

for military assistance, the request was anticipated and the response already planned.

On 10 November, *day 2*, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) gave the order for the MEB to deploy its forward command element, based upon the JUSMAG rapid assessment. The initial MEB tasks were to establish liaisons and communications with AFP and USAID units on the ground and determine priority tasks. These tasks included the reopening of the airport at Tacloban, allowing MEB forces to begin transporting relief goods 18 hours after the operational orders were issued. Anticipating a wider utilization of U.S. military assets, PACOM established Joint Task Force 505 under the leadership of Lt. General John Wissler of the MEF on 17 November, *day 9*. The creation of JTF-505 designated the MEB as the land component command, primarily concerned with tactical decisions.

The Joint Task Force was greatly augmented by the USS *George Washington* and her carrier strike group, which had arrived on 15 November *day 7*. By 17 November, *day 9*, the naval deployment (Combined Task Force 70) grew to ten ships, including the cruisers *Antietam* and *Cowpens*, destroyers *Mustin* and *Lassen*, and dock landing ships *Ashland* and *Germantown*.¹³² In the air, tilt-rotor MV-22 Ospreys, Navy and Marine Corps helicopters, and Air Force C-130s and C-17s provided heavy lift and personnel transport. At its peak, Operation *Damayan* comprised over 13 Navy ships, 2,162 military personnel, and transported over 2,000 tons of relief goods and more than 20,000 evacuees. U.S. military planes and helicopters transported 3,521 relief personnel. All told, the U.S. military fulfilled all 52 USAID Mission Tasking Matrix requests.

On 24 November, *day 16*, the Department of Defense announced that it would begin drawdown and transition of all U.S. military personnel still active in relief.¹³³ On 1 December, *day 23*, the JTF-505 officially disbanded and the MEB concluded its operations in the Philippines. Notable throughout the operations was the incorporation of U.S. military personnel into the Philippine military and civilian coordination mechanism.

¹³² United States Navy, *Operation Damayan Seventh Fleet Consolidated Media Updates*, 20 November 2013.

¹³³ Thomas Lum and Rhoda Margesson, *Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda): U.S. and International Response to Philippines Disaster* (Washington: CRS, 2013), 9.



The Government of Japan provided tents to serve as temporary shelter for families in *barangay* Candahug, Palp, Leyte. (Photo credit: Asian Development Bank, (c) 2013, used under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 license.)

As detailed above, U.S. military personnel were instrumental in the formation of the Manila Multinational Coordination Center. At the MNCC, the Marine (and later JTF-505) liaisons met daily with counterparts from the AFP Central Command, with USAID/OFDA members, and with local AFP commanders on the ground. U.S. military helicopters allowed USAID to perform its first aerial reconnaissance on 11 November, and military planes and satellites provided real-time imagery of the disaster. The first USAID relief good deliveries were made from military planes and helicopters. The planning and response to Haiyan clearly exemplified the strong and clear working relationship between USAID and the U.S. military.

Japan

The relief efforts of the Government of Japan and Japanese NGOs were broad and extensive. The civilian government, military, and NGO relief activities following Typhoon Haiyan constituted Japan's largest overseas HA/DR response in its history. In terms of total manpower mobilized, relief goods and technical teams dispatched, use of military

forces, and economic support, Japan's Haiyan response stands at the forefront of Japan's humanitarian activities in the Asia Pacific.

Civilian disaster relief in Japan is led by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). When the host nation (e.g., the Philippine Government) passes a request for international assistance to Japan, the Foreign Minister approves and JICA implements the relief policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Within JICA, the Japan Disaster Relief Secretariat is tasked with coordination of teams and provision of relief goods. The Japan Disaster Relief Teams typically fall into three areas: urban search and rescue, medical, and expert teams including volcanology, epidemic prevention, flood management, environmental remediation, early recovery, and/or infrastructure assessment. JICA relief goods and supplies focus on shelter, bedding, water, and power supply.

In its initial relief good shipments JICA provided 500 tents, 2,000 sleeping pads, 20 generators, and 70,000 bottles of water through the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and private airlines.¹³⁴ In addition to relief goods, JICA coordinated the dispatch of several relief teams to the Philippines.

On 7 November, *day minus 1*, the JICA Japan Disaster Relief Secretariat seconded two experts to join the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination deployment to Tacloban. This marked the first time in its history JICA had sent more than one staff member to assist the UN.

On 10 November, *day 2*, the Philippine Government requested JICA assistance. A combined needs assessment team comprising experts from MOFA and JICA departed for Manila that same day. Also on 10 November the Philippines requested medical assistance of Japan. On 11 November, *day 3*, JICA deployed a medical Japan Disaster Relief Team to Leyte. The medical relief team quickly encountered the transportation and logistics difficulties still widespread in the affected area, forcing them to delay their deployment. Unconfirmed reports of security threats in the vicinity of Leyte further delayed the team, as credible and verified information on security challenges was absent. On 14 November, *day 6*,

¹³⁴ Masahiro Taniguchi, "Typhoon Haiyan – Japan Civilian Disaster Response" (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 23 January, 2014).

the team arrived in Tacloban (escorted by the Philippine National Police) and on 15 November, *day 8* began operations in the central Rizal Park.¹³⁵

Due to the high intensity nature of disaster medical work, JICA medical teams work continuously for two weeks, at which point they are relieved if medical needs still persist. During Typhoon Haiyan, a total of three medical teams were deployed. Following the initial deployment, a second team was dispatched on 20 November and a third team on 29 November. The final withdrawal of JICA medical personnel occurred on 9 December, *day 31*. The JICA medical teams treated 3,300 people throughout the course of their deployment. In addition to serving at the main medical facility in Rizal Park, JICA deployed a mobile medical team that provided services elsewhere in Tacloban and as far afield as Samar Island. From the outset, JICA coordinated through the DOH- and WHO-led Health Cluster with other medical teams in the area.

Following the disaster, JICA acknowledged selecting Tacloban because the Health Cluster was situated there, and cluster assessments had prominently focused on the city.¹³⁶ This resulted in many other domestic and international health teams continuing to deploy to Tacloban at the expense of outlying areas in Samar and Leyte where no Health Cluster presence meant no new needs assessments.

In the Tacloban region the JICA medical teams quickly displayed their comparative advantage in the realm of mobile X-ray technology. The presence of portable X-ray imaging in the JICA medical tent quickly filled a needed, essential role, given the destruction of local medical facilities in Tacloban and the absence of such capabilities among other foreign medical teams. JICA's wireless networking and tablet computers further enhanced the capability of its medical deployment. This allowed medical staff not at the site of the X-ray machine (or even out of country) to view the images. Also highly notable was JICA's team providing entirely its own electrical supply and communications, a critical necessity given the sporadic nature of power and telecoms at the time.¹³⁷ Finally, the JICA

¹³⁵ Japan International Cooperation Agency, "Japan Disaster Relief Teams' One-Month Activity in Support of the Philippines," January 10, 2014, accessed at: http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2013/140110_01.html

¹³⁶ Taniguchi, remarks at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," 23 January, 2014.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

medical teams factored the transition to recovery into its mission—JICA worked with local Department of Health branches and other teams and NGOs to assess the transition to early recovery and the medical assistance most needed there.

In addition to its medical teams, JICA also deployed two expert Japan Disaster Relief Teams. On 26 November, *day 18*, 20 experts deployed from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan Water Agency, and JICA. The team's mission was to provide expertise on disaster assessment, recovery planning, and disaster risk reduction. The team operated until 19 December, *day 41*. A second team including members of the Japan Coast Guard and JICA deployed on 4 December. This team was tasked with helping Philippine officials respond to a major oil spill on Panay Island caused by the typhoon. The team provided technical assistance and advice until withdrawal on 13 December, *day 35*.

Through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, total civilian financial assistance to the Philippines from Japan totaled USD 56.1 million.¹³⁸ The bulk of this aid – USD 30 million – took the form of emergency grant aid, given primarily to UN agencies and the ICRC/IFRC. Japan made a major contribution of USD 20 million to the Asian Development Bank's Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction. MOFA support for relief and recovery provided USD 4.5 million to Japanese NGOs through the Japan Platform, and smaller grants to the International Labor Organization and ASEAN.¹³⁹

Through Japan Platform, an NGO umbrella group, MOFA funded a wide variety of Japanese NGO relief operations, totaling 23 in all. These NGOs provided relief goods, medical care, and specialized services, such as aid to the handicapped. As with many other international NGOs and relief teams, assistance was clustered around Tacloban. Some served other areas, e.g., the Association for Aid and Relief responding to needs in Bantayan Island near Cebu.¹⁴⁰ Among the NGOs deploying from Japan,

¹³⁸ Japan military assistance was counted separately but was considerable.

¹³⁹ Takeshi Ito, "Typhoon Haiyan: Japan's Disaster Response Lessons Learned, Perspectives On Japan Overseas Aid," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 23 January, 2014).

¹⁴⁰ Go Igarashi, "AAR Japan's emergency response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda" (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 23 January, 2014).

some commonalities were noted: the debate over force protection, the need for external coordination, and the requisite for a local partner. The Japan Platform NGOs exhibited a range of participation in the cluster system and interaction with military forces for transport and logistics, and varying levels of self-sufficiency.¹⁴¹

The deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces for Haiyan relief activities was significant. Operation *Sankay* constituted the largest overseas HA/DR operation in Japan's history, eclipsing even its response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The nearly 1,200 deployed troops hailed from the three branches of the Self-Defense Forces. On 12 November, *day 4*, the Philippine government transmitted a request for military assistance from Japan. The following day, 13 November, *day 5*, a military medical team of approximately 50 people departed for the affected area in Region VIII.

On 15 November, *day 7*, the Government of the Philippines requested assistance in manpower and transport abilities. The following day, 16 November, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force dispatched two C-130s, and on 17 November three Maritime Self-Defense Force ships departed from the port at Kure—destroyer *Ise*, landing ship *Osumi*, and support ship *Towada*.¹⁴² These ships arrived at Leyte Gulf on 22 November, *day 14*, and by 24 November the full JSDF contingent was operational.

Internally the JSDF formed two task forces for the relief operation. On board the *Ise*, the JSDF created a Joint Operations Coordination Center. In Tacloban the JSDF created Joint Task Force Tacloban. These task forces had lines of communication with each other, with Philippine Central Command, and with the MNCC. The JSDF also exchanged liaison officers (LNOs) with the Philippine Navy, the Royal Navy's HMS *Illustrious*, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Due to existing Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, support ship *Towada* was able to provide supplies to the Australian ship HMAS *Tobruk* and to U.S. C-130s. Notable throughout JSDF deployment was the partnership with the AFP and Philippine Navy, and also close communications with the militaries of the U.S., UK, and Australia.

¹⁴¹ Noriyuki Shiina, remarks at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 23 January, 2014.

¹⁴² Mannami, "JSDF Disaster Relief," 22 January 2014.

The areas of operation for the JSDF were Cebu and Tacloban. In nine major affected areas (two in Cebu and seven in Samar/Leyte), the JSDF concentrated primarily on logistics (personnel and relief good transport) and medical activities. The JSDF helicopters and C-130s transported a total of 630 tons of relief goods and 2,768 evacuees during their deployment. Independently and in consultation with the JICA medical teams, the JSDF medical deployment treated 2,646 people and provided vaccinations and epidemic prevention. For both transport and medical operations, the *Ise* functioned as a headquarters ship and had a direct line of communication with the Multinational Coordination Center in Manila. On 13 December, *day 35* Defense Minister Onodera issued the operational termination order. The last JSDF personnel and equipment departed the Philippines on 20 December, *day 42*, marking among the longest military deployments for Haiyan relief.

Other International Assistance

Besides the United States and Japan, many other countries provided civilian and military assistance. By 30 December OCHA had recorded 21 foreign military deployments to the affected areas. These deployments primarily took the form of C-130 flights of relief goods to Villamor or Cebu-Mactan.

Several civil-military deployments during Haiyan were notable. As documented in the Panay hub section, the United Kingdom mounted a robust response. The frigate HMS *Daring* initially began providing relief in northern Panay and was replaced in late November by the light carrier HMS *Illustrious*, which primarily serviced Canas Island near Estancia.¹⁴³ HMS *Illustrious* arrived in Panay via Singapore, from where it had picked up a large stock of relief goods. The deployment of the Royal Navy for relief earned positive reviews. Philippine officials appreciated the Navy's willingness to serve in Panay, avoiding the congestion around Tacloban. At the same time, Philippine and OCHA personnel noted a disinclination to send representation to coordination platforms. Military coordination with the Royal Navy remained on a bilateral basis, with the Philippine Navy and with partners such as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

¹⁴³ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, *Rapid Review of DFID's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines* (London: ICAI, 2014), 25.

Separately, civilian teams from the Department for International Development deployed, and DFID funded UN and NGO partners in Panay and Samar/Leyte. The UK government was the single biggest contributor to Haiyan relief financially: approximately USD 118 million to partners and UK government and military teams.

The Government of Australia was a major responder as well. Aided by the close Philippine-Australia relationship and their geographic proximity, Australian civilian and military units deployed quickly. Utilizing what Australian officials termed a “whole of government effort,” assistance flowed from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and from the Australian Defence Force. DFAT provided cash assistance to the Philippine government and to UN/NGO partners. The Australian Civilian Corps experts deployed to provide assessments and guide response. Total assistance from Australia came to approximately USD 40 million.

The Australian Defence Force provided aid from its air, land, and sea branches. Royal Australian Air Force C-130s and C-17s flew aid to Cebu and Tacloban, while the heavy landing ship HMAS *Tobruk* sailed to Ormoc for relief. Notably 400 personnel from the Australian Army and Federal Police provided assistance in Samar/Leyte. Civilian and military personnel jointly established a 50-bed field hospital at Tacloban airport.¹⁴⁴

The Republic of Korea mounted a civil-military relief response as well. A relative newcomer to overseas HA/DR, South Korea has lately increased its efforts in this area. South Korean HA/DR efforts are led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and assisted by the Ministry of National Defense. During Haiyan, South Korea provided approximately USD 25 million in aid. Civilian aid, through MOFA, comprised humanitarian goods, cash grants to the Philippine government and implementing partners, and official development assistance.

The Korean military also responded. A total of 260 members of the Korean Navy were deployed for relief on two amphibious landing ships, leaving Busan for Tacloban on 21 December, *day 43*. Separately, the Ministry of National Defense inked an agreement with the Philippine Department of National Defense to deploy a 520-man contingent for a

¹⁴⁴ Government of Australia, “Australia moves quickly to respond to Super Typhoon Haiyan,” accessed at <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/australia-moves-quickly-respond-super-typhoon-haiyan>, 29 April 2015.

year to support recovery activities. This deployment, named Operation *Araw Angel*, focused on engineering support, medical assistance, and cultural exchange. The operation was based in Leyte, where Korean military units cleared debris, built medical facilities, fumigated for disease, and led cultural activities such as screening videos and providing Korean language and taekwondo classes.¹⁴⁵ In the aftermath of this deployment, Philippine officials noted that it emerged from a bilateral military agreement, bypassing the usual channels, i.e., the Department of Foreign Affairs. Also Philippine officials have voiced concern that this foreign military HA/DR assistance mirrored capabilities already existing in the Philippines, with an unclear timeline for exit.

¹⁴⁵ ROK Joint Support Group, Philippines, *Operation Araw Angel*, ([PowerPoint slides, 10 March 2014]).

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Philippines

Though absolutely tragic, Typhoon Haiyan has provided an unparalleled opportunity to examine the response system of the Philippines and its partners and to study the lessons of the disaster. In Chapter IV PWA presents findings for the civilian and military apparatus of the Philippines. In Chapter V PWA presents findings for the international partners.

Lessons learned in and of themselves do not, however, suffice. They must be paired with concrete recommendations for overcoming shortfalls or capitalizing upon successes. For the national, regional/local, and military aspects of HA/DR in the Philippines, PWA presents recommendations that follow from our findings and observations, following an assessment of a second typhoon and a relevant disaster study. To aid accountability, each recommendation is tailored to a specific department, or group of departments, that should assume responsibility. For many, assistance from international partners such as Japan or the United States may play a valuable capacity-building role.

The PWA analysis of the response to Typhoon Haiyan considered the disaster response system at the time. Since then the Philippines has introduced several new additions to that system. The 2014 National Disaster Response Plan for Hydro-Meteorological Hazards (NDRP Hydro-Met, released June 2014) provided a more nuanced picture of how the NDRRMC and Operations Centers are to relate to the Response Clusters (earlier identified in 2008 NDCC Memorandum Circular no. 12), and how the responsibilities of the response clusters fit into those of the Incident Command System in this type of large-scale disaster. The 2014 NRDP Hydro-Met contained features embodying many of the

lessons from 2013 Typhoon Haiyan. It was written with the assistance of the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

While the 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan offered little detail with respect to escalating the response from local to national, the 2014 NRDP Hydro-Met was clearer concerning jurisdictional mandates of DRRMCs, and identification of two pathways for local-national interface and scaling up operations. These two pathways are augmentation by national government based on requests by regional DRRMCs, and the assumption of disaster response leadership by the national government. The assumption scenario enables the national government to activate its own response teams in the absence of information coming from the affected areas within 6-12 hours after storm landfall. In the augmentation scenario, LGU officials or local DRRMC leaders perform rapid assessments. These assessments are sent through the regional DRRMC, validated by cluster leads, and passed on to the NDRRMC, which can send resources as appropriate. Under the assumption scenario the national OCD deploys a Rapid Deployment Team to the affected area to establish an Operations Center and to conduct a rapid DANA for the affected LGUs.

The 2014 NRDP Hydro-Met Plan established eight response clusters, separating management of the dead and missing from the Search, Rescue & Retrieval Cluster.¹ The NDRRMC Operations Center manages the operations of the cluster system, with each government department leading its assigned cluster. The department cluster leads are to coordinate operations among cluster member agencies and with the NDRRMC. The DND through the AFP as the cluster lead for search and rescue is expected to “coordinate and deploy all available Search and Rescue teams from the government, civil society, private sector and international community.”² Maintaining its pivotal role in Philippine HA/DR, the AFP has assigned roles and responsibilities in all clusters, except education.

¹ The eight response clusters are Education (DepEd), Food and Non-Food Items (DSWD), Protection and Camp Coordination (DSWD), Health and WASH (DOH), Search, Rescue & Retrieval (AFP), Logistics (OCD), Emergency Telecoms (OCD), and Management of the Dead and Missing (DILG). The full Hydro-met NRDP can be accessed at http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1334/NDRP_Hydro_Meteorological_Hazards_as_of_2014.pdf.

² Government of the Philippines, *National Disaster Response Plan* (Manila: GRP), 2-24.

TYPHOON HAGUPIT – LESSONS LEARNED

Since Typhoon Haiyan, a second notable typhoon occurred. Typhoon Hagupit, though smaller, was also useful as an opportunity to assess disaster preparedness and response in the Philippines.

Preparedness

In early December 2014 Typhoon Hagupit (locally called Ruby) formed in the western Pacific Ocean. Before it made landfall Typhoon Hagupit was a Category 5 super typhoon with winds raging at strengths of 175 mph (280 kph). The Philippines embarked on extensive preparations for Hagupit in light of its predicted similarities to Typhoon Haiyan. The national and local governments broadcast warnings of storm surges, flash flooding, landslides, and destructive winds.

Days before the storm hit, the NDRRM Council and Office of Civil Defense coordinated and convened government agencies to prepare for the typhoon. The Council activated the response, coordination, and logistics clusters under the leadership of the response thematic area, i.e., the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). National and local government authorities and international humanitarian organizations prepositioned civilian and military assets and personnel, including large quantities of relief supplies. Ministerial level officials were deployed to the affected areas to support local authorities and help coordinate the response.

The NDRRMC Operations Center urged the government departments and partners to broadcast early warnings in many forms: radio, TV, website updates, and text message blasts. The international community had greatly bolstered these systems following Haiyan by providing equipment and training to local stations. Preceding the storm, the major NGOs already stationed within the country used urgent text messages to send early warnings weather updates.

The Government of the Philippines quickly established a Multinational Coordination Center and an information management cell at Camp Aguinaldo to prepare for deployment of incoming foreign military assets. The Philippines received offers of support from Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.³ The Philippines National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council Executive Director Alexander Pama confirmed assistance offers including personnel, resources and relief goods. Prior to storm landfall, the NDRRMC designated the Cebu-Mactan Air Base as the major logistical hub and One-Stop Shop for response, to streamline the customs processes and corral all arriving resources.

The Philippine NDRRMC led the humanitarian response leading up to and following the storm. For the first time in the Philippines, a Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Center was co-located in the NDRRMC Operations Center to support the response clusters operations, including the use of military assets to deliver relief supplies.⁴ The Coordination Center was created to liaise with the military MNCC and to ensure leadership in the NDRRMC was fully apprised of military assets and actions.

The U.S. Embassy in Manila helped track and monitor the typhoon prior to landfall. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) sent a disaster team to monitor and coordinate with the Philippine government and humanitarian organizations. On 6 December the U.S. Pacific Command assessment teams from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade arrived.⁵

In preparation for the storm, supplies rolled in and residents moved out. In the days leading up the landfall, the

³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Philippines, *Typhoon Hagupit Situation Report No. 2* (as of 7 December 2014) (Manila: OCHA Philippines, 2015), 2.

⁴ Assessment Capacities Project, *ACAPS Briefing Note – Philippines: 7 December 2014, Typhoon Hagupit* (Geneva: ACAPS, 2014), 2.

⁵ United States Embassy Manila, "Close Bilateral Cooperation Before, During and After Typhoon Ruby/Hagupit Enables Faster U.S. Government Emergency Response" (Press release), 11 December 2014.

NDRRM Council, coordinating with the AFP, DSWD, DILG, and local governments, undertook a massive evacuation. Mandatory evacuations were in effect along the coastline and riverbanks. More than one million people evacuated to 3,640 shelters in advance of landfall, an impressive feat in any country.⁶ At the height of the evacuation, 1.7 million people sheltered in over 5,000 stocked evacuation centers.⁷ The preparation activities of the local and national government, including the prepositioning of road clearance teams, were applauded by numerous international, governmental and non-governmental experts and officials.

Response

Typhoon Hagupit struck at 9:15 p.m. on 6 December 2014 in Eastern Samar province (Region VIII). The typhoon by this point had calmed to a category 3 storm, with sustained winds of 108 mph and gusts of 130 mph. The storm weakened as it moved west across the middle of the Philippines. Hagupit made a second landfall the morning of 7 December on the island of Masbate, and the third landfall occurred in southeast Marinduque province.

Despite earlier dire predictions, Typhoon Hagupit weakened to a tropical storm as it moved toward Batangas province south of Manila, and exited the country as scattered heavy showers. The storm system left the Philippines late 10 December. While a total of 944,249 families/4,149,484 persons were affected, only 18 deaths were reported.⁸ In its wake, OCHA estimated USD 74.7 million in damage, including nearly 40,000 houses

⁶ IRIN News, "From Haiyan to Hagupit – What Changed?" IRIN, 8 December 2014. Accessed at <http://www.irinnews.org/report/100925/from-haiyan-to-hagupit-what-changed>

⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Philippines, *Typhoon Hagupit Situation Report No. 5* (as of 11 December 2014) (Manila: OCHA Philippines, 2015), 1.

⁸ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, *Situation Report Number 27 re: Effects of Typhoon Ruby "Hagupit,"* (Quezon City: NDRRMC, 2014) Tab B, 1.

destroyed and approximately 203,600 damaged.⁹ The Philippines fared far better than had been feared.

Together the Philippine government (DILG and DSWD), the AFP, the USAID DART and 3rd MEB conducted initial needs and damage assessments in the hardest hit areas. Canadian aircraft assisted in aerial surveillance as well. The AFP cleared roads for relief to get through and private company field engineers worked on restoring telecommunications.

The MNCC expressed appreciation for the standby and offers of the foreign militaries, yet declined relief deployments. The DND during this storm believed that the AFP would suffice. The NDRRMC at the same time requested that the UN Cluster System not be activated. The Philippine Government utilized the response of its departments, local and provincial governments, the private sector, and NGOs with an established in-country presence.¹⁰

To aid the response, the Government of the Philippines requested specific aid from the World Food Programme, USAID, Spanish AID, JICA and IOM. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided emergency supplies including 600 blankets, 260 tarpaulin sheets, 600 sleeping pads, 600 jerry cans and 10 water purifiers with a total value of approximately USD 190,000. Japan additionally deployed a ten-man team to the MNCC, comprising eight officers from MOD and two from MOFA/JICA.¹¹ The DSWD worked closely with the WFP and USAID/OFDA to provide and deliver much-needed food assistance, moving prepositioned supplies to affected communities as well as sharing warehouse space and land and sea transport. This effort was funded in part by the USD 750,000 USAID/OFDA provided for emergency assistance in the wake of Hagupit. In

⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Philippines, *Typhoon Hagupit Situation Report No. 6 (as of 15 December 2014)* (Manila: OCHA Philippines, 2015), 1-2.

¹⁰ World Food Programme Logistics Cluster, *Philippines – Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) Response Situation Update 15 December 2014* (Manila: WFP, 2014), 1.

¹¹ Hiroyuki Tahara, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 18 December 2014.

coordination with OCD, the WFP also provided telecoms support in the form of radios, satellite phones and generator sets.¹²

The international NGO community was coordinated through the Philippine International NGO network (PINGON), consisting of Plan International, OXFAM, Care, Save the Children, CRS and other smaller INGOs focused in Samar. These humanitarian partners immediately began to assist local authorities in several areas: distribution of food, water and hygiene kits; information management; child protection; camp coordination and camp management at evacuation centers; and, logistics. Others such as the International Rescue Committee (IRC) deployed their emergency response team immediately after the storm subsided. Working closely with Philippine government agencies, they launched relief and long-term recovery efforts targeting helping hard-hit communities rebuild.

Assessment

Following the storm the Government of the Philippines was widely praised both locally and internationally for its preparedness measures and quick, efficient response. The preparation activities of the local and national government, including the prepositioning of road clearance teams, were applauded by numerous international, governmental and non-governmental experts and officials.

The decreased strength of the storm coupled with the planning and coordination by the government led to much better outcomes than originally predicted. Although material damage was high, the drastically lower numbers of dead and injured was a testament to effective preparedness measures. The United States Embassy in Manila commended the Government of the Philippines on its extensive preparations leading up to Typhoon Hagupit.¹³

¹² Mei Nebreja, "WFP To Provide Transport, Food for Philippines Government Typhoon Response," Manila, 7 December 2014. Accessed at <https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-provide-transport-food-philippines-government-typhoon-response>

¹³ United States Embassy Manila, "Close Bilateral Cooperation..."

Before Haiyan, residents were reluctant to leave their homes for fear of looting or permanent displacement. After the experience of Haiyan, residents better understood the risks of remaining in the storm's path, and heeded their government's warnings. Early warning systems and information dissemination helped affected populations to evacuate and to travel along pre-planned evacuation routes. Displaced residents found shelter in centers packed with food and water. The Filipinos fared far better than they could have due to a prepared government and NGOs.

With the devastation wrought by Haiyan in mind, the Government of Philippines acted swiftly and thoroughly in the face of the oncoming typhoon. It benefitted from new preparedness measures, capacity building activities, and changes in policy. The successful response to Hagupit featured close cooperation among the NDRRMC, government departments, and the local DRRMCs. The close cooperation the Philippine Government and the AFP with the representatives from USAID/OFDA and the U.S. military was crucial in conducting initial assessments of conditions and needs in the hardest hit areas. U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg stated that this coordination "clearly showed that the repeated humanitarian and disaster assistance training and exercises between our two countries is an important part of our relationship."¹⁴

Notable in this disaster was the refusal of proffered coordination assistance from the UN. That OCHA did not establish a UN cluster system following Hagupit was attributable in part to assessments indicating that this would not be a repeat of Haiyan. Equally important, however, was the Philippine government's message to OCHA not to deploy. This message was relayed by the NDRRMC and was backed up by DSWD Secretary Corazón "Dinky" Solíman on the ground. The rejection of OCHA coordination was a testament to the Philippines' ability to manage its own disasters

¹⁴ Ibid.

and to its willingness to vet incoming international assistance offers and decline them if warranted.

The use of U.S. military surveillance and reconnaissance abilities during Hagupit was a further indication that the Philippines had embraced some of the lessons of Haiyan. In this case, the Philippine Air Force still lacked some of the capabilities the U.S. Marines could offer. This assistance comprised the bulk of U.S. military aid and reflected well on the Philippines' ability to request and utilize only international assistance that fills a demonstrated gap.

Based upon the experiences of Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit, Peace Winds America presents lessons learned and recommendations. PWA focuses on three broad areas below: the national level, the regional and local levels, and the armed forces. These recommendations aim to enhance the ability of Philippine responders to manage natural disasters, internally and in partnership with international assistance. The suggestions presented here take into account the overall guidance of the 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan and cleave to the concept of local leadership in disasters, augmented by national or international assistance.

NATIONAL COORDINATION AND CAPACITY

An assessment of the response to Typhoon Haiyan and subsequent disasters begins at the NDRRM Council. The Philippine Government's 2011 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan established the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) as the entity responsible at the national level for disaster planning (mitigation through recovery) and coordinating relief operations. The NDRRMC is the focal point of disaster planning and coordination, and through its regional and local counterparts it effects the planning and response activities for the Philippines disasters. An evaluation of policies and procedures is needed.

The concept of the NDRRMC is sound. Its mandate is broad, ranging from mitigation and climate change adaptation through response to long-term recovery. As a secretarial body, it brings together the departments chiefly tasked with disaster management: the Office of Civil Defense, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the AFP, and others. Through these departments the NDRRMC is responsible for leading, planning, coordinating, tracking, and harmonizing disaster response operations. The NDRRMC ensures that departments have a venue for sharing assessments and operational reports and for liaising directly with counterparts from across the civilian and military spectrum.

The most recent disaster plan of the Philippines summed up the Council's chief task: "As a collegiate body and through the leadership of the Chairperson, the NDRRMC will take the helm of the operations and will provide all decisions and instructions for a timely and appropriate assistance to the affected population."¹⁵ *A national-level coordinator is a requisite* for the largest national disasters, a precept affirmed by the experience of numerous catastrophic disasters in the decade prior to 2015. The Government of the Philippines has committed to the NDRRM concept and laid out a long-term adoption and implementation process. Evaluating the lessons of Typhoon Haiyan should focus on challenges the NDRRMC faced and recommendations for improvement as the national disaster planning and response coordinator.

The previous chapter documented a disparity within the NDRRMC. At one level, the OCD-led NDRRMC *Operations Center* was activated well before the disaster and worked continuously throughout the response. However, at the secretarial level, the NDRRM *Council* did not convene its first meeting until well after landfall. This was largely attributable to key secretaries, including National Defense, Interior and Local Government, Civil Defense, and Social Welfare and Development traveling on their own to Tacloban and the affected areas. As such, the NDRRM Council was forced to rely on lower level staff with great reduced decision-making authority, and on its Operations Center. *Ad hoc* solutions, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs Yolanda Action Center, became necessary.

¹⁵ Government of the Philippines, *National Disaster Response Plan* (Manila: GRP), 14

At the affected area, the many department secretaries could not exert coordinated national leadership. Their distance from Manila stymied inter-agency information sharing and coordination. The secretaries indeed brought a measure of direction to their own department's efforts *in Tacloban*, but in so doing weakened the NDRRMC as well as undermining the concept and practice of local management of disasters.

Relief efforts on the ground ultimately achieved their objectives in large part due to the effectiveness of the OCD-appointed regional Incident Commanders. Also critical were the individual efforts of departments with a deep experience in disaster operations, such as DSWD and the Armed Forces. For future disasters, each department should develop a protocol for a body akin to DFA's Yolanda Action Center. For the NDRRM Council to function, it needs information from its member departments. These action centers could empower the Council and improve its responsiveness.

To help the NDRRMC improve its effectiveness in the future, secretary-level coordinated decision-making is essential. This is particularly necessary for coordination of international assistance, a primary function of the NDRRMC. As the case study recounts, the NDRRMC turned away practically *no* international offer of bilateral assistance. While civilian relief aid sent from other nations was ultimately utilized, not all of it was appropriate, or was all of it speedily sent to the neediest areas. Similarly, many of the large international NGOs (INGOs) did not coordinate with the NDRRMC nor with the response clusters. The INGOs simply traveled to affected areas such as Bantayan Island and began operations with little oversight, coordination, or tracking. The DFA action center – alongside the One-Stop Shop – provided much of the interface for inbound foreign assistance, but as DFA Assistant Secretary Domingo noted, early on there were too few nationally coordinated operational clusters in light of the large volume of relief goods.

The NDRRM Council and Operations Center require two elements to function optimally in a major disaster. First, a robust system is needed at the local and regional levels for assessing needs, determining tasks, and coordinating incoming assistance. Second, the NDRRM Council should be empowered by its key decision-makers. The case study demonstrated that some or all of these elements were lacking, particularly in the hardest hit regions of Eastern Samar and Leyte. Without a steady stream of

accurate, validated, and timely reports, the NDRRMC could not make its key strategic decisions on matters such as international assistance or military deployment. The regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils should be adequately staffed and should be able to maintain uninterrupted communications with Manila.

To capacitate departments fulfilling their roles at the NDRRMC *and* in the field, their respective organizations must have robust surge staffing with the ability to deploy quickly and self-sufficiently. The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) should assume overall coordination of the deployments. The department representative teams from DSWD, DILG, DOH, DFA and DPWH could then deploy jointly, reducing the number of critical trips and increasing the likelihood they would work in concert once on the ground. If a local or regional Incident Command Post has been established, the teams could connect quickly with local counterparts. In the event local telephone, data, or radio communications are disrupted, as occurred in Tacloban, the surge team arriving from Manila could be equipped with means to communicate to the NDRRMC. Similarly in the event that local disaster personnel are understaffed or incapacitated by the disaster, the team could quickly augment their tasks. Many delays and gaps in communication noted during Haiyan could be remedied by this proposal. Unlike in Haiyan, these surge teams must arrive with the mandate to augment, *not* simply replace local leaders. Even if overwhelmed, as in the NDRP *assumption scenario*, local authorities remain the key to effective response.

Second, the NDRRM Council should be empowered by the presence of its key decision-makers. In Typhoon Haiyan, the OCD-led Operations Center was hindered by the absence the key departmental secretaries who immediately traveled to Tacloban. Consequently breakdowns occurred. Assistance was inadequately vetted; there was little or no coordination among departments; and, few communications with local responders.

The President and Congress should set the requirement that prior to and during a catastrophe, the departments must actively and meaningfully contribute to the NDRRMC decisions and operations. A Presidential imperative would go far in ensuring that the NDRRMC remains functioning and unimpaired. Particularly during typhoons whose geographic reach may be extensive, the ability of a national coordinator

(NDRRMC) to assess the entirety of the situation and lead accordingly is paramount.¹⁶ In future disasters, there may be more than one city highly in need of relief.

The lack of an immediate decision-making presence at the NDRRM Council led actors such as the Philippine Red Cross or ASEAN AHA Centre to coordinate only marginally with the NDRRMC, choosing instead to focus at the local and tactical level. In the future the NDRRM Council should lead and coordinate such actors.

Given its prominence, the Philippine Red Cross could increase its efforts to make contingency plans with other national Red Cross societies (and in concert with the IFRC). A focus on logistics, manpower, relief goods, and communication would do much to alleviate the PRC becoming overstretched in a major incident. While the PRC deployed Emergency Response Units and search and rescue teams around Samar and Leyte, the scope of the operation quickly outstripped its abilities. The PRC could also increase its partnership with DSWD with regard to joint warehousing and pre-disaster positioning of relief teams, vehicles, and supplies.

Philippine military coordination during Haiyan was strong. The AFP benefitted greatly from strong leadership, relevant prior training, and key relationships. At the national level, AFP coordination was primarily tactical and operational in nature. The military was able to focus on its areas of expertise such as search and rescue, transport, logistics, and military-to-military coordination. These tasks were well suited to the AFP, and its vertical organization and chain of command were a pronounced asset as opposed to the more horizontal layout of the NDRRMC and civilian responders. Overall, international military and civil-military coordination at the national level showed promise for future operations.

As Commodore Mariano noted in the case study, once the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) was established on *day 7*, its primary task was to provide a common operating picture, including deconflicting flight schedules. The process by which military assistance was offered, negotiated, and accepted remained a bilateral

¹⁶ Typhoon Haiyan revealed that high-profile arrivals place an unacceptable strain on regional airports and displace higher-priority arrivals of relief goods and specialized rescue personnel.

process, working through embassies and military attachés. Due to the Philippines-U.S. combined coordination center concept of operations, the establishment of the MNCCs in Manila and Cebu proceeded fairly smoothly. Philippine officers credited the effectiveness of the MNCC once it was established to the exercises and training done with the U.S. The MNCC conceptually closely resembled the combined coordination centers from the RP-U.S. CONOPS. The national and the Cebu MNCCs were critical to establishing the logistics chain that began overseas, running through Villamor or Cebu-Mactan, and on to the sub-hubs. This chain encompassed the Logistics Cluster, WFP, DSWD, and a panoply of international and local NGOs and country teams. The establishment and smooth operation of the MNCC during Typhoon Hagupit proved the MNCC is a worthy model that merits close scrutiny from other regional nations.

Addressing the limitations and shortfalls of the MNCC during Typhoon Haiyan, three areas did emerge: personnel, procedures, and information. The MNCC officers from the AFP J-3/Operations and J-5/Plans offices noted setting up operations took a full week, and senior officers with training or experience in combined coordination centers were not always available. In the early days of the MNCC, the reliance on U.S. Marines and officers from JTF-505 was a testament to this personnel shortfall. The experience of Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit has now provided the AFP with a core of officers familiar with running an MNCC. However, these officers will rotate and their numbers will decrease through attrition.

The Department of National Defense should proactively ensure there is a wide pool of officers trained in the ASEAN SASOP, the Multinational Forces SOP, the U.S.-Philippines Concept of Operations, and versed in the lessons and strategies of these two disasters. One means of achieving this goal would be to engage these officers as teachers and trainers. Philippine officers who conduct this training could instruct military and civilian HA/DR counterparts in neighboring countries. This training would not only spread this valuable information, but would enhance the expertise of the trainers.

At the procedural level, MNCC staff noted the scope of the military assistance was established first through bilateral channels. For each foreign

military deployment, the foreign military's attaché and Embassy staff created with DFA a separate memorandum of understanding, terms of reference, or statement of intent for the deployment. In future disasters, the MNCC could greatly help expedite this process. The MNCC could serve as a clearinghouse of information and focal point for embassy military staff. As foreign ministries of defense weigh military deployment, their Embassy attachés could obtain accurate and timely information regarding overflight, firearms restrictions, medical and pharmaceutical regulations, force protection, quarantine, and other basic information. A DFA presence in the MNCC would also expedite the process. Since the MNCC will be obtaining needs assessments from the NDRRMC Operations Center, these attachés could additionally use that information to tailor their countries' deployments. With this information, the embassies could speed the process for negotiating and signing memoranda of understanding or terms of reference.

The MNCC noted information deficiencies, such as an open-access, unclassified communication system (i.e., APAN), and local information regarding weather conditions, damages, and supply routes. This was partially attributable to technical shortfalls (such as lack of satellite imagery of the affected areas) and partly due to the inherent confusion of a disaster of this magnitude. The lack of a common information sharing and dissemination system has been observed in many recent Asia Pacific disasters, and remains problematic. U.S. responders have effectively used APAN, and the UN has its well-established Virtual OSOCC platform. Philippine disaster managers – particularly those who may be tasked with setting up international coordination centers – need to select in advance an appropriate information sharing platform. The actual platform – whether APAN or other – is less important than its being open-access, unclassified, and shared in advance with incoming responders. As an aspect of ongoing operations training, DND should select an agreed-upon information sharing platform, and should train routinely internally and with likely HA/DR partners. Venues such as *Balikatan* are appropriate for this joint training. Establishing information-sharing protocols and dissemination systems in advance would increase the utilization of the MNCC in the future.

As national-level AFP officers prepare to establish and run a Manila-based MNCC, they should at the same time prepare to establish and run multiple complementary satellite MNCCs, such as was created in Cebu. The case study noted that while the MNCC-Cebu performed a critical role running the logistics stream at Mactan airport, a comparable coordination center was lacking in Roxas. Ultimately the well-trained and flexible Canadian team and WFP assumed portions of that coordination role. AFP training with partner organizations should be based on the assumption every regional-level civil-military Incident Command Post includes a civil-military coordination center. Nationwide training of military leadership in Incident Command, the basics of running a civil-military coordination center, and the roles and responsibilities of the center should be undertaken. The AFP leadership based at Camp Aguinaldo should have ready, trained surge staffing available to augment regional commanders as they establish coordination centers in the immediate aftermath of a disaster.

The Philippines notably is a regional leader in HA/DR responses that include international assistance. The Philippine experience establishing a military multinational coordination center, and its mechanism for clearing overseas civilian relief goods clearly demonstrates its leadership. The One-Stop Shop (OSS) concept is plainly needed in major disasters. The cases of Hurricane Katrina, the 3/11 Japan tsunami, and the Port-au-Prince earthquake witnessed relief goods piling up unconsigned, being inappropriately used or unusable. President Obama and President Xi of China at the November 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting highlighted the need for improved disaster logistics and importation procedures. The two leaders called upon Asian disaster managers to “facilitate the movement of emergency response personnel across borders and permit the importation, free of duty or restriction, for goods and supplies for humanitarian and emergency response efforts after disasters.”¹⁷ The Philippines clearly has been ahead of the message.

The goal of the OSS is to serve as the single entity to handle customs, immigration, and quarantine for inbound relief. During Haiyan relief and recovery, the OSS system functioned as designed, albeit with a

¹⁷ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: APEC Efforts to Support Emergency and Disaster Preparedness, Recovery, and Resilience” November 11, 2014.

number of hitches to be rectified in the future. Much like civilian and military coordination hubs, a stark disparity was observed between the national OSS at Villamor and those in the regions. DFA and partner departments established One-Stop Shops at Cebu-Mactan and at Roxas following considerable delays, and these OSS shops struggled with adequate manpower, issues of responsibility and consignment, and overall accountability. This shortfall manifested in confusion and delays of relief goods reaching DSWD for distribution. This was acutely felt at Cebu-Mactan, the main hub for relief goods en route to affected areas. One international NGO noted that the absence of the Bureau of Customs at the Cebu OSS required them to photocopy 260 pages of documentation in order to be cleared.¹⁸ As relief transitioned to recovery, the One-Stop Shops were utilized less as their staff returned to their home departments. An assessment of foreign medical intervention during Haiyan also revealed that policies and procedures for vetting and accepting health goods such as medications were not in place prior to the disaster, and were processed *ad hoc*.

To address these issues the relevant departments should form a periodic OSS Working Group tasked with refining policies and procedures for overseas relief. DFA and DSWD should lead this effort, along with the Bureau of Customs. As the first line of contact for international donations or international requests, DFA should be empowered not only to provide direction, but to modify or reject the relief assistance. As noted in the case study, virtually no overseas proffers of assistance were rejected. Notwithstanding the political pressure that may accompany a donation offer and the prevailing attitude of “accept the aid, then find a use for it,” DFA should assume its role as gatekeeper in these situations. DSWD and OCD, who oversee warehousing and logistics, should work closely with DFA to achieve this goal.

The very limited capacity of regional air and seaports (such as at Tacloban) should behoove DFA and the OSS leadership to ensure there is an appropriate demand signal for arriving goods or teams. This gatekeeping role also mandates a continual flow of updated information daily between DFA and the National/Regional DRRM Councils. The DFA must additionally

¹⁸ Charles McJilton, Second Harvest, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan,” Tokyo, 22 January 2014.

have up-to-date information from the MNCC and military coordinators in order to prevent duplication of civilian and military aid. Military relief was rarely tracked through the OSS mechanism.

The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) should involve itself actively in OSS planning and policy development. DSWD is the consignee at the regional hubs, validating and taking responsibility for distributing these incoming goods by an LGU or NGO. During Typhoon Haiyan this system often experienced dramatic slowdowns. Future OSS operations should assign full time DSWD personnel to liaise with local governments, distribution teams, and other government agencies. Ensuring a continual high-level DSWD presence at the One-Stop Shop would ameliorate the backlogs at the regional or sub-regional hubs. DSWD is ideally positioned to perform relief good triage, categorizing offered donations at high, medium, or low priority. Implicit in this recommendation is the permanent, actively monitored line of communication with DFA. A regional One-Stop Shop, alerted by DFA about an incoming foreign medical team or C-130 load of shelter material, could take appropriate steps to process the relief donations even before arrival.

International assistance nominally was tracked through the Philippines' pioneering effort at disaster transparency, the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub (FAiTH).¹⁹ This online tool tracked pledges and donations made by foreign nations, multilateral organizations, private individuals, and NGOs. FAiTH was established as a means of holding the Philippine government accountable for the large volume of international assistance that flowed in following the typhoon. As of March 2015, the portal showed USD 1.64 billion in total pledges (cash and non-cash), held against USD 386 million actually received. The disparity highlights a common trend in international relief, showing in stark relief the volume of pledges never acted upon. Despite the difficulties of collecting on pledges, the Philippines should maintain its commitment to the FAiTH, and continue devoting resources to documenting how received donations were utilized.

¹⁹ <http://www.gov.ph/faith/>

LOCAL COORDINATION AND CAPACITY

The Haiyan case study and after-action reports presented a range of disparities in local and regional capacity to engage in effective relief. One city had effective civil-military coordination, yet lacked an effective relief good distribution system. Another opened its roads and airfield quickly, yet lacked effective command-and-control and decision-making. This Peace Winds America assessment considers specific challenges faced by localities as well as theater-wide response issues.

A commonality among all the affected localities was the extent to which the storm devastated local response capabilities. The AFP, the Office of Civil Defense, DSWD, DILG, and other government and NGO responders saw their ranks decimated by the storm. Officials were injured, killed, or simply unable to access their posts. Entire units, such as the Philippine Air Force Tactical Operations Group at Tacloban, were rendered non-functional. Representatives from these organizations frequently used terms such as “overwhelmed” or “incapacitated” to refer to their local staff. This incapacitation was at the heart of most difficulties subsequently experienced with regard to coordination, communication, information sharing, and decision-making. As AFP Colonel Perfecto Peñaredondo, stationed at the NDRRMC, put it, there was a “deafening silence” from the affected area.²⁰

Foremost among the preparedness activities of these local departments – led by the chief executive and his/her DRRM Council – should be contingency planning to minimize or eliminate the near-total vacuum of able personnel in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.

The PWA case study recounted local headquarters destroyed, DSWD prepositioned food packs washed away, and critical infrastructure rendered useless. The increased ability to accurately forecast hydro-meteorological disasters could bolster continuity of operations and continuity of government. With PAGASA/DOST integrated into the NDRRMC framework, events such as typhoons and major storms can be foreseen and prepared for in advance, with needed information disseminated to

²⁰ Col. Perfecto Peñaredondo, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan,” Tokyo, 22 January 2014.



DSWD personnel and volunteers distribute hygiene kits to residents of Tacloban, Leyte. (Photo credit: IOM, (c) 2014, used under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 license.)

local leaders. Indeed, the widespread and effective evacuation measures taken during Hagupit were a credit to the inter-agency process envisioned in the NDRRM Plan. This was a lesson learned from Haiyan and ably acted upon. In Haiyan, thousands of casualties occurred among Tacloban residents who did not evacuate due to inadequate or disbelieved warnings.

The positive steps taken to plan for and carry out evacuation are a testament to the strength of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan. Unlike the prior system, which focused predominantly on response, the NDRMP sensibly incorporates mitigation and preparedness into its mandate and activities. The benefits of this holistic approach to disasters are numerous.

To further improve the system, DILG and DSWD should review evacuation procedures, gleaning lessons observed and learned from Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit. In Hagupit, people believed and heeded government storm warnings, and the location of evacuation centers was improved. These lessons should be applied not only to storms, but to non-predictable seismic disasters as well. Many locations and buildings may not be appropriate or safe, as demonstrated by the loss

of the DSWD prepositioned food packs in Tacloban. The same lesson pertains to warehousing and stockpiling of relief supplies, reviewed in light of the availability of airports and seaports. Without the success of the AFP inching their way through debris and opening the Tacloban airport, supplies would have been unavailable. These departments should also increase their access to ships and seaports in the archipelagic Philippines. The NDRRMC should request DSWD, AFP, OCD and DILG to work with the provincial and local authorities to review evacuation, warehousing, and air and sea sites and operations.

Adequate stocks of satellite telephones are critical as well, as they do not rely on ground-based cellular towers or radio repeaters. According to an UNDAC team leader in Tacloban, the USD 16,000 spent on satellite phones was a critical enabler early in the response – indeed the best purchase of the operation.²¹ At the local and provincial levels, any investment in disaster-proof communications is worthwhile. So too are efforts to locate local leadership in seismically-protected, storm and flood-resistant buildings.

A host of organizational procedures could improve local readiness as well. The Manila headquarters of key departments – OCD, DSWD, DILG – should be able to activate local headquarters, empowering key staff and reviewing preparedness plans. In the 24 to 48 hours of warning of a major typhoon, local headquarters could charge and stockpile radio batteries, designate evacuation areas, request surge staffing from Manila, establish coordination with DND/OCD, and a host of other preparedness measures. Organizations with local surge capacity such as the Philippine Red Cross could mobilize their membership, staff warehouses, and begin advance planning in partnership with DSWD.

Local leaders require additional education and training to strengthen their decision-making capabilities and also to collaborate with the various departments. Disaster preparedness is led by the Department of Interior and Local Government, which has the lead or co-lead with OCD for community training, planning and preparedness, institutionalization of the Incident Command System, and continuity of operations planning.²²

²¹ Sebastian Rhodes-Stampa, OCHA Bangkok, personal communication, 23 July, 2014.

²² Office of Civil Defense, *National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan 2011-2028* (Manila: OCD, 2011) 28

Once a disaster strikes, the implementation and management of the response falls to local or barangay executives and their DRRM Councils, to OCD (nationally and regionally), and to DSWD (the thematic area leader). When a disaster occurs, local executives should be better trained to immediately assemble DRRM Councils, and to utilize the earmarked monies in their budget for disaster response.²³

In practice, the extent to which this transition of leadership occurred in Typhoon Haiyan varied widely. In some localities, mayors or *barangay* captains formed their Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils. In other localities, local leaders acted alone without establishing linkages among the most important disaster response departments.

It is clear that the dissemination of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, development of local plans, and education on the Incident Command System are still spotty. Equally important – and often neglected during the disaster – is the continuity of operations plan that lays out a strategy for coping with staff shortages and damage to critical infrastructure. Without this continuity strategy, confusion cascaded throughout local governments, leading to near-total communications gaps with regional or national responders. The local governments were generally aware of the National DRRM Plan and the Incident Command System prior to Haiyan, but in many cases lacked realistic plans for local implementation.

At the regional level, the primary goals should be providing a common operating picture, collecting and disseminating needs assessments, and providing and enabling a capable decision-maker. The newly-established Incident Command Post at the Regional DRRM Council needed swift and high-level liaisons with the critical departments—OCD, DSWD, and DILG. Under the leadership of General Velarmino in Tacloban, OCD needed to streamline communications and operations among the three command posts at the airport, police station, and city hall. The UN On-Site Operations Coordination Center and a Reception/Departure Center at the airport added additional layers of interaction and

²³ Republic Act 10121 states, “Not less than five percent (5%) of the estimated revenue from regular sources shall be set aside as the LDRRMF to support disaster risk management activities such as, but not limited to, pre-disaster preparedness programs including training, purchasing life-saving rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and for the payment of premiums on calamity insurance.” Of this five percent, 30 percent is then allocated as a Quick Response Fund for immediate disaster relief.

communication. After Typhoon Haiyan's landfall an improved common operating picture would have been invaluable for the most pressing tasks—needs assessments, road clearance, and relief good distribution.

Regional military leaders were quickly appointed to be regional Incident Commanders. This however did not mitigate the various breakdowns in communication and coordination. As a military organization, the AFP does operate using a hierarchy quite similar to the Incident Command System. The AFP officers are experienced candidates and were rightfully chosen as Incident Commanders. Yet in the three most heavily-affected regions, the issues that arose were often attributable to the fact that ICS knowledge often did not extend past the AFP. Among the representatives from DILG and DSWD, local NGOs, and LGU officials, knowledge of ICS and of the hierarchy established by the NDRRM Plan was simply insufficient.

The ICS was often a novel concept, even among OCD personnel at the regional DRRMCs.²⁴ The uneven pattern of relief and the blurring of departmental responsibilities stemmed directly from little knowledge and experience with the Incident Command System. Personnel at regional DRRM Councils, including OCD staff, did not understand what decision-making power the Incident Commander and they possessed. In the ensuing vacuum, actors such as DSWD or LGU officials stepped in. It became clear that renewed training on the Philippine NDRRM system and ICS should be accorded a top priority in the future, as should “realistic implementation of LGU disaster plans.”²⁵

Crucial to the Philippine adoption of the Incident Command System is the precept that ICS should not pre-empt the principle of *local management of disasters*. ICS training and education should emphasize that while a military Incident Commander may be appointed at the regional level, his or her mandate is to augment and capacitate the provincial, municipal, and *barangay*-level Incident Commanders. The regional IC has the vantage to determine how national-level resources may accomplish the

²⁴ See Chapter II for a description of the Incident Command System. Based on common terminology and unity of command, ICS is a system for organizing disparate stakeholders into a single streamlined operation.

²⁵ Nestor Ramos, “Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) - DSWD Field Office-6,7,8 - Domestic Response,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan, Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

tasks set forth in the assessments generated at the local level. The regional IC may then determine if resources such as AFP reservists or an OCD team from Manila could be of service. Ultimately the implementation of the Incident Command System should empower, not disenfranchise the local level leadership.

Adding at times to coordination difficulties was an additional layer of organization: the cluster system. As described in the preceding chapters, the cluster system mirrors to an extent the UN humanitarian cluster system, dividing tasks into thematic areas led by designated departments. The cluster concept could be a great asset for disaster managers if meaningfully implemented during a disaster. As documented, the capacity at the local level varied quite widely and in many instances was overwhelmed by the competing manpower and logistic needs of the local DRRMC, the cluster system, and often by the added layer of international assistance. This overlapping set of coordination mechanisms was not an *ad hoc* response to the typhoon, but rather a pre-designated aspect of the Philippine domestic system.²⁶

The cluster system could be a great boon for the Philippines if it functions as intended. It can add value to disaster management by providing a platform for disparate civilian, military, and NGO responders to share information on like tasks at a central location. It was clear from Typhoon Haiyan that the cluster system was a double-edged sword for the Philippines. It could be highly beneficial if utilized correctly, but does have the potential to add to confusion through added burden of meetings and lack of clarity of decision-making.

The Philippine cluster system has been designed to bring together many responders around a single thematic area, serving as an information and operations clearinghouse for the use of the Incident Commander. The disaster managers (Incident Commanders) should be able *to establish clearly the points of decision-making* within the local or regional DRRMC operations center. Disaster managers next should establish robust lines of communication between the cluster and the decision-makers at the local or regional operations center. Robust information flow ensures needs

²⁶ The National Disaster Response Plan states, “Systems and mechanisms put in place before a disaster or emergency shall be activated including the cluster coordination system, emergency operations center (EOC) and the incident command system (ICS).” NDRP, 4.

and operational availability identified at the cluster are communicated to disaster leaders. Indeed the National Disaster Response Plan states, for instance, that the “Logistics Cluster will follow the cluster approach in operations taking into account that the direction of the operations will be based on the information provided by the other clusters, Vice Chairman for Response [DSWD], and concerned Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils.”²⁷ In other words, the *locus of decision-making for cluster actions lies not in cluster leadership, but with the DRRM Councils*.

Logistics demonstrate the need for a cluster approach. The burdens of transportation, warehousing, coordinating inventories, distribution, and tracking are highly complex and require a multi-agency approach. With priorities and strategic vision provided by DRRM Council leaders, the cluster, led by OCD, can convene the many departments and international organizations needed to accomplish the tasks. For the system to function, the cluster leads must work proactively with the many cluster members to ensure that they are appropriately utilized and to prevent freelancing. The Typhoon Haiyan response demonstrated where a vacuum in leadership existed, or where cluster roles and responsibilities were not understood, individual agencies and officials simply bypassed them, resulting in confusion and overlaps.

The long-term goal for the Philippine cluster system should be to quickly establish clusters at the national and regional levels, led by Philippine agencies and bolstered with strong ties to provincial and local leaders. Particularly at the national level, cluster leads should ensure incoming international responders are liaising appropriately with the clusters. The UN co-leads should support and augment Philippine department actions. In the example of Typhoon Haiyan, this goal was not met, although the moderated response to Typhoon Hagupit showed promise.

In addition, Philippine and UN cluster co-leads should address the widespread lack of local NGO participation in the cluster system. Typhoon Haiyan showed that these domestic NGOs did not perceive the clusters as providing added value, nor did they have personnel to dispatch

²⁷ Ibid, D-1

to the cluster meetings. The cluster leads should provide a compelling case for NGO participation. They should document how cluster participation can pair NGOs with needed resources, such as transport, force protection, or shelter. The cluster leads should acknowledge that small NGOs do not have the resources to send staff to faraway regional coordination centers. Cluster liaisons at provincial or local Councils could interact with NGOs locally, recording their response plans and passing on needs to the regional clusters.

To ensure the clusters remain a useful value-added in future disasters, resources should be allocated to provide heightened training on the cluster concept, and to capacitate the system in times of disaster. The current NDRRM plan and the National Disaster Response Plan have established the concept of operations for the clusters. Additional training and education would be useful in clarifying how information should flow between the cluster and the Incident Commander/Chief Executive at the operations center, who has the authority to make determinations such as dispatching goods to a given area, and decision-making vis-à-vis incoming goods. Once the national department leadership clarifies the details, these details should be shared with regional and local authorities.

During Haiyan, OCD often ceded its role as Logistics Cluster lead to the World Food Programme. The WFP ably performed this role, validating the twinning concept of Philippine cluster leadership and UN family co-leads. The UN has proven its worth with regard to the Philippine cluster system. However, as a long-term goal, the Philippine cluster leads should aim to steadily reduce their reliance on UN co-leads. As Philippine expertise and capacity grow, the UN co-lead agencies can take on supporting roles. The experience of Haiyan (and Hagupit) has left the Philippines with a cadre of civilian officials experienced in cluster system operations. These officials should lead training efforts and work proactively to institutionalize their knowledge.

The generation and distribution of needs assessments during Typhoon Haiyan typified many of the breakdowns in communication and coordination discussed above. As demonstrated at the Roxas hub, needs assessment issues included the creation of multiple, parallel, duplicative assessments, the failure to share and cross-reference assessments, and mismatches between needs and actual relief good deliveries. Interviewed

officials from the Philippine departments, AFP, and international responders confirmed that overlapping needs assessments were often performed within a given geographic area. This resulted in committing more officials than necessary to assess needs and incentivized responders to act independently, rather than through a coordination hub. *Where information on the severity of damages and differing needs conflicted, the already scant logistics and transportation resources became even more strained.* More thorough implementation of the Incident Command System in NDRRM Councils could have the additional benefit of helping streamline needs assessments.

Under the National Disaster Response Plan, the LGU officials are to conduct the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessments (RDANA) in partnership with local DRRM Council staff and cluster representatives.²⁸ The ability of the LGU officials assisted by the Chief Executive and the LDRRC to conduct a consolidated RDANA after a disaster is critical. If the LGU cannot speedily and effectively conduct and disseminate the RDANA, the response agencies could resort to conducting their own assessments, undermining the ability of OCD to coordinate the ensuing response.

OCD should review and practice implementation of plans for organizing consolidated initial needs assessments. This training and capacity-building activity is appropriate for local and regional response leadership. Participating in these trainings should be local government executives and their backups, relevant departments (DSWD, AFP, and DILG), and OCD leadership.

The case study noted several instances where DSWD distribution of relief goods was not made according to documented needs, but rather to proximity, political connection, fabrications, or personal requests. Partisan skewing of immediate relief can be a sad feature of disaster response, and is certainly not confined to the Philippines. Yet there are means of limiting its extent. A combined RDANA as envisioned in the National Disaster Response Plan could lower its frequency by spreading accountability more broadly. An assessment team comprising officials from DSWD, DILG, DOH, OCD, and the AFP is less likely to misreport needs than a single

²⁸ Ibid., 2-9

department official. In relief disbursement, shared accountability would likewise yield fewer instances of relief than political favors.

At the national level, the agencies involved in creating an RDANA should craft policies to take into account a mega-disaster such as Typhoon Haiyan, or an earthquake that may have a huge geographic extent. Clearly in such instances a single multiagency team from the local or regional DRRMC may not be sufficient. What will be needed is the ability to synthesize many disparate assessments into a cohesive whole and prioritize them by need. The approach should also combine aspects of surge staffing for predictable disasters. The designation and RDANA training of local officials should be conducted, including increased standardization of how disaster damages and needs are assessed, recorded, and addressed. A national-level needs assessment working group could create new procedures, and disseminate them to the LGUs and local disaster management staff.

A notable success in needs assessments was the AFP creation and utilization of real-time maps, which were shared at the regional level. As an organization with the skills and experience to create updated maps “on the fly,” the AFP should proactively work with civilian department partners in the preparedness phase to further cement Geographic Information System (GIS) services as part of the combined response. The AFP is limited in manpower and transportation, yielding areas inadequately represented on their maps. If local government officials were taught to conduct and submit needs and damage assessments to the AFP/NDRRMC, the AFP could significantly improve the map quality. In this way local officials of a hinterland community could ensure their situation was reflected in the common operating picture.

In practice, the local command post or DRRMC should be the venue for these assessments that would then be passed on to the AFP mappers. The AFP can create the maps, then disseminate them among the localities. More broadly, the AFP could assess its mapping strategies in light of those utilized by the lead UN response agencies and by major partner such as Japan and the U.S. Particularly given access to international resources such as updated satellite imagery, the AFP has the opportunity to build an open-access, mutually accessible series of maps that draw upon and



A Philippine Marine loads relief supplies on a Japanese C-130 aircraft at Villamor Air Base (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Mark C. Schultz/Released).

in turn enhance the needs assessments (RDANA) being performed by the LGUs.

The system of AFP mapping needs assessments in real time presents a worthwhile civil-military cooperation opportunity. To implement it,

local government unit leadership would require standardized checklists, forms, and terminology. Under the overall leadership of the National DRRM Council, the LGUs could be given a standardized method of reporting their losses, damages, urgent needs, and early recovery priorities. The NDRRMC should also work to ensure the LGUs are furnished with reliable means of communication. In this way a rural area cut off by road, storm, or earthquake could still rapidly make its situation known to a regional or provincial Council. Using the shared terminology and common forms, the AFP could generate updated maps. Combined with the findings of aerial damage reconnaissance and surveillance, the AFP would be in a position to furnish local Incident Command Posts with timely, relevant and valuable assessments.

MILITARY COORDINATION AND CAPACITY

The Philippine military and national police greatly strengthen the domestic disaster management system. Their participation includes training, interagency exchange, and preparedness measures prior to a disaster. Lines of communication and methods of coordination can be designated and rehearsed, rather than a rapid set of *ad hoc* measures once disaster strikes. This inclusion of the Armed Forces Philippines and the Philippine National Police in the disaster management framework has been a major strength of the system and holds great promise for future responses. Yet an assessment of Typhoon Haiyan indicated the obstacles still to be overcome includes civil-military interaction, operations with foreign militaries, coordination, and HA/DR capacity.

During Typhoon Haiyan the national Office of Civil Defense (a civilian agency within the Department of National Defense) selected military commanders to be Incident Commanders at the regional DRRMCs. This was a natural choice given the AFP local commanders' familiarity with the Incident Command System and the centrality of the AFP to relief operations. Use of military leaders as ICs was also logical due to their knowledge of internal security considerations and ability to balance HA/DR operations with ongoing security tasks. It is reasonable to expect that in future large-scale disasters, regional ICs will be selected from military leadership ranks. If AFP generals are

future Incident Commanders, then the lessons of Typhoon Haiyan are instructive, showing the strengths of AFP leadership as well as areas where improvements are still needed.

The regional Incident Commanders in Tacloban, Cebu, and Roxas sometimes struggled to understand the overlap of multiple different operations centers and varying coordination, command, and control mechanisms. The different centers included AFP-led Incident Command Posts within the Regional DRRM Councils, individual departments such as DSWD, logistics hubs such as MNCC-Cebu, and international centers such as the UN OSOCC. Coordination systems included the Incident Command System, the cluster system, and direct military-to-military coordination. Confusion was therefore inevitable. Notably, Roxas Incident Commander General Aurelio Baladad did not view his role as commanding, but rather liaising and coordinating. The issues pertaining to chain of command and jurisdictional overlap were procedural and doctrinal problems that should be addressed in the preparedness phase. OCD leadership should at the forefront clarify roles, responsibilities, and chains of command. In his assessment of the military response to Haiyan, AFP Col. Perfecto Peñaredondo cited Colonel Romeo Brawner, AFP J-3, who laid out the most pressing needs:

The application of the Incident Command System can be optimized at the local levels if all actors take the lead from the designated ICS commander. Relatedly, the institutionalization of ICS as well as the activation of the MNCC when needed must be harmonized as focal points for effective and efficient coordination. Moreover, there is a need for assimilation trainings to synchronize the ICS with the Cluster Approach. This was demonstrated in the Roxas hub, where integration yielded positive outputs.²⁹

Colonel Brawner's suggestion of assimilation trainings is a worthy one. Trainings are a necessity given the number of civilian and military actors in disaster response and the overlapping coordination. As the leader for disaster response inter-agency coordination, OCD is the most appropriate department to conduct these trainings.

During response, friction arose between the AFP and its primary partners in relief good distribution, the NGOs and DSWD. Many of

²⁹ Lt. Col. Perfecto Peñaredondo INF (GSC) PA, *Uniformed Diversity: Essence of Multinational Response to Typhoon Haiyan* (Unpublished report, 2014), 12.

the smaller local NGOs had little or no prior experience working with military partners and were not well integrated into the ICS, the regional DRRMC, or the cluster system (Philippine or UN). This challenged the AFP which had to take additional time to vet multiple, differing requests for assistance not flowing through the established channels. These issues typically had to be resolved one at a time in the field, with little direction or guidance from the regional Incident Commanders.

The bureaucratic hurdles erected by the DSWD were an added burden to the AFP. The lack of prior civil-military training left DSWD personnel unaware of disaster-time measures such as airdrops, and the DSWD insistence on complete paperwork strained already limited AFP transport resources. The DRRM Councils and OCD in particular could have rectified these issues with a directive from their Incident Commander. Considering how closely the AFP and DSWD work to transport and deliver relief goods, their logistics and coordination procedures should be established well in advance.

At the regional level, DSWD officials should be empowered by their department secretary in Manila to waive temporarily their reporting requirements of delivery of relief goods to facilitate rapid delivery by the AFP. OCD-appointed Incident Commanders should also be empowered with this ability. In addition, regional OCD officials should identify the disaster relief NGOs in their region and provide training on disaster coordination and the policies and procedures for requesting AFP assistance.

Two additional expedients could prove of great value to the AFP as it carries out HA/DR response: co-location and the deployment of liaison officers.

The first, co-location, is applicable both to the AFP's interactions with Philippine civilian response organizations as well as with the international community. Physically siting the Incident Command Post, local cluster leadership, and UN coordination centers in the same location could reduce conflicts and communications gaps. General Baladad notably made a strong case for co-location as a means to advance decision making and maximum representation. The General argued that provinces not represented at regional coordination centers would be inadequately able to advocate for relief. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) mandating

co-location would decrease the incidence of separate coordination centers. SOPs for co-location of coordination facilities should be implemented within the AFP, OCD, and local governments.

Cebu provided a good example of the need for co-location, as it evidenced a notable success and also a notable breakdown in this regard. The logistics hub established at Cebu-Mactan airport was indispensable for the ultimate success of the entire Haiyan relief operations. The capacity of the airport at Cebu outstripped the capacity of Tacloban, and the minimal damage to its facilities allowed for operations to begin rapidly. Its proximity to AFP Central Command was a boon as well. The AFP under the leadership of Major General Deveraturda ably assumed the lion's share of the hub duties, and the co-location of OCD and OSS resources at the Mactan airport made this Cebu-Mactan hub a model for disaster logistics.

At the same time, the disconnect between the military command at Mactan and the regional DRRMC in Cebu City proved problematic. The distance between these two centers was considerable, and prevented effective, unified coordination for the Cebu region, placing an increased burden on LGUs to meet relief needs. In addition, both were themselves far from the hard-hit areas in the north most in need of immediate relief. In this instance, the AFP jointly with the local OCD staff could have improved the communications between the two hubs. Deployment of additional AFP officers, radios, and satellite phones could have improved coordination between these two hubs as well as strengthening linkages with the heavily affected areas. Co-location would have improved the situation, as would have stronger links with local leaders around Bantayan.

The deployment of liaison officers (LNOs) is a second measure for enhancing civil-military HA/DR effectiveness. LNOs at the international level, among foreign militaries and within the MNCC were common, but less so at the provincial and local levels. Colonel Peñaredondo observed aptly that “the role of liaison officers proved beneficial for the entire operation as they facilitated better coordination.”³⁰ The AFP command should take expanded liaison deployment to heart. Co-location could decrease some of the need for LNOs, but within a given region, or across

³⁰ Ibid.

regions, their role remains vital. Among the main responders – OCD, AFP, DSWD – developing a common operating picture and unity of action could be achieved by reducing the stove-piping that naturally occurs. Liaison officers were decisive also for departments not at the forefront of HA/DR, but which had a critical role to play in Haiyan, such as the Metro Manila Development Authority.

On 7 November, prior to landfall, the AFP activated its HA/DR Crisis Action Team. The Crisis Action Team was assembled at the AFP General Headquarters and deployed to Tacloban. In after-action assessments, AFP officers lauded the decision to activate and deploy the Crisis Action Team. Particularly where local military units in the Tacloban region were hard-hit, the Crisis Action Team was able to provide an initial level of organization, early damage assessments, and liaison with incoming foreign counterparts.³¹ The AFP should review the formation and deployment of the Crisis Action Team, and should consider codifying policies and future procedures for such teams. The AFP should also review its policy on activating and utilizing reservists. Reservists hold the advantage of being proximate to the scene of a disaster and already familiar with the region. Expanded use of reservists or even cadet corps such as ROTC may allay any concerns the active duty military has on the impact of HA/DR operations to other AFP priorities.

The relief and rescue capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines were essential to the overall response. Yet significant preparedness issues warrant addressing. The AFP lacked sufficient stocks of HA/DR resources critical for transport, communication, and assessment. At one point a breakdown limited the Philippine Air Force to two C-130 transport planes, clearly inadequate for the extent of the need. The importance of strategic air assets was demonstrated not only through the dearth of planes available to ferry personnel and relief goods, but also to conduct aerial surveillance, mapping, and damage assessments.³²

A pronounced shortage of helicopters existed—a particularly glaring obstacle in light of many islands and communities in need not accessible

³¹ Lt. Col. Haroun al-Rashid Jaji, “AFP Operations in the Wake of Typhoon “Haiyan” (“Yolanda”)”, (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan,” Tokyo, January 22, 2014).

³² Ibid.



Admiral Jaime Bernadino, Vice Commander Philippine Navy and Commodore Reynaldo Yoma, commander, Naval Forces Command Central coordinate with Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery on board the USS George Washington (CVN 73) on 18 November, 2013 (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Shannon Heavin / Released).

by road for more than a week. Among the islands of the Visayas, the AFP found itself wanting transport ships and amphibious vehicles, and even had to endure long queues it could not circumvent at roll-on/roll-off facilities. At command posts in the hardest-hit areas, AFP forces lacked equipment to communicate with regional or national Incident Commanders, with OCD, or the local DRRM Councils and government offices.

To address shortfalls in transport and communication equipment, the AFP in the future has several recourses. Procurement of additional aircraft, naval vessels, and vehicles is an obvious answer. However, the fiscal constraints may forestall acquisition of new transport equipment, and the answers to that particular dilemma fall outside the scope of this study.

Beyond new acquisitions, pre-planning and partnerships could have a sizable impact. During its response to the 3/11 Tohoku tsunami as well as in international relief, Japan has shown itself adept at leveraging the private sector for transport, reducing the burden upon the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and opening additional options for moving people and supplies. Using this model, the Philippine OCD could reach out to partners such as commercial and cargo airlines to create MOUs well in

advance of another disaster. The advantages of the C-130 for disaster relief are many, yet private sector aircraft can prove a beneficial complement to the Philippine Air Force. The AFP and OCD could engage in a similar planning process with logistics cluster partners such as the Department of Public Works and Highways, the Metro Manila Development Authority, and the Coast Guard to enhance speedy requisition of vehicles and boats during disaster. Vehicles are a particular necessity given the consensus in after-action reports that road clearing must be a priority for the AFP.

Logistics, transport, and heavy lift will be central tasks of any international HA/DR deployment to the Philippines, as evidenced during Haiyan by the activities of the United States, Japan, British and other militaries, and civilians such as the UN Humanitarian Air Service. The AFP is doubtless aware of this, yet it could improve its procedures internally for assessing and communicating transport and heavy lift needs to international militaries via the NDRRMC. A review and analysis by the AFP of the specialized vehicles used during the Haiyan response (whether U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft or Japan Self-Defense Forces hovercraft) could in the future speed the deployment of those resources if they were specifically requested by the NDRRMC. This study process should be collaborative with the nations in question to furnish up-to-date information on the logistics platforms available for HA/DR.

Similarly the AFP could embark on a program to standardize communications protocols (radio frequencies, unclassified information networks) among its major HA/DR donors and civilian partners. According to Philippine disaster managers, the Office of Civil Defense is embarking on a project to equip regional and local Councils with radios and satellite phones, mindful of their absence during Haiyan. This effort is a worthy one, but should be coordinated with local and national AFP units to ensure a common telecommunications platform for disasters. OCD could teach and drill these protocols to domestic and international partners alike.

The AFP interaction with the sheer volume of the 22 total foreign military forces that deployed during Haiyan was in general smooth and well handled. The Incident Commanders saw little practical differences between VFA and non-VFA nations, despite obvious advantages inherent in the RP-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and Australian Status

of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). The advantages in coordination and logistics that U.S. forces initially enjoyed – a result of close ties with the AFP and their permanent presence in the Philippines – were made widespread once the MNCC was up and running.

The MNCC again should be highly praised as a mechanism for the AFP to establish its HA/DR concept of operations. The MNCC arranged details of command, clearances, force protection, overflight, and scheduling, which immensely reduced the friction between AFP units in the affected areas and foreign military forces. In the future, the AFP could further refine its concept of operations and on-the-ground coordination, laying out in advance appropriate tasks and missions for incoming international forces.

In the case study PWA noted significant disparities in foreign military team methods. The close interaction of the Canadian DART varied considerably from the more removed and hands-off approach of the British Royal Navy. Praise for the Canadian team was widespread among civilian and military leaders following the disaster, due to its critical role in coordination at the Roxas hub, its smooth interaction with Philippine authorities, and its excellent civil-military operations. While the Royal Navy attracted some criticism for its poor representation at coordination meetings, the AFP lauded its willingness to dispatch the HMS *Illustrious* to coastal Panay where other militaries could not or would not go. Cataloguing and documenting these unique capabilities and operations could help AFP leadership determine optimal tasking and further improve interactions with foreign militaries. The AFP could also increase its efforts to include non-SOFA/VFA nations in annual HA/DR training and exercises. The confirmed benefit of activities like *Balikatan* could be extended to additional partners, i.e., Japan, Canada, the U.K., and South Korea.

A recurring recommendation during the Peace Winds America Initiative has been the concept of Terms of Reference (TORs). Terms of Reference combine a memorandum of understanding on HA/DR with a template section detailing items and services available for relief, how requests are made and fulfilled, and additional information. TORs are bilateral in nature, and can be flexible and updated ideally on a routine basis. TORs lay out frameworks for response but do not bind

or mandate their signatories. TORs are equally appropriate for VFA and non-VFA nations alike. In his assessment of the Haiyan response, General Baladad commended the close cooperation of the Canadian military and Philippine responders as the optimal result of TORs with other nations.³³

The DND, in partnership with critical agencies such as DFA, should engage in a preliminary study to determine how TORs could be crafted with key HA/DR provider nations such as the United States, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. TORs contain *specific* detail about HA/DR requests and operations, so are appropriate even for partners such as the U.S. that already have an HA/DR Concept of Operations. The DND could work to ensure that TORs are merely one facet in the suite of their HA/DR preparedness measures. TORs can complement internal training, bi- and multilateral exercises, and continual policy review and revision.

In the Philippines, the conflict between HA/DR and internal security operations cannot be ignored. Particularly for the AFP and PNP, disaster relief may be seen as a distraction at best and hindrance at worst from the tasks of internal security and counterinsurgency. Both have been key military tasks, and both can exist in tandem. Major General Jet Velarmino, Commander of the 8th Infantry Division, cited in an interview his belief that HA/DR and internal security can exist side-by-side. This can be accomplished, the General said, “provided there are proper equipment, appropriate training and clear guidelines for deployment in order to prevent duplication of efforts.”³⁴

The Philippines has committed to a major HA/DR role for the AFP and the PNP. In its doctrine, policies, and procedures, DND leadership should firmly establish disaster preparedness and response as pillars of its internal mandate, alongside security. In order for the AFP to effectively carry out its mandated functions under the National Disaster Response Plan and 2011-2028 NDRRM Plan, the AFP must be able to approach HA/DR as a core function and not as a side mission from the real task of internal security operations.

³³ Peñaredondo, *Uniformed Diversity*, 10.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

The Haiyan disaster confirmed that HA/DR is a core AFP mission. Yet further training, doctrines, and guidelines are needed. The DND, alongside civilian colleagues in OCD, should appoint a high-level officer at AFP headquarters to coordinate disaster preparedness. This officer could be empowered to implement a military-wide HA/DR preparedness strategy, and to partner as needed with agencies such as OCD. Such an appointment will ensure the AFP has long-standing expertise in HA/DR not solely dependent upon recent disaster experience. The AFP and PNP (a branch of DILG) should also ensure there are clear procedures for military and paramilitary interaction with NGOs, provision of security for relief providers, and understanding of the basic tenets of civil-military HA/DR as laid out in the *Oslo Guidelines* and the OCHA Asia-Pacific Regional Guidelines for the Use of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response Operations.³⁵ This is particularly important in regions where there competing priorities of territorial defense and internal security. At the national level, the AFP should also have a mechanism in place to augment local military forces (whether with reservists or the rotation of active-duty units) if ongoing security operations render them unable to assume their HA/DR responsibilities.

In his assessment of Philippine military operations during Haiyan, Colonel Peñaredondo provided a series of recommendations for future HA/DR improvements. This list below tracks closely with other AFP officer assessments, external analyses, and PWA's own assessments. For these sound recommendations, a permanent HA/DR task force at the upper echelons of DND could point the way to effective study and implementation. Their implementation would prove valuable not just for DND, but for the entire apparatus of Philippine disaster management.

1. *Force majeure* or events that cannot be reasonably anticipated or controlled must be factored in during capability planning and in enhancing the absorptive capacity for international assistance whenever necessary.

³⁵ See OCHA APC-MADRO guidelines, <https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/APC-MADRO%20Draft%20Guidelines%20V8.0%20%2823%20November%202010%29.pdf>.

2. Accessibility and transparency in data gathering, analysis, and assessment are essential to ensure proper situational awareness prior or upon entry of assisting nations.
3. Contingency planning should be done at all levels with affirmative efforts towards integration from the tactical, operational, up to strategic levels.
4. As far as practicable, assisting forces should be complemented by self-sustaining security elements and articulate liaison officers who are familiar with involved agencies and local community leaders.
5. Socio-economic factors must be considered in dealing with each assisting nation or organization to allow for better communication and interaction.
6. Strategic communications should be deliberately orchestrated to avoid being overtaken by the so-called “CNN-effect” on public perception.
7. Arrangements must be made with accounting and auditing procedures to allow expedient actions during response without creating opportunities for potential abuses.
8. Procedures in the acceptance and assimilation of international assistance must be clarified including practical mechanisms down to local levels, and should be exercised or rehearsed if possible.
9. The doctrines and policies on joint and combined HA/DR operations must be enhanced.
10. Further study must enhance the execution of multilateral HA/DR—both military-to-military and civil-military.³⁶

Col. Peñaredondo’s inclusion of local leadership and cooperation in several of these recommendations is encouraging. As with the civilian disaster response apparatus, the Philippine military should in HA/DR planning and execution *place a primacy on the concept of local leadership*. Particularly when high-ranking military officers are appointed to be regional Incident Commanders and international forces deploy, this

³⁶ Peñaredondo, *Uniformed Diversity*, 10.

principle may be lost or buried. Yet ultimately the mission of the AFP and PNP should be to work alongside the civilian departments to prioritize, coordinate, and manage the immediate response tasks set by local leaders. The AFP should bear that mission in mind as it trains to lead the Search, Rescue & Retrieval Cluster and to execute its support for the other response tasks.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the United States, Japan, and Multilaterals

Chapter IV presented a host of findings and ensuing recommendations for the civilian and military disaster response leaders of the Philippines. Yet Typhoon Haiyan (and to a lesser extent, Hagupit) did not generate lessons solely for the host nation. Every major international response is an opportunity to explore how the responders can improve—in partnership with the host nation and with other international assistance.

The Peace Winds America study focused on the lessons learned for the Philippines and two main partners in disaster response – Japan and the United States. Both are mainstays of regional HA/DR and both acknowledge the role disasters play in their relationship with the Philippines. In July 2013, both Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera traveled to the Philippines to emphasize security and economic ties. Each spoke of the importance disaster preparedness and response, and the need for improved readiness. The *Balikatan* exercise between the U.S. and Philippines defense forces yearly includes a humanitarian civic action as a major pillar. In *Balikatan* 2015, humanitarian modules drew heavily on the experience of Typhoon Haiyan and Operation *Damayan*.

The experience of Typhoon Haiyan demonstrated clearly that Japan and the U.S. have a nearly unparalleled ability to provide disaster relief, preparedness, and risk reduction as well. Through permanent missions to the Philippines (USAID and the JUSMAG for the U.S., and JICA for Japan), both countries help mitigate the impact of future disasters. In so doing Japan and the U.S. build upon the National DRRM Plan's core of proactive disaster risk management and improved resilience. Already the Philippines has been exhibiting best practices in disaster

management and response. With additional targeted resources from these two capable partners it could truly establish itself as a regional disaster management leader.

Studying the lessons of recent deployments also holds benefits for the Japan-U.S. relationship. An evaluation of Typhoon Haiyan suggested several areas where Japan-U.S. cooperation could be improved, trainings conducted, and knowledge shared. As both nations have stressed the primacy of HA/DR for their military and civilian forces overseas, it behooves them to enhance their interoperability. This study examined highlights and shortcomings of their disaster operations in the Philippines and suggests appropriate responses, alone or in tandem.

Finally this section assesses the participation of the major multilateral responders to Typhoon Haiyan, i.e., the UN and ASEAN. The enormous humanitarian apparatus of the UN is a given player in any major disaster. Yet the UN collectively and its agencies individually should also use the experience of events like Haiyan to implement needed changes. Particularly in a nation such as the Philippines which has significant ability to manage its own disasters, it is imperative the UN balance rendering aid against overwhelming the host nation.

UNITED STATES

Typhoon Haiyan was generally held up as a model for large-scale natural disaster responses within the United States government. Particularly within the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. military, officials viewed the response to Haiyan as an exemplar of effective relief for Level 3 disasters.¹ Several reasons were cited, particularly the effective partnership between USAID and the U.S. military.

USAID knows the capacities of the Department of Defense and the two have a long HA/DR working relationship. USAID is already on the ground in many Southeast Asian countries and is already prepared to respond with in-country staff, and through its OFDA/Bangkok office. During Typhoon Haiyan USAID/OFDA quickly mobilized its Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and ultimately provided

¹ Senior USAID official, personal communication, 20 June 2014.

a large quantity of relief goods, emergency funding, and coordination assistance. USAID staff was present for early assessments alongside the JUSMAG and fielded requests for assistance from the very beginning. Typical for disasters of this magnitude, USAID partnered primarily with the host nation, the U.S. military, large international NGOs, and with UN family members.

Within the U.S. overseas disaster paradigm, USAID has the unique position and responsibility to validate and transmit appropriate requests/tasks to the U.S. military. Initially all tasking to the military from the DART comprised DSWD or USAID relief good shipments, with UN and NGO tasks fulfilled later. These are the standard partners, but additional outreach during preparedness could furnish USAID with still more, especially among local NGOs. Fortunately, USAID has had an extensive permanent mission in the Philippines and a broad program of disaster risk reduction. USAID could provide additional training and education to enable local government units, department representatives, and Philippine NGOs to transmit requests, via Incident Commanders and the NDRRMC, for transport, heavy lift, or other military tasks. USAID could also research which domestic NGOs are prepared to accept emergency funding during a disaster. As many domestic NGOs may be capably equipped to provide relief goods and services, USAID funding to local NGOs may be both cost effective and efficient. Funding local NGOs also ensures the implementers will remain active through recovery, not just immediate relief. (Such preparedness activity could be a natural point of USAID-JICA cooperation.)

The Haiyan case study demonstrated that the Philippines disaster managers still require assistance to understand, implement, and utilize the Incident Command System. The AFP's ability to implement ICS was satisfactory, but much less so was that of local leaders and the civilian departments active in the regional, local, or *barangay*-level Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils, namely OCD, DSWD, and DILG. Here is an opportunity for increased U.S. assistance to the Philippines. Led by USAID, trainers could work with Philippine partners to enhance knowledge of ICS. USAID/OFDA has ample expertise, as do U.S. domestic bodies, e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the National Guard (through the

State Partnership Program), and state-level emergency management agencies.² One particular element of the U.S. ICS appropriate for the Philippines is the Multi-Agency Coordination System which provides a framework for unifying overlapping jurisdictions into a coherent response. Incident Command and multi-agency coordination could be significant elements of USAID's ongoing disaster risk reduction assistance to the Philippines.

The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) maintains significant capability *forward-deployed* throughout the Asia Pacific region ready to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Without forward deployed forces, rapid and fully capable deployment to disasters such as Haiyan would be far slower and smaller in scope.³ Three key elements to the U.S. defense posture include: (1) forward and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities and equipment; (2) a supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and, (3) a series of treaty, access, transit and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and key partners. In the case of the Philippines, all three proved valuable, from the deployment of Japan-based Marines and Navy forces to the Visiting Forces Agreement that made the deployment easier. The U.S. Pacific Command noted the success of the U.S. response was because of "the long-standing partnership and friendship between the two nations." Due to this partnership, "the U.S., working through the Philippine government, was able to rapidly respond with critically needed capabilities and supplies in times of crisis."⁴

During Typhoon Haiyan the forces under U.S. Pacific Command had an HA/DR concept of operations prepared even prior to the storm's landfall. While the Marines planned for HA/DR operations, U.S. military leadership in country had already made effective use of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) permanently stationed in Manila. On 9 November, *day 1*, JUSMAG personnel were already at Tacloban, sharing their initial assessments and anticipated tasks with the 3rd Marine

² In the National Guard State Partnership Program, Hawaii and Guam are partnered with the Philippines. See <http://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/JointStaff/J5/InternationalAffairsDivision/StatePartnershipProgram.aspx>

³ United States Pacific Command, "Operation Damayan" in *PACOM Talkers*, 14 November 2013.

⁴ Ibid.



Sailors assigned to the *George Washington* Carrier Strike Group and local volunteers work together to load an MH-60R Seahawk with relief supplies from USAID. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Shannon Heavin/Released.)

Expeditionary Brigade preparing in Okinawa and with the USAID mission in-country. In Asia Pacific disaster relief – especially in the Philippines – no other nation can plan and execute HA/DR operations with the speed of the United States.⁵

The disaster relief units of PACOM also garnered praise for their partnership with U.S. civilian and with Philippine responders. Following major HA/DR operations in Indonesia, Haiti, Pakistan, Japan, and elsewhere, the U.S. military (and particularly PACOM) has well internalized its role as a supporter and enabler of USAID. Although the military can arrive with vastly larger numbers of personnel and equipment, officers from the Marines, from Pacific Command, and from the Office of the Secretary of Defense all stress that their HA/DR mission is to achieve objectives set by USAID, by the Chief of Mission, and by host nation partners. In this respect Haiyan was clearly a success, with JTF-

⁵ Under its “72-hour rule”, the U.S. military may provide immediate lifesaving HA/DR assistance, without waiting for approval from the U.S. Department of State. See William J. Clinton, “Executive Order 12966—Foreign Disaster Assistance,” 14 July 1995.

505 completing all 52 Mission Tasking Matrix requests from USAID as well as numerous others from the Philippines and UN. The U.S. military has well internalized its mandate to provide unique capabilities. Officers active in HA/DR have routinely stressed the military's non-involvement in "retail operations" best left to partners such as DSWD, NGOs, or the UN. In a post-disaster Haiyan assessment, 3rd MEB Commander Brigadier General Paul Kennedy stated, "This is more than just Marines and Sailors. We're working side-by-side with USAID and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. And they're giving us direction on how we can use *these military assets to help facilitate* distribution."⁶

The close bilateral ties between the Philippines and the U.S. were a critical enabler of the U.S. military. Not only the Philippines-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement, which allows for the permanent presence of the JUSMAG, but also the bilateral HA/DR Concept of Operations (CONOPS) set the stage for successful interaction. As noted in Chapter III, Philippine officers used their familiarity with the Combined Coordination Center concept in the CONOPS to establish and make functional the Multinational Coordination Center. Similarly trained U.S. officers assisted in creating and running that Center.

The legacy of Philippine-U.S. joint exercises such as *Balikatan* and the Philippine Amphibious Landing Exercise played a role in the field as well. AFP and U.S. officers had a rapport and working relationship that enhanced the effectiveness of their joint operations in Samar and Leyte. Liaison officers – particularly those from Philippines Central Command – were another positive of the HA/DR response.⁷

Several aspects of U.S. military response to Haiyan and Hagupit should be studied as lessons and best practices for future disasters, not only in the Philippines but region-wide. In Haiyan as in the Japan Tohoku tsunami, establishing a hub-and-spoke model of relief goods distribution corresponded well to U.S. unique capabilities. Through the III Marine Expeditionary Force helicopters and MV-22 Ospreys, Air Force C-130 and C-17 aircraft, and the Navy helicopters and amphibious landing

⁶ United States Pacific Command, "Operation Damayan" in *PACOM Talkers*, 14 November 2013. Emphasis added.

⁷ Lt. Col. Rodney Legowski, "3rd MEB Operation Damayan," (Presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 22 January 2014).

ships, PACOM forces are well positioned to move goods and personnel from the hubs to the spokes.⁸ During the Haiyan response, as other international donors dispatched goods to Villamor or Mactan-Cebu, the U.S. had the transport and heavy lift capabilities to deliver the goods to sub-hubs and partners on the ground for distribution. The logistic and transport capabilities of the U.S. military should remain at the forefront of its disaster relief operations.

During Haiyan, the U.S. military's familiarity with the Multinational Forces SOP and the Philippines-U.S. CONOPS was also critical. Although several assessments following Haiyan indicated that many U.S. troops were unfamiliar with the MNF SOP and the HA/DR Concept of Operations, these protocols did give the U.S. a head start, particularly in coordination with the AFP. Given the potential for SOPs (standard operating procedures) and the CONOPS to greatly standardize command-and-control, communication, and coordination, "the utility of such documents to other potential partners should be examined in order to speed the initial organizing efforts in a response."⁹ For disaster-prone nations in Southeast Asia, an assessment of how the Philippines-U.S. CONOPS operated in practice would be well worth the effort. Component commands such as III MEF should also ensure its entire office corps is well versed in HA/DR-specific protocols such as the CONOPS.

The U.S. military resources for aerial or satellite mapping, surveillance, and reconnaissance are unique capabilities that surely could be relied upon again in future disasters. ASEAN nations could catalogue the HA/DR capabilities they lack and investigate how products such as satellite imagery could be quickly obtained. The U.S. military has continued to struggle with its urge to over-classify. As a preparedness measure, military units that perform HA/DR should disseminate procedures for declassifying, and what declassified information can be requested by the host nation. The Philippines military has increasingly utilized the APAN communications platform, most notably during Typhoon Hagupit. Other

⁸ Although the Navy has amphibious ships, very few were initially available at the time of Typhoon Haiyan. Many of the ships were undergoing maintenance in Sasebo Navy Base, Japan—an important operational lesson learned for the military.

⁹ Imes Chui et al., *Lessons from Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)*, (Honolulu: Center for Excellence, 2014), 39.

regional partners and PACOM could work toward similar proficiencies in these communications systems.

NGOs, relief agencies, and UN members should examine the process by which their goods and personnel could access U.S. military transport. According to a 3rd MEB commander, the Marines at Villamor had a priority list for transport. USAID came first, followed by DSWD, WFP, and other vetted partners.¹⁰ NGOs could be trained how to use coordination platforms such as the clusters, the local/regional DRRM Councils, or the NDRRMC to request military tasking. Such training could enable them to better understand and utilize U.S. military assets in the future. It would also apprise U.S. military units of the capable domestic NGOs of the Philippines. Such training is a suitable role for USAID/OFDA in partnership with U.S. military forces in the Philippines, partnered with the Office of Civil Defense.

Both USAID and the U.S. military partnered primarily with the Philippines government, the UN family, and certain designated NGOs during Haiyan. Coordination and streamlining operations with other national partners, however, has remained uncommon. The landing of Marine MV-22 Ospreys on the Japanese destroyer *Ise* was an exception during Haiyan. Overall, the provision of national aid tended to be done on a bilateral basis. All major donors had a military presence at the MNCC, but aside from flight and operational deconfliction there was often little operational overlap. Yet there could be cooperation or congruence with major donors such as Japan or Australia. Japan, Australia, and the U.S. frequently provide similar military services and relief goods. While coordination among these providers now occurs bilaterally or through a body such as the MNCC, there is also the possibility of proactive cooperation. Military HA/DR leaders from the three should explore opportunities for increased cooperation during preparedness, pre-deployment, and on-the-ground operations. The U.S. and Japan formed a combined Task Force for Tohoku tsunami relief in 2011. They should explore this option for overseas responses.

The U.S. and Japan conduct military-to-military joint exercises with HA/DR components, but deepening this relationship is both possible

¹⁰ Lt. Col. Steven Himelspace, 3rd MEB, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 18 December 2014.

and desirable. To facilitate actual joint HA/DR operations, these exercises could meaningfully include not only JICA and USAID, but also host nation partners. Having OCD or DSWD representation at an HA/DR exercise could help PACOM and JSDF officers envision how a combined response would actually unfold in times of disaster. The U.S. Department of State could similarly reach out to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs to plan future responses. In the case of a disaster on par with Haiyan or a West Valley Fault earthquake, the State Department could begin operational planning under the assumption that the Philippines Government will also request Japan to assist.

Policies and procedures for cooperation in mission-critical areas such as logistics, communications, and transport could be further refined among PACOM units, USAID, and their civilian and military partners in the Philippines. U.S. military trainers could increase training on APAN utilization among the AFP and other departments, and joint HA/DR trainings could establish similar points of concurrency such as radio frequencies. According to DFA Assistant Secretary Jesus Gary Domingo, transport and heavy lift during Philippines disasters will remain essential requests to the U.S. military.¹¹ Additional civil-military training to better request and utilize assets such as C-130 cargo planes or CH-47 helicopters could improve the provision of these services in the future. Internally, USAID/OFDA and PACOM forces (particularly III MEF and the 7th Fleet) should review not only the U.S.-Philippines CONOPS but also the Philippine disaster management system as a whole. Improved understanding of disaster management in the Philippines has obvious benefits. To help achieve this goal, both USAID and PACOM should increase the exchange of liaison officers with the AFP and OCD, and identify where further LNOs will be needed in times of crisis.

The U.S. military and USAID should jointly explore new procedural documents to facilitate disaster response in the future. While the Philippines-U.S. CONOPS does provide the overarching framework for U.S. military assistance to the Philippines, there is a demonstrated need for a more detailed Terms of Reference (TOR). A Philippines-U.S.

¹¹ Jesus Gary Domingo, personal communication, 13 April 2015.

Terms of Reference could delve into operational details and tactics not covered by the CONOPS. Updated frequently, a TOR would detail personnel, equipment, and services available to be requested of the U.S. government, civilian and military. For these HA/DR assets, a TOR could provide rough details of what is available, the estimated time of delivery, and other crucial considerations such as specifying landing zone sizes and procedures for helicopters.

In his 10 November request to UN Resident Coordinator Luiza Carvalho, AFP General Emmanuel Bautista requested runway lights for the Tacloban and Roxas airports, jet fuel storage, communications equipment, and generators.¹² These were provided, but only after the UN relayed the message and found appropriate donors. A TOR could allow speedier, more specific provision of aid. The benefits to the United States are significant as well. Emergency relief (particularly that of the military) is expensive and difficult to recall or modify once deployed. A Terms of Reference with the Philippines or any other ASEAN-region nation could help USAID craft a response strategy that maximizes its utility and effectiveness.

JAPAN

Japan's response to Typhoon Haiyan was extremely robust and well received. The transmission of multiple requests to the Government of Japan clearly indicated the regard with which the Philippines held Japan's assistance. The deployment of an advance civilian assessment team was an auspicious beginning, allowing MOFA and JICA to begin advance preparations for the Disaster Relief Teams and providing liaisons to assist the Government of the Philippines tailor aid requests. The information passed back to MOFA Headquarters additionally empowered Japan Platform to begin preparing and dispatching its member disaster relief NGOs. It was clearly evident from this case that Japan remains a leader in Asia Pacific HA/DR.

Japan's HA/DR expertise begins with its needs assessments. Although a host nation request is still the first step, once received MOFA, JICA, and

¹² Gen. Emmanuel Bautista, "Letter to United Nations Resident Coordinator," 10 November 2013.

MOD are capable of rapidly fielding assessment teams. These increasingly integrated teams establish the parameters for the dispatch of JICA expert teams, JSDF troops, and NGOs via Japan Platform. During Haiyan, Japan also crucially capacitated UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) through seconded personnel. This JICA deployment allowed UNDAC to establish and run its Reception/Departure Center at Tacloban Airport. Japan could build even further on its ability to deploy, to perform rapid assessments, and to augment the capacity of the UN. Protocols for joint assessments with USAID and U.S. military teams would be of significant value, as would additional platforms for multilateral organizations and NGOs to access the rapid assessments the teams send back to Tokyo.

For all responders to Haiyan, the sharing and distribution of assessments was a greater challenge than performing them. The U.S. military assessments were sometimes classified and unshareable. Other responders often did not disperse their findings to the OCD-led DRRMCs, or share with other responders. Liaison officers could be empowered not only to coordinate activities, but also could improve distribution of assessments. In the case of Japan, military LNOs could have passed on assessments performed by the MOFA/JICA team.

The JICA disaster relief teams provided primary services, in contrast to the USAID DART, which facilitates and works through partners. This approach has established JICA as a regional leader in medical care and urban search and rescue. Yet this can open the possibility of mismatches between the teams JICA is able to field and the actual needs on the ground. In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, JICA medical teams in Tacloban and afield on Samar and Leyte Islands clearly served a needed role. Most notable was the provision of mobile X-ray technology. DFA and DOH officials at Peace Winds America events confirmed that in terms of medical providers, the Philippines is well provisioned and typically does not require outside assistance. However the Philippines lacks mobile hospitals and specialized equipment. JICA could explore further medical technologies that can be made mobile and provided rapidly. The JICA team was self-sufficient with regard to power, which set a strong example. Many other medical teams, particularly from the NGO realm, were not.

Since 2002, JICA has had an ongoing disaster risk reduction partnership with the Philippines, providing expertise and research. JICA could place emphasis on assisting the Philippines to conduct and disseminate better and more representative needs assessments. During Haiyan, the Health Cluster located in Tacloban sent assessment reports that primarily highlighted Tacloban needs, thus attracting more medical teams to Tacloban which produced still more Tacloban-centric reports. Meanwhile outlying towns and *barangays* waited for adequate care. Addressing JICA, one DSWD official said that although “there were medical needs not just in Tacloban, but also elsewhere in Leyte and Samar,” too many international teams remained in the city.¹³ JICA’s experience performing rapid assessments could be put to productive use to avoid this situation in the future.

Since the JICA medical Disaster Relief Teams are mobile and self-sufficient, JICA and MOFA should establish Japan as the best resource to provide care to areas *not* already inundated with support. This mission could become a civil-military one if Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) resources are needed to transport JICA medical teams to outlying areas. Given that each medical team is relieved after two weeks, the leadership of JICA’s Disaster Relief Team Secretariat could review its deployment procedures and timing to improve the quality of the medical team’s assistance. Since Japan also provides medical assistance through the NGOs of Japan Platform, the elite JICA medical teams could be deployed to areas where they can provide the highest benefit.

The delays experienced by JICA medical teams point to the need for improved pre-disaster resolution of force protection issues. Since Japan does not have a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines, MOFA and JICA need a better system for assessing and mitigating security risks. Although the JICA Disaster Relief Team was ultimately escorted to Tacloban by the Philippine National Police, the beginning of the team’s deployment was marked by confusion and uncertainty of the security situation. In the absence of a VFA, MOFA and JICA need a means of accessing current and accurate reports of security threats, and also a designated system of force protection for their teams. The span of

¹³ Senior DSWD Official, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan,” Tokyo, 23 January 2014.

five days between the first JICA medical team deployment and its initial operations in Rizal Park in Tacloban could have been shortened with these measures in place.

Unlike the United States, where USAID provides the overall direction and leadership of overseas disaster response, Japan's civilian and military relief efforts have remained fairly disparate. Although both JICA and JSDF representatives were present at major coordination bodies (such as the Health Cluster), coordination between the two was minimal. In medical operations in Leyte the two dovetailed to an extent, and Japan Air Self-Defense Force planes flew JICA relief goods to Cebu, but there was little other operational coordination. The lack of shared assessments and information manifested in the JSDF deploying initially to areas around Cebu that were less damaged, and redeploying only later to the harder-hit Leyte. Ultimately JICA reports back to the Minister of Foreign Affairs while the JSDF is answerable to the Minister of Defense. Despite the fact that MOFA's approval is needed for a military deployment, there have been until recently very few opportunities for joint assessments and planning, for combined coordination, and for a holistic view of the Government of Japan response.

According to JICA Vice President Kae Yanagisawa speaking at a March 2014 PWA forum, "Coordination between GOJ's civilian relief teams and the JSDF has so far been made on an *ad hoc* basis. After a decision is made to deploy the JSDF through consultations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, the Minister of Defense has sole authority of ordering mobilization and the forms of operations of the JSDF. Civil-military coordination inside the Japanese Government has yet to be established."¹⁴ This is a ripe opportunity for Japan's disaster response community.

Closer JICA-JSDF coordination in disasters would be of benefit to Japan as a provider nation as well as to the disaster-affected nations. The JSDF has the air, sea, and road transport capabilities to place JICA teams in nearly any location. JSDF troops can further heighten the self-sufficiency of JICA teams, enabling them longer deployments in

¹⁴ Kae Yanagisawa, "Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief," (presentation at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, "Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance - Opportunities and Challenges: Prospects for U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief," Washington, 27 March 2014).

inaccessible areas. A combined coordination of relief could allow the two to adapt their strategies, particularly in areas where there is an overlap in services, such as medical care. In this area, for instance, there was “a serious lack of cohesion between the MOFA and MOD over public announcements on the JSDF’s medical services to be implemented in Tacloban.”¹⁵ The leadership of both organizations has recognized the need to reduce stove-piping and has made some efforts to bridge this gap.¹⁶ Yet more efforts are needed in this area.

According to Atsushi Yasutomi and Saya Kiba of Kobe University, “While the whole-of-government strategy has become one of Japan’s major approaches to civil-military cooperation in disaster relief activities, the JSDF’s experience in the Philippines demonstrates that concrete measures are still needed to translate such strategy to the tactical level.”¹⁷ MOFA (and JICA) and MOD should create a joint operations center upon request for international assistance, before the JSDF dispatches troops. A single locus of all top-level decisions for an operation would significantly improve interoperability in the field. While the JSDF and MOFA/JICA teams would still separately report to their respective ministers, a joint center would greatly ease the burden of information and task sharing. JICA and the JSDF should additionally formulate standard operating procedures and policies for joint overseas disaster response. These policies should include exchange of liaison officers, representation at coordination centers, protocols for mission tasking and transport, and a regular regimen of cross-training and exercises.

At the ministerial level, MOFA has been slow to develop HA/DR expertise among its continually rotating foreign service professionals. For those outside MOFA, it has appeared that MOFA has accorded HA/DR second-class status within its International Cooperation Bureau. Former MOFA director Masatsugu Odaira opined that the International Cooperation Bureau has often been quite slow and outdated in its thinking particularly vis-à-vis HA/DR and civil-military cooperation. However, the

¹⁵ Atsushi Yasutomi and Saya Kiba, “Institutionalizing interagency coordination for disaster relief: Lessons from the JSDF’s civil-military cooperation in the Philippines,” *Liaison* (Honolulu: Center for Excellence, 2015), 35.

¹⁶ According to one MOFA official, MOD officers are now beginning to be included in JICA medical training. Remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 18 December 2014.

¹⁷ Yasutomi and Kiba, “Institutionalizing,” 37.



The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force JDS *Ise* (DDH 182) welcomes a U.S. Marine MV-22B Osprey. Typhoon Haiyan marked the first ever such landing. The helicopter destroyer *Ise* served as a command post for Japanese military forces.

revised Official Development Assistance Charter and increased experience with disaster relief may have changed MOFA's outlook and reticence. Whether the MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau should be more involved in HA/DR, or whether the newly established National Security Council will play a significant role in HA/DR decisions and operations has yet to be seen.¹⁸

In dispatching nearly 1,200 troops from its three branches, the JSDF sent an unmistakable message: Japan is heavily invested in international HA/DR. The sheer number of troops and the deployment of capital ships such as the *Ise* and *Osumi* demonstrated clearly that disaster response is a major overseas role of Japan's military. Assessing the response to Typhoon Haiyan, it is evident that while the JSDF could be a potent HA/DR provider, a coordinated approach that best utilizes its unique capabilities is necessary.

¹⁸ J. Berkshire Miller, "How Will Japan's New NSC Work?" *The Diplomat*, 29 January 2014, accessed at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/how-will-japans-new-nsc-work/> and Eisuke Tanabe, National Security Secretariat, personal communication, 17 December 2014.

Under MOD policies, the JSDF is limited in disaster relief to transport/logistics, water supply, and medical care. Medical care occupied a large portion of the JSDF's response. Yet it remains unclear in retrospect whether the JSDF medical care contributions were truly needed. Particularly in regard to activities such as vaccination and epidemic-prevention the JSDF would be much better supplanted by JICA health teams, by NGOs, or by host nation resources. Where the JSDF is highly capable is in its ability to provide helicopters, high-capacity hovercraft, sea bases, mobile command centers, C-130 transport, engineering support, and technical services such as water purification and search and rescue. It is here that its HA/DR efforts should be focused to improve future responses.

In partnership with MOFA/JICA and through shared informative needs assessments, the JSDF could work to ensure it is providing truly *unique resources beyond the capabilities of the civilians*. One senior MOD official frankly acknowledged that during Typhoon Haiyan the JSDF sent a full readiness force – including a medical component – but “perhaps that much wasn’t needed.”¹⁹ Another MOD leader noted during Haiyan there was uncertainty whether the JSDF was truly being utilized as a *force of last resort*, per the *Oslo Guidelines*.²⁰ Ultimately the JSDF – and the Government of Japan writ large – could benefit by more directed and tailored military deployments, even if this reduced their overall size. MOD Bureau of Defense Policy Director General Hideshi Tokuchi commented that MOD wishes to ensure it retains a light “footprint” on the ground and does not have any interest in deploying autonomously. As such, it will to continue to partner with JICA and others.²¹

To achieve this goal, the MOD should work in tandem with MOFA and JICA and with regional host nations to ensure requests for assistance are an appropriate match with the JSDF's capabilities and timelines. Since MOFA/JICA or combined civil-military assessment teams would typically

¹⁹ Senior MOD official, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 18 December 2014.

²⁰ Senior MOD official, presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan,” Tokyo, 23 January 2014. The Oslo Guidelines state, “Foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military or civil defence asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.”

²¹ Hideshi Tokuchi, MOD, personal communication, 23 July 2013.

be the first to deploy to an affected nation, they should be empowered to identify tasks and mission areas appropriate for the JSDF. The ten-man team dispatched to typhoon Hagupit that included two MOFA and eight MOD personnel was a promising start. Working through their Embassy and with coordination bodies such as the NDRRMC in the Philippines, MOFA could help reduce the incidence of generic requests for JSDF support. Instead, the Embassy, and MOFA/MOD/JICA staff could help the host nation craft specific lists of services uniquely suited to JSDF transport, engineering, rescue, or logistic capabilities.

During preparedness, the JSDF could improve its ability to join host nation coordination platforms. Accounts from Japan's military deployment to Typhoon Haiyan suggested that the JSDF initially reached out directly to PACOM forces for assistance with coordination. This strongly indicated that knowledge of the Philippine NDRRM system, and appropriate liaisons and points of contact with the Philippines were missing. Throughout, direct coordination with the AFP and PACOM forces was sporadic. Later in the deployment the JSDF relied heavily on the OCHA OSOCC and UN civil-military coordination. Such functions are indeed within the purview of the UN, but optimally Japan should be able to establish coordination directly with the host nation. In the case of the Philippines this would entail prompt dispatch of officers to the MNCC (which did occur during Typhoon Hagupit), an exchange of liaisons with the AFP, and a representative presence at the regional Incident Command Posts. In partnership with JICA the JSDF could enhance its disaster training with the Philippines, emphasizing joint coordination, knowledge of capabilities, and a thorough understanding of their respective disaster management approaches. In keeping with the need for interoperability with the U.S., the MOD and MOFA could explore venues for making this training multilateral.

High ranking JSDF officers have acknowledged that partnership and information sharing with the NGO sector have warranted improvement. This area is a nascent one, although meaningful JSDF-NGO cooperation did occur during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami. It is not uncommon for Japan civilian relief workers to harbor distrust of the military, and this distrust has tended to be amplified as the role of the militaries in disaster relief has increased. Many NGOs have expressed that the militaries are competitors

rather than partners. The lack of mutual understanding between civilian and military units concerning the capabilities and functions of one other, and the differences in organizational culture have been major impediments to civil-military collaboration.

Fortunately, civilian and military HA/DR responders from Japan have taken steps to bridge the gap, a trend that should be encouraged. JICA's Disaster Relief Team Secretariat has highlighted the need for JICA, civil society organizations, and militaries to interact with each other in peacetime in order to deepen understanding on the capabilities and culture of each, and to envision cooperation during responses. The Ground Self-Defense Force Central Readiness Force and Japan Platform have recently begun conducting dialogues and trainings to change attitudes and increase partnerships.

In practice there are still too few links between the JSDF and Japan Platform or its member NGOs. Information-sharing among them has improved, but actual coordination and harmonization of responses remains a challenge. Such a gulf is unfortunate, as the JSDF could greatly augment the capacity of the NGOs. Transported by JSDF aircraft or helicopters, Japanese NGOs could reach areas further afield and reduce overcrowding in saturated areas such as Tacloban. Captain Takuya Shimodaira of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has written that the JMSDF could enhance its partnership with the NGO sector in several ways. JMSDF ships could serve as sea bases, housing NGOs and offering them access to unreachable peninsulas, islands, and isolated inland areas. The JMSDF could additionally supply the NGOs with information. If JMSDF officers had access to needs assessments and were plugged into the host nation coordination mechanism, they could in turn relay that information to NGOs who do not have access.²² Finally Captain Shimodaira opined that joint trainings and exercises should increasingly bring together the JSDF and the NGO sector (as well as the UN, U.S. forces, and regional host nations).

Stove-piping among disaster organizations has been an ongoing facet of Japan's relief operations as well as other bilateral providers. The JSDF could increasingly present a united face in NGO outreach, joint

²² Captain Takuya Shimodaira, "JMSDF & NGOs – A Review of the Great East Japan Earthquake," *Liaison* (Honolulu: Center for Excellence, 2015), 10.

training with MOFA/JICA, and operations with U.S. partners. JICA Vice President Yanagisawa recommended in 2014 that the international community develop standardized technical guidelines for various aspects of relief operations (quick recovery of devastated infrastructure, logistics, disease surveillance, food distribution, water supply and sanitation) and disseminate the guidelines to both civilians and militaries. Yanagisawa urged civilians and militaries not to rely on their existing operation tools, but to continue to expand functions in accordance with their roles.

Stove-piping and a narrow focus on traditional roles has hindered a coordinated Japan whole-of-government response strategy. This has been additionally noted within the JSDF. The fragmentation of the three branches has been at odds with the goal of improved JSDF HA/DR operations. It has imperiled as well any efforts at coordination. Optimally, all branches would jointly dispatch officers and liaisons to the MNCC (or comparable body) for tasking and informational updates. Resolution of this problem should lie with the JSDF Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with MOD senior civilian leadership. In the model of the U.S. Joint Task Force 505, any significant JSDF HA/DR deployment could have a designated operational commander and a clearly articulated chain of command. Such a task may be appropriate for the Ground Self-Defense Force Central Readiness Force, which has made HA/DR one of its core focuses. Certainly with the Maritime Self-Defense Force increasing its HA/DR role and capabilities, decision-making and operations demand transparency and information sharing within JSDF. Within a joint task force the JSDF could improve its information sharing and decision-making process among the three branches and in consultation with MOD leadership in Tokyo.

As documented in the discussion below of the West Valley Fault earthquake scenario, JICA has a permanent presence at the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. JICA has been conducting valuable disaster risk reduction work, which should be supported and augmented. Having performed studies of probable disasters such as the West Valley Fault, JICA staff in the Philippines could assist their Japan and other counterparts to better anticipate disaster needs and request them when appropriate.

Of considerable value to Japan and the Philippines would be a Terms of Reference document. For Japan, such a document would not contravene its constitution or any limit placed on military assistance to disasters. Because it is non-binding, a Japan-Philippines TOR would simply list in detail the services and capabilities that MOFA/JICA and the JSDF could provide. Optimally such a document would encourage the Philippines to eschew generalized requests for relief in favor of specific tasks or equipment. A TOR could help Japan further grasp the Philippine disaster management system and understand its coordination and decision-making bodies. A Statement of Intent currently exists between Japan and the Philippines for HA/DR and peacekeeping information sharing. The TOR is the logical next step.

Once a Japan-Philippines HA/DR TOR is written, it could be used as a model for HA/DR outreach to other Southeast Asian nations. According to an MOD official, the AFP Chief of Staff General Gregorio Catapang visited Tokyo to share insights from Haiyan and Hagupit, and to urge HA/DR cooperation in the region.²³ Together the Philippines and Japan could do much to advance best HA/DR practices and partnership to their neighbors. Japan is presently co-chairing the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus Experts' Working Group on HA/DR. As similar Terms of Reference are a goal for the Working Group, it is in Japan's interest to lead the way for ASEAN, showing the value of a bilateral HA/DR Terms of Reference.

In the realm of private sector assistance for disaster relief and recovery, Japan is a well established leader and could explore ways of exporting that expertise. For relief, JICA has several partnerships with carriers such as Japan Airlines to ferry its goods and personnel. In light of the Philippine Air Force's dearth of C-130 transports during Haiyan, department heads from the AFP, OCD, and DSWD could explore memoranda of understanding with domestic carriers to fill gaps that may arise. In light of problems that arose for DSWD repacking relief kits in Manila and transporting them to warehouses in the Haiyan-affected area, Japan may have much to offer in this realm as well. JICA could partner with DSWD

²³ Yusuke Ishihara, MOD Defense Policy Bureau, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 19 December 2014.

to assess the latter's warehousing strategy and connect it with private sector experts in warehousing, logistics, and supply chains.

Japan has also taken the lead in private sector resilience, preparation, and integration into disaster planning. Japanese businesses lead the region in business continuity and disaster recovery plans. Not only have Japanese companies taken the lessons of the 2011 tsunami to heart for their own business practices, they have made efforts to integrate into local preparedness planning. At the March 2015 World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, officials from the nearby Kirin Brewery detailed how their preparedness measures now include the capacity to shelter and feed 700 evacuees.²⁴ Training and education on similar measures for the Philippines could be of great benefit, especially in light of the extensive evacuations occasioned by typhoons there. Led by an organizer such as JICA, Japanese businesses should be given the opportunity to share their lessons learned, best practices, and disaster resilience strategies.

An area where Japan has established its unmatched expertise has been in host nation disaster risk reduction (DRR) assistance. This is nowhere better exemplified than the Philippines, which JICA has been assisting on DRR since the early 2000s. JICA has had a long-standing partnership with the Office of Civil Defense at the NDRRMC and has been instrumental in the creation of several important documents, including the 2014 Hydro-Met and 2015 Seismic National Disaster Response Plan. JICA's ability to integrate itself in the disaster management apparatus of host nations has been extremely beneficial and should stand as a model to other nations invested in pre-disaster preparedness and planning.

Integrating JICA disaster risk reduction expertise into host nation disaster management bodies has been a sound strategy for several reasons. This approach allows the host nation to lead, setting forth its vision for how disasters are managed and key factors such as military participation. JICA expertise could then augment the host nation leadership, providing capacity and technical knowhow without co-opting the host nation. During times of disaster, the linkages between JICA and the host nation would be robust. Incoming JICA teams would have a comprehensive

²⁴ Ann Weru, "Prevention pays: Japan's private sector leads the way," *United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction*, 7 April 2015, accessed at <http://reliefweb.int/report/japan/prevention-pays-japan-s-private-sector-leads-way>.

knowledge of the system they are dispatched to aid. JICA could in turn share that knowledge with partners from the JSDF, the NGO sector, and other bilateral teams.

The discussion below examines another product of the JICA-OCD partnership. The West Valley Fault Study was an important one and contained many lessons that echo or reinforce the PWA findings and recommendations deriving from Typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit.

THE WEST VALLEY FAULT EARTHQUAKE: STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This PWA Report has focused heavily on hydro-meteorological disasters in the Philippines, primarily two recent notable typhoons. Yet significant seismic disasters threaten the Philippines as well: earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanoes. The 2013 Bohol earthquake and the numerous eruptions of volcanoes such as Mount Mayon were but recent examples of this serious hazard. The findings and recommendations of this Report should not be confined to typhoons only, but applied more broadly to all Philippines disaster management and cooperation. An exploration of an earthquake study is relevant here, to assess shared hazards with typhoons and to emphasize the need for improved disaster management for all hazards.

In early 2000s, the Government of the Philippines requested the help of the Government of Japan *to conduct a study on the potential impact of a major earthquake and to develop a plan to address it*. Luzon Island, on which Manila sits, is transected by the Valley Fault System, which has had a history of producing strong earthquakes. Some sections of Metro Manila sit directly on top of a fault line. With a return period less than 500 years for these major earthquakes, (the last known event in the mid-1600s), the active phase is near. Researchers expect the magnitude of a West Valley Fault earthquake will be 7 or more, resulting in major

destruction to an unprepared capital and upheaval that would ripple throughout the country.

In response to the request, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) conducted the study with the assistance of two counterpart Philippine agencies, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS). The study, entitled “Study for Earthquake Impact Reduction for Metropolitan Manila in the Republic of the Philippines (MMEIRS),” spanned two years, from August 2002 to March 2004. The study leaders analyzed 18 historically and instrumentally recorded earthquakes and focused on three that showed typical to severe damages. Of particular note was the most severe earthquake, Model 08 Earthquake along the West Valley Fault, with a magnitude of 7.2.

An earthquake similar to Model 08 would be a national crisis. The study found that existing earthquake disaster management systems in the Philippines would not be able to cope with expected damages. Metropolitan Manila is one of the most densely crowded in Southeast Asia, with a history of rapid urbanization and the resulting infrastructure challenges, namely poor housing conditions, shoddy construction, mixed land-use, and congested areas. The impact of an earthquake of this magnitude striking the unprepared capital would be severe and the subsequent chaos would destabilize the economic system and compromise the functioning of the capital and country.

The JICA/MMDA/PHIVOLCS Study predicted staggering results: more than 30,000 dead with damage sustained by nearly half Manila’s buildings. In the days following the earthquake most roads would be impassable, making relief difficult. For days and possibly even weeks there would be no power, communication or water supply. More than 40 percent of the residential buildings in Metropolitan Manila would be partly or heavily damaged, leaving approximately three million refugees. The earthquake itself would cause 34,000 deaths and 114,000 injuries. To compound this

number, the study leaders predicted an additional 18,000 deaths caused by the spread of fire, with 1710 hectares, or nearly three percent of the metro area burning. Collapsed buildings and the infrastructure problems caused by population density, poor planning, and construction would account for the massive loss of life.

The Study stated that the national and local governments had neglected disaster preparedness and relief planning. The Study reported that emergency planning, training, and procedures had been sorely lacking among the departments, institutions, and coordinating bodies at each level of government. The legal framework was in place, but implementation was poor or nonexistent.²⁵

In order to respond to these gaps, the MMIERS Study included a total of 105 priority action plans. These targeted the development of “regulations for earthquake disaster prevention, promotion of research and development for disaster prevention technology, capacity building for disaster response staff from national to community level, [and] installation of modern equipment for disaster management agencies.”²⁶

PWA is highlighting a handful of recommendations from the 40 highest priority action plans. These plans targeted the legal framework for disaster management and institutional capacity for disaster response, the basic logistical capacity for relief and recovery, community preparedness, and protecting the stability of the national government so it can properly function following a massive earthquake.

The Study recommended the local government use one of the outputs of their Study, i.e., the Earthquake Mitigation and Response Checklists–Local Planning Guide. Each *barangay* was tasked with preparing a disaster preparedness plan. At the time of the Study, most *barangays* in Metro Manila had not prepared any written plans.

²⁵ Japan International Cooperation Agency, *Earthquake Impact Reduction Study for Metropolitan Manila, Republic of the Philippines, Final Report* (Manila: JICA), 3-15

²⁶ Ibid., 3-2

The Study action plans noted the importance of community resilience and a strong and inter-connected civil society with systems of mutual support. In the event of a major earthquake the Study stated the difficulties the national government would have to effectively respond during the first 72 hours. Resilience in these circumstances would require strengthening civil society. The Study recommended a first step toward that end. The Study called for local-level information sharing of potential hazards and vulnerabilities as part of a major campaign to raise public awareness of the risk the people of Manila face. It also recommended participatory methods for developing plans to address these risks.

The Study stated Metro Manila needed to collect and stockpile food, water, clothing, medicine, and other relief supplies. The JICA researchers found many *barangays* did not have any supplies, and those that did proved wholly inadequate for the massive scale predicted by Model 08. In keeping with the general lack of coordination, the Study noted that Metropolitan Manila “is equipped with scant resources and fragmented systems of emergency medical responses.” The researchers highlighted the urgent nature of formulating networks of mutual help between LGUs, as well as creating a “multi-layered response structure” practicable from the local to international level.

The MMIERS Study predicted the functioning of the national government would be greatly hampered. The presidential palace and the parliamentary buildings are situated on unstable ground. The government would have no gathering place in the event that they are damaged. The Study recommended seismic examination of these structures, retrofitting, as well as temporary sites to accommodate government functions and secure access to the emergency road network. The researchers emphasized the need to shore up the telecommunication and transportation system for emergency management.

The JICA/MMDA/PHILVOLCS Study recommended the government “revitalize the councils, update their plans, strengthen

decision-making processes, and encourage lateral communications and mutual aid.”²⁷ The local and provincial councils tasked with disaster coordination had no preparedness function under the old legislation. The councils had no regular meetings or agenda for overseeing any pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation programs, which restricted their capacity for effective collaboration during response, relief, and recovery operations.

²⁷ Ibid., 3-15

Since the 2004 publication of the JICA MMEIRS study, the Government of the Philippines has addressed some critical findings. The Study recommended replacing the legal framework for disaster, which the national government did on 27 May 2010 by the Republic Act 10120 (DRRM Act). The new laws emphasized disaster mitigation and local capacity for response. One of the most important aspects of the law was to *broaden the ability of communities and LGUs to prepare and respond*, rather than allow for response alone. The DRRM Act changed restrictions on the use of funds used by LGUs. Under the former law, LGUs could only use calamity funds for responding to disasters. Under the 2010 DRRM Law, LGUs set aside five percent of their budgets for disasters, of which 70 percent goes to DRR: capacity building, public information, emergency equipment, training, and other preparedness activities.

The JICA Study of Metro Manila’s vulnerability to a major earthquake was a stark reminder that disaster threats to the Philippines do not end at its yearly typhoons. That many of JICA’s recommendations centered on improved community readiness and strengthened coordination systems were to be expected. These systems were sorely tried during Haiyan, and remain in need of continual strengthening. For Metro Manila the stakes are even higher, as a major quake might degrade or delay national-level disaster management. For the city of

Manila and for the departments and response agencies it houses, the findings of the Study – combined with those of Haiyan – constitute an urgent call to action.

Others have added to the JICA research and recommendations. A 2010-2013 project with Australia AID was an example. This study, “Hazards Mapping and Assessment for Effective Community-Based Disaster Risk Management,” or The READY Project, was implemented with funding from Australia Aid and the UNDP in cooperation with the NDRRMC. In October 2014 the Government of the Philippines shared with Metropolitan Manila officials the results of this Study, including hazard and risk assessment maps that included population data, existing infrastructure, and other area characteristics that demonstrated specifics of disaster risks. The government has expected these maps to be used by each *barangay* to prepare land use and contingency plans. Raising awareness of specific earthquake risks should result in improved preparedness activities at the *barangay* level.

For Japan and her partners in the region, the overarching lesson of the JICA and other studies is that the disaster risk reduction, response, and recovery assistance of Japan will surely be needed in the future. Even as the disaster management of the Philippines improves, a calamity along the lines of the Model 08 will unquestionably require the aid of Japan. The responders of Japan’s government, military, and NGO sectors should be prepared for that eventuality.

MULTILATERAL COORDINATION AND CAPACITY

Befitting the scale of Typhoon Haiyan, the international response was major. In Typhoon Hagupit, the level of international involvement was considerably lower owing to Philippine capacity and to a vastly lower level of need. For the numerous international responders, many lessons are to be observed and learned as well as future steps to be taken. For the Philippines itself there is the need to assess the contributions of the international community in recent disasters and take steps accordingly.

In any Level 3 emergency that occurs in the Philippines, the UN family presence is virtually a given. The Philippines has a Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator and a permanent presence

of the major disaster relief organizations, such as OCHA, the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, and UNICEF. Many of these organizations have ongoing development, poverty reduction, and disaster risk reduction programs in the Philippines. Participation in disaster relief activities has been a natural continuation of their work. The UN presence in the Philippines affords it the opportunity to engage in close planning and preparedness measures with counterpart departments. As demonstrated by Typhoon Haiyan, coordination is a necessity in order to harmonize the HA/DR activities of both stakeholders.

HA/DR coordination is one of the most crucial areas for harmonization of efforts. The UN accomplishes this through several means. One is its On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (OSOCC) run by UN Disaster Assistance and Coordination (UNDAC) under the aegis of UN OCHA. During Typhoon Haiyan several OSOCCs were established, notably at Tacloban, Cebu, and Roxas. These centers existed primarily to coordinate UN and international relief efforts alongside those of the Philippines. OCHA will also typically establish a Reception/Departure Center for tracking and rostering incoming and departing teams, which it did at the Tacloban airport. OCHA may establish as well a civil-military coordination center, again focusing largely on international humanitarian assistance. Lastly the UN family will establish its own cluster system, with cluster leads drawn from the UN agencies or from major NGOs such as Save the Children.

The experience of Haiyan demonstrated that while the UN has an important role to play in future Philippine disasters, its efforts may duplicate or run parallel to existing coordination mechanisms. Military coordination stands out as an example here. The strong central military coordination system of the MNCC (bolstered by U.S. military assistance) and the presence of military leaders at regional DRRM Councils call into the question the need for another military coordination system. Indeed as documented in the case study, the UN CMC centers set up during the disaster provided little significant benefit on top of the military coordination already in place.

The reasons for the under-utilization of the CMCs were twofold. First, the Philippines had already established an effective system in the

MNCC. Once operational, the national and Cebu MNCCs were logical points of coordination for incoming militaries, since they already had a critical mass of other military personnel present: primarily AFP, but also the U.S. Particularly since incoming militaries had to negotiate terms of entry with Philippine departments, it was most sensible to utilize the MNCC as a one-stop shop for military coordination. Additionally, the Asia Pacific MNF SOP provided many incoming regional militaries with a working understanding of the MNCC's roles and tasks. Second, the limited supply of qualified liaison officers was a barrier to engaging in multiple coordination platforms simultaneously. If a military unit were plugged into the national MNCC, a regional Philippine command post, or both, liaising with another UN center would be an added burden. From the point of view of the commanders, there was little incentive to utilize the UN civil-military coordination system.

In the realm of logistics the UN has the imperative to streamline its HA/DR operations in the Philippines. The Logistics Cluster is critical. Its lead, the World Food Programme (WFP), is highly experienced and proficient. The logistics cluster can mobilize private sector Logistics Emergency Teams and the UN Humanitarian Air Service, which in the case of Haiyan were necessary. For Philippine disaster response there are several areas where cross-training and interoperability procedures are needed. One is military logistics. The UN logistics cluster should plan for a large volume of military relief goods that will be incoming in a major disaster. The relief goods will be cleared and tracked by DFA and the AFP, and handled at a facility such as the AFP-led Cebu-Mactan logistics hub. Because the system for military logistics has been established and tested, it will be utilized in future disasters. Logically the UN logistics cluster should prepare to work in partnership to complement this logistics system.

Alongside the OCD-led Philippine Logistics Cluster and the One-Stop Shop, WFP should plan to establish its operations at the same physical location whenever possible. At one location, the logistics personnel (OCD, WFP, DSWD, DFA, AFP, etc.) can ensure a unified logistics command, providing a common operating picture. While the process of prioritization will still follow agency lines (i.e., overseas military goods approved by the AFP, INGO goods by the logistics clusters), a combined effort is needed. This common operating picture could allow

both Philippine and UN agencies to weigh priority decisions against factors such as warehouse space, runway capacity, and local transport ability. Since military-transported supplies will often be most appropriate for civilian disbursement, a joint system would be most appropriate.

A single regional logistics command would also help reconcile varying timelines. In Haiyan, the AFP Cebu-Mactan hub was operational on *day 6*, whereas the corresponding UN logistics cluster did not arrive until 22 days later. Maintaining a continuous presence of Philippine logistics experts in one locale could help provide a common operating picture throughout the course of the disaster.

Cross-cluster coordination is of prime importance. In the present National Disaster Response Plan, cluster duties of the Philippine lead and supporting agencies are delineated. Yet aside from a mention of the relevant Humanitarian Country Team partners, no procedures have been established in the Plan for partnership with UN clusters. Particularly for cluster such as logistics, an implementation plan is essential to ensure that the Philippine and UN clusters work seamlessly and efficiently together. OCD and WFP should spearhead this effort. Even pre-disaster, the agencies could begin the task of prioritization.

The UN could help local NGOs prepare for improved civil-military coordination. As noted above, the U.S. Marines had a ranked priority list for accepting Haiyan-related tasking. UN training could help NGOs understand best practices for soliciting foreign military or AFP aid. Training could teach domestic NGOs how best to approach the chief executive or RDRRM Council for international assistance such as military transport. The training could also instruct local executives how to utilize international military forces. If response capabilities were known in advance, OCD could enter a new disaster with a similar set of guidelines and criteria for prioritization. This process should encourage OCD to reach out to NGOs within the Philippines, which may have significant capacity yet be ignorant of how to communicate with the logistics cluster during a disaster.

In the future, if the UN establishes its own clusters and own OSOCC coordination centers, it should take into account parallel Philippine systems. As discussed above, the Incident Command System and OCD-led DRRMC coordination platform suffered in practice from

poor understanding and integration. An additional layer of multilateral organizations runs the risk of further confusion and non-participation. A common complaint in numerous after-action reports was meeting fatigue. Among already overtaxed local coordinators, the presence of OSOCC meetings, cluster meetings, DRRMC meetings, and agency-specific meetings became overwhelming. The UN could address this issue through careful determination of parallel UN centers and the extensive use of liaison officers. Improved UN-Philippine coordination would minimize accounts such as one from the Philippine NGO Citizens' Disaster Response Center (CDRC). During Haiyan, CDRC received partial needs information from the clusters, yet upon arrival at the specified village found other NGOs already operating there.²⁸ CDRC was forced to coordinate separately with these NGOs on the ground in the absence of verified information from the clusters.

Preparedness coordination could allay another problem that arose during Haiyan: the issue of inadequate coverage of rural and remote areas. One cause of this problem was access. At many sites, the roads took days or weeks to open, rendering hinterland communities accessible only by strained air resources. Another cause was the "CNN Effect," where relief organizations clustered around Tacloban due to its media exposure and to its relative ease of access. The UN and the Philippines could preemptively address this perennial HA/DR problem. Preplanning should include procedures for identifying and rapidly accessing communities far from hubs or sub-hubs.

The focus on Tacloban was particularly notable among NGOs due to their inability to reach inland areas and also their lack of integration into the coordination system. That OCHA only set up an NGO coordination platform on December 4, *day 26*, was evidence of the system's failure to adequately integrate NGOs. As the conduit for many of the larger HA/DR NGOs, the UN and IFRC could tackle this problem before it arises. Co-location of OSOCCs with DRRMCs could provide a unified picture of relief needs and help steer incoming UN agencies and NGOs to under-served areas.

²⁸ Suyin Jamoralin, Executive Director, CDRC, personal communication, 16 April 2015.

Combined coordination centers could also fulfill a matchmaking function. At these joint centers a local or international NGO with supplies but no transport could find and partner with an international organization with transport. During Haiyan, DFA Secretary Domingo noted that although DSWD, the Red Cross, the UN, OCD, and recognized NGOs could accept international goods, in reality many were shipped *without local consignees or NGOs*, harming accountability and potentially leading to waste.²⁹ The UN could increase its efforts to assist international donors find locally-approved consignees. Such arrangements would benefit not only the local NGOs, but also the internationals who would gain access to an expanded pool of relief workers and volunteers. Finally both UN and Philippines humanitarian agencies should increase the number and scope of trainings offered to local NGOs, targeting interaction with the DRRM Councils at various levels and with the response clusters.

A unifying theme in the recommendations for the UN agencies and other multilaterals is the need to tailor future responses to the particular nature of the Philippines' system. In the realm of logistics, this should entail partner education concerning the One-Stop Shop, pre-existing warehouse facilities, distribution alongside DSWD and AFP/PNP, and on access to needs assessments. Because OCHA coordinates the deployment of national teams through its OSOCCs (and Virtual OSOCC), there may be a tendency to omit Philippine agencies from the process. The potential complications of such an omission include unneeded teams deploying or, as in the case of Tacloban, a superabundance of resources in one location while others areas remain in need. Ultimately the regional level OSOCCs and Reception/Departure Centers should provide tactical coordination only.

The larger decisions of how, where, and when to deploy international resources should be determined at the NDRRMC in Manila and in consultation with the MNCC. Since large, established INGOs such as World Vision or Save the Children have the wherewithal simply to deploy, and need no assistance, it is incumbent upon the UN to help the Philippines best assign and direct these highly capable organizations.

²⁹ Jesus Gary Domingo, "Perspectives on Yolanda (Haiyan) International Cooperation," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Lessons Learned from Typhoon Haiyan," Tokyo, 22 January, 2014.)

Otherwise, path-dependence sets in, e.g., having arrived at Tacloban airport, NGOs begin relief immediately in that area, even if needs were still unmet in Cebu or Panay. OCHA and WFP in particular could proactively disseminate information for the most needed relief deployments to the Philippine disaster sites.

As the Philippines and UN jointly work to improve preparedness, another lesson of Haiyan should be the recognition of the leadership within the local UN. Just as LGUs should lead disaster response and be supported – but not supplanted – by Manila, the same applies to the UN. The local offices of WFP, OCHA and other UN family members are the best equipped to manage disasters. They generally have the long-standing relationships, the intimate country knowledge, and the relevant experience. In interviews after Haiyan, disaster managers suggested that pre-emption by UN leadership from New York or Geneva hindered the local offices. Sidelining or disenfranchising local UN staff resulted in the over-emphasis of international aid at the expense of Philippine efforts that were marginalized. Indeed, some questioned whether Haiyan even necessitated a Level 3 disaster designation. Perhaps with this in mind, the Philippine authorities rejected OCHA coordination during Hagupit.

Among recent Asia Pacific disasters, Typhoon Haiyan featured the deployment of an ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre (AHA) Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT). The Emergency Rapid Assessment Team pre-deployed to Tacloban, and was on hand for the storm's landfall. In addition, on 17 November the ASEAN AHA Centre sent office units and generators from its Subang, Malaysia warehouse to Tacloban. Overall, the activities of AHA Centre response were useful, but highly limited in scope and coordination.

The decision to focus on Tacloban was a direct manifestation of the lack of AHA staff, being too few for Manila and field operations concurrently. Once on the ground, the AHA Centre coordinated with OCD counterparts but acknowledged it still had too few staff to attend all the necessary meetings. Notably its team was also short of resources, lacking sufficient vehicles and fuel for assessment and coordination operations. In hindsight the AHA Centre ERAT did provide needed assistance, but the overall contribution to the disaster was questionable

and was not indicative of the actions of a well-resourced, capable agency with a clear plan for disaster operations.

Fundamentally the AHA Centre should evaluate its role in future disasters. From the experience of Typhoon Haiyan it was evident that it still lacked the resources to field a large, self-sufficient team that could make a difference in the largest disasters. While its shipments from Subang and its telecommunications equipment were no doubt helpful, these were not capabilities unique to ASEAN. An organization that replicates OCHA tasks, but at a smaller level, does not seem a high priority, either for the Philippines or elsewhere in the region. Despite the fact that the ASEAN SASOP envisions a coordination role for bilateral military assistance coordination between ASEAN members, it is not clear this was a needed function in Haiyan.

The experience of Typhoon Haiyan could be used by ASEAN to assess the role that the AHA Centre could and should play. Notably it could be of great assistance acting as an intermediary among would-be responders in the ASEAN region. Although national assistance will still contain a bilateral component, the AHA Centre could facilitate connections, assist ASEAN members to tailor their responses according to need, and provide critical information how to access the NDRRMC, One-Stop Shop, and regional hubs. Such a role would not require huge teams or large quantities of specialized equipment.

In order for the AHA Centre to fulfill this function, it should facilitate ongoing education and training on the SASOP protocols and run tabletop exercises exploring how the Centre can add value to bilateral negotiations of HA/DR responses. An AHA Centre liaison presence at the NDRRMC, the MNCC, and regional coordination centers could be highly valuable. Since many potential responders in the ASEAN region are comparatively new to overseas HA/DR response, the AHA Centre could help them connect most effectively. In preparedness, the AHA Centre could partner with Philippine departments and the UN to offer regional trainings. These trainings could educate ASEAN neighbors concerning the Philippine response system and could serve as venues to disseminate lessons learned and best practices all may find valuable.

Conclusion

THE JAPAN-U.S.-PHILIPPINES CIVIL-MILITARY INITIATIVE

Peace Winds America launched the Japan-U.S.-Philippines Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative in 2013 based on several factors. One was that Japan-United States disaster preparedness and response cooperation, though more substantive than in the past, could be strengthened much more. In many areas PWA posited that the two nations could significantly increase their civilian, military, and civil-military cooperation for HA/DR. Another was that the Philippines was the ideal partner for accomplishing the Peace Winds America mission of *strengthening disaster preparedness and response in the Asia Pacific*. The vulnerability of the disaster-prone Philippines, its strong, growing ties with Japan and the U.S., and its promising disaster management system all well positioned it for the Initiative. Third, PWA envisioned the trilateral Initiative as an opportunity for the three nations to strengthen disaster preparedness and response within and among each other. In addition to strengthening the trilateral HA/DR partnership, Peace Winds America surmised the findings, policies, and practices would be applicable to other Asia Pacific nations.

These suppositions have been borne out by the Initiative. While PWA and others widely disseminated the lessons of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, PWA review found there remain numerous areas for closer Japan-U.S. HA/DR linkages. The unmatched capabilities the two countries bring to the field are still predominantly dispatched and deployed independently. Opportunities for synergy abound. Across the spectrum of disaster preparedness and response, from assistance agencies (USAID, JICA) to military units (CRF, III MEF) to NGOs (Japan Platform and INGOs), PWA found areas where closer communication and collaboration would prove beneficial both for preparedness and response. As Japan and the U.S. commit to their already strong economic and military ties, HA/DR

can and should occupy a central pillar of their cooperation strategy in the region.

The Philippines is an ideal HA/DR partner of Japan and the United States. Politically, culturally, and economically the Philippines has been strengthening its ties with these two strategic partners. Throughout the Peace Winds America Initiative, it became abundantly clear that trilateral HA/DR provides fertile ground for further cooperation. Through the U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement and USAID mission and through the permanent JICA presence of Japan, there is a ready platform for in-depth study of how responses are conducted and how preparedness can be improved. Once Typhoon Haiyan struck, these relationships only deepened.

Finally, the findings of the Japan-U.S.-Philippine disaster preparedness Initiative are limited neither to the Japan-U.S. alliance nor to the trilateral partnership. From the PWA Initiative, a wide range of lessons can be profitably extrapolated to other Asia Pacific nations, particularly the ASEAN member-states, neighbors of the Philippines. From domestic utilization of military forces for disaster response to mechanisms for soliciting U.S. or Japan assistance, regional neighbors can glean much from the Initiative. Indeed the participation of civilian and military representatives from Vietnam in an October 2014 PWA workshop confirmed HA/DR training is not limited solely to the Philippines or to Typhoon Haiyan. Particularly for vulnerable countries that have not recently experienced a mega-disaster, these lessons may well prevent one from occurring.

The trilateral Initiative has been also a validation of PWA methodologies. From feedback, it has been apparent there is no substitute for bringing together a diverse consortium of colleagues to openly review and discuss HA/DR issues. Military and NGO participants separately revealed that PWA workshops were their first opportunity to meet the other, exchange views, and learn capabilities and limitations. Guided by expert partners and high-level policy discussions, these workshops achieved as much to promote networking and relationships as they did for formal training. The workshops and forums also greatly aided – and were aided by – a year-long, in-depth case study. This Haiyan case study anchored the Initiative and provided an essential common ground of

discussion for participants from the Philippines, Japan, United States, and for Southeast Asian nations.

LESSONS LEARNED — BEST PRACTICES FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

The experience of Typhoon Haiyan holds many valuable lessons for the Philippines, for the United States and Japan, and for its neighbors in the ASEAN region. Despite the tragic loss of life during Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippines and its regional partners should be encouraged. The Peace Winds America assessments show that even for highly vulnerable nations, *leadership, disaster management frameworks, and implementation of best policies and practices are extremely effective disaster risk reduction tools*. So effective are they that they can eclipse infrastructure and technology-based disaster mitigation approaches.

It is imperative these lessons are learned and acted upon. Speaking at a PWA workshop in January 2014, Philippine Ambassador to Japan Manuel Lopez stressed this need:

Typhoon Yolanda may have been a class of its own, but we fear that it could also very well be the harbinger of a disturbing “new normal.” One need only to watch the news to worry that, in this era of climate change, we will likely experience heretofore unprecedented calamities... Even as we struggle to help the affected communities rise again, the Philippine Government fully recognized that greater attention will have to be paid to mitigation the impact of climate change, and strengthening disaster preparedness, as this Workshop highlights. Boosting resilience, disaster risk reduction and management will increasingly be crucial to achieving a robust response.

Nations at risk of typhoons or tsunamis need not be at the mercy of natural disasters if they do not possess expensive infrastructure like seawalls. While such structures may have value, they are at best only secondary to basic disaster preparedness and response strategies. The Philippines has demonstratively shown the value of these strategies. For instance, the great loss of life in Tacloban during Haiyan was only partially a failure of the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration to predict the storm surge. It was equally attributable to fear, reticence and misunderstanding of local citizens who did not wish to evacuate, and to local departments that could not communicate why evacuation was critical. The evacuation

success during Hagupit was therefore not a technological upgrade in forecasting ability, but rather an improved evacuation plan implemented by the whole government, locally and nationally.

Perhaps the most critical lessons learned of Typhoon Haiyan and the PWA Initiative has been the ***need for the combination of competent leadership and thorough disaster management frameworks***. Without strong leadership, frameworks alone will not suffice. They will not be implemented fully or consistently, yielding a disjointed and fragmented response. In this scenario, local executives, individual departments, and responders such as NGOs will freelance without coordination. Conversely, without a management framework, strong leaders will be hamstrung, forced to manage *ad hoc* the disaster response. Where disasters are broad in scope, each regional leader will adopt differing approaches, rendering national-level coordination impossible.

During Haiyan, ***effective leaders in key posts*** were essential. These included Philippine Navy Captain Roy Trinidad at Tacloban Airport, Assistant Secretary Jesus Gary Domingo at the DFA Yolanda Action Center, General Roy Deveraturda and his OCD colleagues at Cebu-Mactan, and Commodore Rafael Mariano at the MNCC-Manila. What these leaders had in common was the ability to fuse the capabilities of numerous stakeholders, whether civilian or military, Philippine or international, government or NGO. They were well versed in core management systems such as the Incident Command System and the cluster system. They demanded information and assessments of needs, and could determine priorities accordingly. Their management was typified by flexibility in the face of changing assessments, resources, and circumstances. While their decision-making was authoritative, they recognized the need for inclusiveness.

Disaster management should be handled at the lowest level, so competent leadership is first needed there. Just as “politics is local,” so too is disaster management local. The Philippines provides an apt example. The *barangay* captain, then chief executive or mayor is the accountable leader. In a disaster spanning two or more municipalities, the next level chief executive – the provincial governor – is accountable. The NDRRM Plan has clearly stated the responsibilities of the local, municipal, and provincial leaders. Through training as well as hands-on

experience, many chief executives have honed their disaster leadership skills. The Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of Civil Defense are making considerable progress in disaster management training, although it could be further complemented by others, e.g., the UN, JICA, USAID, or even PWA.

Once a disaster transcends the provincial level, it is incumbent upon national authorities to select an appropriate regional leader. At the regional level, disaster leadership tends to be less fixed in advance, but rather dependent on selection and availability. As the Philippine experience demonstrates, the best leaders are those who can best manage the emergency, regardless of their affiliation. Whether civilian or military, nationally or locally-based, a regional commander should be able to provide a common operating picture for the affected area, and unite all responders across agency lines. These were factors in the success of the AFP generals that Philippine leaders prudently selected to be Incident Commanders during Typhoon Haiyan. The Philippines should work to export its expertise in regional disaster management. It can well train its neighbors on the salient aspects of regional-level coordination and the civil-military interagency process during major incidents.

In reviewing past disaster responses, failure or success often depends upon leaders making decisions in rapidly changing circumstances. This ability is predicated upon accurate assessments of changing situations, knowledge of resources and personnel, accountability and flexibility, and knowledge of the local/regional/national systems and procedures. In large disasters the U.S. and Japan have fallen short or could have been more effective in their national responses. However both Japan and the U.S. acknowledge these essential keys—***leadership, a disaster management framework/system, and implementation of best practices.***

Effective disaster response warrants a country-by-country evaluation of their disaster management framework. National disaster centers are now nearly universal throughout Southeast Asia, but vary considerably in their mandates, capabilities, and practices. From PWA trainings and the case study analysis, PWA has highlighted several factors critical for a national disaster management authority to consider as it refines preparedness and response frameworks.

Assessment of the Philippines case shows the criticality of *framework buy-in at all levels*. Under the Philippine NDRRM Plan, the same basic measures and response procedures apply to all levels of government. Such a system can achieve truly robust disaster management, but only if leaders and departments understand and accept the framework for response. Thus in the Philippines this process begins with *barangay* captains, then local executives, then provincial governors, then regional incident commanders, and finally the NDRRMC. At each step the leadership must understand its responsibilities and decision-making authority and recognize how it is to pass on damage and needs assessments and request specific assistance. The particulars of this system are unique to the Philippines, but the principle is broadly applicable.

The case of Typhoon Bopha (locally Pablo) in 2012 provides an apt example of why this scalability is important. The typhoon crossed central Mindanao. As this was a very rare track for typhoons in the Philippines, the Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental provinces were wholly unprepared. In this instance disaster management quickly had to transfer to the provincial, then regional and national levels. While not discarding the principal of local leadership, the Philippine system is strong precisely because it anticipates and plans for this upward progression of leadership and disaster management authority. It is flexible and scalable.

The Philippine example is important because over the past two decades, the ASEAN nations have been devolving more responsibilities and accountabilities to their provinces and municipalities. With this devolution of authority come the responsibilities of both disaster preparedness and response. These capabilities and competencies vary considerably—some are quite strong, yet many local authorities and provinces are weak, with undeveloped response capabilities. Nearly all local and provincial authorities could benefit from assistance with preparedness measures and response best practices.

The Philippines, the UN, Japan, the U.S., and ASEAN could help immeasurably with management training. Municipalities in the Philippines and Japan can demonstrate the utility and value of mutual aid agreements, which proved their worth during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami and in Typhoon Haiyan. Across the whole spectrum of preparedness – including coordination, civil-military interaction,

prepositioning and warehousing, and mega-disaster (worst case scenario) planning – local, municipal, and provincial authorities in the ASEAN region could benefit from further training.

The United Nations, which has wisely opted to focus on strengthening national response capabilities, could expand its training efforts, focusing on local capacity, coordination mechanisms, and the cluster system. This latter system, which has proven hugely effective in humanitarian emergencies, could be significantly improved with better host nation buy-in. As demonstrated in the Philippines, the clusters function best with adept host nation leadership and wide participation not just of UN agencies and INGOs, but domestic departments, NGOs, and the private sector. Similarly, ASEAN and the AHA Centre could prove valuable providing training to the member states in disaster frameworks, coordination mechanisms, and local and provincial preparedness and response. Similarly, ASEAN, the AHA Centre, and the ADMM+ could prove valuable, using their resources to promote Terms of Reference and train partners on the ICS or similar coordination mechanism. (The ADMM+ HA/DR Experts' Working Group is presently studying Terms of Reference for its members.) For both multilaterals, training should emphasize holistic disaster management, capacitating locals both to manage their own disasters and to use regional or national centers appropriately.

The United States and Japan should augment and refine this training. The U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program can be expanded. This Partnership Program could provide further trainings on civil-military logistics during disasters, and also on the Incident Command System. Through JICA and MOFA, and Japan Platform, Japan can provide training on public-private partnerships, use of the private sector in response and recovery, mutual aid agreements, and community-based disaster risk reduction strategies.

Japan, the U.S., and ASEAN members should examine the Philippine framework for guidance on worst case scenario planning. Such planning must be incorporated into national response frameworks. Although the primacy of local leadership should be encouraged, it behooves nations to plan for true calamities. The *assumption* scenario in the new

Philippine National Disaster Response Plan is a good example.¹ While not automatic, it lays out a mechanism for national management when localities are wholly incapacitated. Worst case scenario planning is essential for projected disasters such as a major West Valley Fault quake, or super typhoons. In the West Valley Fault quake, the local Manila mayors will be overwhelmed and cut off. A nationally-directed response, with international assistance, will unquestionably be needed. Nations that have not recently experienced a major disaster would profit by this planning.

The Philippines can also instruct its neighbors on best practices for local disaster risk reduction and response. The 2010 Law (see Chapter IV) mandates five percent of funds set aside for DRR activities, and 30 percent of that amount for response. Such a nationally-mandated mechanism would be of benefit to other vulnerable nations in the region, and could spur the quest for improved local management. At the same time, the NDRRMC through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) should expand efforts to hold local executives accountable for allocating those funds wisely. With a continual emphasis on worst case scenario planning and a focus on transparency, OCD and its partners can significantly boost local preparedness. Worst case scenario planning should encompass disasters of unforeseen *type*, (e.g., a Manila earthquake), as well as unforeseen *severity* (e.g., Typhoon Bopha).

For regional disaster management centers, ***implementation of a unified coordination mechanism is paramount.*** The Philippines has elected to adopt the aforementioned Incident Command System (ICS). ICS is “a systematic tool used for the command, control, and coordination of emergency response.”² Developed by the U.S. Forest Service, it now has been adopted widely in the response community. Whether nations use the actual Incident Command System or an analogue is of secondary importance to ensuring its key principles are adopted. These are a unity of command achieved by the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure. Whether for

¹ Government of the Philippines, National Disaster Response Plan (Manila: GRP), 1-5.

² U.S. Department of Transportation – Federal Highway Administration, “Glossary: Simplified Guide to the Incident Command System for Transportation Professionals,” Accessed 20 May 2015 at http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/ics_guide/glossary.htm.

Japan, the U.S., or an ASEAN nation, any unified system of disaster coordination should be implementable at all levels of government, scalable, and specific to the nation in question. It should be inclusive and be taught to civilian and military leaders alike. In this realm the Philippines can demonstrate best practices for selecting a command system and implementing it nation-wide.

National disaster management centers should be interagency bodies or have representation from other civilian departments and domestic military forces.³ Without these linkages the probability of one or more departments “freelancing” and bypassing the coordination of the center becomes great. The leadership of these centers should also be empowered to appoint or select incident commanders during an emergency (whether from their own staff or other department). Finally, ***these national disaster management centers should have the budget, staff, and expertise to inculcate and exercise disaster mitigation, preparedness, and response planning from the local to the national level.*** Particularly for geographically decentralized nations (such as Indonesia or Malaysia), disaster expertise that resides solely in the capital is insufficient. Local and provincial leaders must be capacitated to manage disasters in and among their localities.

In the realm of national disaster management centers, the Philippines again is leading the way. The NDRRMC – a needed upgrade from the prior NDCC – is not only a robust center with full civil and military buy-in, but also has shown a laudable commitment to continuous improvements. Their ongoing review process, and new disaster plans such as the Hydro-Met National Disaster Response Plan, are testament to this commitment.

The merits of co-location (command and coordination) were made abundantly clear in the case study analysis. National disaster frameworks and management centers should not leave this variable to chance or to be decided *ad hoc*. ***Co-location is particularly necessary in cases where military units shoulder disaster response logistics duties.*** While joint training and exercises can improve the civil-military interface, there is no substitute for co-located command and coordination centers during disaster. Not only do co-located facilities promote unity of effort and

³ The NDRRM Council and its Operations Center are prime examples here, seamlessly merging civilian departments, military branches, and civil society. See Chapter II.

reduce redundancy, they are also essential to keep discrete responders focused on their areas of comparative advantage. Where joint coordination is not in place, inappropriate tasking may ensue. This may take the form of military units conducting “retail operations” (i.e., passing out relief goods), when they are far more suited to specialized tasks such as debris clearance or search and rescue.

Following Haiyan, the Philippines is well poised to instruct neighbors on the operation and benefits of an integrated logistics chain. The “hub and spokes” model it employed, using Villamor and Cebu-Mactan as hubs, was a notable success for relief operations. Paired with Japan and the U.S. (who employed a similar system during the 2011 Tohoku tsunami), the Philippines can export this knowledge. It would be of particular value to nations such as Indonesia or Malaysia, who have large geographic footprints.

The notion of *comparative advantage* in disasters extends beyond domestic response. Certain responders such as the U.S. military are well versed in thinking of response with regard to their unique capabilities. Yet matching international responders with their comparative strengths or capabilities requires preparedness in advance by both host nation and international responder. Host nation authorities should be furnished with detailed and updated lists of capabilities by their major international partners in advance of disasters. These responders should comprise bilateral partners, ASEAN member-states, UN agencies, and major NGOs.

To facilitate dissemination of capabilities, Terms of Reference (TOR) may be of great use. TOR documents at the national disaster management center can help those authorities craft specific and appropriate requests for assistance. Because they are bilateral documents and contain no binding clauses, they are fully compatible with existing agreements and protocols such as the ASEAN SASOP, the Multinational Forces SOP, and visiting forces agreements. The advantage of TOR documents is that they can facilitate rapid and highly specialized assistance. Where disaster managers on the ground identify needs such as air traffic control, vertical lift, or water purification, the host nation can reach out directly to a known partner, rather than submit a blanket request and wait until it is fulfilled.

For the Philippines and ASEAN member-states in general, TORs are attractive because they can allay fears regarding military responses. Nations without a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) may hedge or balk at allowing military assistance in disasters (as occurred in 2008 in Myanmar during Cyclone Nargis). TORs ensure each host nation is fully aware of the resources and personnel to be dispatched during a disaster. They can vet and approve these resources in advance and can set the conditions and timeline for exit and other sovereignty safeguards, such as force protection. Because of the undeniable advantages the U.S. military and the Japan Self-Defense Force can bring in a disaster, it is of definite benefit of regional nations to plan for such deployment. The Philippines should lead by example, demonstrating the value that bilateral Terms of Reference documents can bring.

Many of the nations in Southeast Asia presently conduct large-scale military-to-military exercises. Typically conducted in partnership with the United States, these exercises include *Balikatan* in the Philippines, *Cobra Gold* in Thailand, and *Keris Strike* in Malaysia. They can include thousands of military personnel. While defense is their primary focus, all now embrace a disaster or humanitarian component. These exercises build rapport and relationships and enable practice on joint deployments, field interoperability, communications and logistics overlaps, and unified command.

Yet the limitations of these exercises should be acknowledged. While some include other nations, civilian agencies, UN family members, or NGOs, this inclusion is rarely substantive. The non-military participants are observers. The sheer number of military personnel precludes meaningful joint training on civil-military coordination and cannot provide a true focus on local civilian-led disaster response techniques. These large-scale exercises should maintain their humanitarian components, but the nations in question should also broaden their civil-military HA/DR training. Training such as those provided by PWA are smaller in scale and maintain parity between military and non-military participants. They acknowledge the key role of the military while emphasizing the need for civilian-led responses. PWA trainings are inclusive, incorporating and empowering leaders from small NGOs, a wide diversity of government departments, key UN agencies, the private sector, and a range of regional

nations. To the nations of ASEAN, such trainings – of small size and modest expense – could well complement exercises such as *Cobra Gold*.

JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES – STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE, STRENGTHENING HA/DR PARTNERSHIPS

In its 2011-2013 Japan-U.S. Initiative, Peace Winds America found the resurgent Japan-U.S. security alliance held great promise for close future cooperation in overseas HA/DR operations. Japan and the U.S. have demonstrated their cooperation through their regular civilian and military exercises, and through the combined response to the 3/11 Tohoku tsunami. As Kurt Tong, then Deputy Chief of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo said at a PWA workshop, “One of the most visible aspects of the alliance’s contribution to the region is our cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster response.” Still, two nations could well benefit from streamlining their humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.

The previous PWA 2011-2013 Initiative concluded that while Japan and the U.S. individually harbor significant capabilities for overseas response, their mechanisms for interoperability, information sharing, and joint decision-making were lacking. National Defense Academy Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi noted that the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense-Cooperation called for the creation of a peacetime bilateral coordination mechanism. However, he said, the creation of such a mechanism has continued to lag and its establishment was “overdue homework for the two governments.”⁴ Particularly in light of the excellent civil-military tsunami response, failure to capitalize upon its lessons would be a missed opportunity.⁵

Through the PWA trainings, forums, and research of the present Japan-U.S.-Philippines Initiative, it is clear that while the capacity of the two nations is undiminished, ***work remains to realize the potential of the partners mounting a coordinated response.*** An assessment of the Japan

⁴ Quoted in Jon Ehrenfeld and Charles Aanenson, *Strengthening the Alliance: HA/DR Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific*, (Seattle: PWA, 2013), 204.

⁵ Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi, JGSDF (Ret.), remarks at “Strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance -Recommendations and Findings of the Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative,” Tokyo, 25 July 2013.



U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Hugh Wetherald shakes hands with JMSDF Rear Admiral Hisanori Sato, Commander of the Japanese Joint Task Force, aboard the helicopter destroyer *JDS Ise* (DDH-182). This cooperation during Haiyan response set an example for future joint HA/DR operations. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Cansin Hardyegritag/Released.)

and U.S. response to Typhoon Haiyan showed largely non-overlapping actions and response measures taken in the Philippines. While the JSDF did initially use U.S. Marine assistance to connect and coordinate with the host nation, subsequent HA/DR activities were largely separate. There were instances of coordination – such as the JMSDF accepting the landing of MV-22 Ospreys on the *JDS Ise* or the JSDF dispatch of liaison officers to the *USS George Washington* – but these were largely tactical, not strategic partnerships.

It is not realistic, i.e., politically or legally feasible, to fully interlock the overseas disaster response activities of the U.S. and Japan. Each must be separately requested by the host nation and each is guided by its own policies, its unique capabilities, and a host of specific decisions made on a case-by-case basis, such as the deployment of military assets. Yet PWA has found that once the host nation requests both nations, the two countries could streamline operations, reducing redundancy, and capitalizing upon their shared abilities and expertise.

Joint Japan-U.S. disaster collaboration could begin at the needs assessment phase. The response to Typhoon Hagupit demonstrates that Japan has embraced the concept of joint civil-military assessment teams, an important step. These Japan teams and their counterparts from USAID and PACOM should have a mechanism for establishing rapid liaisons. In the early days of a disaster, critical assessment requirements such as helicopters may be limited. Since these initial assessments are by nature rough and designed to provide a broad picture of damage and needs, a combined initial assessment could suffice for the governments of Japan and the U.S. A shared assessment could then empower like agencies – such as JICA and USAID – immediately to begin strategizing logistic factors such as on-the-ground information sharing, shared C-130 flights, and planning response areas. Thus events such as the redeployment of the JSDF in Haiyan from Cebu to the harder-hit Samar/Leyte region could be avoided. Since needs assessments are informational documents only, they in no way commit Japan or U.S. responders to a particular course of action. But they offer the opportunity for enhanced Japan-U.S. cooperation with the host nation.

In the realm of logistics the *two nations could significantly improve their collaboration on the ground*. The willingness of Japan to use military assets such as its destroyer/helicopter carriers, hovercraft, and C-130s makes it a natural partner of the U.S. The JMSDF should train to use its maritime fleet not only command posts for Japanese forces, but as combined coordination centers for civil and military stakeholders. (These stakeholders should encompass NGOs, as Captain Shimodaira recommended.) This capability would mirror that of the U.S. Navy carrier strike groups and could potentially open new areas to combined international civil-military coordination. In archipelagic nations such as the Philippines or Indonesia, such capability could drastically improve HA/DR outcomes.

At the same time the JGSDF – led by the Central Readiness Force – should increase its ability to provide ground coordination. The CRF should focus on two areas. First, CRF should establish and maintain closer cooperation with all JSDF branches in order to provide a unified command-and-control architecture. Top leaders within the JGSDF, JMSDF, or CRF should arrive at the scene empowered to

establish a single strategic command. Beyond tactical considerations (such as JMSDF helicopters transporting goods to shore), this central command could provide high-level linkages with U.S. peers and could use its authority to approve joint tasking and common operational areas. Second, the CRF should improve its ability to coordinate with host nation civilian and military authorities. Such improvement warrants in-depth training on country-specific disaster coordination mechanisms and the appropriate decision-makers. Peacetime dispatch of liaison officers to relevant bodies such as the Armed Forces Philippines (AFP) and the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) would prove most beneficial during the actual time of disaster.

The platform and legal basis for the cooperation suggested above comes ultimately from the Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation, but more specifically from the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. These Guidelines, updated in April 2015, lay out the mandate for overseas HA/DR cooperation between Japan and the U.S.:

When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating United States Armed Forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution.⁶

The Defense Guidelines further state that Japan-U.S. defense cooperation can also include peacekeeping, training and exercises, logistic support, intelligence, maritime security, and partner capacity-building. While the Guidelines are an important basis for HA/DR collaboration, they do not mandate specific mechanisms or procedures. It is therefore incumbent upon DOD, PACOM, JSDF, MOD, USAID and State, MOFA and JICA to establish these specifics. Any discussion of HA/DR collaboration should include a categorization of unique capabilities, and raise the possibility of expanding these. Although now limited to heavy lift, medical care, and water purification, the JSDF has many other potential unique capabilities, particularly in engineering.

⁶ Government of Japan, *The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation* (GOJ: Tokyo, 27 April, 2015), 20.

As these agencies establish and refine procedures for joint HA/DR operations, civilian agencies should remain well represented in the process. Cooperation between the JSDF and U.S. military is already extremely robust, but in disaster response they technically operate under the leadership of MOFA and the USAID/State Department, respectively. Training, exercises, and policies designed to foster closer HA/DR operations should take this factor into account. A worthwhile step would be training to establish a joint operations center in the disaster-affected nation. Such a center would be located in the capital of the host nation and would include leaders from the main Japan and U.S. responding agencies. A single point of coordination in the host nation – with linkages back to ministries in Tokyo and Washington – would greatly improve interoperability on the ground. Operationally, Japan and the U.S. should plan to co-locate this center with the host nation coordination center in order to better streamline response and the provision of international assistance.

As Japan improves patterns of coordination with the U.S., it is also reinforcing its HA/DR credentials within Southeast Asia. As the co-chair of the HA/DR Experts Working Group of the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM+), Japan is exceptionally positioned to capitalize upon Japan's unique abilities. Presently the Working Group is focused on three areas: creating a civil-military SOP, reviewing legal issues around international HA/DR assistance, and designing tabletop and field training exercises. Wisely, co-chair MOD is attempting to craft an SOP that will reinforce, but not overlap with existing guidelines such as the Multinational Forces (MNF) SOP or the ASEAN Standby Agreement SOP (SASOP). According to MOD, its approach is to “emphasize the need for synergy among all these existing HA/DR activities,” focusing on procedures, information sharing, military-to-military coordination, and protocol reconciliation.⁷

The efforts of MOD through the ADMM+ should be streamlined with MOFA/JICA ongoing capacity-building initiatives. Where JICA has a presence on the ground – such as at OCD in the Philippines – it can pass along new SOPs and best practices emerging from MOD and the

⁷ Yusuke Ishihara, MOD, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 19 December 2014.

ADMM+. In this way ASEAN nations will be more fully prepared to work with Japan during severe disasters. Particularly for nations that have not experienced a major disaster recently, such as Vietnam, this information during the preparedness phase could significantly improve its requests during the response phase. Japan is well suited to exhibit leadership in this realm and should strive to ensure its various responders – JICA, JSDF, Japan Platform – present a unified and coherent message to its vulnerable neighbors in Southeast Asia.

On their end, Japan and the United States can greatly assist their ASEAN neighbors with the formulation of Terms of Reference. Not only do TORs hold great promise for the sovereign host nations, but for the responders as well. Military disaster response is expensive. The U.S. military response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was estimated to cost USD six million a day.⁸ TORs would allow the U.S. and Japan to hone narrowly on their unique capabilities, reducing the likelihood of a large dispatch of unspecialized troops. In this way a TOR would more speedily procure needed resources during a disaster, all while minimizing sovereignty concerns and increasing the cost effectiveness to PACOM or the JSDF.

Japan and the United States have jointly and separately stated their commitment to disaster preparedness, and to the Philippines as well as to the ASEAN region. Japan is expanding its activities through JICA while revising its Official Development Assistance charter to include military contributions. The United States continued apace with its “rebalance” toward the Pacific. Together they have committed to including humanitarian assistance and disaster response as a pillar of their strategic alliance.

To some observers, there may be other, more pressing needs for joint Japan-U.S. cooperation than HA/DR. The geopolitical standoff over South China Sea territories or deproliferation on the Korean peninsula may seem to trump disaster response. Yet HA/DR holds the potential to be a significant and long-term source of close cooperation and partnership for the two allies. In the words of Seiji Kihara, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, “PWA programs which

⁸ Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia* (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 23.

involve various stakeholders will help strengthen cooperation between Japan and the US and to contribute to peace and stability of this region.” Without detracting from other regional priorities, HA/DR builds patterns of military and civil-military cooperation that hold immense value. As the threat of disasters in the region grows ever more pronounced, now is the time for Japan and the United States to recommit to a durable, dynamic, and effective partnership for overseas disaster preparedness and response.

結論

日・米・フィリピン民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブ

ピースウィンズ・アメリカ(PWA)はいくつかの要因に基づいてこの日・米・フィリピン民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブを2013年に立ち上げた。要因の一つとして、日米間の防災対策と災害対応のさらなる実質的な協力の強化を図ることである。両国は多くの分野にてHA/DR(人道支援/災害救援活動)における民間、軍隊、および民軍協力をより大幅に強化することができるとPWAは確信している。さらなる要因として、フィリピンは**アジア太平洋地域における防災対策と災害対応の強化**というPWAのミッションの達成可能な理想的なパートナーであるからだ。フィリピンは災害多発地域で脆弱性があることや日本および米国との成長著しい結び付き、さらに同国の有望な災害管理システムは、当イニシアチブにて分析する価値があるに相応している。PWAは当三国間のイニシアチブをそれぞれの国内および三国間の国際的な防災対策と災害対応の強化に好適なチャンスであると予見することが第三の要因である。三国間におけるHA/DRパートナーシップの強化に加えて、そこから得られる知見、その方針、および実践が他のアジア太平洋諸国に対して適応可能であろうとPWAは推測している。

これらの推定は当イニシアチブの実施によって導かれたものである。2011年の東日本大震災での教訓の多くは拡散されているが、まだ日米間ではいくつか密接なHA/DR連携の可能性が存在することが分った。両国の比類の無い優れた能力は残念ながら依然としてまだ散発的に発揮され、展開されている。まだ相乗効果の可能性は数多く存在しているのだ。救援機関(USAIDやJICA)から軍隊(CRF、III MEF)、さらにNGO(ジャパン・プラットフォームおよびINGO)に至るまでの防災対策において、より密接なコミュニケーションと協力体制が防災対策と災害対応の両面において有益であることを確証できた。また、日米両国がすでに保有している強力な

経済的および軍事的な結束に全力を傾注し合うなか、この地域におけるHA/DRは、両国の協力戦略の心柱として担うことが可能であり、またそうあるべきである。

フィリピンは日米の理想的なHA/DRにおけるパートナーである。それは、フィリピンが政治的、文化的、および経済的に、日米の戦略的パートナーとしての結束をそれぞれ強化してきたからである。本イニシアチブを通じて、三国間HA/DRは更なる協力のための豊かな土壌を提供するものであることがますます明瞭になった。「訪問米軍の地位に関する米比協定」とUSAID(米国国際開発庁)ミッションを通じ、また日本からはJICAが継続的に存在していることにより、どのようにして支援活動が行われ、いかに防災対策が改善され得るかの調査のプラットフォームがすでに存在している。台風ハイエンがフィリピンを襲ったとき、これらの関係はさらに深くなった。

最後に、このイニシアチブに関する知見は、日米協力や日・米・フィリピンの三国パートナーシップだけに限られない。多くの教訓が他のアジア太平洋諸国、特にフィリピンの隣国であるASEANメンバー諸国の利益として幅広く活用されることが可能である。国内の災害支援に軍隊と協働することから、米日の救援を要請するメカニズムに至るまで、地域隣国は本イニシアチブから多くの知見を見つけることができる。事実、ベトナムの民軍両者の代表が2014年10月に行われたPWAワークショップに参加したことは、HA/DRは単にフィリピンや台風ハイエンだけを対象とするものではないことを確認することができた。特に近年は巨大な天災を経験していない災害多発地域では、将来イニシアチブで学んだ教訓が役立つ可能性を持っている。

この日・米・フィリピンのイニシアチブはPWAのワークショップ・フォーラム形式という方法論の有効性の証明にもなった。イニシアチブで収集した多くのフィードバックからは、多様な背景を持つ諸国にとってHA/DR問題をオープンに検討し、討議する上でこれに優る方法は無いことが明らかになっている。軍隊およびNGOの参加者らは、PWAの開催したワークショップが彼らにとって相手国の当事者らと会い、意見を交換し、そして互いの能力と限界を学んだ初めての機会であったと、それぞれ率直な感想を述べるのできる機会でもあった。専門家のパートナーと高レベルのポリシー・ディスカッションで構成されたこれらのワークショップは、ネットワーキングと関係を促進する上で、正式な訓練に優るとも

劣らない効果をもたらした。このようなワークショップとフォーラムはまた、一年間のケーススタディを大いに支えてきたと同時に逆に支えられる結果ともなった。この台風ハイエンにおけるケーススタディは、本イニシアチブの根幹となり、フィリピン、日本、米国、および東南アジア諸国からの参加者にとって必須な共通の討議の場を提供するものとなった。

教訓：防災対策と災害対応の成功事例

台風ハイエンでの経験は、フィリピン、米国および日本、さらにASEAN地域の近隣諸国にとって、多くの教訓を与えた。台風で多大な人命を失ったことはとても残念なことだったが、フィリピンとその近隣パートナー諸国は将来の災害救援において学びがあったことを忘れてはならない。それは、ピースウィンズ・アメリカのイニシアチブによる分析で、自然災害に脆弱な諸国にとってすら、**リーダーシップ、災害管理フレームワークやベストポリシー、そしてそれらの実践こそが非常に有効な災害リスク低減ツール**となることを示しているからである。それらの手段は、インフラと技術に基づく減災アプローチをもはるかに凌ぐほど有効である。

これらの教訓を学び、そしてそれを実行に移すことが必須である。2014年1月に行われたワークショップにてマニュエル・ロペス駐日フィリピン大使はこの必要性を強調していた。

台風ヨランダ(台風ハイエンのフィリピンでの名称)は、そのクラスとして典型的な巨大さだったが、我々が恐れるのはそれが今後起こり得る「新状態(ニューノーマル)」の前触れかも知れないということである。我々が今経験しつつある気候変動において、今まで経験したことのないような災害が降りかかってくることを心配しながら、今後ニュースを見つめなければならない…今回の災害で苦難に見舞われている地域が再建されるように援助している最中も、フィリピン政府としてはより大きな注意を気候変動の影響を低減する努力に向け、このワークショップが指摘するような防災対策の強化を図らなければならないだろう。そして、回復力の増強、災害リスクの低減や救援管理は、頑健な災害対応を達成する上でますます重要になってくるだろう。

台風や津波のリスクに曝される国々は、防波堤のような高価なインフラ設備を持たなければ、天災に振り回されるだけだという必然性はない。そのようなインフラ設備はそれなりの価値はあるものの、基本的な防災対策や救援戦略に比べればせいぜい2番手の重要性しかない。フィリピンはこれらの戦略の価値を目に

見える形で示した。例えば、台風ハイエンの最中にタクロバン市で発生した人命の膨大な損失の原因としては、フィリピン大気、地球物理および天文学サービス行政局が暴風雨の高まりを予想しきれなかった要因はその一部に過ぎない。それと同程度の責任が、恐怖、遠慮および誤解のせいで退避に踏み切らなかった地元の市民や、退避の必要性を伝えなかった地元の政府機関にある。したがって台風ハグピット時の退避の成功は、予想能力の技術的改良がその理由ではなく、むしろ国家および地方政府が改善された退避計画を実施した結果である。

台風ハイエンを通して本イニシアチブで学んだ最も重要な教訓は、**有能なリーダーシップと徹底した災害管理フレームワークの組合せの必要性**であろう。強いリーダーシップの欠けたフレームワークは十分に機能しない。そのようなフレームワークでは、十分にまたは着実に実施することが不可能であり、救助活動は支離滅裂な、ばらばらなものとなってしまふ。そのシナリオにおいては、地元の執行者、個々の部門、およびNGOのような支援対応を行うアクターが、不統一に勝手に動いてしまうだろう。逆に、管理フレームワークが無い場合、強いリーダーが身動きできなくなってしまう、無理に対応しようとして場当たり的な指示を下すことになってしまう。災害が広範囲に渡った場合、異なるリーダーたちがそれぞれ勝手な手法を採用すると、全国レベルで統一された対応をすることが不可能になる。

台風ハイエンの場合、**重要な各ポストに有能なリーダー**がいたことが鍵となった。それらのリーダーとしては、タクロバン空港にいたフィリピン海軍のロイトリニダッド大佐、DFAヨランダ・アクション・センターにいたロイ・デヴェラターダ次官補、およびセブ・マクタン地域にいた彼のOCDの同僚、およびMNCC-マニラ基地のラファエル・マリアーノ提督が挙げられる。これらのリーダーたちに共通していたのは、文官・武官、フィリピンまたは外国、政府またはNGOなどの区別を問わず、様々な分野の責任者たちの能力をうまく統合する力を持っていたことである。彼らは災害管理における核心的存在、例えばインシデント・コマンド・システムやクラスター・システムについて詳しい人物たちだった。彼らには情報とニーズの評価を求め、それに従って優先順位を付ける能力があった。彼らの管理に共通した特徴は、刻々と変化する判断、人的資源、および状況に直面して、柔軟性を保ち得る能力であった。彼らは決

断においては威厳を保ち、しかも部下の人心掌握が必要であることを知っていた。

災害管理は、最も被災地に近い地元レベルから取り扱われねばならず、有能なリーダーシップはまずそのレベルで発揮される必要がある。「政治は地元が基本」というルールは、災害管理に於いても同じで、指示は地元からスタートする。フィリピン人はその点で模範的である。バランガイ(フィリピンの最小地方自治単位の名称)キャプテンまたは首長は責任を持つリーダーである。災害が二つまたは三つの地区にまたがっている場合、次のレベルの責任者(例えば知事)が責任を負う。NDRARM計画は地方自治体、市単位の地自体、および県や州単位の自治体の各レベルのリーダーの責任を明確に定めていた。訓練並びに実務体験を通じて、多くの首長がリーダーシップ技能を磨いていた。内務省および地方政府と国防省は、例えば国連、JICA、USAID、さらにはPWAまで含む外国の機関の援助により更に洗練される余地が残っていたにせよ、災害管理訓練においてかなりな進歩を実現していた。

ひとたび災害が州のレベルまでくると、国が適切な地方のリーダーを選任する責任を負うことになる。地方レベルにおいては、災害リーダーシップは前もって決められていることは稀であり、実際の選択範囲に応じて決められる。フィリピンの経験が示すところによれば、最善のリーダーは、誰がどの組織に属しているかよりも、誰が緊急事態の管理能力が最も高いかで決められるべきである。文官か武官、国の役人か地方政府の役人のいずれかに拘わらず、地方の司令官は、管理する地域の運営に統一された指令体系を適用し、命令系統の部下全体を掌握できなければならない。彼らは台風ハイエンの時に慎重に指揮司令官として選ばれたフィリピン人リーダーであり、フィリピン軍の将軍に成功をもたらした因子である。また、フィリピンは地方の災害管理に関するその経験を近隣国に共有する努力をするべきである。それは重大な災害において地方レベルでの特徴的な態様において、また民軍間のプロセスに関して、隣国の教育上、大いに役立つからだ。

過去の災害における対処を検討する上で、失敗と成功は、急速に変化する状況に対処して下されるリーダーの決定に依存する。この能力は、変化しつつある状況の正確なアセスメント力、資源と労働力の理解力、責任と柔軟性、および地方と全国における対応システムに関する知識に基づいている。米国および日本は共

に、甚大な災害に遭って国としての対応で不十分な結果を経験している。しかし、米国および日本は共に、これらの基本的な鍵とは、リーダーシップ、災害管理フレームワークや対応システム、およびベストプラクティスの実施の必要性を認識していることである。

効果的な災害対応は災害管理フレームワークの国別評価の根拠となる。国の災害管理センターは東南アジア全体にわたりほぼ同等であるが、その目標、能力、および実行指針においてかなりの差がある。防災対策と救援フレームワークの改善を考察するためにPWAはトレーニングとケーススタディを分析し国家の災害管理当局のいくつかの要因を取り上げている。

フィリピンにおける災害のアセスメントでは、**フレームワークに対するいかなるレベルでの同意**が最も重要であることが分った。フィリピンのNDRRM計画の下では、同じ基本的な手段と対応処置があらゆるレベルで適用されている。このようなシステムは真に強固な災害管理を実現することができる、ただし、リーダーと部局が対応のためのフレームワークを理解し、受け入れることがその条件となる。かくして、フィリピンにおいては、このプロセスは**バランガイ**のリーダーから始まり、続いて市長、次に州知事、さらに広域の指揮司令官、そして最後にNDRRMCという段階が設けられている。各ステップにおいて、リーダーはその責任と決定権限を理解し、損害およびニーズのアセスメントを如何にして次々と転嫁すべきか、さらに特定の支援を要求すべきかを認識しなければならない。このシステムの具体的な詳細はフィリピン独特なものだが、基本理念は広く適用することができる。

2012年における台風ボファ(地元名パブロ)は、このスケーラビリティ(プロセスの拡張性)がなぜ重要かを知る上で適当な実例となる。この台風はミンダナオの中央を横切った。これはフィリピンの台風として非常に稀な例であるので、コンポステラ・バレーとダバオ・オリエンタル州は全く防災準備がされていなかった。この場合、災害管理は迅速に、州単位から広域単位へ、そして更に国レベルまで広げて行かなければならなかった。フィリピンのシステムは、ローカル・リーダーシップの制度を捨てることなく、リーダーシップと災害管理責任の上向きの連鎖を見通して計画されていること、正にその故に強固なのである。高い拡張性とはローカル

レベルから国家レベルまでの柔軟な対応が敏速に可能なシステムであるといえる。

過去20年間にわたってASEAN諸国ではフィリピンにおける州や市などの地方自治体に次から次へと責任とアカウンタビリティを委譲して来ていた故に、このフィリピンの例は大変重要なのである。この権限委譲には、防災対策と救援処置の両方の責任がそれに伴って移動する。これらの能力や力量は大きく異なる。それは、かなり強い能力を持つ者もいるが、多くの市や州レベルの行政官は救助活動能力が未熟であり、能力が弱い。そのような彼らにとって、防災対策と救助活動の最善の成功事例は役立つはずである。

フィリピン、国連、日本、米国、およびASEAN諸国にも、マネジメント訓練は大いに役立つはずである。フィリピンや日本の地方都市は、台風ハイエンや2011年の東北地方太平洋沖地震の津波の時に実証された相互援助協定の便宜と価値を披露することができる。協調活動、民軍協力、予備配置や倉庫保管、およびメガ災害(最悪事態シナリオ)計画を含む様々な広範囲の防災対策は、ASEAN地域の村や町レベル、市レベル、および州レベルなどの各レベルの地方自治体政府にとって更なる訓練として学ぶべきものが少なくないだろう。

個別の国家的救助対策に的を絞ったのは国連としては賢い選択だったろうが、さらに地方自治体政府に的を絞り、協力メカニズム、およびクラスター・システムに訓練の範囲を広げることも可能である。人道主義的見地に立った場合、緊急事態に対して大変効果的であることが証明されたこの後者のシステムは、被災国から更に前向きの同意が得られたことで大幅な改善が実現した。フィリピンにおいて実証されたように、クラスターは被災国のリーダーシップが機敏に動き、国連機関やINGOだけでなく、国内の諸機関、NGO、および民間セクターなど、広範囲に適用されたときに最も良い効果を発揮する。同様に、ASEANおよびAHAセンターは、災害フレームワーク内のメンバー国に対して訓練、協力メカニズム、および市・州の地方自治体への防災対策や災害対応を提供することで、貴重な役割を果たすことができる。さらに、ASEANおよびAHAセンター、およびADMM+は、彼らが持つ資源をTORの促進およびICSやその他の類似協力メカニズムのパートナーの訓練に利用することで、貴重な役割を果たすことができる。(ADMM+HA/DRエクスパート・ワーキング・グループは現在、メンバー規約を検討中

である。)これら両多国間機構の場合、訓練は全体論的な災害管理を協調すべきであり、それによって地方自治体が彼ら自身の災害を管理するだけでなく、地方および国立のセンターの資源の適切な活用を可能にするように仕向けるべきである。

国連と日本はこの訓練を拡大し、改善に努力すべきである。米国防軍パートナーシップ・プログラムは拡大可能である。このパートナーシップは、災害時の民軍兵站支援、および緊急司令システムに関する拡大訓練を提供することができる。JICAおよびMOFA、並びにジャパン・プラットフォームを通じて、日本は公共・民間パートナーシップ、緊急援助および復興活動における民間セクターの利用、相互援助協定、およびコミュニティーベースの減災戦略に関する訓練を提供することができる。

日本、米国、およびASEANメンバー諸国は、フィリピンのフレームワークを最悪事態に対する計画に関するガイダンスとして検討すべきである。そのような計画は国別のレスポンス・フレームワークの中に組み入れられていなければならない。地方自治体の裁治権は助長されなければならないが、一方、国家には深刻な災害に対応する計画を持つように促さなければならない。新しいフィリピン国家災害対応計画の中の仮定シナリオはその良い例である。¹ 自動的ではないが、それは地方自治体が壊滅した場合の国家管理のメカニズムを規定している。最悪事態に対する計画は、ウエストバレー活断層大地震やスーパー台風などの予想される災害に対しては無くてはならないものである。ウエストバレー活断層地震がおきれば、マニラ市長は完全に外部との連絡が途切れるだろう。そのときには、疑いなく国際援助に支援された、国家の指揮の下における対応が必要になるだろう。近年は巨大な天災を経験していない諸国にとって、この計画が参考になることは疑いない。

フィリピンは、地方災害リスク対策および災害対応に関する最善事例についても近隣諸国に教示することができるだろう。2010年法(第5章参照)は5%の資金をDRR活動資金として準備しておくこと、そしてその30%は災害対応資金とすることを義務付けている。そのような国家的に義務付けられたメカニズムは他の近隣諸国においても必要であり、地方自治体の管理の改善も促すことになるだろう。同時に、NDRRMCは民間防衛局(DCD)を通じて地方

¹ フィリピン国政府、国立災害対処計画(National Disaster Response Plan Manila:GRP)、1-5。

自治体にそれらの資金の有効利用を義務付ける努力を拡大すべきである。最悪事態シナリオの計画を絶えず強調し、透明性に焦点を絞ることで、OCDとそのパートナーたちはローカルの防災レベルを大幅に向上させることができる。台風ボファの例に見るごとく、最悪事態シナリオの計画は誰も見たことの無いタイプ(例えばマニラ地震)、または誰も見たことの無い激しさ(例えば台風ボファ)の災害を含んでいるものでなければならない。

地域災害管理センターにとって、**統合調整メカニズムを実現することは重要である**。フィリピンは前述のインシデント・コマンド・システム(緊急司令システム、ICS)の採用を決定した。ICSは「緊急対応時の命令、指揮、調整に使用される組織上のツール」である。²元は米国森林局で開発されたものだが、現在では多方面の緊急対応部門で使用されている。その基本的概念が採用される限り、実際にインシデント・コマンド・システムそのものが採用されるか否かは、重要ではない。共通の組織構造のなかで運営される施設、設備、人員、手順、およびコミュニケーションの組合せから得られる統一的な管理である。日本、米国、またはASEANメンバー国において、災害時における調整のための何らかの統一システムが政府の全てのレベルにおいて採用されるべきか、拡張性があるか、可能か否かは別の問題であるそれは全面的に採用が必要であり、民政部門および軍部のリーダーの両方に等しく教えられるべきである。この領域に於いて、フィリピンはコマンド・システムの選択とその全国的な実施に関して最良の実施例を提示することができる。

米国災害管理センターは省庁間連絡機関であり、民政部門または国内軍部の代表も含む者とする。³このようなリンクとなる機関が無いと、省庁のいずれかが当センターをバイパスし、自分勝手な「フリーランス」が横行することになってしまう。これらのセンターは災害時において(自らのスタッフまたは他の部門から)司令官を選択し、指名する権限を与えられなければならない。最後に、**これらの国家災害管理センターは災害軽減、防災対策、および救援計画をローカルレベルから国家レベルまで教え込み、訓練するための予算、スタッフ、および専門的技術を持つべきだ**。特に地理的に分

² 米国運輸省一連邦道路管理局、「用語集Simplified Guide to the Incident Command System for Transportation Professionals (運輸業者のためのICSの簡便ガイド)」, 2015年5月20日アクセスによる http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/ics_guide/glossary.htm

³ NDRRM評議会とそのオペレーションセンターはここで民政部門と軍部、さらに民間とを隙間無く結合する主要な事例である。第II章参照。

散度が高い国家(例えばインドネシアまたはマレーシア)については、首都だけに存在する災害専門技術では不十分である。市長や州知事らは彼らの地域における災害を管理するための能力を与えられていなければならない。

国立災害管理センターの領域において、フィリピンは再びリーダーの役を務めている。NDRRMC(前組織であったNDCCから必要に応じて更新された組織)は民政部門・軍部両方から認められた唯一の強固なセンターであり、継続的な改善努力を続けている称賛すべき存在である。その継続的な再検討プロセスおよび新しい災害対策計画、たとえば、Hydro-Met National Disaster Response Plan(水害・気候災害全国対応計画はそのような努力から生まれている。

コ・ロケーション(司令部および調整部の統括)のメリットは、すでにケーススタディの分析で明らかにされている。国立災害対策フレームワークと管理センターは、この変数を偶然や場当たりの決定に任してはならない。**コ・ロケーション(co-location)は、軍部が災害対応のロジスティクス業務を他の部局と分担する場合は、特に必要である。**合同訓練と演習は民軍インターフェースの改善に役立つ一方で、災害時のコロケーションとしての司令部や調整部の代替となるものは何もない。コロケーション施設は、努力統合と重複削減を促進するだけでなく、応答者(司令に従う者)のそれぞれに彼らの得意分野に集中して従事させるのに役立つ。合同作業が行われないところでは、不適切な作業配分が生じる可能性がある。これは軍隊が本来得意な特殊作業、たとえば、残骸の後片付け作業や生存者の捜索や救出の代わりに、「小売り作戦」(すなわち、救援物資の支給作業)に従事するなどの形態をとることもあることを意味する。

台風ハイエンの去った後、フィリピンは隣国の援助隊を指揮して統合されたロジスティクス・チェーンの利点を活用する十分な準備ができていた。彼らが展開した「ハブ・アンド・スポーク(hub and spokes)」モデルは、ヴィラモアとセブ・マクタン地域をハブとして使った救出作戦において目覚ましい成果を挙げた。日本と米国(2011年の東北地方太平洋沖地震の津波の時に同様なシステムを活用した)と協力することで、フィリピンはこの知識を外に共有することができるだろう。これは対象地域が広大な、インドネシアやマレーシアには格別優れた価値を提供するであろう。

災害における**比較優位**という概念は、国内対応の垣根を越えて展開される。一部の応答者、たとえば米国軍人は、彼らのユニークな能力に関連して対応策を考えることに長けている。しかし、外国の対応者が彼らの得意な技能を生かすためには、被災国と外国の対応者の両方にそのための準備が必要である。被災国の当局は主な外国のパートナーの詳細な最新の能力リストを、災害が発生する前に渡されていなければならない。対応者は、双方のパートナー、ASEANのメンバー国、国連機関、および主要NGOなどから構成されていなければならない。

能力を簡単に伝えるためには、Terms of Reference (業務指示書、TOR)が便利である。TORが国の災害管理センターにあれば、当局が特定の、適切な救援要請を発行する上で役立つ。それらの書類は二者間文書であり、何ら拘束条件を含んでいないので、既存の契約やプロトコル、例えばASEAN SASOP、多国軍SOPと完全に適合する。TOR文書の利点は、それらが迅速で高度に特殊な支援を簡単にすることにある。現地にいる災害管理者が、たとえば、航空管制、垂直リフト、または浄水化などのニーズを指摘すると、被災国はブランケットリクエストを発行し、それが充たされるのを待つのではなく、直接既知のパートナーに連絡することができる。

フィリピンとASEANメンバー国にとっては、軍隊の対応で感じる恐れをTORが和らげてくれるため受け入れやすい。訪問米軍協定(VFA)を持たない国は、災害における軍隊の支援を辞退したり、尻込みする傾向がある(2008年にサイクロン・ナルギスに襲われたミャンマーの場合など)。TORは各被災国が災害時に派遣される資源と人員を十分に吟味することを確実にする。彼らは事前にこれらの資源を吟味して承認し、出国の条件と日時やその他を設定し、主権の安全条件を確保することができる。米軍と日本の自衛隊は、災害時における彼らの圧倒的な優越性の故に、そのような展開は当該地域国にとって絶対に有利である。二国間業務指示書(TOR)文書がもたらす価値を論証することによりフィリピンは諸国を主導すべきである。

東南アジア諸国は現在大規模な軍隊同志の演習を行っている。通常は米国とのパートナーシップにより行われるこれらの演習には、フィリピンのバリカタン(Balikatan)、タイ国コブラゴールド(Cobra Gold)、およびマレーシアのケリスストライク(Keris Strike)などが含まれる。これらの演習には何千人もの兵士が参加する。彼

らが注目するのはもちろん軍事演習であるが、今では全てが災害または人道的な要素を中心としている。これらの演習は調和と互いの結び付きを築き、共同作戦、戦場相互活動の可能性、コミュニケーション、およびロジスティクス業務のオーバーラップ、および統合司令の練習を可能にするものである。

一方、これらの演習の限界についても理解しておかなければならない。一部は他の諸国、民政機関、国連系団体、またはNGOを含む場合があるが、それは通常限定的である。通常は軍人以外の参加者はオブザーバーである。軍人の参加者数が絶対的に多いために、民軍協調に関する十分な相互訓練は無理であり、地元の民間人主導の対応テクニックに真に焦点を絞ることはできない。これらの大規模演習は人道的構成要素が維持されるべきであるが、問題となる諸国は彼らの民軍HA/DR訓練を拡大すべきで、PWAが提供する訓練はスケールが小さく、軍人と非軍人の比率が同等なのが特徴である。PWAは文民の災害対応の必要性を強調する一方で、軍人の主要な役割を認めている。PWAの提供するトレーニングは、包括的、協調的、また小規模NGOからのリーダー、広範囲の政府機関、主要な国連機関、民間セクター、および近隣諸国からの参加者を支持している。ASEAN諸国にとって、小規模で、費用があまりかからない、そのような訓練は、コブラゴールドのような演習に対する補完となり得る。

日本と米国：同盟を強化し、HA/DRパートナーシップの強化

2011-2013に実施された日・米民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブにおいて、PWAは日米安全保障の再生が海外HA/DR作戦のために近い将来大いに期待できることを見出した。日米は定期的な軍民演習を通じて、また、東日本大震災における協働支援を通じて相互協力を実証してきた。当時の在東京米国大使館の大使代理カート・トング氏がPWAの実施したワークショップに参加したさいに述べたように、「当地域に対する協力の寄与の最も明瞭な様相の1つは我々の人道的支援と災害救援における協力である。」さらに、両国は人道的支援と災害救援から大きな利得を得ることができる。

2011-2013のイニシアチブにおいて指摘されたように、日米両国は海外での災害対応においてそれぞれ独自に優れた能力を

持っているにも関わらず、相互運用機能、情報共有、および合同意思決定に関する彼らのメカニズムには不足がある。防衛大学校の山口元陸将は1997年「日米防衛協力のための指針」において平時における二国間調整メカニズムの創立の必要性について言及した。しかしながら、そのようなメカニズムの構築は遅れており、「両国政府の出し遅れた宿題」となっている。と山口元陸将は述べている。⁴特に、東日本大震災においては両国の民軍共同の対策が見事だっただけに、その教訓を生かせなかったことは機会の喪失と言うべきである。⁵

PWAの日・米・フィリピン・イニシアチブでの訓練、フォーラム、および研究において、両国の能力が低下しつつあるという事実は無いが、**協力的な対応のための両国の能力発揮はまだ不十分であると言える**。台風ハイエンに対する日米の対応の評価によれば、フィリピンにおいて主として非重複行動と対応手段がとられたことが示されている。当初、陸上自衛隊は米国海兵隊の支援を得てフィリピン側とつながり、協力を行った。が、それ以降のHA/DR活動はほぼ独立的に行われた。協力が行われた例、たとえば、海上自衛隊がMV-22オスプレイの護衛艦「いせ」への着艦を許したこと、陸上自衛隊が連絡将校を米海軍空母ジョージワシントンに派遣したこと、などもあったが、これらは主として戦術的なものであり、戦略的パートナーシップではない。

米国と日本の海外災害対応を完全に固定化してしまうことは、政治的または法律的に、現実的ではない。それぞれの国は、被災国によって独立的に要請され、独自の方針、特有な可能行動、およびケース・バイ・ケースに行われる一連の決定、たとえば軍事アセットの配備命令、などに従って導かれなければならない。にもかかわらず、ひとたび被災国が両国に要請を行った後、両国は重複を排除し、共有する機能とそれぞれ得意な能力を最大限に利用して作戦の合理化を実施することができることをPWAはこのイニシアチブから学んだ。

日米合同災害救援の協働はニーズ・アセスメントの段階からスタートさせることができる。台風ハグピットへの対応を例とする

⁴ ジョン・エーレンフェルドおよびチャールズ・アーネンソン共著、同盟の強化：アジア太平洋地域におけるHA/DR 協力 (Seattle:PWA, 2013 / .204)

⁵ 自衛隊(元)陸相山口昇氏は、「日米同盟の強化―日米民軍防災対策構想の提案と知見」2013年7月25日東京において、以下のように述べている。



米国海軍ヒュー・ウェザルド少将と統合任務部隊指揮官、海自第4護衛隊群司令 佐藤寿紀海将補。海上自衛隊ヘリコプター搭載護衛艦「いせ」に乗艦し握手を交わす。台風ハイヤンでの両国間における協働支援活動は将来のHA/DR任務は模範となるだろう。(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Cansin Hardyegritag/Released.)

と、日本側は合同民軍アセスメントチームのコンセプトを、重要なステップとして理解した。同時に、日本側チームとその相手である USAID および PACOM からの米国側チームは緊急連絡網のメカニズムを構築するべきである。災害の初期においては、重要なアセスメントの必要性、例えばヘリコプターが限られているなどといった初期評価は、その特性として大まかなものであり、よって生じた損害とニーズの大まかな情報を提供することを目的に設計されているので、日米両国政府にとって総合的な初期評価が得られればその目的を達成することができる。共有された評価は次に、JICA や USAID のような機関を動かして、直ちに陸上での情報共有、C-130 の共同運行、および陸上での対応地域の計画のよロジスティクスの戦略を開始可能にする。したがって、台風ハイエンの場合では、陸上自衛隊をセブ地区からもっと被害がひどいサマール/レイテ地域へ移動させるような無駄を省くことができる。ニーズ・アセスメントは単なる情報文書であり、それは日米いずれの対応者に対しても特定の行動をとることを約束させるものではない。

しかしながら、それは日米の共同作戦を強化するための機会を被災国に対して提供するものである。

ロジスティクス領域において、**日米両国は地上における協力を大幅に改善することができる**。日本がその軍事アセット、例えば駆逐艦/ヘリコプター母艦、ホーバークラフト、およびC-130を利用することに積極的であることは、日本が自然に米国のパートナーとなることを意味している。海上自衛隊はその自衛艦隊を日本の防衛のための指揮本部であるだけでなく、民軍関連機関のための合同協力センターとして利用するように訓練すべきである。(これらの関連機関には下平一等海佐が提案したように、NGOも含めるべきである)この機能は米国海軍空母打撃群が持つものと同等なもの出あり、可能性としては合同国際民軍協力への道を開くものである。フィリピンやインドネシアのような列島国家においては、そのような機能はHA/DRの結果に格段な改善をもたらし得るものである。

同時に、自衛隊においても、中央即応集団(CRF)を先頭に、地上での調整能力の強化をするべきである。また、CRFは次の二つの分野に焦点を絞るべきである。第一に、合同指揮および管理組織を提供するために、CRFは自衛隊の全部門と密接な協働体制の設立と維持が必要である。そして陸自、海自またはCRFのトップの指揮官たちは、単一の戦略司令部を設立するために災害現場に集結すべきである。そうすると、戦術的条件(たとえば、艦艇から陸地まで物資を輸送するための海自のヘリコプター)以外には、この中央司令部は米国の同僚との間にハイレベルの通信回線を設置し、自己の権威を利用して共同戦略の分担と担当領域を決定することができる。第二に、CRFは被災国の民政・軍部の各当局とCRF自身との協力関係を改善すべきである。それにより、その国独特の災害協力メカニズムおよび適切な意思決定者に対して綿密なトレーニングが確保されるからだ。平時からリエゾン・オフィサー(連絡官)をフィリピン軍および民間防衛局(DCD)に送り込んでおくことは、災害時において最も効果的であろう。

上記に勧告した協力の法的根拠とプラットフォームは、最終的には日米相互協力および安全保障条約に基づくものであるが、より具体的には日米防衛協力のための指針に基づくものである。これらの指針は2015年4月15日に更新されており、日米間での海外におけるHA/DR協力のための委任された権限を並べたものである。

大規模な人道主義的および自然的災害が発生した場合に、それに関心をもつ政府または国際機関からの要請に応じて両国が行う人道主義的支援/災害救助(HR/DR)作戦を実施する場合、両国政府は共同支援を提供するために適切な方法で密接に協力し、参加する米国軍隊と日本国自衛隊の間の相互運用機能を最大化する。協力活動には、共同ロジスティクス支援とオペレーションの調整、計画、および実行が含まれる。⁶

防衛協力のための指針はさらに、日米防衛協力はまた、平和維持、訓練および演習、ロジスティクス、情報活動、海上警備、およびパートナーの能力向上を含むことができると述べている。指針はHA/DR協力の重要な基礎であるが、それは特定なメカニズムまたは手順を指定するものではない。したがって、合衆国国防省、合衆国太平洋軍(PACOM)、自衛隊、防衛省、合衆国国際開発庁(USAID)および合衆国務省、外務省およびJICAがそれらの具体的な内容を設定する義務を負う。HA/DR協力に関する全ての討議は、特有な可能行動の種類を含み、その可能行動の拡張の可能性を討議すること。現在では、重量物リフト、医療、および浄水に限定されているが、自衛隊はその他の様々な可能行動、特にエンジニアリングにおける能力の可能性を秘めている。

これらの部門が共同HA/DR作戦を設定し、精緻なものとする一方で、民政部門もこのプロセスに十分な代表者を送り込んでいなければならない。自衛隊と米国軍部の間の協力は既に非常に強固なものとなっているが、災害対応においては、彼らは理論的にはそれぞれ外務省およびUSAID/国務省の指示に従わなければならない。密接なHA/DR戦略を促進するように設計された訓練、演習、および方針はこの点を念頭においていなければならない。災害を生じた国に合同作戦センターを設置するための訓練を実施することが望ましいステップの1つである。そのようなセンターは被災国の首都の近くに置かれ、日米両国の主要な対応部局からのリーダーを含まなければならない。被災国内に置かれた唯一の調整点からは東京およびワシントンの各部局へのリンクが張られることによって、地上の相互運用機能が大幅に改善される。戦略としては、日米両国はこのセンターを被災国の協力センターと共に合同で設置し、対応活動と国際支援の提供の合理化を図らなければならない。

日本は米国との協力のパターンを改善する一方で、東南アジアにおける自国のHA/DRに対する信用を補強しつつある。ASEAN防

⁶ 日本国政府、日米防衛協力のための指針 (GOJ:2015年4月27日、東京)、20。

衛大臣会議プラス(ADMM+)のHA/DR専門家によるワーキング・グループの共同議長として、日本は日本特有の能力を有効に利用する上で非常に有利な立場にある。現在そのワーキング・グループは3つの分野に焦点を絞っている。国際HA/DR支援に関する法律的な問題を検討し、机上および現場の訓練演習を設計して、民軍SOPを創立すること賢い副会長MODは、多国籍軍(MNF)SOPまたはASEAN待機協定およびSOP(SASOP)のような既存のガイドラインを補強するが、それらと重複しないようなSOPを作ろうとしている。MODによれば、そのアプローチは、手順、情報共有、軍隊間協力、および相乗効果調停に焦点を絞って、「全ての既存のHA/DR可能行動における相乗効果の必要性を強調する」ことである。⁷

ADMM+を介しての防衛省の努力は外務省/JICAの進行中の能力構築構想によって合理化されるべきJICAは地上に於いてはその存在感を示している—例えばフィリピンにおけるOCDが、JICAはMODおよびADMM+から出現する新たなSOPおよびベストプラクティスを伝達することができる。こうしてASEAN諸国は、激しい災害の中でさらに完全に日本と活動する準備が整えられる。特に近年巨大な天災を経験していない国、例えばベトナムにとって、防災対策段階のこの情報はその国が緊急対策段階に遭遇した時にその国の要求を大幅に改善する結果となり得る。日本はこの領域においてリーダーシップを発揮する可能性を強く持っており、自国の対応者、例えばJICA、自衛隊、ジャパン・プラットフォームが統一的な一貫性のあるメッセージを東南アジアの近隣諸国に発するように努力すべきである。

一方で、日本と米国は二国間業務指示書(TOR)を作成することによってASEAN近隣諸国を大いに支援することができる。両国は被災国家だけでなく、支援関連者たちに対してもよりよい取り決めを提供することができる。軍部の対応は高価につくものである。2004年のインド洋津波に対する米軍の対応は1日当たり600万ドルかかった。⁸TORによって、日米両国はそれぞれの特徴を生かすことが可能になり、戦力にならない大量の部隊を派遣するなどといった無駄を避けることができる。このようにして、TORは必要な人材や資材を速やかに入手し、一方では被災国の主権に関

⁷ 石原雄介、防衛省、Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 19 December 2014における発言

⁸ Bruce A. Elleman (ブルース・ラーマン、Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 23.

する懸念を最小限度に抑え、PACOMまたは自衛隊に対する費用の有効性を向上させることができる。

日本と米国は共同で、または単独に防災対策への公約をフィリピン、並びにASEAN地域向けに言明している。日本はJICAを通じた活動を拡大しつつ、ODAに軍事力の貢献を含むように改訂が行われている。米国は太平洋に向けた「リバランス」の歩みを急ピッチで行っている。両国は揃って彼らの戦略的提携の支柱としての人道的援助と災害援助に公約している。

一部のオブザーバーには、HA/DR以外にもっと緊急なニーズのある日米協力の形態が見えるかもしれない。南シナ海領域の地政学的対立または朝鮮半島における非核化問題が2国間における災害救助の障害となるかもしれない。しかしそれでも、HA/DRはこの二つの同盟国の重要かつ長期的な親密な協力とパートナーシップの根源となる可能性を持っている。木原誠二(元)外務省政務官の言葉によれば、「様々な利害関係者が関与しているPWAプログラムは日米間の協力を強化し、それによってこの領域の平和と安定に寄与する。」他の地域的優先事項の重要性を減じることなく、HA/DRは膨大な価値を持つ軍事と民軍協力の形態を構築している。この領域に災害の脅威が今まで以上に明奇なりつつある今こそ、日米は海外における災害対策や災害救援活動において、持続性のある、ダイナミックでそして効果的なパートナーシップ関係を保つことを再度宣言すべきである。



THE JAPAN-U.S.-PHILIPPINES CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE

The strong disaster capabilities of Japan and the U.S. have been demonstrated in many recent natural disasters. These allies and partners stand well prepared to lead the Asia Pacific in preparedness and response. In this Report the NGO Peace Winds America explores how the two nations can even further enhance their cooperation with each other and with the Philippines.

Peace Winds America has examined the response to Typhoon Haiyan, focusing on disaster frameworks, leadership, and coordination mechanisms. The Report offers best practices, lessons learned, and training suggestions to strengthen disaster preparedness and response. The recommendations offer guidance for the three nations trilaterally, for the Japan-U.S. strategic alliance, and for ASEAN and its member-states.

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