

Strengthening the Alliance

HA/DR Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

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The Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative

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Front cover photo: A U.S. Navy MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter from USNS *Niagara Falls* delivers stores to the Royal Australian Navy amphibious transport ship HMAS *Kanimbla*, during tsunami relief operations off the coast of Indonesia, January 2005 (Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence).

Back cover photos from left to right: Children in Indonesia give thumbs up to USAID/OFDA staff after a delivery of clean water following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami (U.S. Agency for International Development); A team from the 15 Brigade, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, gathers for instruction on Kadena Air Base, Japan, before heading to Tohoku to provide relief (Photo by 18th Wing Public Affairs / Senior Airman Sara Csurilla, 16 March 2011); Japan civilian and military responders search tsunami wreckage in Sukuiso, Iwate Prefecture (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Dylan McCord/Released).

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Preface

The U.S. and Japan have long been friends aiding each other and serving neighbors in the Asia-Pacific. Japan peacekeeping missions and U.S. disaster relief efforts illustrate their commitment to the public good of the Asia-Pacific. Such efforts are needed now more than ever, as the threat of natural disasters in Asia grows ever more pronounced.

These stalwart allies together can render a profound service. Over the past ten years there have been numerous instances of Japan-U.S. humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) teamwork: in Utapao and Aceh (the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami), in the 2009 Pakistan floods, and in 2010 Haiti earthquake. The Japan-U.S. partnership following the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami was exceptional, anchored on the deep friendship and commitment to assist each other in times of need. The Japan Self-Defense Forces performed superbly on 3/11, demonstrating its ability to operate and persevere in a chaotic situation replicating the worst damage that any enemy could inflict. The rapid response of the U.S. “illustrated that a friend in need is a friend indeed” in the words of a senior Japanese official and colleague. Our two nations have reached a turning point. They have demonstrated their readiness to move forward as equals, cooperating not just on economics and traditional security, but also in the provision of this public good for the Asia-Pacific.

Peace Winds America (PWA) recognizes the tremendous capabilities of Japan and the U.S., especially when they partner. Yet the HA/DR expertise that Japan and the U.S. have developed over the years needs continued refining. Policies, mandates, procedures, connections—all need to be strengthened.

The awareness of this HA/DR capacity, as well as a concern for the most vulnerable Asia-Pacific nations, led PWA to establish the Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative. The two-year program focused on strengthening the capacities of Japan-U.S. HA/DR. PWA workshops, forums, and interviews included and empowered all stakeholders, including governments, militaries, NGOs, businesses, and multilaterals. The program was designed to improve the communications, connectivity, and collaboration among the Japan and U.S. HA/DR providers and at large in the region.

Partnering in times of natural disasters has tested the Japan-U.S. relationship. Both have passed the test. Still much work remains to improve our disaster response and humanitarian assistance cooperation at all levels. The role of civilian government agencies must be expanded, codified, and practiced. Our militaries must learn to work collaboratively with non-governmental organizations, the

private sector and regional multilaterals, particularly the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), now emerging as an HA/DR asset.

Peace Winds America has stepped forward to advance this critical task. Its Civil-Military Initiative is an excellent start. The policy and procedural recommendations for Japan and the U.S. must be addressed with participation of government officials.

The work of “whole of society” Japan-U.S. cooperation must continue and expand. Making the most of this opportunity will strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance and permeate into other areas of cooperation. This is a natural regional and global mission and role for the strong Japan-U.S. partnership. The benefits – a stronger alliance and a region more prepared for natural disasters – are worth the effort.

Lieutenant General W. C. Gregson, USMC (Ret.)
Nokesville, VA
April 2013

Acknowledgements

Numerous people and organizations have ensured the success of the Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative and this Report. Thanks to our superb supporters we have been able to review and research numerous case studies and key HA/DR stakeholders, to conduct workshops, forums, meetings, and interviews, and to publish this Report, **Strengthening the Alliance—HA/DR Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific**.

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Several institutions helped ensure the success of the Initiative through contribution of facilities, logistics, staff, and invaluable expertise. The U.S. Embassy/Tokyo (Ambassador John Roos, Richard Bakewell, Paul Lewis, Rob Luke, Tyrone Fernandez, Joe Young); the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Dr. Mike Green, Eri Hirano), The Tokyo Foundation (Tsuneo Watanabe, Takaaki Asano); The Nippon Foundation; and, Peace Winds Japan (Kensuke Onishi, Rika Yamamoto, Tetsuto Binnaka, Maki Tateishi, and many hard-working volunteers).

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The Report was strengthened by the excellent writing of Tsuneo Watanabe (The Tokyo Foundation) and General Noboru Yamaguchi (National Defense Academy). PWA wishes to recognize the contributions of James Schoff (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Stacey White (Independent), and Richard Gibson, plus the thorough work of our publishers at the National Bureau of Asian Research, Jessica Keough and Jonathan Walton.

More than 200 participants participated in the workshops and forums, interviews, and follow-up meetings. Without them, the Civil-Military Initiative would not have been possible. They have been the decision makers and “boots on the ground” in disasters in the Asia-Pacific, providing best practices, lessons learned, and making recommendations for better preparedness and response.

PWA wishes to highlight the contributions and participation of: The Diet of Japan (Councillor Masahisa Sato, Representative Shinjiro Koizumi, Representative Mieko Nakabayashi); Cabinet Office (Masakatsu Okamoto, Shoichi Hasegawa); Ministry of Defense (Taro Yamato, Yutaka Sekito, Lt. Col. Hiroyuki Kanemura, Major Katsuyuki Sugimoto, Yoshimitsu Morihoro, and Shinji Soeda); Japan International Cooperation Agency (Kae Yanagisawa, Masahiro Taniguchi); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Funakoshi Takehiro, Isao Miyatake, Yukio Yoshii); Japan National Defense Academy (Col. Nozomu Yoshitomi); Fire and Disaster Management Agency (Atsushi Koresawa); ADRC (Kiyoshi Natori); JPF (Noriyuki Shiina); AAR (Kiyoshi Onishi); IFRC; Sojitz Corporation (Yukio Tada); U.S. Department of Defense (David Helvey, Jeff Wiltse); U.S. Forces Japan (General Burton Field, General W. Blake Crowe, Daren Epstein); III MEF (Lt. Col. Michael Curtin, Lt. Col. Michael Pelak); U.S. Navy (Cdr. John Bradford, Ted Shaw); U.S. Department of State (James Zumwalt, Mark Knapper, Ray Greene); USAID (Al Dwyer, Mark Bartolini, Jon Brause, Steve Catlin); Booz Allen Hamilton (Jeff Hensel); ROK Ministry National Defense (Hong-ghi Choi, Col. Tae-Whan Kwon, Lt. Col. Jong-soon Kim); ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Taejin Kim, So Rie Lee); WFP (Kenro Oshidari, Samir Wanmali); UNOCHA (Sebastian Rhodes Stampa, Masaki Watabe); Puji Pujiono; IMC (Rabih Torbay, Kevin Noone, Yumi Terahata, Agron Ferati); and, Samaritan's Purse (Matt Swenson).

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In closing, we wish to acknowledge the people of Tohoku, Japan. Their resilience in the face of adversity and their response to the catastrophe of 3/11 is inspiring. They embody all the best qualities needed to weather a major natural disaster.

Executive Summary

The Peace Winds America Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative has targeted strengthening humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. and Japan anchor disaster preparedness and response in the increasingly vulnerable Asia-Pacific. Over a period of 18 months, Peace Winds America has trained over 200 participants representing the militaries, government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector, as well as the multilateral organizations and the disaster-prone nations. The PWA approach to improving HA/DR preparedness and response is to empower the “whole of society,” involving all stakeholders of the responding and the receiving nations. Improved cooperation, capabilities, and communication lead to more effective Japan-U.S. disaster preparedness and response.

PWA is urging Japan and the U.S. to fortify and operationalize the security alliance by focusing on improving HA/DR preparedness and response. The recent history of side-by-side response to Asia-Pacific disasters, particularly in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, has clearly demonstrated that the Japan-U.S. alliance is strong when activated. However, the alliance must not wait idly for the next call. Japan and the U.S. must continue to build on their HA/DR capacities, honed in the Tohoku disaster, and use their soft power to assist Asia-Pacific nations to be disaster prepared. Peace Winds America is confident that together Japan and the U.S. can serve the Asia-Pacific and strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

POLICY AND TRAINING IMPLICATIONS

- Japan and the U.S. must strengthen the Japan-U.S. security alliance, building upon their HA/DR capabilities to provide a “public good” for the Asia-Pacific.
- Japan and the U.S. must improve their HA/DR preparedness and response and assist other Asia-Pacific nations’ HA/DR capacities.
- Japan and U.S. HA/DR policies, procedures, and training must include the “whole of society” in preparedness and response.

Policy and Training Implications (continued)

- Japan and the U.S. must implement policy and procedural changes within the Defense and Foreign Affairs/State Departments (and assistance agencies) to strengthen civil-military coordination within and between both nations.
- All joint HA/DR training must include and empower the sovereign host nation, recognizing its pivotal and central role in preparedness, response, and recovery.
- MOFA, the JSDF, JICA, and Japan Platform can strengthen their overseas response with better mutual cooperation, expanded roles, reduced stove-piping, and increased civil-military training.
- Although the value of civil-military HA/DR cooperation is increasingly recognized, Japan-U.S. civil-military cooperation requires further clarification, guidelines, and training.
- Japan and the U.S. must establish a bilateral civilian-led HA/DR coordination and command center for overseas response.
- The Japan-U.S. HA/DR policies, procedures, agreements, and training must include the multilaterals, i.e., the UN (particularly UNOCHA and WFP), and ASEAN.
- Japan and U.S. HA/DR training must incorporate the private sector, capitalizing upon its significant capabilities for disaster response.

要旨

ピースウインズ・アメリカ(PWA)による「民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブ(Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative)」では、アジア太平洋地域における人道支援、災害救援活動(HA/DR)強化を目標に掲げてきた。日米両国は、脆弱性を増す同地域の災害支援対策、災害対応において、重大な役割を担っている。PWAは18ヶ月間にわたり、軍隊、政府機関、非政府組織(NGO)、民間セクターをはじめ、国際組織や災害多発国からの参加者200名以上に対して、訓練を実施した。PWAは、HA/DR支援対策・対応の向上策として、被災国および支援国すべての関係者を含む「社会全体(whole of society)」に力を与える、というアプローチをとっている。協力、能力そして調整力の向上という目標の先に、より効果的な日米災害支援対策・対応の道が拓ける。

PWAでは、HA/DR支援対策・対応の強化に焦点を当てることにより、日米両国に対して、安保体制の強化および活用を求めている。最近のアジア太平洋地域災害への対応、特に東日本大地震および津波に対する両国の連携を振り返ると、ひとたび活用されれば、日米同盟体制は強い力を発揮することが証明されてきた。しかし、次に有事が起こるまで、現状の日米同盟体制をそのままにしておいてよいわけではない。日米両国は、東日本大震災で培われたHA/DR能力、そして、アジア太平洋諸国の災害対策を支援してきたソフトパワーを今後一層高めていく必要がある。PWAは、日米両国は、共にアジア太平洋地域に貢献し、日米同盟を強化していくことが可能であると確信している。

方針および訓練の含意

- 日米両国は、日米安保体制を強化し、アジア太平洋地域の「公益(public good)」を提供するHA/DR能力を一層高めていかなければならない

方針および研修の含意(続き)

- 日米両国は、HA/DR支援対策および対応力を高め、他のアジア太平洋諸国のHA/DR能力の支援を行わなければならない
- 日米両国のHA/DR方針、手順、訓練においては、「社会全体」の支援対策および対応における「社会全体性」を考慮しなければならない
- 日米両国は、防衛、外務、国務に関わる各省(および支援機関)内部の方針および手順を改変し、両国内および両国間の民軍連携を強化しなければならない
- 支援対策、対応、復興において、被災国(host nation)が中心的役割を担うことを認識し、あらゆる共同HA/DR訓練において、主権を有する被災国を含め、また権限を与えなければならない
- 外務省、自衛隊、国際協力機構(JICA)、ジャパン・プラットフォームは、海外国との相互協力、役割範囲の拡大、情報の共有、民軍訓練の増加により、海外での対応力を強化できる
- 民軍HA/DR協力の有用性に関する認識は高まっているが、日米民軍協力には更なる明確化、指針、訓練が必要である
- 日米両国は、海外での対応に備え、文民主導による二国間HA/DR連携・指令センターを設立する必要がある
- 日米HA/DR方針、手順、合意、訓練には、国連(特に国連人道問題調整事務所(UNOCHA)および国連世界食糧計画(WFP))やASEANなどの国際機関を含めなければならない
- 日米HA/DR訓練には民間セクターを組み入れ、その優れた災害対応能力を十分に活用しなければならない

List of Acronyms

AADMER	Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
ACSA	Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM+	ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus
ADRC	Asian Disaster Reduction Center
AHA Center	ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance
APAN	All Partners Access Network
APC-MADRO	Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN + 3	ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BACC	Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell
BAKORNAS	National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (Indonesia)
BCC	Bilateral Coordination Center
BCP	Business Continuity Plan
BNPB	National Disaster Management Agency (Indonesia)
CBIRF	Chemical Biological Incident Response Force
CCC	Combined Coordination Center
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
CNAS	Center for New American Security
CNN	Cable News Network
COE	Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
COP	Common Operational Picture
CRF	Central Readiness Force (Japan)
CSBA	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
CSF	Combined Support Force
CSG	Carrier Strike Group or Combined Support Group
CWGER	Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DiREx	Disaster Relief Exercise

DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DOD	Department of Defense
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DRAT	Disaster Relief Assessment Teams
DRMAU	Disaster Relief Medical Assistance Unit
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRT	Disaster Relief Team (Japan)
DTT	Defense Trilateral Talks
ERAT	Emergency Response Assessment Team
ERMS	Economic Recovery and Market Systems
ESG	Expeditionary Strike Group
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FDMA	Fire and Disaster Management Agency (Japan)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.)
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOC	Government of the People's Republic of China
GOH	Government of Haiti
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOP	Government of Pakistan
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force
GSOMIA	General Security of Military Information Agreement
HA/DR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HARRT	Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
III MEF	U.S. Third Marine Expeditionary Force
IMC	International Medical Corps
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
JAIF	Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund
JANIC	Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JDR	Japan Disaster Relief
JDRT	Japan Disaster Relief Team
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Command

JGSDF	Japan Ground Self-Defense Force
JHOC	Joint Humanitarian Operations Course
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
JOCV	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer
JPF	Japan Platform
JRCS	Japanese Red Cross Society
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
JSF	Joint Support Force
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
JTF-TH	Joint Task Force - Tohoku
KOICA	Korea International Cooperation Agency
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LNO	Liaison Officer
LSA	Logistics Support Area
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MCAP	Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIRA	Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment
MiTaM	Mission Tasking Matrix
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NBR	National Bureau of Asian Research
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority (Pakistan)
NDPG	National Defense Program Guidelines
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan)
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review Report
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Center
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PWA	Peace Winds America
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review

RDC	Reception/Departure Center
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
RMT	Response Management Team
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDCF	Security Dialogue and Cooperation Forum
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
TCG	Tripartite Core Group
TEPCO	Tokyo Electric Power Company
TKFD	The Tokyo Foundation
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
USD	United States Dollars
USFJ	United States Forces Japan
USG	United States Government
USNS	United States Naval Ship
USS	United States Ship
VOSOCC	Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and the Asia-Pacific

THE THREAT OF NATURAL DISASTERS

The 21st century has been widely proclaimed the “Asian Century,” marked by the emergence of economic powerhouses such as China and the Republic of Korea. Projections of future growth point to a century dominated economically by Asia. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) projects that by 2050 Asia will account for half of global gross domestic product (GDP) as its populations enjoy developed nation standards of living.¹

Of the many threats that imperil the ADB projections, perhaps none looms as ominously as the potential for natural disasters. Cutting across geopolitical boundaries and economic spheres alike, disasters will remain an inescapable part of life in an “Asian Century.” The Asia-Pacific as a whole will see growth challenged by typhoons, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, tsunamis, pandemic disease, volcanoes, drought, and crop failures. Good governance and responsible financial stewardship may allow Asia-Pacific nations to avoid many barriers to growth, yet natural disasters are here to stay.

The Asia-Pacific must contend with the inescapable reality that it is, and will remain, one of the most disaster-prone regions in the world. Historically more than half of recorded natural disasters have occurred there. Since record keeping began in the early part of the 20th century, 82 percent of those killed in natural disasters lived in the Asia-Pacific. Between 2000 and 2009, a staggering 2.15 billion people were affected to some extent by natural disasters in Asia. That is merely the number about which we know.² While economic development of nations in the region lowers vulnerability to natural disasters, growing populations and urbanization tend to increase that vulnerability.³

Fortunately, disaster preparedness can address many of these risks. “Preparedness” used throughout this report refers to measures taken prior to a

¹ Asian Development Bank, “Executive Summary,” in *Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century*, eds. Harinder Kohli, Ashok Sharma, Anil Sood (Singapore: Sage Publications, 2011), 5.

² International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *Disasters in Asia: the Case for Legal Preparedness* (Geneva: IFRC, 2010), 1.

³ United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction* (Geneva: UNISDR, 2011), 22, states that every month cities in East Asia gain two million new residents.

disaster that increase response effectiveness. These measures may be organizational, such as training for cooperation with a local partner. They may be legal/statutory, such as establishing a host nation disaster management center. They may also be physical, such as creating radio stockpiles or relief good warehouses. In total, “preparedness” is the actions taken by likely responders to mitigate the consequences of future natural disasters and improve quality of the response.

Organizations involved in disaster preparedness, such as the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, correctly point out the high correlation between development status and disaster risk. In parts of the region with similar risk profiles, developed nations are vastly less vulnerable to similar threats. Japan, for instance, is calculated to suffer 17 times fewer deaths than those from a comparable cyclonic event in the Philippines. Economic development and disaster resilience are intrinsically linked. As nations in the region develop, their vulnerability will decrease. Yet development can only lower risk to a certain extent; it cannot wholly eradicate the threat of catastrophic events. The Asia-Pacific's continuing economic growth notwithstanding, the specter of natural disasters will remain a major concern.

Population growth and urbanization are among the primary reasons why preparedness must remain an urgent priority for Asia-Pacific nations. The majority of Asia-Pacific mega-cities are located on flood plains, in coastal regions, in typhoon tracks, or near tectonic faults. Those population centers remain vulnerable irrespective of their level of development. As Richard Matthew writes for the National Bureau of Asian Research regarding these mega-cities, “One unfortunate outcome of rapid urbanization is the development of vast peri-urban areas constructed with little or no regulation” where vulnerable populations live in extreme risk from a wide variety of disasters.⁴

Climate change is another major external force increasing the risk of disasters. Nearly every climate model for the Asia-Pacific shows an increase in the frequency and severity of major weather events. While long-term projections cannot with any degree of certainty pinpoint specific risks, the overall picture is increasingly clear and worrisome. A greater number of cyclonic storms and extreme weather events will reduce the period between disasters and associated recovery, rebuilding, and risk reduction efforts. Their heightened severity will imperil even wider areas. In its 2007 assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that “*all* coastal areas in Asia are facing

⁴ Richard Matthew, “Climate Change and Environmental Impact,” in *Strategic Asia 2010-11: Asia's Rising Power and America's Continued Purpose*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble and Travis Tanner (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), 214.

an increasing range of stresses and shocks.”⁵ In addition to storms, the potential for food insecurity will be similarly exacerbated by a changing climate. The IPCC reports “recent studies suggest that substantial decreases in cereal production potential in Asia could be likely by the end of this century as a consequence of climate change.”⁶ The combination of demographic and climatic change ensures that the risk of natural disasters will remain stark.

The growing economic interdependence within Asian nations calls for a multi-national approach to preparedness. For example, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami had economic repercussions far beyond Tohoku, the most affected region. As expected, year-on-year automobile production fell in Japan immediately after the earthquake, with March production down 85.7 percent from the previous year. In the ensuing months, the true impact of the disaster began to be felt, as auto production dropped precipitously in China, the U.S., Thailand, and the Southeast Asian region. U.S. auto production did not return to its pre-tsunami level for over nine months.⁷ In the case of the Thailand floods later in 2011, the cost of computer hard drives (of which Thailand manufactured nearly half the global supply prior to the floods) rose on average from 65 USD on 3 October 2011 to 192 USD by the end of that month.⁸

If economic trends remain constant, the Asia-Pacific will become increasingly interdependent with the global economy, ensuring that the effects of disasters are felt acutely far beyond the disaster struck areas. Regional interdependence dictates coordinated responses when disasters cross borders rather than remain contained within one country. This was the case in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami and would be the case in the event of severe Mekong River flooding, or of cyclones devastating Palau, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

The Asia-Pacific nations face numerous other political and economic challenges, with natural disasters getting little attention unless at the time of disaster. Many vulnerable nations have developed a range of effective response mechanisms allowing them to cope with repeated shocks. Indonesia, for instance, has improved markedly its preparedness and response capabilities. It now has a capable disaster management authority that works well with Indonesian military, civil defense, and civilian government agency resources. Yet the insidious nature of a major disaster is its ability to engulf even capable, prepared, and responsive nations. The case study of the 2011 Japan tsunami will catalogue the numerous

⁵ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Coastal and low lying areas” in *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007*, eds. M.L. Parry et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Emphasis added.

⁶ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007*, eds. M.L. Parry et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁷ Masahisa Fujita, “Mainstreaming Global Resilience: The Lessons from Complex Mega-disasters” (presentation at World Bank, “Mainstreaming Resilience in a Complex, Networked World,” Tokyo, 13 February 2012).

⁸ Ibid.

ways in which even Japan, a global model for disaster readiness, was overwhelmed by the scale of the triple disaster. Nor can any one agency shoulder the burden. No assistance agency, military command, non-governmental organization (NGO), or multilateral organization has the manpower, resources, financial strength, or logistical wherewithal unilaterally to mitigate a major event.

THE STAKEHOLDERS IN A COLLABORATIVE HA/DR RESPONSE

Recent natural disasters illustrate the pressing need for *robust collaborative responses* across both operational sectors and national boundaries. With the assumptions that (a) natural disasters will remain an inescapable fact of the Asia-Pacific, (b) the impact of these disasters will be increasingly regional or global, and (c) national-level resources are frequently insufficient, it becomes imperative to **strengthen effective civil-military humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)**. The HA/DR mechanism uniting major stakeholders would include:

- **Civilian stakeholders are national, provincial/prefectural and local governments**, including foreign ministries and assistance agencies, national disaster management centers, fire and emergency management departments, and departments of interior, social welfare, agriculture and urban development.
- The **Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement**, including national societies.
- **Military** responders include domestic-based units and civil defense of host nations, and international forces.
- The **NGOs** range from small, local actors to major international responders such as World Vision or Doctors Without Borders.
- The **private sector** is an overlooked but vital complement to civilian stakeholders and civil society.
- Uniting the above actors are **multilateral organizations** such as the United Nations (UN) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

In a disaster on the scale of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the participation of all the above responders is essential to successful crisis mitigation. Effective preparedness, response, and recovery hinge largely on the ability to integrate these diverse stakeholders into a harmonious whole throughout the entire response.

As crucial as these above stakeholders are, there is a pivotal stakeholder, one all too frequently omitted from HA/DR discussions: the **host nation**. The country struck by a disaster is frequently termed the “affected state” in the disaster

management world. Peace Winds America, however, eschews that terminology in favor of the “host nation” designation to reflect the lead role that a host nation necessarily plays in the period during and following a disaster. The ASEAN Regional Forum disaster relief cooperation guidelines capture “host nation” responsibility succinctly: “The Receiving Country has the first and foremost responsibility to take care of the victims of disasters occurring on its territory. The Assisting Country will provide disaster relief only with the consent of the Receiving Country.”⁹ The extent of domestic preparedness and response, the ability to perform accurate needs assessments, the broadcast of requests for international assistance, and the coordination of that assistance when it arrives are the responsibility of the host nation.

Fundamentally all preparedness planning must aim to strengthen the nation struck by disaster. Despite the helpful international resources, the one factor that most determines the successful outcome of a relief operation is *judicious, competent oversight, and coordination by the host nation*. Even in the absence of sufficient domestic resources, host nations that can transmit specific requests for aid, direct them to the areas of most need, and maintain clear communications between field operators and command staff will see markedly better outcomes. This host nation capability is fully compatible with national sovereignty. Without ceding control over territory or resources, host nations can utilize a broad range of international responders.

HA/DR—THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION

Recent disasters in the Asia-Pacific have demonstrated the urgent need for broad collaboration. Major catastrophes transcend single-stakeholder responses, and “require governments and international organizations to operate in post-sovereign spaces, increasingly relying on transnational forms of cooperation between governments and among peoples.”¹⁰ Former U.S. National Security Council Asian Affairs Director Victor Cha noted that, “Asian countries still prefer to operate according to more traditional templates, prizing sovereignty over collective efforts.”¹¹ These two principles are not, however, irreconcilable. Despite the need for multinational, multi-partner responses, HA/DR can still be accomplished without constituting a threat – perceived or otherwise – to the sovereignty of host nations. This goal can be attained through mutual preparedness training, new partnerships, and increased knowledge of national

⁹ ASEAN Regional Forum, *ARF General Guidelines for Disaster Relief Cooperation* (Manila: ASEAN, 2007), 2.

¹⁰ Victor D. Cha, “The Geometry of Asia’s Architecture: Traditional and Transnational Security” in *Asia’s Response to Climate Change and Natural Disasters*, eds. Robert S. Wang and Jeffrey D. Bean (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 99.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 99.

and organizational disaster policies, procedures, legal mandates, capabilities, and key limitations. For host nations, understanding the roles and missions of international responders as well as their functions on the ground can decrease hesitation to call upon them. This understanding boosts the accuracy of the “ask,” the detailed request for assistance. For responding organizations, better knowledge of these factors can help them tailor offers of assistance, form more responsive partnerships, and establish dialogue with likely host nations before the next crisis.

An additional benefit of mutual disaster cooperation is the notion that HA/DR remains a “safe space,” an acceptable forum for nations to overcome their differences and meet on common ground. The Asia-Pacific region is home to historical grievances and disputes that in some cases prevent full normalization of relations. From territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands or the Liancourt Rocks to mutual antagonisms dating from World War II or before, a host of barriers prevent cooperation on economic, social, and military matters throughout the region. Joint cooperation on HA/DR offers a low-risk means of bridging those divides. As many of the case studies in this paper will show, cooperation in disaster relief as well as preparedness offers nations a safe forum in which to establish working relations at operational and director levels. Outside the media scrutiny of highly visible, contentious issues, HA/DR fosters trust and stable working relationships. Such relationships can be immensely valuable as a prelude to wider cooperation.

The “safe space” concept of HA/DR is particularly important because it allows for military and technical cooperation among nations that might not otherwise cooperate. In many instances, planning for disaster relief operations enables unique military-military (mil-mil) engagement. For example, amidst the political tensions plaguing U.S.-Japan-South Korea relations, HA/DR remains an area of robust cooperation. Mil-mil meetings, tabletop exercises, and planning events take place even in the face of communications breakdowns at the diplomatic level. Similarly, despite the simmering tensions between them, Japan and China have established a model of HA/DR cooperation. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been working on preparedness with the Chinese earthquake bureau designing response plans, conducting training in three provinces and establishing joint training with their urban search and rescue (USAR) teams.¹² Mil-mil HA/DR cooperation even extends the notion of safe space to U.S.-China relations. In a November 2012 HA/DR exercise, U.S. and Chinese militaries for the first time engaged in operational planning for joint disaster relief. Said Major General Tang Fen of the China Mass Work Office, “The Chinese and American militaries do have our differences, but it is

¹² Kae Yanagisawa (Director General, East and Central Asia and the Caucasus Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency), personal communication, 11 November 2012.

my belief that it is the indispensable responsibility of the two militaries to join forces in disaster relief.”¹³ Such cooperation can lead to productive relationships and future cooperation through establishing a cadre of government officials able to work productively with foreign counterparts.

The importance of HA/DR as a venue for improved relations is not limited to the realm of bilateral or trilateral arrangements. Closer coordination on disasters presents a tremendous opportunity for regional multilateral cooperation, particularly through ASEAN. Discussing the recent history of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in *Asia Policy*, S.R. Joey Long notes that:

Efforts to develop mechanisms for preventive diplomacy have not been fruitful because members remain uncomfortable about the mechanisms’ potential for intruding on domestic affairs. If the focus were to shift to less controversial nontraditional security matters, however, cooperation could be expanded. The ARF countries’ participation and collaboration in the May 2009 disaster relief exercise in the Philippines suggest that institutional members are prepared to work together to address a common threat.¹⁴

Disasters are a shared threat. Closer collaboration among all ARF members offers the threefold benefit of better preparedness of member states, more effective collective response efforts under the ASEAN umbrella, and an increased value of ASEAN/ARF institutions. HA/DR cooperation offers a wide array of options for joint preparedness. Through planning at the operational and civilian/NGO level, even nations with a history of frosty relations or mutual suspicion can minimize the potential for conflict. Partners ready to engage at a more substantial level can begin to involve their militaries and senior civilian officials in developing pre-disaster arrangements such as acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, information sharing platforms and pre-authorization for specialized resources such as medical or canine teams.

HA/DR can serve also as a mechanism for progress within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Encompassing economies including China, Taiwan, Russia, and Chile, APEC’s scope is wider than that of ASEAN/ARF. Intra-organizational APEC political feuds have worked to hamper progress. But disasters may be a way forward here as well. The APEC Emergency Preparedness Working Group has brought together response agencies in managerial forums and senior level policy discussions. APEC’s focus on public-private partnerships has been particularly welcome as this topic comes to the fore in disaster preparedness and response fora.

¹³ Terril Yue Jones, “Chinese, U.S. Soldiers Complete Disaster Relief Drill Amid Asia Tensions,” *Reuters*, 30 November 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/us-china-usa-military-idUSBRE8AT0M820121130>.

¹⁴ S. R. Joey Long, “The United States, Southeast Asia, and Asia-Pacific Security,” *Asia Policy* 12 (July 2011): 6.

Strengthening regional multilateral organizations is a strong argument for proactive HA/DR engagement. For nations in need of greater convincing, however, there are myriad domestic benefits as well. Avoidance of catastrophic economic losses alone should be a powerful incentive. The 1988 Spitak Earthquake in Armenia inflicted approximately 20.5 billion USD in damage on that country, totaling a stunning 908 percent of its 1990 GDP. The wildfires that swept Mongolia in 1996 inflicted nearly 1.71 billion USD in losses, almost twice the country's GDP. More recently, the World Bank estimated that damages from the 2011 Tohoku disaster could reach or exceed 235 billion USD, easily establishing it as the world's costliest natural disaster.¹⁵ These numbers are only the direct, easily measurable losses. Indirect costs in reconstruction, loss of productivity, infrastructure replacement, and the relocation of businesses could run far higher.

Effective preparedness measures, rapid relief, and targeted recovery can greatly mitigate the economic impacts of a disaster. Following a major disaster, as many as 40 percent of businesses will stay closed permanently.¹⁶ While temporary closures in a significant emergency are unavoidable, the efficacy of the response and the swiftness of recovery plans may be deciding factors in whether a company reopens or shuts permanently. Nor is this disaster vulnerability limited to individual businesses. The widespread devastation of the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe, among Japan's busiest ports, forced a near-total shutdown. Although major infrastructure was largely rebuilt within a year, "one notable exception is the Port of Kobe which permanently lost container shipping business to other Asian ports."¹⁷ The earthquake's economic toll on Kobe still lingers.

In the realm of global health, the need for collaborative action to identify, contain and treat potential epidemiological outbreaks has never been higher. Two salient examples in the 21st century – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and influenza A/H5N1 – dramatically illustrate the ability of a vector-borne illness to become a global pandemic with stunning rapidity. In the space of nearly six months from the first reported case in Guangdong, China, in November 2002, SARS spread to at least 16 other countries, killing 775 people and sickening over 8,000. The need to coordinate information and response tactics is particularly important in the case of a pandemic, especially given the ease and frequency of cross-border travel today. Pandemics raise the prospect of massive economic losses stemming from the costs of treatment and prevention, and lost trade, tourism, and productivity.

¹⁵ The World Bank, "The Recent Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan: Implications for East Asia," in *East Asia and Pacific Economic Update* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011), 1.

¹⁶ "Washington Emergency Management Department: Businesses Plan," accessed 28 November 2012, http://www.emd.wa.gov/preparedness/business/prep_business_plan.shtml.

¹⁷ Risk Management Solutions, Inc., *1995 Kobe Earthquake 10-Year Retrospective* (Newark, CA: Risk Management Solutions, Inc., 2005), 7.

Economic stability may be a decisive argument in favor of better HA/DR cooperation, but it is hardly the only one. Preparedness and relief efforts can help avoid catastrophic demographic or political shocks. Significant natural disasters can, in the presence of other contributing factors, spark sociopolitical instability or state failure. In the developing world, a major disaster can provide the impetus for societal breakdown. The appalling crisis that engulfed Sudan beginning in 2003 had its genesis as an environmental catastrophe. The UN Environment Programme starkly described the underlying cause: “Northern Darfur – where exponential population growth and related environmental stress have created the conditions for conflicts to be triggered and sustained by political, tribal, or ethnic differences – can be considered a tragic example of the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse.”¹⁸ The natural disaster in Sudan was a slow-onset emergency and thus considerably less reported than an earthquake or typhoon. It was, however, equally devastating in its consequences.

In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, numerous responders in Indonesia voiced concerns about instability brought on by the effects of the disaster to the rebel Free Aceh Movement. Although fears of insecurity were not born out, that tsunami remains an example of the potential for natural disasters to exacerbate already precarious political and security situations. Prompt effective relief and recovery can minimize time spent without effective governance and allow the full range of human needs in the affected areas to be addressed.

Disasters can weaken states by precipitating mass population movements. For the host nation, the logistical, financial, and political costs of accommodating internally displaced persons (IDPs) may be unsustainable. In peripheral areas or regions already experiencing unrest, these demographic shifts can be particularly difficult. Following the 2008 Cyclone Nargis that wrought devastation upon Myanmar, nearly 260,000 people fled their homes to IDP camps or informal settlements. An ASEAN assessment found that “displaced households may have experienced protection issues associated with inadequate shelter, land insecurity, lack of livelihood opportunities, minimal humanitarian assistance, loss of documentation, and limited access to health care and schooling.” That finding is true both in this case and generally of disaster-affected displaced people.¹⁹ The prospect of transnational refugees is equally worrying and further demonstrates the need for HA/DR cooperation that spans borders. A 2009 report by the Environmental Justice Foundation noted that current estimates of the total number of “climate refugees” – those displaced by climate-related

¹⁸ United Nations Environment Programme, *Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment* (Nairobi: UNEP, 2007), 8.

¹⁹ “ASEAN Post Nargis Management Portal—Integration and Resettlement,” accessed 29 November 2012, <http://www.aseanpostnargiskm.org/protected-lives/integration-and-resettlement>.

disasters – may reach 150 million by midcentury.²⁰ Waves of refugees fleeing natural disasters remain a frequent and potent source of instability for both origin and recipient nations.

A 2011 World Bank study reported that every dollar spent on disaster risk reduction saves between four and seven dollars spent in response.²¹ The overwhelming evidence from multiple recent disasters confirms that the economic, infrastructural, and sociopolitical costs outweigh many times over the costs of preparedness. In Japan or Thailand, for example, the loss of an entire supply chain, or cascade of supply chains, can wreak economic losses that linger for years. In nearly every respect, the costs of improved HA/DR preparedness are cheap compared with the costs of inaction.

The Peace Winds America Civil-Military Initiative found that there exist numerous and significant gaps in organizational knowledge and partnerships among the disaster stakeholders. Improved coordination, based on better mutual understanding and interoperability, can achieve dramatic results. Analysis of the Tohoku disaster shows the tremendous achievements made in Japan-U.S. joint response simply due to focuses on inter-organizational liaisons, joint training, and mutual understanding of policies, procedures, and capabilities.

The costs of this preparedness – primarily in the form of training sessions, workshops and forums – are essentially negligible when compared to the results of the Japan-U.S. response to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident. Although many nations in the Asia-Pacific will need to expend larger sums on disaster-resilient infrastructure, these costs too are vastly outweighed by their benefit.

HA/DR—THE "WHOLE OF SOCIETY" APPROACH

As Asia-Pacific disasters increase in frequency and severity and the at-risk population swells, the ability of a single actor to mitigate a major natural disaster will become marginal. Even in states like China that have ample manpower, the needs presented by major catastrophes are overwhelming. Development status does not impart the ability to respond with a single entity, a lesson amply demonstrated by the 2005 Hurricane Katrina or the 2011 Tohoku disaster. There is, therefore, a pressing need to maintain a “whole of society” focus when approaching preparedness, relief, and recovery. “Whole of society” entails

²⁰ Environmental Justice Foundation, *No Place Like Home: Where Next for Climate Refugees?* (London: EJJ, 2009), 14.

²¹ According to the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, “Disaster risk reduction is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters. Reducing exposure to hazards, lessening vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improving preparedness for adverse events are all examples of disaster risk reduction.”

the involvement and empowerment of the primary HA/DR stakeholders—government agencies, militaries, civil society (NGOs and the private sector), the Red Cross movement, and multilateral organizations. For the purposes of the Civil-Military Initiative the military is considered a separate entity, even from the national government it serves. The priorities of the military, its capabilities and limitations in a disaster, its operational focus and ability to enter affected nations and form partnerships are all sufficiently dissimilar from civilian government.

The “whole of society” concept is predicated on the belief that the needs generated by a disaster can only be met by a coalition of stakeholders. Although the host nation government is properly the leader and organizer of an HA/DR effort, its limitations are such that it must enlist partners. The logistical, engineering, personnel, or technical abilities of a responding government agency may be insufficient for given tasks. This likely necessitates coordination with others. Among the chief complements to the host nation civilian response are domestic and international militaries, which increasingly maintain an array of capabilities well suited for HA/DR operations. Following the *Oslo Guidelines* for civil-military interaction, military units may provide critical assistance in times of disaster that cannot be found at the civilian level.²²

Equally important for disaster response is civil society, encompassing NGOs, Red Cross branches, community organizations, and the private sector. Particularly at the local level, NGOs and businesses enjoy a comparative advantage in their knowledge of specific needs, local culture and language, and relief and recovery priorities. NGOs tend to be less hampered by bureaucratic needs and red tape that can afflict government agencies or multilaterals. Given sufficient funding, NGOs can move quickly to perform needs assessments and begin triage and initial response measures. Particularly in outlying or peripheral regions, a local NGO may be viewed as more legitimate by survivors and enjoy comparably greater access and information flow. NGOs often maintain a year-round presence in a given region and may have a strong institutional memory that is important in areas subject to frequent disasters.

International response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami raised record amounts of money, primarily for those international NGOs responding to the disaster. That generosity continued with other high-profile disasters in subsequent years such as Hurricane Katrina, the Port-au-Prince earthquake, the Tohoku disaster, and Hurricane Sandy. Although a financial boon to recipient NGOs, international contributions occasioned significant scrutiny of those organizations’ response and performance. After the Haiti earthquake, which raised 1.4 billion USD in private donations from Americans alone, there arose questions about NGO overhead costs, percentage of funds spent, accountability, transparency and the perceived disinclination to partner with

²² See Chapters V and VI for discussion of the *Oslo Guidelines*.

locals. The *Washington Post* reported one year after the earthquake that, “twelve Haitian members of the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission sent its co-chairman Bill Clinton a letter in December protesting that they were ‘completely disconnected’ from the decision-making process.”²³ Greater institutional partnerships with local actors and greater access to training and operational resources can help NGOs at all levels maintain the reputation of being effective stewards of relief and/or recovery dollars.

The Peace Winds America (PWA) Civil-Military Initiative places a particular emphasis on the role of the private sector in disasters. The private sector rose to prominence as a major force for HA/DR during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where pledges of aid (primarily monetary) were significant both in number and size. The *Chronicle of Philanthropy* recorded 340 million USD in corporate donations for that disaster, including in-kind contributions, such as water supplies from PepsiCo and 25 million USD in drugs from Pfizer.²⁴ Although businesses have a lengthy history of involvement at the local level, the size and scope of the tsunami relief effort was unprecedented. Corporate donations made up an appreciable amount of the 3.16 billion USD total sent from the U.S. While large multinational corporations were notable for the sheer size of their donations, they also established themselves as capable non-monetary partners. From medications (Pfizer and Abbot) to telecoms (Cable & Wireless Worldwide), transport (Qantas) to food and relief goods (Tesco, Tetra Laval and Pepsi), and even with on-site translation services (Wing On Travel), the private sector emphatically showed its utility in the response phase of an HA/DR operation.

Despite these 2004 strides, the role of the private sector in HA/DR is still largely uncertain and undefined. Large gaps remain regarding the potential for partnerships, proffered capabilities, and frameworks for incorporating businesses into relief efforts. PWA has begun codifying this information and establishing the linkages between future private sector responders and their counterparts in government agencies, military units, multilaterals, and NGOs. Throughout the course of the PWA Civil-Military Initiative, the prevailing response of business executives to the concept of greater private sector integration has been one of interest. Yet they express the caveat that much work remains to clarify roles and responsibilities. Because of the inherent nature of their organizations, business leaders cannot respond directly to disasters in the manner of assistance agencies or NGOs. That limitation encourages partnership. Companies are well aware that they can provide significant financial assistance to HA/DR operations.

²³ William Booth, “NGOs in Haiti Face New Questions About Effectiveness,” *The Washington Post*, 1 February 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/01/AR2011020102030.html>. According to the Disaster Accountability Project, as of January, 2011 730 million USD of the 1.4 billion USD raised for relief had been spent.

²⁴ Suzanne Perry, “Donations to Victims of 2004 Asian Tsunamis Topped \$3 Billion,” *The Chronicle of Philanthropy*, 11 January 2007, accessed 30 November 2012, <http://philanthropy.com/article/Donations-to-Victims-of-2004/550601>.

Yet to become involved in preparedness, transport, provision of relief goods, housing, reconstruction assistance, and innumerable other disaster needs requires further planning. Companies must identify potential partners beforehand and work intensively to establish common operating goals and methods. That aim is eminently feasible and has been the focus of significant attention throughout the Civil-Military Initiative.

Access is another powerful argument for the “whole of society” approach. The case studies detail several instances of disaster responders being unable to reach the victims when unable to gain entry to the host nation. The inability of ready, willing resources to reach disaster victims is unacceptable. The HA/DR “whole of society” approach minimizes the likelihood of this eventuality by offering numerous alternate or complementary options for response. The more options presented to a reticent host nation – government aid, business contributions, NGO response teams, military personnel – the greater the chance that one or more will be accepted and allowed to respond. The entity that has gained access can work with the host nation acting as a funnel, accepting materiel, staff, and technical advice from organizations that may still be awaiting access.

The broader the collective response, the greater the likelihood that effective coordination can elicit each responder’s areas of strength. A focus on the areas of comparative advantage of responding organizations allows stakeholders to operate in their area of specialization, e.g., medical care, telecommunications, or temporary shelter. For militaries, NGOs, and businesses alike, relief work originating around unique capabilities will render them more efficient.

THE FOCUS OF THE PWA INITIATIVE: U.S. AND JAPAN HA/DR

To address strengthening HA/DR in the Asia-Pacific, Peace Winds America elected to focus its efforts on Japan and the U.S., the regional HA/DR leaders. These two nations possess expertise, experience, and capacity, reinforced by the unique relationships between them. Drawing on recent Japan-U.S. involvement in Asia-Pacific disasters, PWA has anchored the disaster preparedness program on these two major donor nations. While other countries in the region – particularly South Korea and Australia – have established themselves as competent overseas HA/DR entities, Japan and the U.S. are the largest and most capable.

The United States

The U.S. has been an Asia-Pacific power since the Second World War. Its economic investment in the region, network of military bases, and corporate footprint provide it nearly unmatched clout in the region. The actions of the

U.S. leave little doubt about the continuing importance of Asia-Pacific to its policies. The Obama administration has adopted a policy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific and has emphasized that shift in economic, trade, military, human rights, and diplomatic initiatives. East Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific island nations, are increasingly important to Washington. President Barack Obama has personally affirmed that the U.S., as an Asia-Pacific country, will continue to play a leadership role within the region for years to come. “The Nation’s strategic priorities will,” he predicted, “increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific.”²⁵

The significant U.S. involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs will necessarily entail its involvement in future disaster relief efforts. The U.S. is also obligated by the strong regional memory of its actions in the aftermaths of the 2004 and 2011 tsunamis as well as other smaller crises. U.S. ability to project power in the region is nearly unmatched despite the many miles that separate Washington from the Asia-Pacific. Robert Wang wrote for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based international policy organization:

In the case of the 2004 tsunami, for example, the deep bilateral partnerships, shared understandings, and working relationships of the United States made possible the remarkable collective response to this unprecedented crisis. No other country in the regional has an equal capacity for response at this time.²⁶

While the U.S. remains the undisputed leader in Asia-Pacific disaster response, it acts in concert with other national players. Australia’s AusAID has established itself as a competent and effective humanitarian actor, particularly in Oceania, but its primary focus rests on disaster risk reduction and development. Emergency response is a secondary objective. China is increasingly capable but hampered as an HA/DR responder by its relative inexperience on the international stage and by the cloud of political issues that would surround international relief deployment. South Korea is skilled, but its resources are far less significant than what the United States can bring to bear. Japan is highly capable and increasingly confident, with considerable resources, quickly matching the regional reach of the U.S.

The spread of military forces under the aegis of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) adds heft to the U.S. role as a regional disaster resource. While no U.S. military units are exclusively tasked with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the sheer range of capabilities of U.S. forces deployed makes it among the largest potential responding organizations. In this area, the U.S. military has been, in its parlance, very “forward leaning.” HA/DR is one tool in its growing

²⁵ Admiral Michael Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 13.

²⁶ Robert S. Wang, “Conclusion” in *Asia’s Response to Climate Change and Natural Disasters*, eds. Robert S. Wang and Jeffrey D. Bean (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 117.

operational toolbox. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review reflected that reality, stating that “finally, the United States seeks to develop additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific that respond to the need for constant readiness of U.S. forces to carry out joint operations, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.”²⁷

The former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Lieutenant General W. C. Gregson elaborated on this concept:

The role of our forward deployed forces is far broader and more constructive than simply waiting for someone to turn the master arming switch on. Broad, active, widely distributed presence throughout the theater dampens sources of instability, deters conflict, gives substance to U.S. security commitments, and ensures continuing American access to the region.²⁸

The U.S. military is not an autonomous actor in the Asia-Pacific. It remains bound by the guidance of the President through the Department of Defense (DOD), and, in the case of HA/DR, the Department of State. Yet the military still has considerable influence in pushing its priorities and can advocate forcefully for its involvement in disaster response. “DOD’s geographic combatant commands build and maintain relationships with militaries across the globe through disaster responses, civic assistance missions, training exercises, and formal security cooperation programs. This network of connections to foreign militaries gives DOD access to senior decision-makers across the globe.”²⁹ The senior level access to foreign governments (i.e., host nations) makes the military – and by extension the U.S. as a whole – a major player in any regional HA/DR effort. Accordingly, civil-military cooperation from preparedness training to response becomes a must.

The U.S. “rebalance” towards Asia is a net positive from the perspective of improved multilateral responses to disaster situations. The buildup of U.S. resources, both military and civilian, will have a salutary effect on regional response and coordination abilities. The heightened personnel presence in the Asia-Pacific “will undoubtedly be useful, however, for training with allies and partners and in multilateral activities. And they will add materially to the region’s ability to deal with transnational scenarios like counterterrorism and disaster relief.”³⁰

²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), 66.

²⁸ Gen. W.C. Gregson, “Panel 2: Understanding Two Policy Pillars—TPP and U.S. Military Strategy,” (remarks at Brookings Institution, “Understanding the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” 31 January 2012).

²⁹ Center for Strategic and International Studies, *From Conflicts to Pandemics*, coord. Elizabeth Morehouse (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010), 3.

³⁰ Rory Medcalf, “An Australian Perspective on U.S. Rebalancing toward Asia,” National Bureau of Asian Research, accessed 2 December 2012 at <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=242>.

The benefits from training, support with non-traditional security threats (including disasters), and the implicit security guarantees stemming from the increased U.S. troop presence in the area may well reassure many Asia-Pacific nations. Having observed that the rebalance does not fundamentally alter the political status quo, the reaction of many of the region's most disaster vulnerable nations, particularly within the ambit of ASEAN, will be to take advantage of these new resources. Australian scholar Rory Medcalf asserts "most countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, seem comfortable with the U.S. 'pivot' toward Asia."³¹ The United States should capitalize upon this general acceptance to use its increased military presence to work towards meaningful progress on HA/DR preparedness.

The U.S. military clout in the region is not the sole reason why the U.S. will continue to be the most prominent HA/DR actor. Washington's civilian disaster response mechanism, the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), maintains a robust Asia-Pacific presence and possesses considerable experience responding to a wide range of crises. In FY2010 alone, OFDA responded to 23 disasters in 14 countries across Asia, ranging from provision of funding for OFDA assessment teams to a full Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in the case of Indonesia.³² No other Asia-Pacific nation has as robust a civilian HA/DR network prepositioned in many of the most vulnerable nations in the region.

Also contributing to U.S. primacy in major disaster relief efforts are the numerous U.S. headquartered NGOs, and the constellation of U.S. businesses in the region. With their growing relevance to relief and recovery operations, the location and size of NGOs and businesses adds measurably to the aggregate effectiveness of the U.S. response.

Japan

Japan's prominence in overseas HA/DR has risen steadily over the past two decades. Japan's abilities have matured to the point where it is now a lead Asia-Pacific disaster relief provider and increasingly important on the international stage. Japan's HA/DR prowess and its special relationship with the U.S. have rendered it the most important Asian force for disaster preparedness and relief.

The genesis of the Japanese overseas disaster response lies in its 1987 Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (DRT), which names the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as the lead agency for such efforts. The subsequent 2002 Law Concerning the Independent Administrative Institution Japan International Cooperation Agency establishes JICA as the implementing

³¹ Medcalf, "Australian Perspective."

³² Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2010* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2011), 65.

agency for overseas HA/DR responses, under the authority of MOFA, but without the independent ability to integrate the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) into its response. Since early responses in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and especially since the major response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Japan Disaster Relief Teams have grown in capability, experience, and ability to train and work with other disaster relief entities. The Japan SDF, although limited by the self-defense provision of Article IX of the Constitution of Japan, has similarly grown in stature, especially with regard to non-traditional security operations such as humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.

After China, Japan is the second-largest Asian economy, but arguably first in the ability to project soft power. As Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage wrote for the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies:

Japan's soft power is also considerable. She rates among the top three countries in international respect and first in the world in terms of "national brand." Japan's Self-Defense Forces – now the most trusted institution in Japan – are poised to play a larger role in enhancing Japanese security and reputation if anachronistic constraints can be eased.³³

HA/DR is ideal for demonstrating Japanese international soft power prowess. Japan already boasts deep HA/DR expertise through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) efforts overseas and through coping with disasters at home. The Japan Self-Defense Forces is highly regarded both at home and abroad due to its effective disaster preparedness and response and its considerable contributions to global peacekeeping operations (PKO). Especially in light of its relief operations during the Tohoku disaster, the non-combat skills of the JSDF have come to the fore. The recognition that "Asia suffers from a precarious ecology, and the JSDF's disaster response expertise makes it a powerful regional asset" will add to expectations for it to assume a more muscular role in HA/DR.³⁴ Article IX constitutional debates notwithstanding, the JSDF now has sufficient experience and expertise for it to become a even more significant partner of JICA.

Japan NGOs are increasingly involved in disaster response, indicated by the growth of membership within the Japan Platform coordination organization since 2005. Though limited by small staff and limited resources, the Japan NGOs are responding effectively to Asia-Pacific disasters. The Japan business community, especially throughout the Asia-Pacific, is an HA/DR resource that remains dormant and cautious, yet open to partnerships.

³³ Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 1.

³⁴ Sheila A. Smith, "A Strategy for the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 19," *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed 4 December 2012, <http://www.cfr.org/japan/strategy-us-japan-alliance/p28010>.

THE PEACE WINDS AMERICA CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE

Peace Winds America has implemented the Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative in order to strengthen U.S. and Japan disaster preparedness, response and recovery in the Asia-Pacific. Through building capacities, enhancing connectivity, and developing cooperation, Japan and the U.S. can better serve the disaster prone nations of the Asia-Pacific and their public good. Recognizing the innate strengths of both nations in HA/DR, the Initiative was conceived to capitalize upon an ideal opportunity for enhanced partnership.

While serving at U.S. Embassy/Tokyo from 2003 to 2008, PWA CEO Dr. Charles Aanenson became acutely aware that Japan and the U.S. could improve joint HA/DR response in the Asia-Pacific. The 2004 Niigata earthquake demonstrated the need for greater cooperation among Japanese NGOs and the Japan Self-Defense Forces despite strides subsequent to the 1995 Kobe earthquake. The disconnect that remained between military and civilian relief efforts was striking. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was another primary catalyst for action. Responding to that crisis, U.S. and Japan military forces partnered successfully through well established joint coordination mechanisms (detailed in Chapter III). Civilian agencies, NGOs, and private sector responders, however, generally acted unilaterally with few of the partnerships that the scale of the disaster warranted. Resources and staff could have better served the affected host nations and enjoyed better Japan-U.S. coordination.

After laying the groundwork with Japanese government officials and NGOs, Dr. Aanenson initiated a civil-military disaster preparedness program, partnering with the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs think-tank. The program focused upon disaster preparedness of Japan and U.S. government, civil, military, and NGO assets. In 2006-2007, U.S. Embassy Tokyo held three disaster preparedness training sessions for Japan and U.S. participants from the militaries, assistance agencies, diplomatic corps, government ministries, and NGOs. Immediate results included the JSDF and U.S. Third Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) working together in the May 2006 earthquake in central Java; Japanese NGOs receiving USAID funds to respond to the 2007 Niigata earthquake; and senior officers of Japan Platform, the JSDF, and JICA holding quarterly meetings to continue discussing collaboration. Throughout the course of the Civil-Military Initiative, Peace Winds America has enjoyed significant support from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and from the U.S. Consulate General in Okinawa, combined with the outstanding cooperation of the Japan Ministry of Defense, JICA, and Japan Platform. Peace Winds America's success results from leveraging its wide network of active collaborators.

The most significant outcome of the Japan-U.S. joint actions has been the mutual recognition that HA/DR requires the strengthening of all players and that hands-on training is pivotal to strengthening skills and connectivity. Despite the lengthy history of Japan-U.S. cooperation, there existed significant gaps among stakeholders with few lessons learned in HA/DR. Defense training has tended to be significantly more insular than that for nontraditional security operations. The nascent concept of engagement with civil-society is underdeveloped, particularly as it pertains to HA/DR preparedness. With the recent lessons of Asia-Pacific disasters, the PWA Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative has been ideal for strengthening HA/DR among all partners.

PWA has been well positioned to carry out this Initiative predicated on openness, inclusiveness, and the "whole of society" approach. An NGO is the clear choice for a facilitator among diverse partners. A non-military organization ideally serves as facilitator given the Civil-Military Initiative stress on the importance of *civilian leadership in disaster relief and recovery*. The fact that the Civil-Military Initiative was conceived and led by an NGO ultimately conveys the important message that involving the NGO sector is necessary for success. This message has been long overdue—and paramount to Japan and U.S. NGOs, the private sector, the militaries, as well as to the host nations.

PWA has robust experience in disaster relief and recovery operations. PWA has responded to disasters including Typhoon Morakot (Taiwan), the 2009 West Sumatra earthquake, the 2010 Port-au-Prince earthquake in Haiti, the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, and 2012 typhoons Saola and Bopha in the Philippines. In each case PWA established partnerships with effective local or regional NGOs, extending its reach and leveraging the greater access and local knowledge of its partners. PWA responded immediately to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, establishing relief operations in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures that in time transitioned to recovery programs. PWA research and in-depth analysis of the Tohoku disaster is therefore matched by its on-the-ground relief and recovery experiences.

The 2011-2012 Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative had the overarching goal of improving command, control, communications, and coordination between Japan and the U.S., and among the regional disaster response stakeholders. Initiative methodology consisted of a series of senior-level policy forums, and hands-on, operations-level workshops highlighting best practices and lessons learned from examination of shared case studies. Alternating these two program elements produces a positive feedback effect as events build upon each other. Rather than a single capstone conference or seminar, repeated meetings forged and strengthened new organizational contacts. In that context,

the importance of sequential events that “build confidence and build patterns of cooperation,” particularly between new partners, cannot be overstressed.³⁵

The first Civil-Military Initiative focused on “policies, procedures, and partners,” with considerable time spent presenting, discussing, and analyzing the disaster policies, procedures, go/no-go triggers, decision trees, legal mandates and institutional goals of HA/DR organizations across sectors. Though grounded in the Japan-U.S. HA/DR system, concerted effort were made to involve the host nation and especially the UN. The recent Tohoku disaster featured prominently, allowing officials from all sectors to hear after-action reports and lessons learned from the disaster—many for the first time. The breadth of participants reflected PWA’s emphasis on all-stakeholders and “whole of society” measures while laying the groundwork for future organizational partnerships. The second workshop revolved around “deployment, execution, and transition,” focusing heavily on the specifics of HA/DR operations on the ground. Response planning, deployment methods, partnerships in relief, and the transition to recovery/reconstruction phases were the second workshop themes.

In addition to research on disaster preparedness, relief, and recovery in the Asia-Pacific, PWA drew upon a wide array of other primary sources, comprising the workshop presentations and group products, forum discussions, in-person meetings and interviews with core collaborators, and access to unpublished agency after-action reports, lessons learned, and analyses. Access to these sources has been key because agency documents – particularly lessons learned and after-action reports – too often are not shared beyond the boundaries of the reporting agency.

A series of meetings with policy-makers and ministry officials capped the work of the Civil-Military Initiative. Over the course of 18 months, PWA staff conferred with members of both houses of the Diet of Japan and the U.S. Congress, bureau officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA, directors at the Ministry of Defense, senior U.S. military and USAID officials, and directors at South Korea’s foreign and national defense ministries. The breadth of knowledge accumulated through the PWA Initiative is of considerable utility to policy-makers.

The PWA Civil-Military Initiative accomplished its aims on two fronts: training more than 200 participants in civil-military HA/DR operations, and providing recommendations and tools to shape and guide HA/DR policies at all levels. Ground-level responders are empowered by hands-on training as bureau directors used the Initiative to help formulate new operational guidance. Policy-makers and national leaders can utilize targeted recommendations and a detailed study of HA/DR in the Japan-U.S. alliance to bring the two nations closer together as they prepare and respond to future disasters.

³⁵ Dr. Michael Green (Senior Vice President for Asia, CSIS), remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

The Japan-U.S. Security Alliance and HA/DR

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INTRODUCTION

Japan has been a major allied security partner of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the Japan-U.S. security treaty was enacted in 1951. Since that time the treaty has been a major pillar of Japan’s security and defense policy and support for the Japan-U.S. alliance among the Japanese has been strong. In a 2011 poll conducted by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, *Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (NHK), 71 percent responded that the U.S.-Japan alliance well serves the security of Japan.¹ Yet the security treaty does not exist without controversy and ambivalence among some Japanese citizens.

One of the reasons for Japanese unease has to do with the asymmetrical characteristic of the alliance and the burden of hosting the U.S. military on Japanese territory, especially on Okinawa Island. Political resistance to the security treaty has come primarily from liberal-left wing political groups who fear entanglement with U.S. military activities. Their arguments against the alliance are based on Article IX of the Japanese Constitution which promotes an idealistic, liberal, “pacifist” view.

Despite this resistance, the majority of Japanese do support the alliance, acknowledging its positive impact on national defense and security. The perception of China as a rising threat in the region further strengthens this support.

With regard to the Japan-U.S. security alliance, it is important to note that the Japan public is generally ambivalent about its own military. Without full trust in their own military, particularly within the “pacifist” camp, it is natural that the Japanese display apprehension about the large number of foreign military forces stationed in their country. The Japanese general distrust of militarism stems

¹ Michio Sekiya “Nichibei Anpo no Ima” (Current Situation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), *Hosokenkyū to Chosa*, March 2011.

from Japan's failure to control its own military in the 1930s and 1940s, leading to the catastrophic war between Japan's Imperial Army and China and the U.S.

The Japan psyche has been shaped by its distrust and anti-military disposition, and by its contradictory sentiments regarding its defense policy and the alliance with the U.S.

Japan is currently undergoing a critically important period of transition. Attitudes among younger generations are changing, and the former security paradigm of "pacifism" is shifting toward a new "normalcy" that is more accepting of the utility of national military forces. At the same time, however, the new "normalcy" paradigm in Japan has become a source of tension vis-à-vis neighboring countries such as China and South Korea. Currently, Japan's transition, or "right" turn, has also worried U.S. experts who fear Japanese military entanglement in a conflict with China.

Given the highly sensitive regional environment, a change in Japanese security policy obliges Japanese policy-makers to provide reassurance to its citizens that the new "normalcy" paradigm is not a return to the old aggressive "garrison" state of Imperial Japan. They must also provide reassurance to Japan's neighbors, particularly in light of Japan's sensitive territorial disputes with China and South Korea.

Key to Japan's confidence-building efforts on both domestic and international fronts is the creation of military goods and services that are beneficial to the region. *To this end, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) should prudently and effectively work with its allied partner, the U.S., and with Asian neighbors such as South Korea to increase civil-military cooperation in non-combat missions such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR).*

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE

Japan's Dilemma—The Gap Between Constitutional Idealism and Alliance Realism

History is essential to understanding the characteristics of Japan's security policy as well as future collaborative missions of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan defense and security policy planning began at the end of World War II under U.S. and allied occupation. At the time, neither General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), nor Japan's citizenry possessed confidence in the ability of the new civilian political leadership to control independent Japanese military forces.

As a result, the Japanese government accepted a draft Constitution whose Article IX renounced war, waived the right of belligerency, and declared that national military forces would not be established or maintained. Article IX, originally a product of U.S. government and SCAP advisement, was intended to



The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S. Navy joint honor guard celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty at Alliance Park, Naval Air Facility Atsugi on 19 January 2010. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Mike R. Mulcare/Released.)

neutralize Japan as a potential military threat to the U.S in the future. However, it was also acknowledged that every nation state requires military forces to secure its own territory. The dilemma was resolved by way of Article IX that renounced military tools as means of solving international disputes, and the Japan-U.S. mutual security treaty that charged the U.S. with responsibility for the security of Japan. Below are excerpts from both Article IX and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1951:

Japanese Constitution, Article IX

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

The Mutual Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan in 1951, Article I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at

the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

At the time of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1951, regional stability in Northeast Asia continued to worsen with the allies fighting on the Korean Peninsula until 1953. In this context, Japan founded its own military force in 1954 with the support of the U.S. Given the dictates of Article IX, however, the activities and mission of the newly established Japan Self-Defense Forces were politically and legally restrained and have remained so ever since. The highly restricted activity of the JSDF has, instead, been reinforced by U.S. Forces Japan, a force guaranteed by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Theoretically, it was thought that as Japan became more independent, it would change the legal status of the JSDF from “restricted” to “normal.” In reality, however, Japan has not done so. Instead it has taken the pragmatic strategy of living with the contradictory constitutional interpretation of Article IX and the security alliance with the U.S.

Transition During the Yoshida Doctrine and the 1955 Political System

The focus of Japan after World War II was on economic growth rather than military strength. This strategic course was called the Yoshida Doctrine, named for Shigeru Yoshida, prime minister from 1946-47 and 1948-54. During the post-World War II period, Japan was granted access to U.S. and other Western markets. At the same time, Japan bore few of the economic costs associated with remilitarization because it had entered into the 1951 security treaty with the U.S. The dual-pronged Japanese policy of economic growth and non-militarization attracted broad support domestically, reflecting the strong anti-war sentiment that existed in the country at the time. The energy of Japan was fully concentrated on domestic reconstruction and economic growth. Further strengthened by the international environment of bipolar stability during the Cold War, Japan was able to break into the circle of advanced industrialized nations, eventually achieving the world’s second highest GDP.

After 1951, the main political parties in Japan reorganized and formed a cabinet and parliamentary government. The reunification of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the merger of two conservative parties (the Japan Democratic Party and the Liberal Party) led to the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in November 1955. The new political arrangement was called the “1955 System.” Politics were generally dominated by the LDP until 1993.

Because the LDP was basically the only party in power since 1955, the political opposition in Japan – the Socialist and Communist parties – had little to no experience in running the country. Over time it was observed that opposition policies became increasingly ideological and non-pragmatic. The Socialist and

Communist parties' main supporters were the ardent "pacifists" arising in the Japanese citizenry following the Second World War. Their views were at such odds with the LDP that there was little common ground for discussion or debate with the government on questions of defense or security policy. As a result, Japan security policy has largely been driven by ideological party posturing, with scant dialogue or constructive debate.

The Japan political environment saw some improvement during the course of the 1990s when less ideological parties emerged from the opposition. Two such parties were the then New Frontier Party and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). It was not coincidental that the emergence of these parties came about at a time when the Cold War was ending. The impact of the Cold War on Japan's security policy, however, remained with the strong residual Cold War structure persisting in North Korea. With the end of the Cold War, North Korea did not open its economy and conducted instead a brinkmanship policy with its regional neighbors designed to maximize its influence by threatening nuclear development.

Facing a potential threat from North Korea and a possible contingency on the Korean Peninsula, Japan and the U.S. adopted a new guideline for Japan-U.S. security. With the guideline, the Diet of Japan passed in 1998 the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan that enabled Japan and U.S. military forces to prepare and respond to crises in areas around Japan. The passage of such a bill was possible for the first time in Japan because of the more pragmatic approach of the DPJ opposition. Instead of opposing the bill outright as the Socialist Party would have done under the "1955 system," the DPJ opposition proposed independent amendments that focused on retaining civilian control and on ensuring that the Diet would remain informed about any security situation arising in areas around Japan.²

In 2009 the DPJ opposition party took control of the Japanese government. With the installation of the DPJ-led government, the Liberal Democratic Party then became the biggest opposition party, a party of pragmatists with nearly half a century of governing experience. This was a great opportunity for progress on Japan security policy, an issue that had been stalemated under the "1955 system." During its administration, the DPJ unveiled new developments in Japan defense and security policy. Unfortunately Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama delayed progress, and even set back the alliance policy due to his handling of the complex nature of the relocation plans of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Real progress occurred in 2010 when Prime Minister Naoto Kan approved the "National Defense Program Guideline for Fiscal Year 2011 and Beyond" (2010 NDPG). The Guideline introduced the "Dynamic Defense

² The Democratic Party of Japan, "The Democratic Party of Japan's Basic Policies on Security (Provisional Version)," (Policy Guidance, June 1999), <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/security.html>.

Force” concept, presenting Japan’s defense posture in the context of regional strategic balance, a strategic departure from the former static concept of “Basic Defense Force.”³ Further to these changes, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda strengthened U.S. confidence in the Japanese commitment to the Japan-U.S. security alliance through the April 2012 Japan-U.S. Consultative Committee. The resulting joint statement on dynamic defense cooperation enacted new guidelines for the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Later in the December 2012 general election, the LDP returned to power and Shinzo Abe, who supports a strong Japan-U.S. alliance, became the prime minister. Since his election, some of his proposals have included changing the interpretation of how the right of collective defense is exercised and creating a Japan version of the National Security Council. Many political observers also expect him to put forward an initiative that will move Japan even further toward a “normalcy” security policy.

China and South Korea are concerned about nationalistic elements in Abe’s policy, laying into sharp relief the balancing act that Japan must perform as it manages its security alliance with the U.S. and, at the same time, seeks to repair relations with China—both critical to regional stability. It is clear that Prime Minister Abe and other leaders face enormous challenges managing Japan’s policy transition from the old “1955 system” to the new Asia-Pacific security policy.

Weak Japanese political leadership over the years has sown seeds of anxiety among Japan’s neighbors. However, looking back on Japanese history, the outlook is not entirely grim. Japan today may well be at a historic turning point, on par with the Meiji restoration of the late 19th century, the start of war with the U.S. in 1941, or the signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951. In the past, Japanese leaders have emerged in response to the needs of the time, putting Japan on a dynamic path toward progress and security.

Unmet Expectations in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Although both Japan and U.S. support for the mutual security alliance is strong, Japan’s self-imposed restrictions on its national military activities have the leaders of both countries concerned about the maintenance of the alliance. For instance, it would be very difficult for U.S. leaders to maintain alliance support in the case of a security contingency in the vicinity of Japan wherein the JSDF was unable to cooperate with U.S. military missions due to political and legal restrictions. U.S. public support would rapidly wane.

Given the mutual concern about the operability of the security alliance, Japan and the U.S. have gradually accepted an expansion of JSDF military activities in order to maintain Japan’s own territorial defense and regional security.

³ Noboru Yamaguchi, “Deciphering the New National Defense Program Guidelines of Japan,” (The Tokyo Foundation, Policy Research Brief, 2012), 3-10.

The two nations created guidelines for security cooperation, once in 1978 and again in 1997, in order to ensure smooth and effective joint operations. Currently, both the Abe and Obama administrations plan to adopt further guidelines that would reflect new realities in the regional security situation.

These new guidelines may not, however, fully resolve the contradictory nature of Japan-U.S. joint military practice. Reviewing the 1997 guidelines process, the approach was described as “incremental,” meaning that both Japan and U.S. experts acknowledged the difficulties inherent to changing the interpretation of Article IX by the Japanese government as there is opposition to a revised interpretation both within Japan and by its neighbors.⁴ The Japan Government continues to interpret any integrated action of the JSDF with U.S. combat activity as unconstitutional. At the same time, neighboring nations remain concerned about a rise in Japanese aggression as occurred in the 1930s.

It is also important to note that the Japan-U.S. relationship has occasionally aroused bitter disappointment among U.S. officials. Dissatisfaction first surfaced around trade disputes during the 1970s and has existed ever since. During the 1980s, the notion that Japan was a “free rider” in the alliance was often employed to diminish Japan. When the economic bubble burst in 1990 and any perceived economic threat from Japan subsided, negative American feelings toward Japan lessened. That being said, as awareness of the limits of U.S. economic power and influence has grown in recent years, a new kind of U.S. frustration with Japan appears to have arisen.

In 2009, the troubled management of Prime Minister Hatoyama’s government administration worried U.S. officials, even though they were already aware of the gap between their expectations and the realities of alliance management since former LDP-led administrations. For example, former Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Michael Finnegan, published a November 2010 report writing for the private think tank, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). In the publication, entitled *Managing Unmet Expectations in the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, Finnegan wrote that problems with the alliance dated back to well before the Japan general election of August 2009 and ruled out the rise to power of the DJP administration as the cause.⁵ Instead he declared that “the attitude of the DPJ government toward maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance as it is, may be the catalyst for a readjustment that fills the gap in expectations between both sides.”⁶

Finnegan’s report candidly addresses U.S. disappointment regarding the work that Japan still must do to “normalize” the security arrangement. He and his

⁴ Mark T. Staples, “Legal Reform of the Self-Defense Forces,” *United States-Japan Security Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guideline*, Chapter 4 (CSIS Pacific Forum, May 2001), 45-47.

⁵ Michael Finnegan, *Managing Unmet Expectations in the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), 5.

⁶ *Ibid*, 6.

colleagues established a number of scenarios that would compromise the alliance. While Japan and the U.S. have worked out how the alliance would function in certain scenarios and war games, in many cases the arrangement would fail, with the two military forces working at cross-purposes. In a number of scenarios, there is the worry that Japan will not respond to U.S. military requests or that the U.S. will fail to take military action in spite of Japanese hopes.

Finnegan's report also includes an analysis of how China views the Japan-U.S. alliance. Therein, he explains that China does not necessarily seek an end to the alliance, because it fears the emergence of an independent nuclear-armed Japan that could set off a vicious cycle of nuclear weapons development in South Korea and Taiwan. China would likely prefer the continuation of a weak alliance between the two countries that could potentially fail to mobilize in the event of an emergency in the East China Sea or South China Sea. In his conclusion, Finnegan promotes the importance of building a cooperative Japan-U.S. relationship that actually functions for the protection of Japanese territory – returning to the origins of the alliance – instead of diluting it by addressing global issues such as Iraq and Afghanistan as prioritized during the Koizumi-Bush years.

Despite slight partisan differences among Asian security specialists in the U.S., they share two important views: (1) they expect Japan to play a positive role in the alliance; and (2) they are disappointed that it is not doing so. These views exist in a political environment wherein U.S. influence in Asia has waned, Japan building its relationship with China has become more difficult, and the U.S. military budget has become increasingly constrained.

About the time of the NBR report, another report was published by the Japanese think tank, The Tokyo Foundation (TKFD) and the Center for New American Security (CNAS). The October 2010 report titled, *Renewing Old Promises and Exploring New Frontiers: The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order*, also called for an updating of “old promises” not fulfilled toward allies, again reflecting the consensus of both Japanese and U.S. security experts.

Contributors to the joint report reaffirmed that experts on both sides do not wish that the Japan-U.S. alliance be left in its current state. That being said, observers do see its utility. Looking beyond Asian security specialists to more general U.S. public opinion, there are clearly very few people calling for an end to the alliance with Japan. The rise of China and its recent assertiveness in the South China Sea have in fact reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance to security in the Asian region.

Old Promises and New Frontiers

The TKFD/CNAS joint report takes the stance that “traditional alliance functions or ‘old promises’ – deterrence and crisis response – should be updated

to reflect the security dynamics in Northeast Asia, including shifts in the balance of power caused by the rise of China and developments on the Korean Peninsula.” One important area where “old promises” need to be renewed is in strengthening regional deterrence.⁷ It goes on to say, “With the United States deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, it is critical to reconfigure alliance roles, missions, and capability-sharing arrangements by conducting bilateral nuclear and conventional deterrence consultations.” The implementation of the realignment initiatives articulated in the May 2006 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” is considered essential in this process, as it will help sustain and fortify the U.S. forward presence in the face of China’s growing anti-access and area-denial capabilities.⁸

The report is also of interest in that it advocates for a Japan-U.S. strategy that combines military, legal, and political approaches to managing regional issues. For example, China is viewed to apply principles of international law selectively to assert its claims over maritime interests while it develops a blue-water navy. Because the sea lanes of communication stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific are of critical importance to the liberal international order, Japan and the U.S. should cooperate with and promote naval capacity building among littoral countries in Southeast Asia to maintain maritime security.⁹

The challenge according to Jim Thomas, Vice President for Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, participant in the Finnegan report, and also a major writer of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, is how to sustain U.S. military capability in the Asia-Pacific region over the long-term, especially at a time when the military is suffering financial difficulties. Thomas, the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense under the Bush Administration, promotes the view that Japan should effectively share the burden of counterbalancing China’s naval strength in the scenario of an air-sea battle, cooperating under the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In a report authored by Thomas and others, Japan’s role is clearly stated: “Importantly, AirSea Battle is not a U.S.-only concept. Allies such as Japan and Australia, and possibly others, must play important enabling roles in sustaining a stable military balance.”¹⁰

⁷ Notably the American consensus is that Japan has failed to do its “homework” as an alliance partner in terms of regional and global security, with U.S. discontent silently building over many years. Nowhere is this consensus stronger than among government officials currently dealing with these issues, and specialists who have been involved in managing the alliance in the past.

⁸ The Tokyo Foundation (TKFD) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Study Group on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, *Joint Statement-Renewing Old Promises and Exploring New Frontiers: The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Liberal International Order*, (Washington, D.C. and Tokyo: CNAS and TKFD, 27 October 2010), 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

¹⁰ Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept*, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), XI.

The Tokyo Foundation/CNAS report proposes a “new frontier” for Japan-U.S. cooperation, beyond the renewal of “old promises.” It lists an increasing number of issues around which Japan can play an important role as a “global civilian power,” harnessing the power of the Japan-U.S. alliance. These are: (a) humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; (b) climate change, energy, and natural resources; (c) nuclear nonproliferation; and, (d) development and aid policy.¹¹

The TKFD/CNAS report identifies HA/DR as a key pillar of a renewed Japan-U.S. alliance, noting that the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) can contribute to “strategic lift” in responding rapidly to disasters and humanitarian crises, as was the case in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 2004.¹² The report outlines that providing security against natural disasters is a priority issue in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the Japanese government White Paper on Disaster Management, Asia accounted for about 37 percent of natural disaster events, 89 percent of disaster victims and 59 percent of disaster deaths from 1978 to 2007.¹³

The TKFD/CNAS report adds that Japan-U.S. military cooperation can provide core infrastructure in an emergency with its high interoperability and practiced procedures. U.S. involvement could also address new security challenges in Asia, given U.S. capabilities as an effective naval peacekeeper. The report posits that Japan-U.S. HA/DR cooperation among U.S. forces in Japan and the 22 SDF and related agencies of the Japanese government would provide a dialogue on contingency scenarios in Japanese territory and surrounding regions.¹⁴

The report also stresses that a seamless response capability involving both the military and civil society is very important and states that Japan-U.S. HA/DR activity could contribute to human dignity in East Asia and the Pacific.¹⁵

JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION AFTER THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE

Impact of Operation *Tomodachi* on the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 11 March 2011 and the ensuing Fukushima nuclear crisis provided invaluable lessons about the strengths

¹¹ Tokyo Foundation, *Joint Statement*, 18-19.

¹² Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) joined the disaster relief operations in Thailand and Indonesia. The team engaged in transportation activities, epidemic prevention, and medical services. About 1,600 SDF personnel were sent, and their operations in Thailand and Indonesia were their largest-ever international disaster relief operations. Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2005*, (White Paper, 2005), 249-245.

¹³ Tokyo Foundation, *Joint Statement*, 18.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 19.

and weaknesses of the Japan-U.S. alliance. On the plus side, the close cooperation of the JSDF and U.S. military demonstrated the basic interoperability of Japan and the U.S. on a military level. On the downside, it also revealed significant difficulties with information sharing. The functioning of risk management mechanisms in Japan was also an issue, clearly exposed as inadequate both within the bureaucracy and at political levels.

The Japan SDF went into action 29 minutes after the earthquake struck, mobilizing 100,000 troops over seven days and immediately beginning search and rescue as well as its aid mission. A Joint Task Force (JTF) was created for the first time by the SDF, with Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces working in close collaboration. On the U.S. side, military forces mounted Operation *Tomodachi*, massing 24 ships including the USS *Ronald Reagan* aircraft carrier, 190 aircraft, and mobilizing 24,000 troops. Operation *Tomodachi* was also responsible for carrying out search and rescue activities as well as a range of other efforts, including clearing away rubble at Sendai Airport and Oshima Port, monitoring radiation levels, providing barges to carry water to cool the stricken reactors, and mobilizing the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) to help stabilize the nuclear accident.

To facilitate communications with Japan, the U.S. military installed an all-forces support team of approximately 300 personnel at Yokota Air Base, coordinating directly with an SDF liaison team dispatched to the base. The key post of liaison officer for the SDF was filled by Ground Self-Defense Force Major General Koichiro Bansho, offering strong leadership.¹⁶

Compared to the strong Japan-U.S. military cooperation seen in the aftermath of the disaster, however, information sharing between the civilian governments of the two countries was a major concern. A framework for civilian-level information-sharing was created by the DPJ government, but it was inexperienced in responding to a crisis of this magnitude. A coordinating task force was ultimately established, involving the Japanese government, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the U.S. military. This task force contributed to rebuilding the confidence that was feared lost between the U.S. and Japan in the very earliest days of the response effort.¹⁷

The U.S. Strategic Rationale in Operation *Tomodachi*

On 17 March 2011, President Obama made a speech in support of and in solidarity with Japan. The most striking phrase he used in the speech was, “In

¹⁶ “Yuji nami sakusen-chousei ittai: Yokota-ni bei-tougoubutai, jieitai mo jouchu,” (Contingency-Level Integrated Coordination of the Japan-U.S. Operation: U.S. Joint Force and Japan Self-Defense Forces Deployed At Yokota Air Base), 7 April 2011, *Asahi Shimbun*.

¹⁷ Ibid.

the midst of economic recovery and global upheaval, disasters like this remind us of the common humanity that we share.” While this was a humanitarian appeal to provide disaster relief to Japan, it also confirmed that the U.S. stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Japan on the basis of their shared history, and also on the basis of their shared values.

On 6 April, in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Robert F. Willard listed challenges to sustaining the stable international environment of the Asia-Pacific region. These challenges included North Korean nuclear weapons development, China’s rapid military modernization and unclear intent, natural disasters, and humanitarian crises such as pandemics and famines.¹⁸ Looking at the Asian security environment, the U.S. feared that if the damage to Japan worsened, its political and economic power would be negatively affected. This would certainly have a direct impact on the U.S. economy. The U.S. also wanted to avoid a change to the regional balance of power in the direction of China. In an interview with NBR, Admiral Thomas Fargo, former Commander of U.S.



Aboard the *USS Ronald Reagan* on 4 April 2011, Japan Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa receives the Operation *Tomodachi* banner from the five U.S. uniformed military services. Goodwill messages are sent to the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ friends and families, and to the people of Japan. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Kyle Carlstrom/Released.)

¹⁸ Robert F. Willard, “Statement before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” (U.S. House of Representatives Testimony, 6 April 2011).

Pacific Command, noted that “Japan is our long-standing alliance partner and the habits of cooperation that have been built over some 50 years have allowed us to once again respond very quickly.”¹⁹

These comments by senior U.S. officials indicate that they see U.S. political and economic power to be closely related to Japan’s security and, moreover, that the U.S. would like to avoid a major shift in the regional power balance toward China. A lengthy history of military and HA/DR cooperation reassured U.S. leaders and provided another rationale for the substantial U.S. response to the disaster. Sapped by stagnation and by divisive issues such as the Okinawa base dispute, Operation *Tomodachi* was a step toward rebuilding confidence in the alliance, a long-term challenge.

Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC)

Japan’s evolving policy direction was demonstrated by the New National Defense Program Guidelines in December 2010. In June 2011, Japan and the U.S. convened a “two plus two” Security Consultative Committee (SCC) to discuss these defense guidelines and broad cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. At this meeting the four ministers (foreign affairs and defense) drew heavily on the invaluable experience of the joint HA/DR operation in the Great East Japan Earthquake. This agreement included the “new frontier” of the alliance as TKFD/CNAS proposed in June 2011.

Before Operation *Tomodachi*, Japan’s New National Defense Program Guidelines were announced by the Kan administration in December 2010. The guidelines were highly significant in that they contained the seeds of a potentially historic change in Japanese security policy and risk management. Up until that point, Japan’s defense policy had been legally and politically constrained by the concept of “exclusive defensive defense,” a reflection of Article IX of the Constitution, and had adhered to the concept of “basic defensive power.” The guidelines introduced the new concept of “dynamic defensive force,” whereby Japan is able to determine its defensive posture in response to the international context.²⁰

The new guidelines also proposed the establishment of a risk management organization like the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) governed by the Prime Minister which would have the means to respond to multiple simultaneous crises in a “seamless” manner. As such, the body would be useful in just the kind of earthquake/nuclear emergency situation that the country

¹⁹ Graham Webster, “The Military Foundations of U.S. Disaster Assistance in Japan: An Interview with Admiral Thomas Fargo, USN (Ret.),” <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=127>.

²⁰ Japan Ministry of Defense, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond*, (Policy Guidelines, 17 December 2010).

recently experienced.²¹ Further to the National Defense Program Guidelines, the agreement of the foreign ministry and defense ministers on the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee is more evidence of a sea change in risk management and security policy. The alignment of the Japan Guidelines and the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review speak to new closeness in defense and security cooperation within the alliance.

Among the common strategic objectives enumerated by the SCC, Japan and the U.S. have agreed that the mission of their alliance in the Asian region is to: (a) “encourage China’s adherence to international norms of behavior”; (b) “encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues”; and, (c) “strengthen security cooperation with ASEAN and support ASEAN’s efforts to promote democratic values and a unified market economy.”²²

The objectives do not only involve Japan and the U.S., but also the cooperation of Australia, South Korea, and India in addition to the ten ASEAN nations. The new Japan-U.S. agreement, moreover, posits a strengthening of deterrence and emergency response, based on the effective interoperability demonstrated by the U.S. and Japan forces during the 3/11 Great East Japan Disaster, with a logistical base established in Japan to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.²³

International Liberal Order—Direction for Japan-U.S. Regional Security Cooperation

Considering the rise of China in the East Asian region and long-standing U.S. frustrations regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance, the time is ripe for Japanese policy to remove bureaucratic stovepipes and deal with the emotional anti-war opposition of its citizenry so that it can build a Japanese defensive force able to cooperate and perform effectively with the U.S. on security matters. By advancing Japan-U.S. cooperation to address regional stability, worries about the rise of China and other regional countries can be kept to a minimum.

In the Tokyo Foundation/CNAS joint statement, the shared task of protecting the common good of a “liberal international order” in East Asia is mentioned as a mission for the Japan-U.S. alliance.²⁴ This may be new wording, but it is in keeping with the traditional expectations of the alliance. The report reads:

Japan and the United States are not the only beneficiaries of this stable international environment. The postwar liberal international order has been accessible to any

²¹ Ibid.

²² U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, *Joint Statement of the “Toward a Deeper and Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,”* 21 June 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166597.htm>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Tokyo Foundation, *Joint Statement*, 10-12.

country, regardless of its economic system or political orientation vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. The rapid economic development and social modernization of East Asian countries, particularly China, was made possible due to sustained, open access to the liberal international order. The bilateral alliance has thus provided a sound basis for regional stability and prosperity.²⁵

The notion of the “liberal international order” aligns with the goals of both the Japan and U.S. security communities. Therefore it should be relatively straightforward to gain consensus for this approach from U.S. politicians both liberal and conservative.

Japan’s security policy in the Asia-Pacific region should seek the support of regional partners and strive to enhance the appeal of the Japan-U.S. alliance. In that sense, it can create “soft power” in the region that will attract other nations. While the focus is certainly on military contributions to the alliance, economic recovery in Japan and Japan’s adherence to free trade will be increasingly important to the success of the alliance as well. For instance, the Kan and Noda governments’ policy of a “third opening of the nation” and its consideration of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are a vital part of alliance policy.²⁶

If encouraging China to be a stable and responsible regional “stakeholder” is a primary goal, then an important tool will be incentives for mutual economic dependence between Japan and China in the future. To achieve this, Japan needs to be more proactive in increasing its economic contributions and influence across the Asian region. At the same time, Japan should work to establish a bilateral strategic policy discussion with China around issues like deterrence and cyber security. In the meantime, progress to create a hub in Japan to support HA/DR communications, based on the country’s experience with major earthquakes and other disasters, will go a long way towards enhancing the appeal of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the Asia-Pacific region.

Another task for Japan will be the reinforcement of its infrastructure and procedures to improve information security systems, to introduce security clearances across all government departments, and to enhance counterintelligence measures. Japan will also have to strengthen its legal framework in this regard.

Okinawa Base Issues Remain a Challenge

While the governments of Japan and the U.S. have agreed on a current proposal for the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, there would be few observers in either country who believe a transition from Futenma to the Henoko district of Nago, Okinawa will go smoothly given the staunch

²⁵ Ibid, 10.

²⁶ In late 2010, then Prime Minister Naoto Kan proposed Japan pursue trade liberalization with a “third opening” to the world—the first two being the arrival of Commodore Perry in the 19th century and the post-World War II American occupation.

opposition from prefectural and local authorities. Yet neither Japan nor the U.S. has the breathing space to replace the current plan with a new one, and even if they did revise the plan, acceptance by local populations is far from guaranteed.

One important development in the ongoing challenge is that Japan and the U.S. were able to come to a revised agreement that streamlines U.S. military presence on Okinawa. In particular, the 2012 agreement between Prime Minister Noda and President Obama will shift 9,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other Asia-Pacific sites. The rationale for the revised agreement is founded on the common understanding that relocating Futenma from a crowded part of Okinawa to a new site would necessitate years of planning. The revised approach separates the Futenma relocation from other elements, such as moving Marine forces to Guam and returning some to parts of Okinawa, as well as further developments in the functions of joint security cooperation.²⁷

The new plan notwithstanding, the Japan government will still need to work hard to build trust with the people of Okinawa, something that will not be achieved overnight. Long-term relationship building beginning at the top levels of government will be necessary. A good model for this work could be the 1995 Special Action Committee on Okinawa, which at the time focused on local-level relationship building in Okinawa.

It is clear that without the trust of the Okinawan people, no plan advanced by Japan and the U.S. can be executed. The fact remains that today Futenma is the world's most dangerous air base and is putting support for the Japan-U.S. alliance at risk. The overall direction of the Japan-U.S. alliance is fairly obvious, yet the Futenma issue is imperiling support for the alliance. Without political initiative, there will be little progress.

Many Okinawans deeply appreciate Operation *Tomodachi*, a very positive symbol of the Japan-U.S. alliance and the U.S. soldiers' devoted work. At the same time, people recognize how the U.S. Marine Corps has behaved arrogantly in Okinawa.²⁸ Anti-war sentiment also is strong. The difficulty of Okinawa issues comes partly from the Okinawan people's deep frustration and suspicion of the Japan central government and its Self-Defense Forces. Okinawans share a collective memory of the 82-day-long Battle of Okinawa between the Japanese Imperial Army and the U.S. Forces in 1945. Okinawan people have not gotten over suspicion and anti-war feelings against both the Japanese and U.S. militaries.

Japan-U.S. cooperation in non-military areas is of paramount importance especially considering such a skeptical perception on Okinawa.

²⁷ Paul Eckert, "U.S., Japan unveil revised plan for Okinawa," *Reuters*, 27 April 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/27/us-usa-japan-okinawa-idUSBRE83Q03M20120427>.

²⁸ "Gun-no Ronri-ni Mubou-na Kuni-yo," (Military Logic in an Innocent Japan) *Ryukyuu Shimpō*, 24 June 2011.

Greater Support for the Self-Defense Forces and Partnering after Operation *Tomodachi*

In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Japanese public has expressed increased support for the JSDF and, in particular, satisfaction and gratefulness for the supporting Operation *Tomodachi*. Throughout its history, the JSDF has engaged in disaster relief. The willingness to engage in HA/DR is naturally due to the historical limitations of the JSDF but also due to the experience of Japan with a range of large-scale disasters over the years.

In a poll conducted by the Japanese government in January 2012, 97.7 percent of the Japanese stated that they appreciated JSDF operations in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. In the same poll, 79.2 percent of Japanese respondents said they were impressed with the achievements of the supporting Operation *Tomodachi*. The positive image of the JSDF went up from 80.9 percent in 2008 to 91 percent in 2011.²⁹ In parallel, a record 82 percent of Japanese described having “friendly feelings” toward the U.S. in a December 2011 government poll.³⁰

The liberal leaning Democratic Party of Japan showed strong support for the alliance as the government party from 2008 to 2011. This was an important political turning point when Japan’s ruling and opposition parties shared the positive view of expanding the JSDF’s military and security role for the first time in history. The DPJ reform plans for the alliance became more feasible thanks to the increased public support.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. forces highly effective cooperative response clearly demonstrated their capabilities as cornerstones of Asia-Pacific regional security. With growing support for the Self-Defense Forces and its alliance with the United States, the Japanese government has an opportunity to expand its missions and strengthen ties with the U.S.

Anxiety Regarding the LDP Administration and the Need for Reassurances to Neighboring Nations

In the general election of December 2012, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to his second tenure as prime minister with a proposal to change the constitutional interpretation of “the right of collective defense.” As for the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the rebirth of an LDP government was taken as a boost to increasing ties within the bilateral alliance.

Despite a number of steps forward, Abe’s prime ministership has created a new anxiety among experts in Japan and U.S. Many worry that Abe’s

²⁹ Japan Cabinet Office “Jieitai Boucui-mondai ni-kansuru Ishikichousa,” (Public Poll Regarding the Self-Defense Forces and Defense Issues) 22 March 2012.

³⁰ Martin Fackler, “Japan Poll Finds Record Good Will for U.S.,” *The New York Times*, 4 December 2011.

assertiveness toward China may result in military conflict. In particular, it is feared that chilly relations between Japan and China will worsen as China further challenges Japanese territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands. Since Prime Minister Noda's purchase of the islands, Chinese paramilitary maritime patrol vessels and airplanes have entered Japanese territory a number of times, creating a highly insecure environment. The government of Japan must provide greater reassurances to China and its neighbors who openly declare that Japan's actions in the Senkaku Islands are proof of its potential return to the militarism.

One group sounding the alarm is the U.S.-based Eurasia Group. The Eurasia Group listed a potential military conflict between Japan and China among their "Top Risks 2013." They describe the risk as follows:

The country will become more assertive in its policy postures as a new Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government pursues a more nationalist bent. New Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has already pledged to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities and to solidify Japanese control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Beijing will see such a move as confrontational, and it will herald another period of heightened tension in the Japan-China relationship.³¹

Given that China has similar maritime disputes with other East Asian nations surrounding the South China Sea, it is imperative to reassure China and the region as a whole that the aim of the U.S. military presence and the Japan-U.S. alliance more generally is to serve the public good, i.e., stability and security in the region.

That being said, the functions of Japan-U.S. cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are more important than ever. Japan and the U.S. could even engage the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in such activities. If China were to join, it would improve trust and confidence among the countries, as the Chinese seem to be open to HA/DR collaboration. In the aftermath of the Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008, China accepted a Japan urban search and rescue team, even though it was required to fly to China by private charter rather than use military aircraft.³²

Reassuring South Korea of the benign character of the Japan-U.S. alliance is equally important. Although South Korea is one of America's closest allies, distrust of Japan's "normal" security policy runs deep. South Korea refused to accept the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) that would have improved communications in contingency operations against North Korean aggression. Distrust between Japan and South Korea is a concern, particularly if there were a security contingency on the Korean peninsula.

³¹ The Eurasia Group "Top Risks 2013," accessed 28 January 2013, <http://www.eurasiagroup.net/pages/top-risks-2013>.

³² "Memories That Still Linger" *The Japan Times*, 1 June 2008, <http://weekly.japantimes.co.jp/ed/memories-that-still-linger>.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Japan-U.S. joint disaster relief is an important area for development as it can function to address the highly complex diplomatic and security challenges of the Asia-Pacific region. Due to its non-combat nature, HA/DR cooperation would help to build trust and confidence among players in the region. Such cooperation has never been timelier.

HA/DR would serve as a great opportunity to train in joint operations. Such non-combat cooperation is an effective tool to persuade skeptics in the Japan domestic audience who still hold reservations regarding the Japan-U.S. alliance and the normalcy paradigm of removing Japan's self-imposed legal and political restrictions. There should be little time wasted preparing a regional cooperative framework for possible future disasters in the region. Japan and the United States are responsible for creating an initiative to address natural disasters.

Case Studies: Recent Major Disasters

Throughout the Civil-Military Initiative, Peace Winds America has maintained a strong focus on the use of recent disasters as models for lessons learned and best practices. Regrettably there has been no shortage of major disaster events in the past decade to study. The storms, floods, and earthquakes that comprise Initiative case studies have spanned the full geographic reach of Asia, affecting areas urbanized and rural, developed and developing, politically stable and unstable. The case study analysis also involved the dispatch and response of the full range of HA/DR actors: civilian government, military, civil society, multilaterals, and the private sector. In every case the specific dynamics of the responders and their interaction with the host nation(s) varied, providing a diversity of situations for examination.

A consistent finding of Initiative events and interviews is that there is very little information sharing among agencies. In the wake of a major disaster, such as the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, organizations looking for case study materials will find publicly available reports, think tank “white papers,” and government publications. Individual agency after-action reports, “hot washes,” and lessons learned documents may however be (a) classified; (b) for internal use only; (c) unpublished or undistributed; or (d) all of the above. Smaller actors, such as NGOs, may not perform regular after-action reviews or may be hesitant to be critical of partners or funding sources. Even when case study documents are available, many stakeholders are not aware that they can request them.

In the wake of the 2011 Tohoku disaster, PWA documented a number of cases of poor or non-existent communication and coordination among actors. Attempts to remedy these shortcomings must be collaborative in nature, as an agency cannot hope to improve partnerships or increase collective preparedness unilaterally. With better access to post-disaster analyses, responding organizations can better plan future responses. The need for broad dissemination of case reports is especially critical. As the stigma of civil-military cooperation fades for NGOs, after-action reports and self-assessment documents will serve a critical role in studying how the military responds to disasters and how civil society actors can partner with them. Detailed reportage from prior disasters can help military commanders gauge the capacities and unique capabilities of NGO partners. Coalitions such as Japan Platform or InterAction, and civil-military focused

NGOs such as Peace Winds America can serve to facilitate this important information sharing.

During the PWA Civil-Military Initiative workshops, the overarching focus of case studies has been on lessons learned, the applicability of HA/DR to the broader political and security context, and the identification of tools most useful for future planning and response. These elements take precedence over the general chronologies of the disasters, which are well documented elsewhere. The Japan and U.S. responses are the central focus throughout the Civil-Military Initiative. The study of the two nations' actions in these disasters informs the following chapters on Japan-U.S. preparedness, response, and recovery.

Another important concentration in the PWA review of disaster case studies is the role of the host nation. Disasters retrospective reports often look only at high-profile international response efforts, marginalizing the host nation in HA/DR discussions.

2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI


The earthquake off the coast of northern Sumatra on the morning of 26 December 2004 was one of the deadliest natural disasters in history and had a profound impact on the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The 9.1-9.3 M_w ¹ subduction quake generated waves up to 98 feet, devastated large swaths of 14 countries, and left over 230,000 people dead, including 165,708 in Indonesia and 35,399 in Sri Lanka alone. Many millions were affected, injured and displaced. The humanitarian response, in dollars and manpower, was unprecedented. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, international pledges of assistance came to 12.2 billion USD, and eventually reached as high as 14 billion USD.²

In Indonesia, the damage was particularly overwhelming and impaired the functions of nearly all potential responders. A vice president of the Indonesia National Disaster Management Coordinating Board arrived in Aceh soon after the tsunami to find no functioning district-level disaster managers. Virtually all other local government functions, including the military, were similarly non-functional. Civil society was unable to act. According to UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 27 percent of local NGOs operating in Aceh pre-tsunami lost staff members.³ On 29 December, however, the Coordinating

¹ This report uses the moment magnitude scale throughout to indicate seismic intensity of earthquakes. Moment magnitude, represented as M_w , has largely superseded the older Richter scale.

² Rhoda Margesson, "Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations," *Congressional Research Service* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2005), 4.

³ Elizabeth Scheper, *Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities: Indonesia Country Report* (London: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, 2006), 28.



The unparalleled scope of the 26 December 2004 tsunami. In addition to severely hit regions of Indonesia, nations as far away as Tanzania were affected, including the entire coastline of Sri Lanka. (Photo credit: Based on OCHA/ReliefWeb.)

Board formed a Special Coordination Unit for Aceh, headquartered in Jakarta. The Home Affairs Ministry staffed this unit with 156 personnel and dispatched others to establish command posts across the affected region.⁴ Due to the near-total lack of local government coordination, the armed forces of Indonesia played a critical role in conducting search and rescue and in delivering relief. On 27 December the Government of Indonesia made an open-ended request for international assistance through the UN. However, international responders were given little guidance on the type or nature of relief needed.

Domestic responses in other hard-hit countries resembled that of Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand, the magnitude and geographic extent of the damage rendered local government unable to cope. Sri Lanka was especially overwhelmed and quickly issued its own international appeal for assistance. The appeals to the UN included Thailand, the Maldives, and India.

The U.S. Response

The United States Government (USG) supplied direct relief to the affected areas in the Indian Ocean through two primary sources: the U.S. Agency for

⁴ Ibid, 24.

International Development (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

U.S. Civilian Response

Due to the scale of destruction, the deployed USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) necessarily had a multi-country mandate, focusing on Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Maldives and India. At the peak of its deployment, the DART comprised roughly 55 members, drawn from Washington, D.C.-based USAID staff, experts from Los Angeles and Fairfax County urban search and rescue (USAR) teams, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, the U.S. Forest Service, and the George Washington University medical center.⁵ Complementing the DART were over 100 more field-based USAID staff. Also supporting DART operations was a 42-member Response Management Team (RMT) based in Washington that worked to coordinate airlift and streamline operations with other responding agencies.

Due to the limited need for urban search and rescue, once on-site, the DART primary roles were coordinating assistance and providing relief supplies, followed by reaching out to local authorities and NGOs to begin planning longer-term initiatives such as job placement, schooling, cash-for-work and other recovery measures. In Indonesia, the DART assessed 25 locations over the course of six days to determine needs and humanitarian requirements. Four initial airlifts provided kitchen sets, mosquito nets, body bags, water jugs, and hygiene kits while DART members worked to repair water purification and sanitation facilities on the ground.⁶ Similar relief operations occurred simultaneously in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Total U.S. assistance through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for the duration of the disaster totaled 84.1 million USD, funding HA/DR work by local governments and UN agencies including the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNOCHA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), and more than 50 local and international NGOs.⁷

A retrospective analysis of the USAID response shows an unusually high level of cooperation and coordination with the U.S. military, due to the unprecedented scope of the disaster. The DART in Thailand quickly established a military liaison cell at the Utapao coordination center and placed staff at PACOM headquarters, ensuring close coordination of USAID-Department of Defense joint operations.

⁵ OFDA, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2005* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005), 16.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷ USAID, "Indian Ocean—Earthquakes and Tsunamis Fact Sheet #39," (situation report, U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005).

Testifying before Congress about civil-military integration during the disaster, then USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios praised the mission:

The military's willingness to follow USAID guidance on the best use of their assets to support local governments and NGOs was a milestone in our relationship. I am convinced that this coordination was key to saving lives, feeding people, and relieving great suffering.⁸

Natsios further maintained that a more streamlined, less stove-piped approach to HA/DR within USAID allowed for greater flexibility on the ground and fewer opportunities lost. Particularly within the USG, this disaster catalyzed a new approach to civil-military interactions in emergencies.

A significant lesson learned by civilian responders to the Indian Ocean tsunami was the importance of the so-called “Cuny principle,” which emphasizes *the critical importance of utilizing and engaging local actors in all phases of disaster response and recovery*:

The people in their communities are the first responders. Moreover, they embody strengths that exist in no other group—strengths that absolutely must be harnessed if we are to build positive change in the affected society.... But the best way for outsiders to assist is to provide help that is part of a long-term solution defined by local actors, rather than just a hand-out. In practice, this means that relief assistance efforts should focus on recovery and renewal from the very beginning.⁹

The “Cuny principle” has long been a mantra within the HA/DR community, but the sheer size of this disaster and the scope of its devastation re-emphasized the importance of utilizing local and host nation assets to the greatest degree possible. Because host nation government resources – particularly at the local or provincial level – were overwhelmed or non-functional in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the role of NGOs emerged as particularly crucial. In this case, local actors were in some instances domestic NGOs, but just as frequently international NGOs or UN agencies with a long-standing presence in the host nation. In cases similar to the Indian Ocean tsunami, NGOs have the dual advantage of being quick to respond, flexible, less encumbered by red tape, and possessing a knowledge of on-the-ground factors in a way that USAID/OFDA or DOD may not.

In his testimony to Congress regarding the 2004 tsunami, Natsios acknowledged the “Cuny principle,” stating, “So our doctrine over the years has been to ensure that there is a competent NGO on the ground that knows

⁸ United States Senate, “Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned—Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” (Testimony transcript, U.S. Senate, 2005), 54.

⁹ United States Senate, “Hearing,” 55. This eponymous principle derives from disaster expert Fred Cuny, who in *Disasters and Development* stressed the primacy of locals in relief and response.

how to do this or a U.N. agency like the World Food Programme that receives the food and ensures the most vulnerable get it.”¹⁰

The “Cuny principle” is similarly important with regard to the immediate phase of HA/DR response. Despite the growth of rapid aerial deployment capabilities, international assets will generally arrive after the most emergent stage of disaster response. This was particularly the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami, where the geographic scale of the damage meant that rescues and life-saving actions were largely carried out by locals. According to former Asian Disaster Reduction Center executive director Atsushi Koresawa, this was also the case during the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe, Japan wherein nearly 99 percent of rescues from collapsed buildings and fires were made not by fire department or urban search and rescue personnel, but by families and neighbors of the victims.¹¹ Even in the presence of a robust Asian HA/DR mechanism comprising many competent providers, local community leaders and NGOs are generally still the first to arrive on the scene and provide aid.

Operation Unified Assistance—U.S. Military Response

The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster saw the rapid deployment and heavy usage of U.S. military assets across the region. At the request of U.S. embassies in host nations and in consultation with U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense stood up the PACOM Joint Task Force (JTF) 536 composed primarily of elements from the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) in Okinawa. Complementing units from III MEF were the USS *Abraham Lincoln* Carrier Strike Group (CSG-9) and the USS *Bonhomme Richard* Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG-5), along with some four dozen land-based aircraft.¹² Three Disaster Relief Assessment Teams were deployed by PACOM to Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia.

To establish command-and-control operations and liaise with the other civil and defense assets operating in theater, III MEF operated out of the Royal Thai Navy Base at Utapao on the Gulf of Thailand. Once there, JTF 536 was re-designated as Combined Support Force 536 (CSF), under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Robert Blackman to reflect the “increasingly multilateral nature of the relief effort.”¹³ The CSF operated alongside the Utapao Combined Coordination Center (CCC), which included military and civilian leadership. These two

¹⁰ United States Senate, “Hearing,” 65.

¹¹ Atsushi Koresawa, “ADRC’s activities to reduce disaster risks and enhance disaster resilience in Asia,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

¹² Lt. Cdr. Robert Loughran, *Who’s in Charge Here? Civil-Military Coordination in Humanitarian Assistance*, (Newport: Naval War College, 2008), 4.

¹³ James L. Schoff, *Tools for Trilateralism: Improving U.S.-Japan-Korea Cooperation to Manage Complex Contingencies* (Herndon, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 66.

groups quickly emerged as the logistical center of operations for the response. In addition to the PACOM forces, the CCC had representation from UNOCHA, the USAID DART, and liaison officers from Britain, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and Australia.¹⁴ To ensure the effective flow of information, assessments, and orders with the CCC, the Combined Support Force established subordinate Combined Support Groups (CSGs) on location in Aceh, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. These CSGs functioned to “support host nation-led efforts, but in most instances provided invaluable managerial and coordinating expertise that might otherwise have gone lacking, while augmenting overstretched local assets.”¹⁵ In addition to the CSGs, elements from the *Abraham Lincoln* established an information management center in Banda Aceh to coordinate requests, assessments, and reports from NGOs on the ground.

In keeping with its HA/DR mandate, PACOM forces quickly began handing over tasks, insofar as possible, to host nation or civilian government resources and establishing an exit strategy. General Blackman’s directive of 6 January (only twelve days after the disaster), stated that, “U.S. forces will limit operations to essential life-sustaining operations and, where feasible, will hand off HA/DR functions to other agencies as soon as practical.”¹⁶ This order dovetailed with a request from the Indonesian government that all U.S. military forces withdraw by March 2005. The last PACOM assets departed the disaster zone within two months of deployment, although the U.S. Navy’s hospital ship USNS *Mercy* remained until 16 March. During the course of the operation, military assets delivered 24 million pounds of relief supplies, supported by 1,800 sorties from the *Abraham Lincoln* alone.¹⁷ The total U.S. forces deployed for the disaster exceeded 15,000 DOD personnel.

The legacy of the civil-military cooperation and coordination mechanism during the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami is a mixed one. The Utapao Combined Coordination Center was praised as an effective means of establishing joint command-and-control operations, and as a unified post where assessments could be received and orders dispatched to field elements and CSGs. On the whole, however, the response revealed serious problems both within PACOM’s HA/DR operations as well as with its inter-governmental coordination. One retrospective analysis found that PACOM was inadequately prepared for such a large-scale HA/DR operation and that there were serious

¹⁴ Ralph A. Cossa, “South Asian Tsunami: U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone’ For Relief Operation,” *USA: Foreign Policy Agenda*, 2005, accessed 7 December 2012, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/ijpe1104.htm>.

¹⁵ Cossa, “South Asian Tsunami.”

¹⁶ U.S. Pacific Command to commanding general, Combined Support Force 536, message 061800Z JAN, 05, 6 January 2005.

¹⁷ Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia* (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 92.

deficiencies in proper equipment, planning, and training. From the outset, “on the fly” planning and execution became the norm, leading to large amounts of confusion and frustration.¹⁸

Interviews with commanding officers revealed that PACOM and U.S. Navy units deployed quickly, albeit often with vague or incomplete orders and a poor understanding of their role both on the scene and within the larger response framework. Overall, Operation *Unified Assistance*, “document[ed] the requirement for enhanced communications, and humanitarian assistance training, and the necessity for a timely response.”¹⁹

Another lesson learned from the HA/DR response was the importance of using the unique capabilities of U.S. military. The role of the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* has been singled out as particularly important. It provided a mobile fixed wing and helicopter base without an in-country “footprint,” and also it provided a potent demonstration of the USG commitment to the relief effort.

Critics, however, have pointed to the enormous cost of operating the aircraft carrier (approximately six million USD a day) and the fact that other platforms may be more ideally suited to an HA/DR mission.²⁰ USNS *Mercy* achieved a similar result. Due to its slow speed and the distance it was required to travel, it arrived over a month after the disaster, significantly diminishing its utility for immediate post disaster medical care. Although the *Mercy*, like the *Abraham Lincoln*, demonstrated USG commitment to the cause, for disasters of this type, local and regional NGOs may be more timely, effective, and cost-efficient options. Ultimately U.S. military forces must balance intangibles such as demonstrating political will and solidarity with the costs of doing so, which are often quite steep.

The Combined Coordination Center at Utapao increased coordination among assets, but did not harmonize command functions. According to Rear Admiral Douglas Crowder, the lack of a “combined military chain of command” meant that each individual agency at Utapao was making separate bilateral agreements with the Indonesian government.²¹ While Utapao may be seen as a success in its coordination mission, the notion of a unified chain of command – to the extent that it is possible – remained unrealized during the disaster. This underscores the critical importance of an integrated relationship with the host nation. Because each government was negotiating separately with host nations, donor nations had to make a range of separate bilateral plans with each individual host nation.

¹⁸ Lt. Adrian W. Jope, *HA/DR: Is USPACOM 'Ready on Arrival?* (Newport: Naval War College, 2007), 1.

¹⁹ Jope, *Ready*, 5.

²⁰ Elleman, *Waves*, 91.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 94.



The aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) underway on 9 January 2005 to support Operation *Unified Assistance* in the Indian Ocean off Banda Aceh, Sumatra, Indonesia. (U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Jordon R. Beesley/Released.)

The Japan Response

Japan's response to the Indian Ocean tsunami was historically its largest overseas relief mission and an important catalyst for Japan's growing role as a regionally important HA/DR actor. The tsunami came only two years after the Law Concerning the Independent Administrative Institution Japan International Cooperation Agency, designating JICA as a standalone agency reporting directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in cases of disaster team dispatch overseas.

JICA's response to the 2004 tsunami centered on the four hardest-hit nations: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Maldives. The JICA Sri Lanka team was the first to deploy, leaving Narita airport 23 hours after the tsunami and arriving at Colombo before any other international relief team.²² It was followed soon after by the deployment of JICA teams to Thailand and the Maldives on 29 December and to Indonesia on 30 December. Over the course of the disaster response, JICA fielded a total of 13 Disaster Relief Teams (DRTs) comprising 248 members. Complementing the DRTs were relief goods shipped directly from the JICA warehouse in Singapore.

²² Japan International Cooperation Agency, "JICA Reforms Phase 2—Evolving International Cooperation," in *JICA Annual Report 2005* (Tokyo: JICA, 2005), 11.

The DRTs on the ground fell into three areas of expertise: medical, search and rescue, and expert teams. The medical cohort included doctors, nurses, and pharmacists registered in Japan and drawn from a JICA list of volunteers. The urban search and rescue personnel were drawn from the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA), and the Japan Coast Guard. DRT expert teams vary by disaster. In this case, teams included DNA forensics experts, hygiene and disease prevention specialists, and infrastructure and building experts.²³

The Indian Ocean tsunami was the first real test of JICA's unique volunteer system. The Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCVs) are maintained on a JICA-managed roster and called upon in times of disaster. The strength of this program is twofold: (a) it quickly boosts JICA's manpower for overseas relief efforts; and (b) makes use of a wide pool of resources outside that agency's direct employment. In this case, JOCVs were able to pair with DRT members in Indonesia and Thailand and provide critical translation and interpretation resources.²⁴ Over the course of the disaster, more than 1,800 JICA volunteers were activated and participated directly in relief efforts.²⁵

The Government of Japan (GOJ) response also saw a significant participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in partnership with JICA DRTs. In response to a request from the Thai government on 27 December and in consultation with the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) mobilized two destroyers, *Kirishima* and *Takanami*, and the supply ship *Hamana*, sending them to Phuket to begin relief operations, primarily USAR and body recovery.²⁶ On 12 January, the transport *Kunisaki*, the destroyer *Kurama* and the supply ship *Tokiwa* deployed to Sumatra to provide manpower and logistical support for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) operating in the area. A total of 1,220 JMSDF personnel were also involved in the mission.²⁷

This disaster was notable because of the high profile deployment of JSDF from all three branches. Over the course of the disaster, more than 1,570 JSDF personnel provided medical care or USAR, either independently or in concert with JICA. The first response was the JGSDF field hospital run jointly with a DRT in Lam Ara, Aceh.²⁸ Later in the response, JGSDF medical teams partnered

²³ "Indonesia: Japan disaster relief team," ReliefWeb, 17 March 2005, <http://reliefweb.int/node/168964>.

²⁴ JICA, "JICA Reforms," 11.

²⁵ "Indonesia: Japan disaster relief team."

²⁶ "International Disaster Relief Operations," Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, accessed 5 December 2012, <http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/english/relief/index.html>.

²⁷ Dr. Rosalie A. Hall, "Civil-Military Cooperation in International Humanitarian and Civil Emergency Activities by Japanese Security Forces in Indonesia," (Nippon Foundation Asian Public Intellectual Follow-Up Grant, 2008), 8.

²⁸ Hall, "Civil-Military," 9.

with Indonesian resources, UNICEF, and international NGOs in Banda Aceh, providing epidemic disease control and primary medical care.

Throughout the disaster, the role of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) was to transport troops and supplies to facilitate the relief effort. The first C-130 aircraft and 45 JASDF personnel arrived at the Utapao coordination center in late December. Thereafter, C-130s and other aviation resources were utilized to provide transport as needed for what became Japan's largest overseas deployment to an international disaster relief mission.

Case Study Analysis

For the U.S. and Japan, the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster marked a major turning point. The size of the response, the integration of civil-military participants, and the huge outpouring of assistance from the public and private sectors dwarfed that seen in any other disaster before it. The geographic range and extent of the damage helped establish the notion of HA/DR as a cross-sector enterprise. Even in the presence of highly capable and efficient host nations, the sheer magnitude of the disaster necessitated a multi-agency response.

For Japan, the scope and effectiveness of its civilian and military response definitively established the country as a first-order HA/DR provider in the Asia-Pacific region. This recognition was only heightened when U.S. Secretary of State General Colin Powell personally called Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura to request Japan's assistance in the response.²⁹

Many lessons were learned from the military response to this disaster. The Utapao Combined Coordination Center and Combined Support Force 536 in particular stand out as models for much of what went right and what did not during the operation. The Combined Coordination Center showed that large scale multilateral civil-military cooperation is possible to streamline efforts even in the largest disasters. The CCC had representation not only from the UN, major international donors, and the largest NGOs, but also, crucially, from the host nations. The Utapao operations allowed coordinated planning. The daily interaction between the CCC and the military officials at CSF 536 showed the extent to which cooperative civil-military engagement could provide a significant added value to a major response.

Despite the presence of the primary military responders at Utapao – U.S., Japan, India, Australia, Thailand, and others – as well as civilian and UN counterparts, there was no theater-wide command structure established. This hindered the efficient dispatch of appropriate resources in some cases. Although the civilian CCC had the nominal lead, the logistics were quickly taken over by the military side. It was “General Blackman who usually led the

²⁹ Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-Japan Relations: Planning Ahead,” *Comparative Connections* 6, no. 4 (2005), 33.

daily group meetings.”³⁰ In hindsight, however, the *ad hoc* nature of the Utapao CCC was not without its benefits. One senior U.S. naval officer opined that formalized agreements towards a fixed command structure inevitably become too U.S.-centric, something that is not advantageous in the long run.³¹ Rather, it is preferable to increase training in complex emergencies and foster joint and combined operations so that the Combined Coordination Center concept implemented at Utapao will in the future remain effective, flexible, and enjoy broad support.

For the Japanese military, the Utapao CCC was crucial. Operating in what was by far its largest overseas HA/DR operation, the JSDF relied heavily on the CCC as a place to “plug in,” obtaining information and needs assessments.³² When Japan’s Defense Minister issued the operational order, the CCC was already up and running and ready to accept JSDF liaison officers. The indispensability of this combined coordination effort was not lost on the Japanese officer corps.

As effective as the military component to the response was, the after-action reviews brought military limitations and constraints into sharp relief. For the U.S., any military HA/DR operation that places boots on the ground must recognize and contend with a “clock on the welcome mat” that runs out faster than for most other nations. Indeed, even as the U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force was setting up and running the CCC, the Thais quietly informed PACOM that the Americans should exit while their approval rating was still high.³³ The lesson here, according to several U.S. military officials, is that planning for the “endgame” or exit strategy must begin almost as soon as one arrives. This knowledge places a premium on the military providing capabilities that are most useful in the initial phases of an HA/DR scenario, as an extended stay may not be operationally or politically viable.

The Indian Ocean tsunami was a watershed event for civil society responders in several ways. During the PWA workshops, first-person accounts suggest there was a high level of discomfort on the ground surrounding the notion of NGO-military partnerships. This was not a new phenomenon in HA/DR situations, but the extent of the deployed military forces and the sheer level of need in the affected countries prompted both sides to re-evaluate their positions after the event. For the military responders, the quickness with which they were required to depart obliged them to find an NGO “coalition of the willing” to fill the gap.³⁴ Similarly, the overall military unwillingness to partake in “retail

³⁰ Schoff, *Tools*, 67.

³¹ U.S. senior military officer, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

³² Japanese senior military officer, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

³³ U.S. senior military officer, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

³⁴ U.S. senior military officer, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Tokyo, 29 February 2012.

operations” – such as procuring and distributing food and water – makes finding civilian partners as quickly as possible a priority.

Equally important were the military’s issues with sovereignty. In Indonesia, the U.S. had to keep its helicopters on a ship twelve miles offshore, returning each evening rather than parking them at the disaster zone.³⁵ For NGOs, these sorts of restrictions are far less common.

As a result, this experience facilitated the development of policies and procedures directed at normalizing military-NGO partnerships on the ground. NGOs were overwhelmed by the needs on the ground and were grateful for the military support. Rabih Torbay, Vice President of International Medical Corps, was frank in his assessment that the NGO sector could not have done its job without eschewing traditional NGO reluctance to forge partnerships with the military. Torbay said to remain viable, “We could not keep isolating ourselves.”³⁶ Not every NGO has embraced this philosophy. Japanese NGOs in particular are still wary on this front. Still, the 2004 response effort resulted in a stronger willingness to form civil-military partnerships.

The post-disaster focus on the international response, and particularly on high-visibility aspects such as the deployment of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and the establishment of the Utapao coordination center, has tended to omit analysis of the role of host nations.

Some information about host nation response has been compiled. The hardest-hit country, Indonesia, was hampered in its domestic response by several problems. Geography militated against an effective response, as the bulk of damage was localized in Banda Aceh, a peripheral region with a simmering guerilla movement that had been fighting the central authorities for over 40 years. Indonesia at the time had only an *ad hoc* disaster management body, BAKORNAS (National Disaster Management Coordinating Board), that functioned with no resources and severely limited policy/implementation authority. In this context, the armed forces of Indonesia played a major role in what otherwise would have been a civilian-led operation:

In Aceh, for example, BAKORNAS was not able to mount a significant operational response. Poorly coordinated responses were undertaken by the Indonesian military, community groups, line ministries and international agencies. The Vice President, Yusuf Kalla, moved his office to Aceh to coordinate the response, but the general view is that coordination was poor during the relief phase until the BRR [Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias] agency was set up in April 2005 with responsibility for recovery and reconstruction.³⁷

³⁵ Brig. Gen. William Crowe, “Military Partnering with Others in HA/ DR,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012).

³⁶ Rabih Torbay, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

³⁷ Barnaby Willits-King, *The Role of the Affected State in Humanitarian Action: A Case Study on Indonesia* (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2008), 11.

While the host government response in Thailand was more robust, the overwhelming lesson of the Indian Ocean tsunami aftermath was the need for more effective host nation disaster management bodies.

Even as the spotlight shone on major external partners to the relief effort, this tsunami disaster prompted an important rethinking of the way in which Asia-Pacific host nations participate in HA/DR efforts. Concerning Indonesia, Barnaby Willits-King wrote:

Particularly in such a large country, the opportunity for international agencies to have a useful impact comes through harnessing government systems and making them work better. No international agency has the scale to work in all 33 provinces and hundreds of districts. The analogy of helping the [Indonesian] government to point the fire hose in the right direction is a valid one here.³⁸

2008 CYCLONE NARGIS


On 2 May 2008 Cyclone Nargis made landfall near the Myanmar Ayeyarwady Division. The cyclone caused widespread devastation throughout the Ayeyarwady and Rangoon divisions, including massive flooding and the destruction of homes, critical infrastructure, and cropland. The UN reported that at least 2.4 million people were “severely affected” and at least 1,400 villages destroyed. Myanmar government and humanitarian organization estimates placed the death toll at over 130,000, ranking it among the deadliest natural disasters in recent years.

International Response

On 6 May, Myanmar’s delegation to the UN formally requested international assistance. However, in practice, the Myanmar government restricted humanitarian access to the country, limiting the issuance of entry visas for relief workers. For the week following the disaster, the government was unyielding, insisting that it would accept aid in general but not the dispatch of humanitarian workers, citing Myanmar’s own domestic capacity to respond.

Finally on 23 May the Myanmar government agreed to grant greater access to the country, bowing to significant international pressure, particularly from the UN Secretary General and from ASEAN, whose role in coordinating response efforts was much greater than in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In late May under ASEAN’s leadership, the Tripartite Core Group (TCG) was formed with representation from Myanmar, ASEAN, and the UN. The TCG facilitated the entry of relief workers and supplies into the country, providing a platform in which the Myanmar government was an equal party. The TCG

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 30.



Cyclone Nargis' devastating path through the Myanmar Ayeyarwady Delta. (Photo credit: Based on OCHA/ReliefWeb.)

also spearheaded the creation of recovery coordination centers and monitoring and evaluation efforts.³⁹

The role of multinational assistance after Cyclone Nargis was especially critical in Myanmar, where bilateral negotiations yielded inadequate results. The overall UN efforts were led by the World Food Programme. The resulting UN contribution was 288 million USD.⁴⁰ Within the UN cluster approach, the WFP led food, telecoms and logistics; the UN Children's Fund took charge of education, nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); UN Development Programme led early recovery/livelihoods; Food and Agriculture

³⁹ "ASEAN Post Nargis Management Portal—The Success of the TCG," accessed 7 December 2012, <http://www.aseanpostnargiskm.org/response-to-nargis/tripartite-core-group/the-success-of-the-tcg>. In its post-disaster analysis, ASEAN elaborated on what it felt were the key successes of the TCG: "One: TCG was chaired by a representative from the Government of Myanmar, in this case Deputy Foreign Minister at the time U Kyaw Thu. Usually in any disaster response, the lead role in an emergency is taken on by the government. Therefore this leadership by the Myanmar Chair was significant. Two: The Ambassadors of the ASEAN member states brought in their own political weight and added their diplomatic flair to the mix. The UN brought in the perspective of the international community and the technical expertise in responding to a humanitarian emergency of this scale. Three: Lastly, based on the fact that they all had a common goal – to help the victims of Nargis and that their mandate was humanitarian – not political."

⁴⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *GAO-11-700: Burma - UN and U.S. Agencies Assisted Cyclone Victims in Difficult Environment, but Improved U.S. Monitoring Needed* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2011), 14.

Organization (FAO) handled agriculture; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) led protection; World Health Organization (WHO) led the health; and UN Humans Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) took charge of shelter assistance. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provided disaster coordination assistance.

ASEAN was acutely aware of the expectations placed upon it. Following the disaster, its Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan noted:

ASEAN collectively felt what was needed was a joint response to show to the world that ASEAN can make a contribution on issues of such highly emotional and highly sensitive matters. Failure to do that would certainly have a negative lasting impact on the organisation.⁴¹

ASEAN quickly stood up an Emergency Response Assessment Team (ERAT), which arrived on 9 May with representation from the ASEAN Secretariat, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The ERAT acted primarily as an assessment and liaison mechanism, providing needs reports and coordination support to other international humanitarian actors. In conjunction with the Tripartite Core Group, ASEAN was successful in working with government authorities to ultimately approve the issuance of 3,833 visas for humanitarian workers.

The comparative success of UN and ASEAN efforts to access the disaster area and to engage with government authorities stood in sharp contrast to the numerous obstacles faced by nations attempting the bilateral approach. The U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Myanmar declared a disaster on 5 May and immediately began coordination with the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. Over the course of the response, the U.S. provided 74.9 million USD for immediate relief assistance and another 9.7 million USD for long-term recovery. However, with only minor exceptions the majority of its work was done remotely and through intermediaries. Denied visas and access by Myanmar government authorities, the U.S. Disaster Assistance Response Team was forced to operate from across the border with a logistics operations based at Utapao, Thailand. Hampered by lack of access (only seven OFDA personnel were able to visit disaster sites in Myanmar during the response), OFDA turned to NGO partners who were proffered greater freedom of operation.

At the time of the disaster, several PACOM military units in the region were participating in a military exercise, which included an HA/DR aspect. Under some pressure from Washington and the Tripartite Core Group, the Myanmar government approved an air bridge from Thailand, allowing DOD to complete 185 C-130 airlifts of critical supplies including food, water, and

⁴¹ “ASEAN Post Nargis Management Portal—ASEAN’s Response,” accessed 7 December 2012, <http://www.aseanpostnargiskm.org/response-to-nargis/aseans-response>.

shelter materials.⁴² Even though it allowed the air bridge, Myanmar refused any further DOD assistance and insisted that all air bridge supplies be delivered first to government representatives rather than directly to relief agencies.

Japan provided direct relief supplies in the form of tents, generators, and additional contributions, mostly through WFP. According to the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Myanmar government eventually accepted the offer of a medical DRT, although the acceptance came rather late in the aid effort.⁴³

There were some nations who had more success than Japan and the U.S. in efforts to provide immediate humanitarian assistance. Representatives of two close Myanmar neighbors – India and Bangladesh – were allowed into the country comparatively swiftly. India’s military provided the first international assistance of any sort to Myanmar, arriving with aid supplies, medicines, food, water and HA/DR experts. Closely behind the Indians were the Bangladeshis. The Bangladesh effort comprised planeloads of relief goods and aid workers. On 16 May Myanmar accepted India’s offer to send a team of medical personnel to establish two mobile hospitals. India’s humanitarian workers were not given unrestricted access to the disaster area or their choice of personnel despite Myanmar’s rapid acceptance of India’s aid offer. Myanmar denied the Indian request to send urban search and rescue and media teams to the affected area. Later, the governments of Malaysia and Thailand were both able to dispatch planes of emergency supplies and relief professionals.

Case Study Analysis

Cyclone Nargis was a unique disaster in many ways and provided an important wake up call for Asia-Pacific HA/DR responders. Humanitarian workers in the area had previously encountered acute needs situations in highly restrictive nations. Periodic crop shortages and famines in North Korea provided some experience in that regard. Cyclone Nargis, however, was unique in that it was a large-scale sudden-onset disaster.

The greatest legacy of Cyclone Nargis in terms of HA/DR is that it illustrated starkly both the necessity and the advantages of partnerships, multi-sector responses, and civil-military cooperation. In the absence of the UN and ASEAN who gained comparatively rapid access to disaster-affected areas and facilitated other responders’ entry, bilateral arrangements between Myanmar and donors would have fallen woefully short. Where host nations are particularly sensitive to sovereignty issues, bilateral arrangements (such

⁴² GAO, *GAO-11-700*, 18.

⁴³ Senior JICA officer, (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, September 2011).

as between Myanmar and India) may not always be sufficient in cases of large-scale disaster.

The multilaterals were successful for a number of reasons. UN agencies such as WFP and UNICEF, who have histories of effective on-site coordination, can facilitate a larger UN presence. Case studies show that wariness among neighbors can hamper HA/DR efforts, but in this instance ASEAN's unified approach was instrumental in pressuring the Myanmar government to ease entry restrictions.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), an umbrella humanitarian body, offered this conclusion:

Taken as a whole, the initial restrictions on access perhaps forced international actors into a more creative and flexible response, one which valued – after a rather isolationist response during the first couple of months – local and regional capacities more than is often the case. In its response to the emergency, ASEAN took a bold step by actively assuming a leadership role, both in convincing the Myanmar government to cooperate with the international community and in co-managing the response itself. ASEAN's approach to the post-Nargis response may well offer a model for other regional organizations. Natural disasters of this scale are unfortunately very likely to become increasingly frequent in this region and expertise in responding to and managing them will be much needed in the future.⁴⁴

For nearly every organization responding to Cyclone Nargis, access and logistical difficulties necessitated *ad hoc* partnership arrangements. One international NGO, Save the Children, played a critical role, largely because of its on-the-ground presence in Myanmar that pre-dated the cyclone. By Save the Children's estimates, it accounted for ten percent of the total international humanitarian assistance raised for the Cyclone Nargis disaster response, and at its height, had 1,000 personnel involved in HA/DR work. For agencies like USAID, partnerships with Save the Children and WFP were essential. A U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report found, "emergency relief and humanitarian efforts became highly dependent on Burmese nationals and international staff already in Burma."⁴⁵ With over 40 international NGOs and 70 local NGOs already on the ground in the affected region, they were the natural partners for international responders seeking to establish an in-country presence.

NGO-run Local Resource Centers were very important for sharing needs assessments and overall coordination. Mercy Malaysia found in its Nargis analysis that, "The creation of the Local Resource Centers and deployment of the NGO

⁴⁴ Domitille Kauffmann and Susanna Krüger, *IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, 2nd Phase Country Study, April 2010—Myanmar*, (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2010), 53.

⁴⁵ GAO, *GAO-11-700*, 36.

Liaison Officers have helped the coordination environment enormously.⁴⁶ The importance of local staff is a lesson that often seems to be re-learned with each subsequent disaster. Without a strong basis of support from host nation assets, from local NGOs, and from permanent humanitarian in-country missions, any international response will find itself at a massive disadvantage as it struggles with language, logistics, procurement, communications, and transportation. The role of the foreign embassies is critical and their staff should be reaching out proactively to host nations, forming relationships with capable NGOs and domestic response bodies.

Equally important for effective partnerships in the case of Cyclone Nargis were civil-military operations. As the USAID/OFDA DART experience demonstrated, coordinating with a DOD air bridge became one of the few means of shipping relief goods directly to the affected region. Similarly, civil-military partnerships were at the center of India and Bangladesh government responses, allowing at the outset the dispatch of large quantities of supplies and HA/DR responders. The finding that, “In the Myanmar context, military personnel and equipment provided by ASEAN countries [proved] especially valuable as a means to supplement existing logistical capacities,” is a lesson that should be applied to other disasters as well.⁴⁷

Perhaps unsurprisingly, friction emerged during the course of the civil-military coordination. In one case, DOD provided five-gallon water jugs that USAID found to be “inappropriate” as they were heavy and difficult to transport.⁴⁸ The lesson to be drawn is the need for training around issues of the suitability of relief items. Both the civilian and military response to Myanmar proved to be highly capable, but their capabilities did not always mesh. Even when same country partners such as USAID and DOD amass a growing body of shared response experience, there continues to be the need for ongoing training and communication to consolidate lessons learned and to transmit them to new HA/DR personnel.

The overarching need for pre-disaster coordination and preparedness was made abundantly clear by the Cyclone Nargis case study. Host nation responders were not the only ones unprepared. International NGOs, military units, multilaterals, and assistance agencies were also lacking in some preparedness measures. For instance, many of the *ad hoc* partnerships that emerged during the crisis could have been negotiated, even informally, well in advance of

⁴⁶ Mercy Malaysia, “Humanitarian Partnerships following Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar—Prepared by Mercy Malaysia with Input from Partners in Myanmar,” (Unpublished report, Mercy Malaysia, 2009), 3. Mercy Malaysia noted difficulty engaging with the TCG and recorded NGO “frustration” cooperating with the UN. The local resource centers help provide communication and coordination that did not come from the TCG.

⁴⁷ Ben Ramalingam and Sara Pavanello, *Cyclone Nargis: Lessons for Operational Agencies* (London: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, 2006), 7.

⁴⁸ GAO, *GAO-11-700*, 65.

this disaster so as to avoid some of the major problems in coordination and communication. Joint training, better inter-organizational liaison programs, and pre-plans for likely disaster areas could have all worked to minimize obstacles during response. While “mutual suspicions and mutual distrust” were at the heart of Myanmar’s decision to restrict international access, it is nonetheless important for humanitarian organizations to demonstrate better preparedness vis-à-vis host nations.⁴⁹

The stance of Myanmar regarding entry and the subsequent *ad hoc* adaptations on the part of HA/DR workers should generate lessons learned not only for Myanmar. The close cooperation of a range of local and international NGOs, military units with heavy lift capabilities, and assistance agencies should inform all major disaster responses. The collaborative efforts that took place in Cyclone Nargis should be viewed positively, not as a one-time response to a unique challenge, but a standard way of operating in the future.

2008 WENCHUAN EARTHQUAKE

The Wenchuan Earthquake struck Sichuan Province, China on 12 May 2008. The quake had a measured magnitude of 7.9 M_w and was felt as far away as Beijing. Approximately 69,000 people were killed outright in the earthquake with another 375,000 injured in destroyed buildings and as a result of earthquake-triggered landslides. Another 18,000 persons were reported missing. The widespread collapse of buildings displaced nearly 15 million people, leaving many of them homeless.

The major regional city affected, Chengdu, reported significant damage, but the brunt of the destruction was felt in outlying areas such as Beichuan County, where a reported 80 percent of buildings collapsed. Post-disaster media reports focused on the inadequate construction of schools, an estimated 7,000 of which collapsed during the earthquake. The urban search and rescue component of this disaster was unprecedented. The Chinese government reported that 84,017 people were rescued from collapsed structures.⁵⁰

Domestic and International Response

The Government of the People’s Republic of China (GOC) quickly responded, primarily by dispatching 139,000 troops from a wide range of active units, reserves, paramilitary organizations, and civil defense. Shortly after the disaster, the China Central Committee – the top body within the Communist

⁴⁹ Senior JICA officer, personal communication, 11 November 2012.

⁵⁰ Jiang Lingling, Wang Jiexiu and Liu Lianyou, *TA-7081-PRC - People’s Republic of China: Providing Emergency Response to Sichuan Earthquake* (Beijing: Asian Development Bank, 2008), 26.

Party – established an Earthquake Disaster Relief Headquarters within the State Council. The Headquarters oversaw rescue teams, anti-epidemic measures, public safety, water resources, and earthquake monitoring across nine subdivisions. The Red Cross Society of China was also a major actor, providing relief and coordinating supplies.

HA/DR personnel were hampered in their attempts to reach the worst-affected areas by heavy rains, aftershocks, and ongoing landslides. In portions of Wenchuan County, rescue personnel did not arrive until 48 hours after the disaster. GOC special operations troops were forced to parachute in to more remote areas to begin assessments and establish communications. The national response bodies were complemented on the ground by province-level management agencies, which coordinated tasks including search and rescue, shelter construction, healthcare, dissemination of needs assessments, disbursement of funds for recovery, and compensation payments.

On 14 May, two days after the earthquake, China formally submitted a request to the UN for international assistance, with a focus on the needs of displaced families. The international response was significant. In addition to the approximately 303 million USD of monetary contributions, several nations sent relief items and technical teams. Relief goods included large quantities of warm clothing, tents and shelter supplies, food, medication, and hygiene equipment. Among the larger response teams sent to Chengdu were a Canadian medical team of doctors and paramedics, a Philippine medical team, a Singapore Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team, and a South Korean HA/DR team. In all, a total of four international USAR teams and nine medical teams from eleven nations operated on the ground. Virtually all of the international teams were requested and accepted through bilateral arrangements. While UN agencies maintained an operational presence, coordination was the responsibility of the GOC rather than UNOCHA.

The U.S. Ambassador to China set in motion the U.S. response with a 13 May declaration of a humanitarian disaster. USAID/OFDA mobilized resources and prepared specialized USAR equipment (including saws, concrete cutters, hydraulic gear, and generators) for shipment to China. Once the GOC request for assistance had been formally submitted, a nine-person OFDA technical team deployed. On the ground, the team conducted USAR training for the Public Security and Fire Brigade of Chengdu Province and the Seismic Disaster Emergency Rescue team of Sichuan Province.⁵¹ USAID/OFDA also separately deployed shelter and earthquake monitoring experts and partnered with DOD to provide relief supplies by two Air Force C-17s.

⁵¹ OFDA, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2008* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2009), 64.

Japan contributions to the rescue and relief efforts were notable for their speed and on-the-ground presence. On 13 May, the Chinese government made a direct bilateral request to Japan for relief items. Tokyo responded by sending 60 million USD worth of supplies. The Japanese initially intended to utilize a JSDF plane as the quickest way to dispatch relief, but were unofficially asked to use a civilian plane.⁵² Two days later the Chinese requested a USAR team and a team was mobilized and deployed that same day. According to JICA, the Japan USAR team was the first international disaster assistance team ever sent to China. On 19 May, MOFA fielded a request from China for a JICA medical DRT. In the year following the Wenchuan earthquake, JICA initiated several disaster risk reduction projects in and around Sichuan Province.

Case Study Analysis

The timing of the Wenchuan earthquake affected the Chinese response in two notable ways. Coming immediately on the heels of Cyclone Nargis, China's leadership was highly sensitive to international condemnation of Myanmar's reluctance to admit foreign assistance. China also had to consider its domestic response to the earthquake in the context of the increased international media present in China to cover the upcoming Olympic Games. These two factors strongly contributed to the GOC's rapid request for international assistance and its granting of access to HA/DR responders. Beijing's bilateral assistance requests were unprecedented.

Even as it established several firsts with respect to the acceptance of international aid, the Chinese response demonstrated its inexperience in requesting international assistance and managing response teams on the ground. With over 150,000 military, paramilitary, and civilian domestic responders, China had no lack of domestic manpower. Nonetheless the Chinese earthquake Disaster Relief Headquarters struggled to get experts to affected areas. Widespread landslides and an initial shortage of appropriate helicopters resulted in significant logistical bottlenecks with some of the hardest hit areas remaining unvisited for days. These difficulties were compounded by internal politics and ethnic tensions in the affected area. The lack of a seasoned coordinating presence such as traditionally supplied by UNOCHA became clear in hindsight.

Although the 13 foreign disaster teams deployed to the Wenchuan earthquake were an important first for the country, China did not always know how to use those teams most effectively. The Japan urban search and rescue DRT, for instance, was initially directed to a landslide area and tasked with "jobs

⁵² MOFA official, personal communication, 26 December 2012. The GOC was concerned about the possibility of a civilian backlash upon seeing a Japan military plane.

poorly matched to its capabilities.”⁵³ It was clear that the utilization of this team by the Chinese incident commanders was not highly effective given how many live rescues were made days after the earthquake. Similarly, the JICA medical team was sent to a university hospital in Chengdu, where it provided tertiary care. For a front-line, self-supporting medical team to be used in this manner indicated the inexperience and significant knowledge gaps of the domestic command structure.

The Wenchuan earthquake experience lends strong support for more broad-based preparedness measures and specialized resource training. Chinese authorities quickly learned that despite their large reservoir of manpower, it was difficult to clear landslides quickly, establish communications in remote villages, or deal with the vast numbers of homeless survivors. Among the small number of international teams on the ground, communications were good, but disaster preparedness activities and information sharing schemes could have significantly improved integration with Chinese experts and resources. The international teams should have been assigned to tasks in their respective fields of expertise, and supported by domestic responders. Unfortunately, that did not happen.

The Japanese experience in this disaster illustrated the ability of HA/DR scenarios to forge new ties between countries. Even though the Japanese USAR team was not effectively utilized, it was still important for both nations that it deployed at all. Relations were helped still further by the publication of a photo of the Japanese USAR team bowing in respect to a covered victim on a stretcher. This photo was widely seen in China. JICA observed that, “While the team behaved as they would in Japan, the local people were deeply impressed and expressed their gratitude for the team’s efforts.”⁵⁴ Such goodwill moments can be the foundation for future cooperative preparedness and on-the-ground efforts in times of need.

2009 SUMATRA EARTHQUAKE

On 30 September and 1 October, successive earthquakes measuring 7.9 M_w and 7.0 M_w struck approximately 30 miles northwest of Padang, West Sumatra. These earthquakes affected a wide area centering around Padang and left at least 1,195 people dead and another 1.2 million otherwise affected. With more than 135,000 houses destroyed or damaged, at least 745,000 people were reportedly displaced. The earthquake also inflicted severe damage on agricultural areas,

⁵³ Kae Yanagisawa, “Case Studies - Sichuan, Padang, Christchurch - What made differences?” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

⁵⁴ Japan International Cooperation Agency, *JICA Annual Report 2009* (Tokyo: JICA, 2009), 143. This photo can be viewed at http://www.xinhuanet.com/photo/slide/20080616cjc_tpzd/slides/p_0003.jpg.

irrigation systems and markets, resulting in an immediate and pronounced effect on the local economy.

The Government of Indonesia (GOI) responded to the crisis primarily through its National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) set up in 2008. In coordination with local provincial governments and the nation's armed forces, the agency quickly dispatched several disaster management teams to Padang, established a command presence, and immediately began rescue and relief work. The active rescue phase remained in place until 5 October. During the rescue phase, many outlying areas cut off by mud and landslides did not see help for days. For areas that could not be reached overland, Indonesian authorities relied upon aerial deliveries by helicopter and fixed wing aircraft.

International Response

Indonesia quickly issued a “blanket appeal” to the UN that triggered an international response. Due to the difficulty of accessing many of the hardest-hit areas, Indonesian requests for assistance emphasized the need for USAR assets as well as food, shelter, and health resources. A coalition of international NGOs, including the International Federation of the Red Cross (which led shelter efforts), Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children, and CARE began operations on 1 October, coordinating closely with UNOCHA and the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team. The larger international NGOs formed an operational consortium led by Mercy Corps, which had a pre-existing in-country presence. That consortium quickly established a joint needs assessment system and accepted foreign assistance funding, including three million USD from USAID/OFDA.

As early as 1 October, the Indonesian government made a direct bilateral request for aid to Japan, asking for urban search and rescue (USAR) and medical teams as well as relief goods. Later that day, the JICA USAR and medical teams deployed to Padang on a chartered flight. Upon arrival, the 75-person team was the first international urban search and rescue asset to begin operations in the affected area. The Japan USAR Disaster Response Team was instrumental not only in conducting searches but also in coordinating other domestic and international HA/DR resources as they arrived. The DRT worked collaboratively with the UNDAC-run On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). Meanwhile, a JICA medical team established operations in Pariaman City and saw 1,477 patients over the course of ten days. On 3 October, following Indonesian consultations with the Japan Minister of Defense, the JSDF deployed an advance team to Indonesia, followed by a 33-person medical team.

The U.S. government response included a USAID/OFDA DART dispatched on 5 October and remaining operational until it departed on 25 October. Several OFDA personnel remained in-country to monitor donor activities and recovery efforts. OFDA support included financial contributions of 7.8 million USD across

all operational areas. The U.S. military responded as well. Air Force C-130s flew in relief goods and support personnel, while the destroyer USS *McCampbell* and amphibious transport dock USS *Denver* provided personnel, rotary wing aircraft, and relief goods. The U.S. military additionally established a Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team (HARRT) field hospital that treated nearly 2,000 patients. Overall, DOD assistance for the relief effort included personnel from all services at a cost of 4.2 million USD.⁵⁵

Case Study Analysis

In terms of lessons learned, the 2009 Sumatra earthquake responses are notable as a result of the mismatch between requests for international assistance and actual needs on the ground. Too many international USAR teams arrived at the scene due to Indonesia's "blanket appeal," its initial emphasis on the need for collapse rescues, and its difficulty turning down aid. In fact, it was noted that "although 21 international rescue teams, including the Japan team, continued to make intense around-the-clock search efforts, the teams were unable to find a single survivor."⁵⁶ Only intervention by the UN prevented the further dispatch of redundant USAR teams from abroad. By the time international USAR teams did arrive, what rescues had been possible had already been carried out by local resources and on the ground.

The main lesson from this disaster response effort is clear: the host nation must balance the need to issue an expedited request for assistance with the imperative to verify needs and conditions on the ground. The remoteness of affected areas, coupled with difficulty in reaching them, made rapid assessments nearly impossible. Local teams tended to exaggerate specific needs, resulting in the dispatch of too many international USAR teams.⁵⁷ A second lesson from this study is that the host nation must remain continually engaged with the international community as it processes and updates needs assessments, and makes deployment decisions. In some cases it may be appropriate for the host nation to reject inbound resources as unnecessary or unsuitable.

The 2009 Sumatran earthquake did see effective communication and coordination among the host nation, UN, NGO, and international teams. Even though the Japan USAR team arrived too late to make any survivor rescues, it coordinated effectively with the Indonesian National Disaster Management Agency and UNDAC. The JICA and JSDF medical teams liaised

⁵⁵ USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, "Indonesia—Earthquake, Fact Sheet #12," (Situation report, USAID, 2009), 3. It is notable that at the same time as the DOD response to Indonesia, U.S. military personnel were simultaneously responding to American Samoa (earthquake and tsunami) and the Philippines (Typhoon Ketsana).

⁵⁶ Japan International Cooperation Agency, *JICA Annual Report 2010* (Tokyo: JICA, 2010), 163.

⁵⁷ Senior JICA officer, personal communication, 10 November 2012.

effectively with the health cluster, with U.S. military counterparts, and with local medical resources.⁵⁸

Indonesia's experience interacting with the international humanitarian community contributed strongly to its effective use of both multilateral and bilateral channels to establish effective shelter and health clusters. Also effective was the activation of the cluster approach which enabled humanitarian organizations to adopt the Joint Needs Assessment tool and coordinate effectively upon arriving in affected areas. Finally the prompt in-and-out response of U.S. military units, which finished in-country operations on 16 October, stood as a model for effective civil-military cooperation.

2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE

Although the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 was outside the Asia-Pacific region, it still had a profound impact on HA/DR operations elsewhere in the world, especially for the U.S., Japan, and the UN.

The 7.0 M_w earthquake of 12 January 2010 was centered west of Port-au-Prince in the town of Léogâne. The earthquake directly affected at least three million people and the final death toll may never be known with certainty. Haitian estimates place the number of deaths at around 316,000. The accuracy of that tally, however, remains uncertain in part due to the burial of large numbers of bodies in mass graves immediately following the disaster. The widespread destruction of government offices and inconsistent recordkeeping prevented an accurate tally of property damage.

In the aftermath of the earthquake, there was a near complete absence of Haitian government response. The Presidential Palace and the National Assembly were destroyed as were municipal buildings, police stations, hospitals, and communications infrastructure. Post-earthquake governance was further thwarted by destruction of the building that housed the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The collapse of the building killed 85 UN workers, including the chief of mission. Although the majority of casualties in Haiti were caused by collapsing structures and fires immediately after the earthquake, the death toll continued to rise as compromised buildings collapsed in aftershocks. Medical facilities were overwhelmed and Haitians without life-threatening injuries or illnesses often found that it was difficult to access treatment, leading to persistent fear of disease outbreak.

⁵⁸ The term "cluster" refers to the UN's eleven HA/DR sectors, each comprising a group of UN agencies and focusing on a specific need or set of needs, such as healthcare, shelter or nutrition.

International Response

The outpouring of response to the Haitian earthquake was both immediate and widespread. Within the first three months of the disaster, international financial aid reached 2.5 billion USD, with an additional 1.3 billion USD pledged. Within six months, this number rose to 5.3 billion USD pledged. The dispatch of in-kind relief and personnel was similarly unprecedented, although massive logistical delays hindered the effective distribution of the items. The Port-au-Prince airport was severely damaged in the earthquake, causing problems with air traffic control and logistics. The U.S. military restored airport functions within a couple of days; however, the American controllers then faced the daunting task of coordinating hundreds of relief flights daily into a damaged airport that had previously handled on average only about twenty flights per day. Tensions quickly began to rise in the face of public accusations of critical supplies being turned away. The chaotic situation at the airport was in many ways a microcosm of the situation at large, where huge numbers of UN, national, and NGO relief resources attempted to address overwhelming needs with little coordination.

The U.S. military's Joint Task Force Haiti was heavily involved in rescue and relief efforts under the aegis of Operation *Unified Response*. In addition to control tower operations at the airport, transportation tasks of the military included port and beach clearance and debarkation, helicopter landing zones, aerial delivery of supplies, opening of main supply routes, reopening of road networks and bridges, and assisting with host nation sea, ground, and air transportation assets. The U.S. military also established several Logistics Support Areas, liaised with civilian counterparts to rebuild power, sanitation, water and phone systems, and assisted in the construction of displaced person camps. In tandem with myriad other health actors operating within the UN health cluster, the military established several mobile hospitals and medical logistics facilities.⁵⁹

In addition, the U.S. military dispatched the aircraft carrier USS *Carl Vinson*, cruiser USS *Bunker Hill*, helicopter carrier USS *Bataan*, and the hospital ship USNS *Comfort*, as well as numerous other smaller Navy and Coast Guard ships. In all, over 17,000 military personnel participated in the operation, making it by far the largest U.S. military HA/DR operation to date. The U.S. military participation in the relief effort was approved by the Government of Haiti and carried out under the auspices of MINUSTAH.

The U.S.-UN relations were not without some challenges. According to the Humanitarian Policy Group, "some reports indicated that the U.S. military were initially reluctant to engage with the UN humanitarian coordination leadership and mechanisms because of security procedures and resistance to

⁵⁹ Lt. Col Michael Pelak, "Disaster Response: III MEF Perspective," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition," Tokyo, 6 June 2012).

taking instructions from the UN.”⁶⁰ France was particularly vocal about the large U.S. footprint in Haiti, with France’s humanitarian minister declaring, “This is about helping Haiti, not about occupying Haiti.”⁶¹ In the end, however, U.S. military assets did not stay long in Haiti. The last military elements, those from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, departed by 24 March.

The civilian leadership of Joint Task Force Haiti, led by USAID and its Disaster Assistance Response Team, remained in operation after the U.S. military departure. At its peak, the USAID/OFDA DART response to the disaster comprised 545 personnel. OFDA additionally activated a Washington-based Response Management Team and maintained close ties with other U.S. government entities, including Health and Human Services, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DOD, U.S. Geological Survey, and the Peace Corps.⁶² Through the DART, its partner agencies, and NGOs, USAID engaged in a full range of relief activities, including healthcare, shelter, food, water, sanitation, temporary employment, and the transition to long-term recovery. Complementing the DART’s work, OFDA coordinated the dispatch of six American USAR teams comprising 511 rescuers and 29 dogs.

The Haiti earthquake occasioned Japan’s largest ever Western hemisphere disaster response and deployment of civilian and military HA/DR assets. Japan made the decision to respond to the Haitian crisis on 14 January. Japan initially sent a civil-military assessment team that deployed immediately after the earthquake. Responding to a direct bilateral request from the Government of Haiti, a Japan Disaster Relief medical team was dispatched on 15 January. Upon its arrival, the Japanese team began operations in Léogâne at the earthquake epicenter.⁶³

The Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) worked in parallel with the civilian response throughout the disaster. It issued its mission planning order on 15 January. The next day MOD sent a JASDF C-130, already in the U.S. for joint training, to Homestead Air Force Base in southern Florida.⁶⁴ Two days later, MOD ordered that C-130, with JICA medical personnel on board to Haiti. That same aircraft transported U.S. citizens back to Florida on its return. On 21 January, Japan’s Minister of Defense ordered the deployment of a Self-Defense Force Disaster Relief Medical Assistance Unit, composed of 13 doctors and

⁶⁰ Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Hayson and Stuart Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil–Military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2012), 17.

⁶¹ Michael Krebs, “French minister accuses U.S. of ‘occupying’ Haiti,” *Digital Journal*, 19 January 2010, <http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/285993>.

⁶² OFDA, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2010* (Washington: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2011), 119.

⁶³ Japan International Cooperation Agency, *JICA Annual Report 2010* (Tokyo: JICA, 2010), 17.

⁶⁴ Japan Ministry of Defense, International Operations Division, “Transition from Relief to Recovery - Case in Haiti by JSDF” (presentation at Peace Winds America “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012).

100 support personnel. The first wave of the SDF personnel began operations on 23 January, merging with the JICA medical DRT teams that were already on the ground.

On 25 January Japan requested permission from the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti to deploy a Ground Self-Defense Force engineering unit. Permission in hand, the Ministry of Defense issued an order on 5 February. On February 16, the Japan GSDF Central Readiness Force (CRF) engineering unit began in-country operations, taking over from the outgoing JSDF medical unit.⁶⁵ The CRF unit's first mission in Haiti was a land clearing operation for the World Food Programme. The Central Readiness Force engineers cleared rubble, inspected earthquake-damaged structures, repaired roads, and constructed simple buildings. The two Japan SDF elements variously partnered with a range of NGOs, a Canadian field hospital, UN coordination authorities, U.S. and South Korean military forces, as well as Italian rescue teams.

Case Study Analysis

Whereas previous disasters had seen host nations unprepared to interface with the international community and coordinate relief, the host nation was absent altogether in Haiti. The widespread collapse of government buildings and loss of government personnel thwarted any hope of Haitian leadership from the outset.

The governmental vacuum in Haiti compounded by the sudden loss of the MINUSTAH command structure was felt in every aspect of relief and recovery efforts. While individual actors assumed control of some sectors (as with the U.S. at Port-au-Prince airport) and UNOCHA had a country coordinating presence, the inability of the host nation to provide meaningful support rendered the responders at an immediate disadvantage.

The paucity of host nation leadership adversely affected the pace by which expenditures were made. Some six months post-disaster, CNN reported that a mere two percent of the 5.3 billion USD in committed aid had been disbursed to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.⁶⁶ Although UNOCHA and MINUSTAH, as well as Joint Task Force Haiti, were vital in coordinating and dispatching NGO assistance, a wider coordinating presence of the host nation was totally absent. Without the host nation, neither UN agency had the capability or training to coordinate the entire relief and early recovery operation.

The Haiti earthquake exemplified the conundrum that NGOs face in post-disaster situations. Once the immediate food, water, hygiene, and

⁶⁵ Japan MOD, "Transition from Relief."

⁶⁶ Joe Johns and MaryAnne Fox, "Most countries fail to deliver on Haiti aid pledges," *CNN International*, 15 July 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/07/15/haiti.donations/?fbid=S8GMY1Tbhaj#fbid=WtTnH1680Nu&wom=false>.

medical needs are met, the transition from relief to recovery is challenging. NGOs experienced difficulties in launching medium and long-term recovery efforts because of the lack of detailed information about such basic matters as government support, zoning, and long-term follow-up. Without the adequate government institutions, NGOs and their donors are often hesitant to initiate recovery without a national partner.

The fact that any progress was made in Haiti is a testament to the mostly *ad hoc* coordinating bodies on the ground. In the words of one responding Japanese NGO director, “In the case of Haiti, a partnership with UNOCHA was vital for us; we knew nothing about the country.”⁶⁷ With the exception of UN personnel and longstanding NGOs, such as Partners in Health or Doctors Without Borders, many responders had little experience. The response in Haiti clearly demonstrated the importance of coordinating bodies making themselves accessible to *all* stakeholders in the field. A further lesson was the need for deeper, proactive links between coordinators and responders. One large American NGO, International Medical Corps (IMC), responded immediately but was soon hindered by a general lack of coordination on the ground. In cases like those, according to IMC Director of Program Development Agron Ferati, deep linkages between coordinators and responders are paramount.

If NGOs can establish relationships with coordinators such as UNOCHA or a DART team that are “more than just financial links,” they can begin to share capacities and develop common strategic thinking.⁶⁸ What is needed, therefore, are stronger inter-organizational ties before a disaster that will allow NGOs to arrive in-country and work in an integrated way from the start. Ferati noted that such connections should also extend to the private sector, pointing out Google’s role in Haiti providing updated maps of damage, affected populations, needs, and relief resources.

The need for strong civil-military HA/DR collaboration is exemplified by the Haitian earthquake case study. The extent of military deployments – particularly U.S. – was considerable. As documented above, U.S. military forces played a role in virtually every aspect of the immediate response. For the NGO sector, which was stretched to the limit, their presence was of critical importance. One NGO responder described the situation as such: “problems with access, fuel and transportation shortages, lack of facilities for responders, shortages of medical supplies, aftershocks, highly stressful conditions, and overall poor

⁶⁷ Kiyoto Onishi (Executive Director, Association for Aid and Relief), remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Tokyo, 29 February 2012.

⁶⁸ Agron Ferati (Director, program development, International Medical Corps), remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 15 February 2012.

communication.⁶⁹ In those circumstances, NGOs willing to partner with military colleagues, and in particular to share information and capabilities prior to a disaster, will be at a comparative advantage. Civil-military cooperation in a disaster can speed access to affected areas, widen the pool of needs assessment, augment resources, and serve as a bridge to other responders and coordinating bodies.

The response of Japan's civilian and military response in Haiti is particularly illuminating. The close collaboration between JICA and the Ministry of Defense in Haiti – beginning with the joint civil-military assessment mission – is a model for future responses. The staggered nature of the deployments, with the JICA medical team deploying first and later being augmented by the Japan Self-Defense Forces Medical Assistance Unit, worked well within a Japan overseas HA/DR system that does not allow for the immediate dispatch of military units. According to JICA and MOD officials, their medical teams worked well together on the ground in spite of the difficult conditions. As part of the overall UN health cluster, the Japan medical team met three times weekly with healthcare counterparts. Japanese medical responders also established close bilateral relations with the USNS *Comfort*, a Canadian field hospital, and a variety of NGOs such as Save the Children and World Wide Village. As an example of a civil-military deployment taking individual capabilities and strengths into account, the effort in Haiti stands out. Similarly, the deployment of the Japan GSDF Central Readiness Force engineering team highlighted the effective use of military resources for unique capacities and tasks beyond JICA's resources and abilities.

Japan HA/DR responders were to some extent still learning along the way. In the relief phase, cooperation between health NGOs and the JDR medical team was generally smooth. In the later recovery and peacekeeping effort, cooperation was not always attainable. The Japan GSDF Central Readiness Force units in Haiti were successfully able to partner with NGOs, including Peace Winds Japan, and with the Japan Platform coordinating body on projects such as school building. However, other attempts at cooperation attempts failed in part due to lack of cooperation between the NGOs and officials of the Japan SDF and the MOFA.⁷⁰ Future deployments should place greater emphasis on Japan SDF-NGO partnerships in planning and in delineating cooperation opportunities.

Japan must establish bilateral civil-military arrangements with a wider range of likely partners. According to one U.S. military officer, the transport of U.S. nationals on JSDF C-130 flights required protracted MOFA-State Department negotiations and remained a one-off event rather than developing into a routine tool for use by both countries.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Kevin Noone, "Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR): Presentation to Japan-US-South Korea Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Workshop," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedure and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

⁷⁰ Senior MOD official, personal communication, 15 November 2012.

⁷¹ Senior U.S. military officer, personal communication, 15 February 2012.

Experiences such as the Haiti earthquake response illustrate HA/DR as a “safe space,” particularly for military-military and civil-mil interactions. One MOD official commended the side-by-side Japan SDF and Korean military work in Haiti, pointing a way forward for Japan-South Korea relations.⁷² With the set goal of disaster relief and operating under the legal auspices of a UN mission, HA/DR operations can bring together military and civilian professionals in a collaborative joint operation.

2010 PAKISTAN FLOODS

The flooding that began in Pakistan’s Indus River basin in late July 2010 constitutes one of the worst disasters in Pakistan’s history. Although the death toll totaled somewhere in the vicinity of 2,000 people, significantly lower than in other recent disasters, the humanitarian toll was vastly higher. Estimates on the number of Pakistanis directly affected by the floods range from 18 to 20 million. At the peak of the emergency in August some 61,776 square miles – nearly one-fifth of Pakistan – was submerged. Flooding displaced 11,000,000 people and destroyed 17 million acres of cropland. The effects of the flooding were compounded by the complex emergency in northwest Pakistan, where violence between tribal groups and Government of Pakistan (GOP) forces left three million people internally displaced. Estimates of the total direct and indirect costs of the 2010 floods reach nearly 43 billion USD.

Domestic and International Response

Pakistan’s domestic disaster response system is led by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). For a variety of reasons, that agency’s emergency response to the Indus River flooding was “one of the most difficult ones in recent times.”⁷³ Responders were confronted with a number of challenges, including vast areas inundated by water, persistent monsoon rains, disease outbreaks, difficult terrain, security fears, and poor infrastructure. Government of Pakistan authorities, struggling to provide adequate numbers of boats and helicopters, were often unable to provide assessments of the basic needs in the affected regions. Pakistani Army, Navy, and Air Force assets were quickly marshaled to assist with rescue, evacuation, food, health, sanitation, and shelter efforts. Even as response teams reached displaced victims and attempted to provide basic services, they struggled with outbreaks of diarrheal disease and unsanitary water. As Riccardo Polastro of the humanitarian evaluation

⁷² Senior MOD official, personal communication, 6 November 2011.

⁷³ Dr. Niaz Murtaza and Sahar Gul Bhatti, *Pakistan Floods 2010: Evaluation of Concern Pakistan’s Emergency Response to 2010 Floods* (Dublin: Concern Worldwide, 2011), 5.

organization DARA noted, “resources were soon stretched to the limit due to the sheer scale and geographical spread of the disaster, compounded by a general lack of preparedness.”⁷⁴

The U.S. response to the flooding was broad-based, reflecting the importance of Pakistan to the U.S. and the heavy U.S. presence in the South/Central Asia region. The USAID/OFDA DART deployed to Pakistan in August where it joined OFDA and State Department staff already on the ground. The DART took on numerous roles once on the ground, including flight and responder coordination, relief supply provision, disease surveillance and water, sanitation, and hygiene support. On 9 August USAID established a Washington-based Response Management Team. The military became involved as well, providing aircraft (fifteen helicopters and four C-130s), *halal* meals, prefabricated bridges, assorted relief supplies, and direct rescue and evacuation efforts. Meanwhile, USAID/OFDA provided four million USD in funding directly to the World Food Programme to establish a UN Humanitarian Air Service to coordinate flights of relief goods and personnel. At the request of the Pakistan NDMA, OFDA and other international responders working in country focused primarily on four response areas: health, food, shelter, and WASH.



A worker offloads supplies from a U.S. Marine helicopter during flood relief operations in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan, 13 August 2010. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Horace Murray/Released.)

⁷⁴ Riccardo Polastro et al. *Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to Pakistan's Flood Crisis* (Geneva: DARA, 2011), 56.

Japan mounted a robust civil-military response to the disaster. Islamabad made its direct bilateral request to Japan on 9 August. Responding to the bilateral request as well as a combined international humanitarian appeal, JICA dispatched two medical DRTs and contributed 470,000 USD directly to the government. JICA also sent tents, water purification systems, water tanks, and drainage pumps. On 13 August a seven-man military Damage and Needs assessment team deployed. On 19 August, having seen a significant role for the military, the Minister of Foreign Affairs requested participation by the Japan SDF.

As an advance JSDF team left for Pakistan, the Japan Minister of Defense issued a 20 August operational order that sent the following day 50 members of an Aviation Wing to the disaster area. Two days later, JASDF C-130s, loaded with UH-1 helicopters, left for Pakistan. Boosting the flow of HA/DR assistance, the amphibious landing ship *Shimokita* departed on 26 August for Pakistan with two large CH-47 Chinook helicopters onboard. On 4 September, a commercial cargo plane departed with an additional helicopter for the operation.⁷⁵ The mission termination order came on 5 October and the Japanese relief effort concluded on 10 October.

Case Study Analysis

The Pakistan National Disaster Management Authority is a comparatively new government body established only after the 2005 Kashmir earthquake. It is responsible for disaster management and national-level response and preparedness strategies. A retrospective analysis of the NDMA performance reveals a competent organization that nonetheless suffered certain key weaknesses. NDMA had few resources, especially relative to more established Pakistan government institutions and to the military. The NDMA struggled to coordinate and communicate with international responders across large geographic areas. Overall, the central government provided too few directives. The provincial authorities were unable to liaise effectively with either national or international responders, nor were they able to provide accurate and timely needs assessments.⁷⁶

One of the larger challenges with the response to the Pakistan floods was the timing of the international appeal. The decision to request international humanitarian assistance – particularly targeted resources such as helicopters – was significantly delayed due to the government’s reluctance to request help.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Japan Ministry of Defense, International Operations Division, “International Disaster Relief Operations of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF),” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedure and Partners,” Tokyo, 27 September 2011). Japan’s ability to transport helicopters via ship, military aircraft and civilian aircraft is a significant tool in its overseas HA/DR arsenal.

⁷⁶ Kae Yanagisawa, “Host Nation Capabilities/Complexities,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012).

⁷⁷ Kenro Oshidari, “WFP Emergency Activation,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

As was the case during the Nargis response, concerted international pressure markedly changed the outcome of the HA/DR effort. Both quiet bilateral governmental pressure and public multinational encouragement induced Pakistan to request assistance.

In Pakistan, the NGO sector encountered difficulties in the form of poor coordination but also with regard to ongoing security risks in the country. Many NGOs were required to partner with the host nation and international military to provide adequate protection for their personnel, though they were the subjects of criticism for doing so. An IASC report found that “a common position across the agencies with regards to use of military assets was absent, despite having adapted earlier in 2010 a set of country-specific guidelines for civil-military interventions.”⁷⁸

The use of military assets is accepted within the context of the *Oslo Guidelines* and can be quite logical in the context of large-scale relief missions.⁷⁹ The reality in the Pakistan case was that military helicopters were in many cases the *only* mode of access to affected areas and that military escorts were the *only* means of ensuring the safety of humanitarian workers. The Pakistan case illustrates the need to establish partnering agreements and cross-sector information exchange prior to disasters. The experience in Pakistan provides ample evidence that erecting a *cordon sanitaire* between NGOs and the military may have serious consequences in some disasters.

The disaster marked one more milestone in the international recognition of Japan as a major HA/DR leader. In its provision of critical helicopters for the relief effort, the JSDF demonstrated its ability to make important contributions to HA/DR. At the time of the Pakistan floods, the U.S. military had few helicopters readily available. The ability of the JSDF to fill the gap was, in the words of a senior DOD official, “a key example to emulate.”⁸⁰ As in Sumatra and Haiti, the Japan response was typified by its civil-military nature, comprising JICA resources, JSDF helicopters and troops, and individual NGOs with Japan Platform as an operational coordinator.

A Ministry of Defense official told Peace Winds America that the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains quite reliant upon UNOCHA to establish coordination centers.⁸¹ As Japan’s prominence in international HA/DR grows and its joint operations with the U.S. increase, it will need to develop a method of coordinating civilian and military responders that goes beyond general UN

⁷⁸ Polastro, *Inter-Agency*, 56.

⁷⁹ These guidelines are discussed at greater length in the following chapters. Briefly, they allow for military intervention under civilian leadership, and as a last resort when civilian capabilities are overwhelmed.

⁸⁰ Senior DOD official, personal communication, 3 October 2012.

⁸¹ Senior MOD official, personal communication, 15 November 2012.

or host nation coordination mechanisms. This would greatly strengthen Japan as an overseas responder and give it more freedom to act.

2011 CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKE

The 6.3 M_w earthquake that struck Christchurch, New Zealand on 22 February 2011 was neither the most deadly nor the most destructive of recent Asia-Pacific disasters. The response to Christchurch was notable, however, for several lessons.

Although small by comparison to Nargis or the Pakistan floods, the Christchurch earthquake was New Zealand's second deadliest natural disaster on record. The 7.1 magnitude Canterbury earthquake of September of the previous year caused few casualties but may have contributed to the widespread damage that occurred. The February earthquake killed 185 people, mostly as a result of collapsed buildings and related fires. The region also saw mass ground liquefaction, precipitating flooding, destroying utilities, and complicating the reconstruction and recovery effort. The Christchurch earthquake also caused an 11-foot tsunami in Tasman Lake.

Domestic and International Response

In accordance with New Zealand emergency management law, New Zealand Civil Defense was the lead agency in responding to the disaster. As a developed nation with a robust incident management and command system, New Zealand had a wealth of centrally coordinated responding agencies on which to rely. In this case, the primary responders were the New Zealand police, members of the New Zealand Fire Service, St. John Ambulance, the Red Cross and Salvation Army, and the New Zealand Defense Force. The dispatch of the latter was not automatic. Christchurch Mayor Robert Parker told Peace Winds America that Prime Minister John Key initially objected to using military assets. However, he later relented in the face of appeals by Parker's office that cited the military's unique logistics capabilities.⁸² The Royal New Zealand Air Force provided a Wellington-Christchurch air bridge, while ground troops provided supplies, security and support to civilian counterparts. In all, around 1,400 troops augmented their civilian counterparts' relief efforts.

The Japan response to the Christchurch earthquake was particularly robust. Eight hours after the earthquake struck, JICA, in consultation with the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, opted to dispatch an observer team. Two hours later, the government of New Zealand asked the Japan government for an urban

⁸² Robert Parker, personal communication with Peace Winds America at Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs workshop, Seoul, South Korea, 10 May 2012).



Search and rescue personnel from the JICA Disaster Relief Team operate in Christchurch following the 22 February earthquake. (Photo credit: Gabriel Goh, ©2011, used under Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 license, <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en>.)

search and rescue team.⁸³ Thirty hours after the earthquake, the JICA Disaster Relief Team was en route to Christchurch. Seven days later a second USAR team deployed and a third team six days after that. On the ground, New Zealand's emergency services were joined by USAR counterparts from Japan, the United Kingdom, the U.S., Singapore, Australia, and China. The New Zealand police was augmented by 300 police from Australia.

Between the combined domestic and international USAR teams, around 70 rescues were made from collapsed structures. These rescues were all within the first 24 hours after the earthquake struck, meaning that for many of the international USAR teams, the focus of efforts was on body recovery and other non-rescue tasks. The bulk of the HA/DR response involved the provision of food, water, hygiene supplies, and shelter for displaced residents, establishment of water treatment and desalinization facilities, medical care for injured persons, restoration of basic utilities, and initial steps toward rebuilding infrastructure and supporting affected businesses.

⁸³ Yanagisawa, "Case Studies." Elements of the JICA DRT teams were still in New Zealand when the 11 March earthquake struck Japan and were recalled immediately.

Case Study Analysis

In remarks at a May 2012 HA/DR conference in Seoul, Christchurch Mayor Robert Parker recalled that his briefings on earthquake preparedness had projected the risk of a 4.5 magnitude or greater earthquake in Christchurch as exceedingly slim. Both the February and the September earthquakes occurred along previously unknown faults.⁸⁴ That two large and destructive earthquakes blindsided seismic experts in a developed and well-prepared nation such as New Zealand underscores the major challenges associated with all aspects of earthquake prediction and prevention. Predictions and risk assessments are inherently based on incomplete seismic knowledge. The complexity of predicting earthquakes means that preparedness measures should plan for the worst case scenario.

In many respects, the Christchurch earthquake was a model for host nation management of complex disasters. The leadership of the relief effort was wholly domestic, comprising a civilian-led emergency operations center in Christchurch augmented by an emergency task force in the Prime Minister's office and liaison officers from the military. To coordinate aid providers, New Zealand responders established and ran the on-site operations coordination center led by an overall incident commander according to the country's established incident command system. In all of these functions, the New Zealand government took on the leadership role often assumed by the UN in less developed nations.

The Christchurch disaster also stands out as an exemplar of highly effective international HA/DR coordination. The international response was broad-based, comprising military forces, USAR, and other specialized disaster teams as well as relief goods and monetary contributions. The on-site leadership in Christchurch was effectively able to receive, track, and dispatch numerous HA/DR actors, as well as the flow of relief goods. That leadership maintained local control over humanitarian resources and successfully paired needs on the ground with discrete skill sets.

The international response to the Christchurch disaster was notable for several reasons. According to JICA, the limited number of collapsed buildings paired with New Zealand's highly skilled fire service meant that the host nation had sufficient capabilities to mitigate the disaster without external assistance. Why then did so many international USAR teams deploy? The answer, according to JICA, was a "gap between operational and political considerations."⁸⁵ The political need to project a massive effort to rescue victims outweighed the reality that the eight responding overseas USAR teams were not strictly needed. The second and third JICA USAR teams were dispatched for Japanese political reasons alone.

The Japan response highlights another important lesson from the Christchurch disaster. Twenty-eight Japanese nationals died in the earthquake,

⁸⁴ Robert Parker, presentation, Seoul 2012.

⁸⁵ Yanagisawa, "Case Studies."

including a large contingent of students in the collapsed Canterbury Television building. With several of its nationals involved, the Japan government quickly sent requested assistance teams to Christchurch. With three separate JICA deployments, the Japan HA/DR presence in New Zealand was second only to that of Australia. Japan's strong and speedy response undoubtedly helped cement its reputation for HA/DR expertise. The prominent Japanese role showed that in proffering HA/DR assistance donor nations can alter or modify their offers depending upon how they perceived their national interests. Political considerations play an important role in how aid is offered and solicited.

CASE STUDIES CONCLUDING SUMMARY

Case studies have been central to the Peace Winds America Civil-Military Initiative and were central to all workshops, senior forums, interviews, and panels. Several commonalities arose in the case studies presented here. In every case, the role of the host nation was deemed very important to the success of HA/DR activities. Regardless of the type of disaster, participants found that there was a pressing need to strengthen host nation response capabilities at all levels. For example, for certain relief duties, such as urban search and rescue, there is no substitute for effective host nation efforts. Despite the progress made by the UN International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) to strengthen internationally deployable teams, case studies clearly show the limitations of international teams. By the time overseas USAR teams arrive, the window of time for live rescues has largely closed. In terms of lives saved, the most effective use of resources is to partner with host nations at the national, provincial and city levels to reinforce USAR capabilities.

The case studies also illustrate a gap in the ability of host nations to request, manage, and coordinate international aid. The few successful instances of host nation coordination – such as the Christchurch earthquake response – demonstrate how essential these abilities are. There should accordingly be a focus on strengthening international coordination mechanisms (e.g., the Combined Coordination Center) while simultaneously increasing host nation capacities. National capacities must include how to conduct and evaluate needs assessments and transmit accurate and timely assistance requests to avoid scenarios such as the 2009 Sumatra earthquake where there was too much or unsuitable aid deployed. Host nations must work with nations likely to provide HA/DR prior to an emergency to put procedures in place for bilateral requests.

The cases demonstrate the importance of successful *ad hoc* response partnerships, from the creation of the Utapao Combined Coordination Center in 2004 to the formation of the response coalition for Cyclone Nargis. Still the many benefits that can be realized by *ad hoc* arrangements are not sufficient in themselves. They must be complemented by robust efforts in preparedness at

all levels prior to a disaster. Joint planning and interoperability can strengthen existing coordination bodies, establish critical relationships and connections, and make *ad hoc* coordination more effective when set in motion. The above case studies presented disasters confined to one nation, with the exception of the Indian Ocean tsunami. When the disaster strikes more than one nation, a Combined Civil-Military Coordination Center may be the appropriate approach. However, the problems of the Utapao CCC may arise, e.g., difficulty involving host nation actors to determine needs and priorities and confusing or even competing chains of command.

How to effectively partner with the UN – especially UNOCHA – is one lesson raised in the case studies. Asia-Pacific disasters such as Christchurch or Tohoku that do not include major UN coordination actions will continue to be the exception to the rule. As a means of improving organizational efficiency and overall operational effectiveness, enhancing partnership with UN agencies is an important strategy.

The U.S. and Japan in Joint Response— Lessons of the Case Studies

The cooperation of U.S. and Japan civilian and military responders in recent disasters is an unmistakable trend. Starting with the major operation in response to the 2004 tsunami, each successive deployment has deepened mutual bonds and shared experience. The presence of a U.S.-led coordination platform in 2004 was essential in demonstrating to JICA, MOFA and MOD the ability to work fruitfully with the U.S. Conversely, Japan's willingness to devote significant military assets and its unique resources such as the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers strongly impressed U.S. disaster managers.

Joint deployments after 2004 reinforced the trend. U.S. HA/DR authorities saw the benefits of Japan's geographic location and speed of deployment in the Wenchuan earthquake as well as its ability to use JICA recovery and development resources to solidify host nation relationships. The ability of Japan to operate multiple independent civilian and military teams became well established with the Haiti and New Zealand response. The U.S. and Japan are clearly well matched in the rapidity with which they can deploy and the period of time that their forces can stay in theatre. U.S. forces deploy more quickly, but the Japan Central Readiness Force and its peacekeeping operations can remain in-country for longer periods of time.

As the two nations look toward future joint HA/DR operations, they should draw upon the lessons of these case studies for best practices in response. Further preparedness training can improve interoperability between the U.S. and Japan, and strengthen their interactions with host nations of the Asia-Pacific.

The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami may well be the best documented natural disaster in history. The earthquake struck a developed, technologically advanced nation replete with sensing, monitoring, and recording technology. The domestic and international response to the disaster, cutting across every sector, was among the largest ever fielded. The media spotlight on the rescue, relief, and early recovery efforts remained intensely focused for several months. As a result, the volume of material about the Tohoku disaster dwarfs that of other crises, even those with higher casualties.

By virtue of its overlap with the PWA Civil-Military Initiative, the 2011 Tohoku disaster permeated all case study discussions. Workshops and forums of the Initiative offered the opportunity to amass and codify the numerous reports, analyses, and lessons learned from the disaster. Despite the disaster's magnitude and its profound impact on every aspect of Japanese society, it should not be taken for granted that the Tohoku disaster will automatically lead to HA/DR reforms. Bureaucratic inertia, post-disaster fatigue, and financial limitations are all major obstacles to translating the lessons of the triple disaster into improvements for the future. Accordingly, this report places a particular emphasis on Tohoku, and in particular, concentrates on the lesser-known aspects of the Tohoku response and recovery as well as policy implications and recommendations for all stakeholders. Thanks to other case studies presented, Peace Winds America is able to place the Tohoku disaster in its historical context.

This chapter presents a broad retrospective analysis of the disaster, condensing the chronology and on-the-ground details of the HA/DR operation. Peace Winds America has compiled and generated a host of lessons learned and frank assessments of strengths and shortcomings in the response. A review of extant Tohoku disaster literature reveals the need for case study analyses that aggregate lessons learned, drawing in findings from all responders. The Initiative's focus on this case study is also important because it highlights the difficulty of bridging the gap between lessons learned and policy formulation. For this reason the Tohoku findings link with report findings to strengthen policy and procedural recommendations. It is not enough solely to document the painful lessons of the Tohoku disaster—they must be utilized to foster better preparedness and response.

TRIPLE DISASTER IN TOHOKU: EVENT SUMMARY

On 11 March 2011, the 9.0 M_w megathrust earthquake struck 45 miles off the coast of Miyagi Prefecture at 14:46 local time. The earthquake was the largest ever to have hit Japan and moved portions of the Tohoku region as much as eight feet to the east. The whole coastal region of Tohoku experienced significant subsidence; some seaside towns dropped by up to three feet (which increased the total inundation area of the tsunami). Geophysical analysis showed that the earthquake shifted the axis of the Earth by as much as ten inches.

The upthrust of a 110-mile swath of seabed propagated a massive tsunami. Coastal areas of Miyagi Prefecture were the first to be hit, some 26 minutes after the earthquake. The height of the tsunami was without precedent: the town of Miyako in Iwate Prefecture recorded a wave of 133 feet above sea level. In low-lying areas, the wave traveled more than three miles inland. The prefectures of Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima were the hardest hit, but tsunami waves were recorded as far afield as the Philippines, Antarctica, and the west coasts of North and South America.

As of January 2013, National Police Agency of Japan records indicated that nearly 16,000 people were killed in the disaster and another 2,700 were classified as missing.¹ Over 6,000 people were injured and close to 350,000 displaced or rendered homeless. The overwhelming percentage of the casualties was caused by the tsunami, with more than 94 percent of the fatalities being directly attributable to drowning. Mirroring the demographic makeup of Tohoku, around 70 percent of the casualties were elderly. The deaths arising from the tsunami stemmed primarily from two causes: residents who did not receive or heed the tsunami warnings and residents who could not evacuate in time or far enough away. The former category was significant: as many as 42 percent of these residents may not have followed the evacuation warnings or could not fathom the tsunami would reach them. The warnings, however, were promptly issued. The Japan Meteorological Agency's J-ALERT system issued its first Earthquake Early Warning message within eight seconds of the initial shock and its first tsunami warning three minutes later.² These warnings were disseminated by radio, television, loudspeaker, and cell phone text message. At the peak of the disaster, 4,700,000 people were evacuated, a remarkable feat of collaboration among the government, military, NGOs, and private sector.

The property damage caused by the earthquake was staggering. Entire villages, such as Rikuzentakata in Iwate Prefecture and Minamisanriku in

¹ National Police Agency of Japan, "Damage Situation and Police Countermeasures Associated with 2011 Tohoku District – Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake," (Situation report, 30 January 2013), http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo_e.pdf.

² Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, *The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake and Tsunami: Societal Dimensions* (Oakland, CA: EERI, 2011), 6.



The destructive impact of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. (Photo credit: Based on OCHA/ReliefWeb).

Miyagi Prefecture essentially ceased to exist, losing over 90 percent of their structures. In total, roughly 200,000 buildings were destroyed or heavily damaged by the earthquake and tsunami, and 25 million tons of debris were created (with an additional five million tons deposited in the water off the coast). In the tsunami-affected regions the damage to roads, rail lines, electrical power generation and distribution, ports, and other major infrastructure was near total. Critically important telecommunications infrastructure was severely affected, with phone and Internet service down for days and, in some cases,

weeks throughout much of eastern Tohoku. Estimates for the total cost of the disaster have ranged from 220 to 300 billion USD. By any calculation, this was the costliest natural disaster in history.

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant elevated this crisis to the level of *triple disaster*. Immediately after the earthquake the three operating reactors at the plant shut down automatically as designed. When the tsunami hit, however, the wave was in excess of 40 feet, significantly overtopping the nineteen-foot seawall outside the plant. With main power offline due to the earthquake, the tsunami flooded the backup generators and cooling pumps, leading to critical overheating in three of the plant reactors. Even as external cooling efforts commenced, the melting zirconium cladding of the fuel assembly caused a buildup of hydrogen gas that exploded, further complicating mitigation efforts. Ultimately three of the Fukushima reactors would melt down; containment and stabilization efforts following the meltdown lasted months. Although the exclusion zone around the stricken plant has shrunk from its original twenty-kilometer radius, officials warn that some areas near the plant will remain off-limits for decades.

THE JAPAN RESPONSE

Immediately following the quake Prime Minister Naoto Kan established an emergency headquarters, the Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters, to respond to the disaster. This was the first time in the history of Japan that an “extreme” disaster headquarters had been established (all previous such headquarters were for “major” disasters). The work of the headquarters began at 15:37 on 11 March 2011, with information collection and needs assessments dominating the meeting.³ In accordance with Japan’s 1961 Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act, the Headquarters was chaired directly by the Prime Minister. On 17 March the Prime Minister’s headquarters also established a separate Team in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Disaster Victims.⁴

The Disaster Management Headquarters focused initially on information gathering and needs assessments. The Cabinet, ministry, and domestic response staff at the Headquarters used these assessments to begin prioritizing the response. Topping the list was the dispatch of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) units, specialized firefighting and search and rescue teams, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, and Japan Coast Guard resources. The early prioritization of military involvement was made based upon the initial damage reports, which highlighted:

³ Atsushi Koresawa, “Main Features of Government’s Initial Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami,” *Journal of Disaster Research*, 7(2012): 107.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 110. This Team was tasked with, “(i) solving the problems of isolated emergency shelters; (ii) supplying disaster-stricken areas with emergency supplies; (iii) recovering lifelines; (iv) providing temporary housing; (v) disposing of debris; (vi) recovering and burying remains.”

(1) extensive geographic range of the disaster; (2) the destruction of local governance and emergency management institutions; and (3) the number of people affected.

The Headquarters managers next focused on reopening expressways and trunk roads for the transport of relief goods and response personnel. Additional focus was placed on securing airspace over Tohoku for use by assessment and search and rescue units. In addition to transport routes, the Headquarters prioritized restoring basic infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, water, and gas), as well as coordinating the public and private sectors to begin assembling and transporting relief supplies. The Headquarters also sought to address information dissemination and media relations. At the same time, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs began to field the tremendous volume of offers of overseas assistance that were flooding their offices.

The civilian disaster managers dispatched responders primarily through the national law enforcement, fire and disaster agencies. The Japan National Police Agency dispatched 85,000 responders and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency provided 7,577 Emergency Fire Response Teams comprising 28,620 personnel.⁵ The Japan Coast Guard (under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) responded with 54 boats and 19 aircraft, search and rescue personnel, and was heavily involved in debris removal for port access.⁶

The Japan SDF went into immediate action. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa set up on 11 March a Ministry of Defense (MOD) emergency center at its headquarters in Ichigaya. That evening, Defense Minister Kitazawa dispatched the first wave of 8,400 JSDF personnel to augment the local and prefectural civil defense, fire, and disaster management authorities. The JSDF deployment grew to 50,000 within three days, and by day eight some forty percent of total JSDF strength was deployed and remained active for the next three months.

The Ministry of Defense put units from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) under the command of the Northeastern Army of the Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). MOD established Joint Task Force Tohoku (JTF-TH), the largest joint task force in Japan Self-Defense Force history, and also the first JTF in Japan created for a disaster relief mission. For the disaster response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, MOD placed the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Central Readiness Force (CRF) in the lead, with some units from the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces participating.

⁵ Ibid., 109.

⁶ James Simpson, "Tohoku Earthquake: The Coast Guard's Response," *Japan Security Watch*, 9 June 2011, <http://jsw.newpacifcinstitute.org/?p=6604>.

The Japan SDF fielded a total of 107,000 troops at the height of its deployment, spanning five out of nine divisions and four out of five brigades.⁷ Every element of the Japan SDF – Air, Maritime, and Ground – was represented in the operation, including the Central Readiness Force, which predominantly operates overseas. In addition to this massive troop deployment (at its peak it included nearly half of Japan’s *total* active duty troops), the JSDF fielded 60 ships and 540 aircraft.

Lieutenant General Noboru Yamaguchi, then retired from the Ground Self-Defense Force, was called by the Cabinet of Japan to help coordinate response efforts and provided the cabinet-level assessment below.

There are several reasons why the Japan Self-Defense Forces was able rapidly to deploy a large scale of forces and sustain them for a long period of time in the areas whose social infrastructure was severely damaged.

First, the Japan Self-Defense Forces had remarkably improved its readiness for disaster relief operations, particularly after the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake when the JSDF rescue operations were not as timely as those of police forces and firefighters. According to the Self-Defense Law, commanders are authorized to dispatch troops for disaster relief based on request from prefectural governors who are responsible for protecting people from natural disasters except for extremely urgent situations. After the 1995 earthquake, new regulations were introduced requiring SDF unit commanders, in case of an earthquake stronger than level 5 plus, to initiate information gathering and possible disaster relief activities.⁸ The regulations also required every SDF camp and base to be prepared for immediate dispatch of a certain (small) number of rescuers.

Earlier training and exercises greatly aided the rapid deployment of SDF units on 3/11 as well. In 2008, the Northeastern Army Headquarters located at the center of disaster-hit area hosted the inter-agency disaster relief exercise code-named *Michinoku Alert*. This involved 24 local governments and 35 different rescue organizations. Because of this two day disaster training experience, the SDF divisions and brigades that deployed to the 3/11 disaster-hit areas knew with whom they should communicate concerning local government coordination and other rescue organizations, e.g., fire and police departments. The SDF divisions and brigades also knew how to locate, set up, and access command posts and communication facilities.

Existing operation plans also developed and rehearsed by SDF units were useful, even though the plans did not directly address the situation of 3/11. These series of plans for consequence management in case of a large-scale earthquake in the Tokyo area involved more than 100,000 SDF members stationed throughout Japan. Every unit mobilized for the 3/11 Tohoku operations had the detailed Tokyo plans including partnering organizations, equipment, logistics, and transportation. On 3/11, the only adjustment each unit had to make was to change the destination from Tokyo to Tohoku.

⁷ Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi, “Operation Tomodachi and Its Implications” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012).

⁸ The Japan Meteorological Agency Seismic Intensity Scale ranges from 0 to 7.

The second major factor speeding the JSDF deployment and sustainment was the existence of SDF facilities in and around the disaster-hit areas, utilized as stepping stones for rapid deployment. These served as hubs sustaining deployed units and supplying relief goods to victims. Two dozen JSDF camps and bases were in the disaster-hit Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures, as well as within the surrounding prefectures. These camps and bases became logistic hubs, relay points for deployment, and areas for rehabilitation of exhausted troops.

A typical case of deployment can be found when the JGSDF 12th Brigade rushed to its area of responsibility. This brigade was located 80 miles north of Tokyo and 250 miles south of Miyagi Prefecture. The brigade was designated to provide support in case of a large-scale earthquake and tsunami according to a plan developed by the Northeastern Army Headquarters. As this plan was rehearsed in 2008 during the Michinoku Alert exercise mentioned above, the entire brigade activated immediately after the earthquake, assuming the unit would assist in Miyagi Prefecture. The Brigade commander set an interim objective mid-way to Miyagi at Camp Koriyama where he received an order from Northeastern Army Commander to conduct operations in Fukushima. By the early morning on the second day, the entire brigade arrived at Camp Koriyama and began activities in Fukushima Prefecture.

This case demonstrates that with less than 20,000 troops deployed under the Northeastern Army to disaster areas, more than 80,000 troops from all over Japan reinforced the deployment. The regional armies dispatched divisions and brigades that established forward support to the disaster-hit areas, providing maintenance, supply, and medical support, and causing no additional burden on the Northeastern Army.⁹

Trained, though perhaps not fully prepared for the scale of the damage, the first responding units found scenes of near-total devastation and no established on-site command structure. In many of the smaller towns, the entire apparatus of government along with local emergency officials perished in the tsunami or could not be reached. The Japan SDF was, therefore, responsible for establishing an on-site command in these towns, and at the same time, for performing search and rescue, reconnaissance, assessments, and basic relief operations. The three JSDF branches conducted search and rescue, established water supplies, provided food, offered medical assistance, constructed bathing areas, rebuilt bridges and cleared roads, transported supplies and personnel, provided fuel, assisted in burial activities and body recovery, and established epidemic prevention efforts.

The Government of Japan took the lead responding to the emergency at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. On 11 March Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters were established at both the Prime Minister and Cabinet levels. A local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters was additionally set up in the vicinity of the stricken plant. Representatives from the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) were also present at these operations centers. The Fukushima Prefecture Governor issued the first evacuation order at 20:50 on 11 March for a

⁹ General Noboru Yamaguchi provided his analysis of the Government of Japan coordination of the Tohoku disaster (unpublished).

radius of two kilometers. By 15 March, this was expanded by order of the central government to 20 kilometers with some areas of evacuation reaching out as far as 30 kilometers. The Japan SDF was involved in the response, particularly in supporting cooling operations, from the onset of the nuclear disaster. Its role was clarified by an order from the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters on 20 March.¹⁰ JSDF units at the plant additionally provided decontamination and monitoring support and assisted with the evacuation effort. During the nuclear response, the GOJ also reached out to U.S. military and civilian resources for support, securing USAID and military response teams, air monitoring, and provision of fire trucks and radiation suits.

THE U.S. RESPONSE

On 11 March U.S. President Barack Obama stated that the U.S. “stands ready to help the Japanese people.” Japan Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto officially requested assistance from U.S. Ambassador John Roos that evening.¹¹ Ambassador Roos initiated a disaster declaration, which allowed USAID/OFDA to provide relief assistance through the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. USAID/OFDA on 11 March deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), complementing it with heavy urban search and rescue teams from Los Angeles and Fairfax counties as well as establishing a Washington-based Response Management Team. The DART assisted with disaster zone coordination, provided of relief goods (including firefighting equipment directly to the Ofunato Fire Department), and developed detailed needs assessments.

The U.S. military response to the Tohoku disaster was impressive. Named Operation *Tomodachi*, it eventually pulled in military assets from across the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility as well as stateside radiological experts. As the scope of the disaster became evident, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) began an immediate response, establishing a Crisis Action Team, organizing resources and facilitating regular information inputs to PACOM Headquarters in Hawaii. From the outset, U.S. Forces Japan joined the response effort as an operational support partner, not an HA/DR leader. As a senior USFJ official put it:

¹⁰ The order assigned the following roles to the SDF: (1) monitoring support, (2) damage assessment, (3) evacuation assistance, (4) search and rescue of the missing, (5) fire fighting, (6) emergency medical assistance and relief, (7) emergency transport of personnel and supplies (transport of nuclear specialists and nuclear-related materials and equipment), (8) securing or eliminating risks, and (9) others (actions that are within the capabilities of the SDF and are required at that time).

¹¹ CBS News “Obama: U.S. ‘Stands Ready to Help’ Japan,” 11 March 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-20042047.html.

Our main focus was posturing for future tasking and supporting GOJ and JSDF priorities...The Government of Japan and Self-Defense Forces were competent, capable, and led the response from the beginning.¹²

The initial U.S. Forces Japan response to Tohoku included inventory and dispatch of search and rescue units, transport of engineers from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture to Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture to begin power restoration, request of operational planners from Kadena, and the launch of Global Hawk reconnaissance drones for situational monitoring. These initial efforts were often made in the absence of a clear set of assessments from the affected area. This was particularly the case around Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant where U.S. personnel maintained an extremely cautious posture. On 12 March, for instance, a search and rescue mission involving five SH-60 Seahawk helicopters from Naval Air Facility Atsugi aborted their mission when radiation was detected.¹³

The extent of the disaster – and particularly the nuclear component – convinced PACOM to assume administrative command of the military component of the U.S. mission.¹⁴ The command element of PACOM activated Joint Task Force 519, with the mission of establishing a Joint Support Force (JSF) to bridge the gap between the U.S. and Japan militaries and to provide assistance to the Japan response to Fukushima Daiichi. On 18 March, U.S. Pacific Command established the Joint Support Force to lead Operation *Tomodachi* and later placed it under the command of Admiral Patrick Walsh, then the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet and Joint Task Force 519. USFJ commander Lieutenant General Burton Field became the JSF deputy commander.

The U.S. Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) of JTF 519 was the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF). Based in Okinawa, III MEF played a significant role in the U.S. response and was among the most heavily committed PACOM forces. The Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) at Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture was put on alert on 11 March and began deploying on 12 March by aircraft and by high speed vessel on 14 March. On 13 March the Third MEB reached Camp Sendai where they established liaison with the SDF's JTF-Tohoku and began joint operations. Two days later the first Marine supplies began reaching affected populations in Miyagi Prefecture.¹⁵ Separately, troops from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit on the USS *Essex*

¹² Senior USFJ official, unpublished notes, 28 September 2012.

¹³ Daren Epstein, "Unclassified Briefing: Japan-US-ROK CIV-MIL Disaster Preparedness Workshop," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

¹⁴ By activating a Joint Task Force, PACOM enabled access to more military resources than U.S. Forces Japan alone would have had.

¹⁵ Lt. Col. Michael Curtin, "III MEF & Pacific Area of Operations" (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

established a forward control element and began to focus on the hard-hit cities of Ofunato and Kamaishi.¹⁶

During March and early April, until authority for land HA/DR operations transferred to U.S. Army Japan, III MEF transported and delivered supplies (448 tons by 2 April), set up mobile showers, and took the lead in the critical clearing and reopening of Sendai airport. This latter task was a particularly crucial operation. Though covered in six feet of debris and water, the airport was nonetheless reopened for the first C-130 flight only six days after the earthquake. The reopening of Sendai airport was especially important to the relief effort. The U.S. Joint Support Force had been operating on a “hub and spoke” model, with personnel and supplies ferried to “hubs” at airbases at Atsugi, Yokota, and Yamagata. U.S. troops quickly discovered that these “hubs” were too far from the affected area. Sendai became the crucial “hub.”

The role of U.S. maritime forces in Operation *Tomodachi* stands out for its size and the type of assets that were utilized. As in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, a U.S. aircraft carrier played a prominent role, in this case the USS *Ronald Reagan* and its attendant carrier strike group. Also involved in the HA/DR operation was the USS *Blue Ridge*, command ship of the 7th Fleet, ships of the Amphibious Ready Group, including the USS *Harpers Ferry* and USS *Germantown*, and the amphibious dock ship USS *Tortuga*, which transported Japan SDF troops and vehicles from Hokkaido. Twenty U.S. Navy ships participated in Operation *Tomodachi*.

Throughout the operation U.S. naval forces supported the Japan Maritime SDF and Japan Coast Guard. Three U.S. liaison officers were stationed on the helicopter carrier *Hyuga* and three Japan liaison officers were on board the *Ronald Reagan*. While many U.S. naval forces participated actively in the HA/DR mission, including with the transport of relief supplies, reconnaissance and assessments, the presence of the aircraft carrier was in the words of one U.S. defense official, “more a statement of reassurance than a primary provider of relief.”¹⁷ As in 2004, the use of a carrier achieved more to telegraph U.S. commitment to Japan and the HA/DR operation than for its unique capabilities.

The U.S. Pacific Air Force was heavily involved in the operations of U.S. Joint Task Force 519, providing heavy lift to the “hubs” and sending in the first C-130 transports to the newly reopened airport at Sendai. U.S. Air Force personnel, in partnership with elements from III MEF, assisted Japan aviation officials running air traffic control operations at Sendai until Japan assumed full operations on 1 April. U.S. Air Force units were also heavily involved in survey operations, mapping, and aerial assessment, and contributed heavily to the

¹⁶ Andrew Feickert and Emma Chanlett-Avery, *Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Response* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6.

¹⁷ Senior USEJ official, personal communication, 29 September 2011.

monitoring mission in the airspace around Fukushima Daiichi, which provided Japan authorities and its military aerial photos and real-time radiation levels.

The U.S. Joint Support Force deployed 149 aircraft and 19,703 troops throughout the entirety of the HA/DR operation. U.S. troops were involved in some capacity until early May.

BILATERAL MILITARY AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE COORDINATION

In the early days of the response, it became apparent to Japan and U.S. military commanders that an effective Japan-U.S. joint coordination mechanism would be necessary in light of the large numbers of troops being fielded by both nations. The ensuing response marked the first ever joint military operation between Japan and the U.S. Due to the history of close defense cooperation and the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, a model for joint




Diagram depicting the chain of command and bilateral coordination centers of JSDF and U.S. forces during relief operations. (Adapted from Col. Nozomu Yoshitomi, "Bilateral Coordination Between JSDF and U.S. Forces," *Liaison V*, 2012, 25.)

operations was already extant.¹⁸ (It should be noted that the Japan-U.S. joint operations model was designed for combat, so the roles and responsibilities in Japan-U.S. joint HA/DR operations did remain somewhat ambiguous.)

On 11 March Japan and U.S. officials jointly established Bilateral Coordination Centers (BCCs) in Ichigaya and Yokota Air Base. BCC-Ichigaya was organized with 20 Japan staff led by a JGSDF major general and 15 U.S. staff led by a brigadier general of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). BCC-Yokota contained the U.S. Joint Support Force with 300 personnel. Major General Koichiro Bansho of the Japan GSDF was the Japan liaison at Yokota. BCC-Sendai was formed on 16 March with 45 Japan staff led by a JGSDF colonel and 50 U.S. staff led by a USMC colonel. The BCCs at Ichigaya and Yokota were tasked with operational level coordination, while BCC-Sendai and the Joint Forces Land Component Command-Forward took on tactical coordination. The BCCs maintained links with each other as well as with the command elements within the Japan Joint Chiefs, Japan JTF-Tohoku, the U.S. Joint Support Force, and the respective Japan and U.S. air, maritime and ground component commanders.

The U.S. significantly aided Japan in its nuclear response. On the civilian side, the USAID/OFDA DART in Tohoku added to its standard relief mission in two unique ways. The first was the addition of specialized nuclear response personnel to the DART to help manage the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. OFDA reached out directly to the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission to dispatch staff to Japan to complement military and Government of Japan personnel. The second way was to work in partnership with the GOJ to form a Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell (BACC).

The BACC allowed U.S. responders to coordinate directly with Goshi Hosono, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister on nuclear policy, and later appointed State Minister charged with addressing the continuing crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Hosono was assisted by Akihisa Nagashima, a Diet member and former Vice Minister of Defense. In light of the confusing and often overlapping jurisdictions (e.g., Japan Government, TEPCO) as well as the fact that responders from both nations were tackling the nuclear crisis, the Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell was an important asset to responders on the ground. The BACC “presented a single window into the USG through which the GOJ could direct requests for assistance,”¹⁹ which helped to streamline the process and to reduce overlapping missions. Until this task force was established, the nuclear issue was marked by confusion, miscommunication, and little information sharing between the U.S. and

¹⁸ Yuki Tatsumi, *Great Eastern Japan Earthquake: “Lessons Learned” for Japanese Defense Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: Stimson, 2012), 19.

¹⁹ USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2012), 93.

Japan. Tsuneo Watanabe notes in Chapter II that the establishment of the Hosono-led communications mechanism was an important step by the Japanese government and helped to restore confidence lost in the early chaotic days of the nuclear disaster.

On the military side, the U.S. Marine Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) arrived from the U.S. with 155 members on 3 April. In conjunction with civilian counterparts in the DART and other government experts, the CBIRF formed the core of the USG's nuclear support to Japan. The dispatch of the CBIRF, similar to that of the *Ronald Reagan*, was an unambiguous message of U.S. "willingness to devote its most capable resources to the GOJ" and occasioned a special note of thanks from Minister Kitazawa and General Ryoichi Oriki.²⁰ Although the CBIRF was welcomed by GOJ leadership, it may not have added many capabilities not already possessed by Japan. A Sasakawa Peace Foundation analysis found that, "Outside of displaying their equipment and receiving inspections, the CBIRF's activities in Japan did not stand out, but essentially its primary role seems to have been as part of a deployment exercise."²¹

INTERNATIONAL, MULTILATERAL, NGO, AND PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE

Offers of assistance flooded the offices of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) within hours of the disaster. The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) that Prime Minister Kan would make an announcement on the type of international assistance needed as soon as possible. The GOJ requested that foreign teams, making arrangements to respond and/or to provide assistance, wait until requests and needs were officially announced.²² Immediately after the earthquake, Japan received offers of assistance from 113 countries and 14 international organizations and accepted assistance from 14 countries based on assessed needs, e.g., specialized search and rescue and medical assistance. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was charged with coordinating all offers of international assistance.

On 17 March, the GOJ requested that UNOCHA publicize its position concerning relief and relief item assistance as well as its guidelines concerning international NGOs operating in Japan. For relief items, the GOJ was responsible

²⁰ Senior USFJ official, unpublished notes, 28 September 2012.

²¹ The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, *The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management: Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation* (Tokyo: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2012), 53.

²² Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, "Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Update, March 11, 2011," (Situation Report), accessed 10 January 2013, <http://www.coe-dmha.org/Research/ResearchInfoMgmt/Japan/Japan03112011.pdf>.

for identifying needs and setting up a mechanism for storage and transportation to affected people. The GOJ asked that no relief goods be sent without coordination with the government.

The GOJ also broadcast its position on foreign NGO involvement: “Because the search and rescue operation phase still continues in affected areas, access to those areas is strictly limited to rescue workers. It is also reported that there is temporary shortage of petrol in the affected area. International/foreign NGOs are recommended to wait until the situation improves so that those NGOs are able to conduct their activities in a self-sustainable way.”²³

Throughout the response, Japan received offers of support from 163 countries and 43 international organizations, including 28 urban search and rescue offers. Relief and rescue teams from 24 countries arrived on the scene to assist in HA/DR.²⁴ Urban search and rescue teams arrived from Australia, New Zealand, Germany, France, Russia, South Korea, Portugal, and Taiwan. Separate telecoms teams (Austria and Switzerland), logistics teams (DHL), medical teams (Canada, Turkey, and Russia) and assessment teams (Turkey and Italy) deployed throughout the emergency.²⁵ Military forces from Australia, South Korea, Israel, and France also played significant roles in the response, contributing relief goods, medical teams, and air transport.

Australia and South Korea were the largest international donors after the U.S. Australia dispatched a 76-man search and rescue team, and its C-17 aircraft (three of its total of four) were vital for transporting relief supplies and Japanese vehicles. The Royal Australian Navy placed the HMAS *Tobruk* and HMAS *Sydney* on alert to transport relief supplies. The Republic of Korea (ROK) dispatched two Korea Disaster Relief Teams for urban search and rescue and sent relief and recovery items. The ROK teams, which were the first overseas search and rescue teams to arrive in Japan, utilized ROK Ministry of National Defense cargo planes and were able to fly directly to Yokota Air Base. These arrangements were worked out through bilateral channels with the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, although Japan’s lack of prior experience receiving international aid slowed the response in some cases. An existing relationship between a city mayor and the Israeli Defense Forces eased the process of obtaining authorization for deployment of a medical team.²⁶

Because Japan’s central government coordination capacity was unimpaired by the disaster, multilateral organizations contributed but did not coordinate the main HA/DR efforts. UNOCHA maintained a presence from 12-23 March,

²³ UNOCHA, “Earthquake and Tsunami Situation Report No. 6, 17 March 2011.”

²⁴ Koresawa, “Main Features,” 109.

²⁵ “Relief teams: JAPAN 9.0 Earthquake/Tsunami,” UNOCHA Virtual OSOCC, accessed 14 December 2012, <http://vosocc.unocha.org/>.

²⁶ Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.

establishing an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in Tokyo that dealt primarily with information management, targeting international audiences. The UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team established sub-OSOCCs in Ofunato and Sendai, in part to coordinate overseas search and rescue teams. By 21 March, these sub-OSOCCs had closed and referred the few remaining international search and rescue teams to Japan coordinators.

The UN World Food Programme (WFP) played a significant role in the response, handling three primary tasks: coordinating shipments of relief goods; consolidating items and managing their dispatch; and managing private sector partnerships. WFP constructed prefabricated warehouses for supplies in Ishinomaki and Otsuchi and set up 35 mobile office units. To increase coordination with Japan NGOs, WFP (and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) seconded staff members to Japan Platform.²⁷ The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN satellite authority (UNOSAT) provided relief goods and mapping services, respectively.

The NGO response to the disaster was immediate and varied. NGOs provided a full range of disaster services, including transport and distribution of all types of relief goods, primary and secondary medical care, psycho-social support, debris cleanup, childcare, and telecoms. Though Japan had more than 40,000 registered NGOs at the time, most were very small with limited budgets and few full time staff. The NGOs with significant disaster relief and disaster risk management experience numbered approximately 20, with most of their experience in overseas operations. The majority of these larger NGOs were Tokyo-based; still, they immediately began to respond and to appeal for private and public funding.

The lack of information and communications within the NGO community merits highlighting. Confusion surrounding needs significantly slowed the response times of both local and international NGOs. One NGO operating in Japan that had run into information/communications problems in past disasters was International Medical Corps (IMC). The first thing IMC did upon arriving in an affected area was to distribute telecommunications devices, including iPads, iPhones, and satellite phones. This resulted in quick assessment of medical needs.

Japan Platform (JPF) was the primary coordination mechanism for Tohoku disaster relief NGOs. Japan Platform received funding and additional personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, WFP, and the private sector. Ordinarily the mission of Japan Platform is to fund and advise its 32 NGO members to provide disaster relief or development assistance overseas. Now JPF became the coordination framework for Japanese NGOs responding to the Tohoku disaster. The domestic focus was a significant

²⁷ Kenro Oshidari, "WFP and Tohoku," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

change in the operational role of JPF, although it had been involved in the 2007 earthquake in Niigata.

By 1 April Japan Platform had funded or was funding relief activities across the three hardest-hit prefectures, providing monetary support to 26 domestic NGOs distributing relief goods, food and water, building shelters, and performing needs assessments.²⁸ In May Japan Platform sent two full-time officials (one seconded from JICA) to Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures, where they conducted needs assessments. JPF bridged local NGOs in the field with Japan government officials, allowing the two to share information. While the coordination provided by Japan Platform may not have approached the level of a UN On-Site Operations Coordination Center, Japan Platform nevertheless established two-way information. On-site needs assessments conducted by NGOs were sent to Japan Platform and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs while updates on evolving conditions were passed to the NGOs entering affected areas.

As a consequence of the scale of the disaster many *ad hoc* NGO partnerships arose around primary relief tasks such as transport, distribution of supplies, and the establishment of shelter/shower facilities. Out of sheer necessity, NGOs operating on the ground frequently established temporary partnerships with local government resources, JSDF/U.S. military forces, other NGOs (domestic and international), volunteer organizations, and private sector businesses. Partnerships with private sector businesses were particularly important in the earliest phases of the response, when these entities were the only sources of trucks and helicopters needed to access the tsunami zone. The Japanese Red Cross Society (a “special corporation” to the GOJ) recorded over one billion USD in donations in the first month and focused primarily on providing medical care through 822 teams as well as 3,039 corps comprising over two million volunteers.²⁹

The international NGO response to Tohoku was similarly robust and saw the involvement of the many traditional HA/DR civil society actors: the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), World Vision, Mercy Corps, International Medical Corps, Doctors Without Borders, Save the Children, United Methodist Committee on Relief, Samaritan’s Purse, and many others. Those with Japan chapters, such as World Vision Japan and Save the Children Japan, could begin operations immediately and be supported additionally by overseas funds and staff. However, many of the responding international NGOs did not have pre-existing operations in Japan, making the need for coordination and local NGO partnership that much more critical. International Medical Corps, for instance, quickly established working partnerships with PeaceBoat,

²⁸ Japan Platform, *North-East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: Current Status of JPF’s Relief Efforts* (Tokyo: Japan Platform, 1 April 2011), 4.

²⁹ Masanao Mori, “The Disaster Relief Activities of the Japanese Red Cross Society for the Great East Japan EQ,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

Second Harvest, Bond & Justice, and the Kamaishi and Kesenuma Emergency Response Centers.³⁰ In several instances international NGOs were able to forge civil-military partnerships, as in the case of Samaritan's Purse, which used military lift assets out of Yokota Air Base to transport relief goods directly to a Sendai warehouse. Much like JSDF-NGO partnerships, these arrangements were predominantly *ad hoc* and frequently resulting from prior familiarity between partners.

Many of the NGOs mentioned above raised considerable funds for the victims of the earthquake and tsunami through donations made online, via text message, by mail, and by telephone. NGOs and donors organized fundraising events, campaigns, canvassed the streets, and more. According to the *Huffington Post*, U.S. donors gave a total of 352.2 million USD to three major charities—the Red Cross, World Vision, and Save the Children.³¹ Save the Children and World Vision offered school lunch programs and school supplies for thousands of children each day, among other relief tasks.

Initial donations to the Red Cross went to delivering relief supplies, including food, water, personal emergency kits, and blankets. As Red Cross contributions poured in, 101,000 evacuee families in temporary housing were provided with appliances sets including refrigerators, rice cookers, and washing machines. More than 87,000 people received lifesaving health services. One year after the disaster, the Japanese Red Cross Society (which raised 4.95 billion USD globally), shifted its relief priorities. The relief organization had been focusing primarily on survivors' immediate medical needs. The shift in focus centered on developing structural long-term solutions, including building temporary and permanent health facilities.³² The Japanese Red Cross Society has coordinated with the Japan Reconstruction Agency. The Japanese public remains very critical of both organizations, citing their slow disbursement of assistance.

The Japanese public does recognize the extent of NGO contributions to tsunami relief and recovery. At the local, prefectural and central government levels, the enormous efforts by domestic and international NGOs are sincerely appreciated. The disaster revitalized many local NGOs, and has spurred a dramatic growth in volunteerism throughout the nation. More than two years after the disaster, the Tohoku region continues to benefit from volunteers in many capacities.

³⁰ Eric A. Des Marais, Subhasis Bhadra and Allen R. Dyer, "In the Wake of Japan's Triple Disaster: Rebuilding Capacity through International Collaboration," *Advances in Social Work*, 13(2012): 343.

³¹ Jessica Prois, "Japan Earthquake Anniversary: Where Did Your Donation Go? (And How You Can Still Help)" *The Huffington Post*, 11 March 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/11/japan-earthquake-tsunami-anniversary_n_1337570.html.

³² Tetsushi Kajimoto, "Japan Red Cross says whole year wasted in post-tsunami rebuilding," *AlertNet*, 7 March 2012, <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/japan-red-cross-says-whole-year-wasted-in-post-tsunami-rebuilding>.

Following the trend of the 2004 tsunami, the private sector contributed heavily to all phases of the HA/DR effort. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, total U.S. corporate donations for Tohoku were in excess of 298 million USD.³³ This enormous sum flowed primarily to the Japanese Red Cross Society and large international NGOs:

Because there are few American-based NGOs operating in Japan and only a handful of Japanese NGOs with sufficient capacity to manage large programs, the majority of resources from both public and private donors have gone to the Japanese Red Cross.³⁴

In addition to providing monetary donations, the private sector partnered operationally with HA/DR responders. In numerous cases the business community stepped in to fill critical roles and shortages, especially in the frenzied early days of the response. The Japanese technology company Sojitz transported Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and vehicles on board its high-speed vessel *Nacchan World* and, during the recovery phase, shipped modular container houses to the city of Kesenuma. In the monitoring efforts at Fukushima Daiichi, iRobot Corporation robots were used for radiation monitoring, and Boeing ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles provided footage from above. Companies such as Costco, AEON, IKEA, and Coca Cola donated critical goods and were actively involved in the logistics of delivering them to affected areas.

ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED— MILITARY-MILITARY INTEROPERABILITY

The Tohoku case presents a scenario in which a disaster of unprecedented magnitude and destruction necessitated and generated the formation of multiple on-the-spot, *ad hoc* partnering arrangements in order to accomplish the basic roles of HA/DR. A retrospective analysis should not only praise these efforts, but also focus on what did and did not work with a view toward future operations.

The bilateral coordination mechanism between Japan SDF and the U.S. forces has been lauded for its rapid response, its unique contribution to relief, rescue, and Fukushima mitigation efforts as well as its management of nearly 130,000 soldiers. U.S. forces – from the command level on downward – remained the supporting partner. The Japan SDF took the lead in all military undertakings with clear overall leadership of the operation. This empowered all Japanese responders and was especially important in guiding a positive view of the JSDF

³³ “Corporate Aid Tracker – Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami, March 2011,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, accessed 14 December 2012, <http://blcc.uschamber.com/site-page/corporate-aid-tracker-japanese-earthquake-and-tsunami-march-2011>.

³⁴ Stacey White, *Corporate Engagement in Natural Disaster Response* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2012), 11.



Japan Commanding General of the Sixth Division Yuji Kuno and PACOM commander Admiral Robert Willard discuss relief efforts on 23 March 2011 at Sendai airport. (Photo credit: Ben Chang/U.S. Embassy- Japan.)

in media coverage as JSDF commanders and ground troops were being seen nightly on *Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (NHK) televised news.

Writing in the *Journal of Defense Management*, Rockie Wilson of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard lays out the highlights – and drawbacks – of this approach:

Given the U.S. previous experiences in dealing with countries of very limited means, it would have been easy to push U.S. capabilities and operations on GOJ when they were neither required nor welcomed. Japan is a thriving economic, political, and military power in its own right. To overreach its bounds, the U.S. may have caused Japanese leaders to “lose face.”

A common critique among American servicemen was their belief that they could have done more had they been given the chance or had the Japanese requested additional support. If perceived to be disrespected, Japanese leaders may not have accepted future relief. Further, unwanted advances could have very easily fractured or at least impaired long-term relationships between the two countries. In the end, the Bilateral Assistance Coordination process ensured the delicate balance between respecting GOJ leaders and helping the people of Japan was maintained.³⁵

³⁵ Rockie K. Wilson, “Operation TOMODACHI: A Model for American Disaster Response Efforts and the Collective use of Military Forces Abroad,” *Journal of Defense Management*, 2(2012): 6.

One should be reminded that Operation *Tomodachi* was still the first joint Japan-U.S. military field operation. It showed in a number of ways. As noted above, the Bilateral Coordination Center mechanism was created for combat, not HA/DR operations. A Japan Ministry of Defense lessons learned document highlights this fact, noting that the “scope of the coordination responsibilities” was frequently beyond the ability of the Bilateral Coordination Centers, hampered as they were by an unclear division of roles.³⁶ A separate Japan National Defense Academy study found that the BCCs in Ichigaya and Yokota were slow to activate due to the fact that “most of the staff were unfamiliar with bilateral coordination in disaster relief.”³⁷ Furthermore, “there were some frictions about the function/role of each BCC because there was no experience and plan for establishing BCCs in disaster relief.”³⁸ Simultaneously, the Sendai BCC lagged because Japan Task Force-Tohoku and the Japan Northeastern Army could not initially devote resources to it.

Both Japan and U.S. after-action reports have highlighted the fact that neither military had a detailed contingency plan for the disaster. Even with their long history of military cooperation, neither had an “off the shelf” plan for Tohoku, which in retrospect was a hindrance.³⁹ According to then U.S. Forces Japan deputy commander Brigadier General William Crowe, the majority of prewritten Japan-U.S. HA/DR plans were for man-made disasters with no bilateral mechanism for a Tohoku-like event.⁴⁰ Looking toward the future, joint Japan-U.S. plans must strike a balance. They have to anticipate future contingencies like Tohoku and make specific plans to mitigate them. They must also be adequately flexible, given the unique aspects of every disaster. Any “off the shelf” joint HA/DR plan also requires full buy-in across both militaries. Given the complexity of a joint response of this magnitude, without command-level investment in training and joint pre-planning, no emergency plan will be sustained in the context of an actual disaster.

Further problems in coordination and information exchange developed between Japan and the U.S. On the whole – despite years of side-by-side combat preparation – specific knowledge by U.S. forces and the Japan SDF of each others’ unique HA/DR capabilities was minimal and only learned through trial-and-error. The Japan National Defense Academy found that:

³⁶ Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Learned in Disaster Relief Operation After the Great East Japan Earthquake (Midterm Report)*, (Tokyo: MOD, 2011), 18.

³⁷ National Defense Academy of Japan, *International/Military-Public-Private Cooperation in Disaster Relief: Lessons Learned from Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011*, (Unpublished report, Yokosuka: 2012), 7.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 8.

³⁹ Senior DOD official, personal communication, 2 December 2012.

⁴⁰ Brig. Gen. William Crowe, “Military Partnering with Others in HA/ DR,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012).

JSDF had insufficient understanding about U.S. Force's capabilities in intelligence, transportation, medical service, etc. in case of disaster relief. Especially the Ground Self-Defense Force had little understanding about the capability of other military branches of service in the U.S. Forces. Consequently, JSDF could not utilize U.S. Force's capabilities quickly and effectively.⁴¹

The problem cut both ways, as the U.S. Joint Task Force 519 found itself without basic information about Japan's domestic response mechanism, the authorities of differing levels of government, and the specific role of the Japan Self Defense-Forces.

Other communications challenges also cropped up during the response. The computer network that was intended to link the U.S. Forces Japan and JSDF systems ran into repeated problems, delaying messages and task requests. There were also issues with the information sharing website maintained by USFJ and PACOM. The U.S. military frequently classified materials pertaining to operations, which JSDF offices could not access.⁴²

Throughout the Peace Winds America Civil-Military Initiative, military participants on both sides emphasized the need for improved information sharing between the U.S. and Japan, starting with basic knowledge of actors and their capabilities.

A frequently voiced criticism of the Japan HA/DR operations and the U.S. Operation *Tomodachi* was the lack of a "common operating picture." In civilian parlance, this means a broad informational outlook of the whole disaster, taking into account the full spectrum of needs, number and kinds of responders on the ground, and available resources. In the case of Tohoku, this refers to civilian government responders, NGOs, multinationals, and the private sector as well as a coordination mechanism that can accommodate all responders.

U.S. Forces Japan has emphasized its use of the UNOCHA ReliefWeb open-access disaster website and the USFJ establishment of a Joint Requirements Review Board to assess the contributions and abilities of non-military partners and to prioritize incoming requests for assistance. Among U.S. forces "there was a need for, but a lack of, a comprehensive unclassified common operational picture which would have provided shared situational awareness of all HA/DR participants for decision makers."⁴³

This was equally true of the Japan Self-Defense Forces: "Today the JSDF lacks a system that can synthesize the information that was collected by each JSDF service and turn it into a common operational picture that can be shared

⁴¹ National Defense Academy, *Cooperation in Disaster Relief*, 9.

⁴² Shuichi Wada, *Operation Tomodachi in Miyagi Prefecture: Success and Homework* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 3.

⁴³ Cmdr. Steve Jacobs, "Japan's 3/11 Triple Disaster: A Call for a New Lessons Learned Paradigm for Navy Information," *CHIPS*, July-September 2011, accessed 15 December 2012, <http://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?ID=2491>.

across all SDF services.⁴⁴ For both militaries, the common operating picture was insufficiently broad to accommodate all the actors in Tohoku.

The need for a broad common operating picture is illustrated by the respective roles of Japan SDF and the U.S. military forces during the disaster. The JGSDF led search and rescue, water, medical care, food, bathing, bridge construction, road clearance, transportation support, fuel support, burial, music, evacuee support, water pumping and supply, decontamination, and monitoring throughout its deployment.⁴⁵ USFJ priority actions were: information collection sorties; expeditionary airfield operations; commercial seaport clearance; extended lift (primarily air and sea); and health and comfort (including shower facilities and stress management).⁴⁶ The sheer range of these activities indicates the urgent need for an information system that can track and coordinate forces.

A widened common operating picture among and between both militaries could have allowed them to focus on their truly unique capabilities. They could then have delegated less specialized tasks to the NGOs, volunteers, or other civilian partners. The general consensus of Japanese military analysts has been that the deployment of 107,000 troops for a disaster operation “*is unsustainable* from a military point of view.”⁴⁷ More tasks must be delegated to non-military assets at the outset of an operation to allay the burden.

ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED— CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Civil-military cooperation during the Tohoku response was generally informal, *ad hoc*, and the result of spontaneous partnerships. Cooperative measures varied widely in efficacy and organization. While the overall findings of any civil-military HA/DR review point to the need for more formalized partnerships and preparedness training, it should be noted that *ad hoc* collaboration, done right, can be quite effective. Still, a robust set of pre-plans and partnership protocols established in advance of a disaster is preferable.

Japan’s disaster management structure organizes responsibility from the grassroots level upwards: first, local town authorities are responsible, then prefectural authorities, and finally the central government. The breakdown of

⁴⁴ Tatsumi, *Lessons Learned*, 24. According to a Department of Defense official, a DOD analysis after *Tomodachi* concluded that the Japanese lacked the ability to provide “accurate, timely, analyzed data about the disaster.” Senior DOD official, personal communication, 2 December 2011.

⁴⁵ Maj. Hiroto Kobayashi, “JGSDF Peacetime Efforts in Preparation for Large-scale Disasters,” (presentation at JGSDF Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific 2012 (MCAP12), Tokyo, Japan, 25-29 September 2012).

⁴⁶ Daren Epstein, “Japan-US-ROK CIV-MIL Disaster Preparedness Workshop,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 27 September 2011).

⁴⁷ Senior MOD officer, personal communication, 7 June 2012.

this pre-arranged command system during the Tohoku disaster resulted from two primary causes: (1), lack of knowledge of the national-level response system; and (2), decimation of local government capacity. In the first case, few local and prefectural officials had experience requesting military assistance. In addition, the emergent system of bilateral coordination centers was confusing and unfamiliar to local leaders. Consequently local officials did not directly contact the BCCs, leading to significant delays in requests being received. The JSDF and U.S. forces both experienced this lack of a “demand signal,” a recurring complaint in numerous disaster debriefs and after action reports.

Lieutenant General Yamaguchi found in his post-disaster analysis that one of the most important lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake is the vital role played by information and communications infrastructure. The earthquake and tsunami knocked out landline and mobile telecommunications services across the hardest-hit areas by severing conventional and fiber-optic transmission lines and damaging, destroying, or interrupting power to base stations. Communities along the Sanriku coast of northeastern Honshu found themselves completely cut off, unable to share information even with neighboring municipalities. As a result, it was impossible for responders to gauge the seriousness of the situation. Even two weeks after the tsunami, authorities were still unable to pin down the location and needs of many of the communities whose lifelines had been severed. The damage to communications infrastructure also hindered coordination and information sharing among the various responders taking part in relief efforts, from SDF troops and firefighters to volunteer groups and international organizations. In many cases, even the emergency supplies that prefectural authorities had already pre-staged in warehouses in the event of such a disaster never reached the evacuation centers that needed them, either because of transportation problems or because the centers were unable to communicate their needs.

Regarding the importance of information and communication in areas where social networks were fragmented, it is worth considering the military role in providing communication services. For example, Japan SDF could have played a more central function in relaying the needs of disaster-affected people, since every SDF member had access to military communication networks. Tohoku illustrates the need for better civil-military training with local government in communications, needs sharing and response coordination. The disaster was a “worst case scenario” where the normal civilian emergency management system became non-functional. Civil-military pre-disaster training can help local towns and military units alike remain in contact.

The experience of Tohoku reinforced the need for military contingency planning in the event of loss of civilian government functions. Japan’s domestic relief system channels local or prefectural requests to the JSDF. A vacuum therefore appeared when these local governments were destroyed. Speaking at a PWA

workshop, MOD Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Office Deputy Director Hisanaga Okuyama acknowledged that the Japan Self-Defense Forces needed to clarify their policies in cases where civil administrations lose functionality.⁴⁸ This lesson speaks to the need for redundancy in preparedness measures. Policies should be formulated in advance to allow for the swift deployment of critical military assets even in the absence of a local request.

The Japan National Defense Academy review has suggested that the JSDF duplicate the U.S. military strategy of establishing Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs), noting that the rapid re-opening of the Sendai airport was in part a result of good civil-military asset utilization on the part of the U.S.⁴⁹ The Civil-Military Operations Center is a useful model and could be strengthened by regular training that includes local governments, NGOs, private sector officials and MOFA representatives. (CMOCs are discussed in greater detail in Chapter VII.)

The lack of communication coherence between Japan and the U.S. on the risks of low-dose radiation exposure in the aftermath of Fukushima generated another important lesson learned. The messages sent out by the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Pacific Command differed significantly from those of the GOJ. While the GOJ maintained its 20-kilometer evacuation radius, the U.S. Embassy on 16 March issued a 50-mile evacuation notice for U.S. citizens on advice from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.⁵⁰ This discrepancy damaged the credibility of all of stakeholders, particularly the GOJ.

The Japan response to the Fukushima incident had problems as well. Numerous reports have criticized TEPCO for being uncommunicative and closed throughout the nuclear emergency. Within the government, transparency and a clear chain of command were also absent. One post-disaster report has indicated that from the Prime Minister's nuclear response headquarters "there was a lack of communication with other key actors," particularly with the Cabinet's Emergency Meeting Team that was ostensibly working on the same issue.⁵¹ These missteps were widely covered by the media and unfortunately eclipsed many of the successes in the non-nuclear response.

Over 40 domestic and international NGOs responded to the Tohoku disaster. As noted above, partnerships among NGOs, and between NGOs and coordinating groups such as Japan Platform could have greatly strengthened the collective response as well as the sharing of information and assessments.

⁴⁸ Hisanaga Okuyama, "JSDF Disaster Relief Operations in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Support from the U.S. and ROK Forces," (presentation at Peace Winds America "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011.)

⁴⁹ National Defense Academy, *Cooperation in Disaster Relief*, 11.

⁵⁰ David E. Sanger, Matthew L. Wald and Hiroko Tabuchi, "U.S. Calls Radiation 'Extremely High,' Sees Japan Nuclear Crisis Worsening," *The New York Times*, 16 March 2011.

⁵¹ The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, *Fukushima Nuclear Accident*, 20.

The Tohoku case study reinforces the necessity of working through and in collaboration with local actors. Both international NGOs (INGOs) and Japanese NGOs with an international focus found that especially after immediate relief needs had been addressed, a local partner was necessary to bridge the gap between HA/DR personnel and affected Tohoku residents. Regarding the Japan NGOs, Gillian Yeoh of the charity platform Give2Asia notes:

These organizations generally did not have in-depth experience or capacity to work on a large-scale effort as was required after the disaster. On the other hand, the local communities viewed the Japanese INGOs as groups with disaster response experiences not applicable to Japan, let alone Tohoku. Conscious of these issues and concerns, the government as well as network groups such as JANIC and Japan Platform encouraged many Japanese INGOs to partner with local organizations that were much more familiar with affected communities.⁵²

As immediate relief transitioned into medium-term relief and then recovery, the necessity of having a local partner became even more evident.

NGO-military cooperation occurred throughout the relief phase in Tohoku, albeit largely unplanned. Some examples of this cooperation, such as that of Samaritan's Purse, were enabled by individual relationships that predated the tsunami. In other cases, military personnel, primarily non-specialized Japan SDF troops, assisted NGOs in unloading and distributing relief goods at shelters and evacuation centers. In several instances, the local or prefectural authorities acted as intermediaries, coordinating the NGOs and JSDF in tasks such as site clearance and shelter operations. The lack of direct coordination between the two arose from JSDF inexperience in partnering with the NGO sector and from the apprehension of Japanese NGOs about interacting with the military.

In light of the structural barriers to formal partnership between the JSDF and Japan NGOs, Colonel Nozomu Yoshitomi of Japan National Defense Academy has proposed a three-step method for improving cooperation. His method broadly involves: (a) fostering mutual understanding, (b) establishing partnership guidelines/mechanisms, and (c) enhancing/enlarging the scope of the cooperation.⁵³ There is currently no government-level framework for JSDF-NGO cooperation, but this model, by means of joint workshops, trainings, and informal agreements, can potentially help narrow the divide between the two and foster preparedness for the future. Colonel Yoshitomi has also commented on the close relationship between the Japanese Red Cross Society and the JSDF. Their cooperation agreement allows for JSDF air transport of Red Cross personnel and supplies. Although in Tohoku there was, “no positive discussion between

⁵² Gillian Yeoh, *Lessons Learned: The 2011 Disasters in Tohoku, Japan*, (San Francisco: Give2Asia, 2012), 3.

⁵³ Col. Nozomu Yoshitomi, “Military-Public-Private Cooperation in Disaster Relief: Lessons Learned from Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.)

the MOD/JSDF and Japan Red Cross Society,” these initial agreements can be stepping stones towards improved future collaboration.⁵⁴ Agreements can also help to reduce an overlap in services, i.e., dispensing blankets, water, and food to victims—a task for NGOs rather than the military.

U.S. military-NGO cooperation was hampered by a lack of prior knowledge of NGOs on the ground and insufficient resources devoted to tracking them and establishing partnerships. The U.S. military obtained an NGO list from the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but with little prior interaction and no overall coordinating body, the military-NGO liaison officers were “quickly overwhelmed.”⁵⁵ In general, U.S. NGOs were less hesitant to rely on military resources, as in the case of the International Medical Corps, an organization that did not hesitate to contact PACOM to assist with the transport of supplies and personnel.⁵⁶

The U.S. Embassy could have a disaster management officer responsible for facilitating coordination with the host nation. If the officer were acquainted with capable national NGOs, he/she could connect local NGOs with incoming international resources. Arriving personnel from the UN and U.S. responders could also use the embassy to form linkages with the host nation and with local responders already on scene. Unfortunately, this did not occur in Tohoku.

Japan businesses were also inadequately prepared for the disaster. In retrospect, the tsunami has provided important lessons regarding business continuity and supply chain planning. In particular it has been learned that governments, NGOs, and militaries should focus upon building relationships with companies in order to be better prepared in times of crisis.

The examples of Sojitz and Hitachi are illustrative of the unique contributions and obstacles faced by the private sector in seeking NGO, military, or government partners to support relief in disaster response. The scope of private sector contributions was enormous. Kensuke Onishi, CEO of the Japan NGOs Civic Force and Peace Winds Japan, stated that over 1,000 companies contributed to his NGOs during the relief effort, totaling over 14.6 million USD in donations.⁵⁷ A unique small business contribution was the provision of AS350 light helicopters and pilots to transport the first responders. Larger companies such as AEON, Uniqlo, Japan Post, and Unilever not only contributed goods, but helped manage the response supply chain, a crucial necessity in the immediate days following the earthquake. Similarly the military and cabinet-level partnerships with telecom

⁵⁴ National Defense Academy, *Cooperation in Disaster Relief*, 27.

⁵⁵ DOD official, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 15 February 2012.

⁵⁶ Yumi Terahata, “IMC HA/DR,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011.)

⁵⁷ Kensuke Onishi, “NGO’s Partnering With the Private Sector,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012.)

company NTT Docomo were pivotal to the relatively rapid restoration of mobile telephone service in Tohoku.

In some cases, private sector partnerships were more nimble than government responders. Onishi recounted how ten-ton trucks appropriated by the government could not navigate the small, debris-clogged streets of Tohoku while the four-ton trucks he obtained from a private moving company were much more agile and useful. Still these arrangements tended to be *ad hoc* and suffered from a lack of effective top-down coordination.⁵⁸ In order to ship its modular housing, Sojitz contacted the Prime Minister's office, which in turn directed it to Japan Platform. Hitachi lacked a government counterpart that could disseminate information on types and location of needed goods. A joint government-NGO-private sector preparedness platform could have far-reaching impacts on the effectiveness of public-private coordination in the next disaster.

In Peace Winds America debriefs and workshops, the Cabinet Office of Japan, WFP, U.S. Forces Japan and III MEF, JICA, and other responders all independently cited the lack of a "demand signal," or request from affected regions. In HA/DR parlance, without a "pull" emanating from the disaster zone, the responders "pushed" supplies and personnel that did not always match needs on the ground. In the first day or two after the disaster, the absence of "pull" is explained by the damage wreaked on local and prefectural governments. However, after that the absence of a "pull" factor is largely attributable to the lack of broad information sharing networks and coordination bodies necessary to manage and prioritize needs. The JSDF and U.S. military worked efficiently together, but their ability to access field assessments and reports from other sectors was limited. NGOs and businesses also struggled to obtain information collected by troops in the field.

Communication with the Cabinet Office presented difficulties for all parties. Military analyst Kazuhisa Ogawa placed the blame directly at the top, finding that, "mismanagement took place because nation-level leadership functions were absent at the prime minister's office."⁵⁹ Speaking at a Peace Winds America workshop, a MOFA official said that a primary lesson learned for the ministry was the "need for an interagency channel to smooth communications."⁶⁰ Among the Japan SDF and Japanese civil society HA/DR organizations, the recognition of this need is fortunately growing.

⁵⁸ Kensuke Onishi, personal communication, 11 May 2012. Onishi noted that even though AEON had many employees in the Tohoku region, it was initially paralyzed after the disaster, not knowing whom to approach or how to begin relief efforts.

⁵⁹ Kazuhisa Ogawa, "How Japan Should Fortify National Defense," in *Rebuilding Japan After the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami*, eds. Shigeru Ito and Toshio Ojima (Tokyo: Asia Institute of Urban Environment, 2011), 143.

⁶⁰ Takehiro Funakoshi, "Great East Japan Earthquake: Government Preparedness and Response," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 29 September 2011.)

ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED— HOST NATION PREPAREDNESS

The importance of a disaster prepared civil society and culture cannot be underestimated. According to Dr. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation, “Community awareness and effective risk communications may have played a more decisive role in saving lives than extensive technological protective measures such as seawalls designed to resist flooding.”⁶¹

In the Tohoku disaster, the Japanese people demonstrated a *culture of preparedness*. The “Miracle of Kamaishi,” in which 99.8 percent of the town’s schoolchildren safely evacuated has been held up as an example of the importance of this kind of preparedness. A culture of preparedness is vital because it can offset technological gaps. While the performance of Japan’s earthquake-resistant buildings was excellent and tsunami preparedness measures saved countless lives, in some cases, over-reliance on earthquake predictions had dire consequences. Most famously was the tsunami barrier at Fukushima Daiichi, whose height was determined in accordance with pre-existing tsunami models. In some cases the J-ALERT system predicted inaccurate wave heights, leading to complacency and delayed or insufficient evacuation. In a post-disaster assessment, the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute found that:

Communities had high levels of tsunami awareness, pre-disaster mitigation (including structural works) and preparedness; however, they had assumed and planned for a smaller tsunami, in part because of expectations set by seismologists regarding the maximum size event possible on their section of the subduction zone. The size of the actual event overwhelmed communities’ pre-disaster risk reduction efforts.⁶²

Especially in a region as seismically active as Japan, the inherent limitations of earthquake predictions should be factored into any planning or preparedness decisions. Japanese officials and planners must overcome their reluctance to plan for “worst case scenarios.” In cases like the Great East Japan Earthquake or Christchurch earthquake, where risk assessments fell short of the actuality of the disasters, “worst case scenario” planning can increase resilience.

As a nation with a strong rule of law, Japan faces a unique set of obstacles in relief and recovery. In the initial relief efforts, lack of pre-approved authorization for landing zones slowed helicopter-borne responders as they made their way to the disaster zone. Shuichi Wada, writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, reported that in the initial efforts to reopen Sendai airport,

⁶¹ Dr. James Jay Carafano, *The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake: Assessing Disaster Response and Lessons for the U.S.* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2011), i.

⁶² Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, *The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake*, 1.

military responders were forced to work around destroyed cars that had washed onto the airport runway. The challenge in this case was that there is a Japanese law that requires the consent of the owner to remove a vehicle and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism was initially unsure how to circumvent it.⁶³ Ultimately Japan must balance the unique needs of HA/DR with the rule of law. The Tohoku case presents an argument for significantly greater leeway relaxing national statutes in emergency situations.

The less than sure-footed civilian response to the Tohoku disaster should re-energize Japan in its efforts to develop a strong, national-level disaster management body. The Japan Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications dispatched large numbers of responders during the initial response. However as a coordinating body it was not a major player, and quickly becoming sidelined and overshadowed by the Cabinet-level disaster management headquarters and by the combined military response.⁶⁴ Although the Government of Japan bureaucracy generally recognizes the weakness of FDMA, an improved framework for its role has not emerged in the aftermath of Tohoku. The experience of 2011 should be a catalyst for creating a body that more closely mirrors U.S. FEMA—an agency with sufficient financial and bureaucratic clout to coordinate actors and assets during a major disaster. The body should include representatives from local and Tokyo-based NGOs, select private sector businesses, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the military. Such an agency is technically feasible and should be a policy priority.

Accepting external assistance in the wake of a major disaster has proven to be a complex and difficult task for nations like Japan and the U.S. A U.S. Government Accountability Office study indicted the lack of preparedness of the U.S. to accept foreign assistance at the time of Hurricane Katrina. It found that “policies and procedures were lacking in the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign military donations.”⁶⁵ Japan also struggled to vet, sort, and prioritize the flood of offers it received. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should study in detail its lessons learned regarding external assistance in Tohoku and work to disseminate those findings.

⁶³ Wada, *Operation Tomodachi*, 3.

⁶⁴ Senior DOD official, personal communication, 2 December 2011.

⁶⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance*, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2006), 18.

STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE— JAPAN-U.S. COOPERATION IN TOHOKU

General Yamaguchi provides below an assessment on the lasting effects of the Tohoku disaster on the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

The extent to which Japan could depend on the Japan-U.S. Security Alliance has long been a popular query for security specialists in Japan. Analysts raising the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence or the so-called nuclear umbrella question whether the U.S. is determined to protect Japan, even at risk to its own cities such as New York or Los Angeles. Surrounded by the nuclear-armed states of Russia, China and North Korea, the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence remains a crucial issue, particularly while Japan remains a non-nuclear state. President Obama has been seeking a reduction of nuclear weapons since his first presidential campaign. In spring 2009, after President Obama entered office, security specialists in Japan and Korea asked if the U.S. could continue to provide credible nuclear deterrence to its non-nuclear allies. While Japan and Korea welcomed U.S. policy for fewer nuclear warheads, there were some concerns whether the U.S. would unilaterally cut its nuclear arsenal, reducing its deterrent capabilities. In addition, as the previous Bush administration placed a heavy focus on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Asian security specialists wondered to what extent the Obama administration would focus on the Asia-Pacific region.

In spring 2010, the Obama administration published a series of security policy documents that calmed such concerns. These were the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), the Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR), the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR), and National Security Strategy (NSS). The QDR tried to “assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea.”⁶⁶ At the same time the reports mentioned the bilateral efforts to realign U.S. military posture, centering on Guam as a future “hub for security activities in the region.”⁶⁷ Yet the NPR made it clear that “no changes in U.S. extended deterrence capabilities will be made without close consultations with our allies and partners.”⁶⁸ The NPR in particular further stated that the U.S. “will continue to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to their security and to demonstrate this commitment not only words, but also through deeds.”

The U.S. indeed demonstrated its strong alliance with Japan through its deeds after 3/11. On the very day of the earthquake, the USS *Ronald Reagan* was in the Japan Sea on the way to a U.S.-South Korea joint exercise. It changed its destination to the disaster-hit Sanriku coast and began rescue operations on 13 March. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing to Southeast Asia for humanitarian assistance / disaster relief training with regional militaries also re-routed towards rescue operations in Tohoku.

Reflecting their cultural awareness, U.S. Marines visiting evacuation sites did not try to shake hands, but rather bowed to evacuees. At that point in time, very few Japanese would have doubted the American will to stand with Japan in case of

⁶⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 66.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, xiv.

emergency. In other words, the credibility of the alliance, at least in the minds of the Japanese citizens, was higher than ever.

In the meantime, it was reported that the U.S. service members operating in Tohoku were deeply impressed by the evacuees who worked diligently to help others in an orderly and respectful manner. As a result, U.S. forces became even more determined to assist.

The Japanese response to the meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant allayed many U.S. fears about Japan's willingness and ability to manage complex emergencies. Six months after the meltdown, Spain's Crown Prince Felipe awarded the 2011 Concord Prize to a group of Japan Self-Defense Force, police, and fire department members who responded to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. These fire fighters, police officers and SDF members risked their lives to cool down the reactors following hydrogen explosions of the number 1, 2, and 4 reactors at the site. At the time of these efforts, some U.S. government officials had doubts about the determination of the GOJ to tackle the serious accident. These same U.S. officials, however, were relieved by Japan's determination to respond to the disaster. Thus the U.S. became determined to give full assistance to Japan, a lesson that will do much to strengthen the alliance.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Unpublished paper of Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi (Ret.). PWA sincerely appreciates General Yamaguchi's contributions to this Report and his deep commitment to the Japan-U.S. security alliance.

Preparedness in HA/DR

The Peace Winds America Civil-Military Initiative divides disaster preparedness into two main areas. The first focuses on the information and knowledge needed to establish joint partnerships for response. The second concentrates on how knowledge and information can best be shared among all stakeholders. A constant refrain throughout the Initiative was the need for better mutual understanding of HA/DR organizations' capabilities and constraints. This chapter details organizational policies, procedures, and mandates, and how these policies can be communicated. The chapter discusses who might be best positioned to provide training opportunities and how training can be strengthened. Specific recommendations conclude the chapter.

HA/DR PREPAREDNESS: KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, CONNECTIVITY, AND PARTNERSHIPS

The lessons of the Civil-Military Initiative case studies reveal a compelling conclusion that cooperative and coordinated ventures are the future of major HA/DR responses in the Asia-Pacific. Set against the background of Asia's changing demographic and climatic realities, the HA/DR picture must increasingly be one of coalitions. In cases like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the scope of the emergency response far exceeded the abilities of even the best domestic disaster management bodies. In Tohoku for instance, the costs associated with the full range of requisite relief and recovery measures were prohibitive even for a prosperous nation. Of necessity the main tasks of responding will therefore fall to coalitions of stakeholders rather than to single stakeholders. Joint responses can reduce costs and burdens across the board.

The challenges facing multi-organization responses, however, are substantial. In situations where responders do not have a history of communication or interaction with each other, the results can be confusion, disorganization, duplication of efforts, and mismatched prioritization of needs. Concerning Tohoku, Japanese Cabinet officials shared that some international cargo planes arriving after the earthquake contained a mix of relief goods and children toys. Indonesian officials reported that winter clothes were sent to Aceh in 2004; tea sets and chandeliers were sent to disaster-affected populations after Hurricane Katrina. Without effective lines of communication, organizations

may unilaterally dispatch too quickly, placing additional burdens on host nation assets and capacities.

There are, fortunately, numerous means of combating what some HA/DR workers have termed the “fog of relief.” In its analysis of past disasters and HA/DR organizations, Peace Winds America has focused heavily on pre-disaster preparedness methods. Methods may differ, but all are predicated on the notion that better mutual understanding of organizational mandates, structures, capabilities, personnel, limitations, and decision points can decidedly improve performance in the field. This perspective has been shared repeatedly by major HA/DR operators in the Asia-Pacific.

The primary outcome of mutual preparedness through information exchange and training is better HA/DR interoperability, connectivity, and relationship building. Throughout the Civil-Military Initiative, government officials and HA/DR managers have stressed the benefits of joint training and the mutual trust it builds. At a PWA workshop, then U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) deputy commander Brigadier General William Crowe noted that a single agency response was impossible in the Tohoku disaster. Fortunately, the “mutual trust” garnered through years of Japan-U.S. civil-military and military-military (mil-mil) cooperation proved a firm foundation for the joint relief operation that followed.¹ Similarly, prior relationships between the Israeli military and the town of Minamisanriku expedited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acceptance of an Israeli medical team. The U.S. NGO Samaritan’s Purse leveraged its congressional and military contacts to arrange Air Force transport of its response team to Tohoku. The Tohoku disaster demonstrated that, even in the absence of specific partnership arrangements, joint HA/DR training lays the groundwork for trust-building that can translate into effective response cooperation and coordination.

Communications, Capabilities, and Limitations: The Foundation of Preparedness Training

Given the need for more inclusive and frequent HA/DR preparedness events, PWA has worked to establish useful training workshops and policy forums in Japan for several years. What has consistently emerged during workshops and forums is that **basic knowledge of core organizational details, including structure, capabilities, mandates, and limitations** is severely lacking among HA/DR actors. That was found to be true both across and within sectors. As documented in the Tohoku case study, the Japan SDF and U.S. military were

¹ Brig. Gen. William Crowe, “Military Partnering with Others in HA/DR,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012).



Panelists at a Peace Winds America workshop discuss relief and recovery partnerships. From left: Representatives from Samaritan's Purse, Peace Winds Japan, the Japan Ministry of Defense, USAID, and the World Food Programme. (Photo credit: Peace Winds America.)

generally functioning without full knowledge of their partners' capabilities and assets. Even within organizations this problem arose.²

A basic element of disaster preparedness training should be a common knowledge base of **organizational structures and chains of command**. The top-down hierarchy of any armed force improves efficiency within a military setting but it can be disadvantageous to building relations with civilian agencies, as would-be partners may have trouble understanding rank hierarchy. Even longstanding civilian partners experience frustration in that regard. One senior USAID official noted that his agency's advisors to the combatant commands are "too junior to have much pull." That problem is compounded by the fact that it is often difficult to communicate the "rank" of civilian personnel to military counterparts.³ Civil-military preparedness training should be explicit in its teaching of military command structures and not assume that civilian counterparts necessarily understand the respective roles, responsibilities, and decision-making authorities of a general, colonel, or captain. Equally important, military personnel should be introduced to their equivalent civilian counterparts, especially within aid agencies and NGOs.

In a preparedness workshop, Japan Platform (JPF) Executive Director Noriyuki Shiina discussed how in JPF's efforts to foster military-NGO partnerships, he had observed frustration among military officers when dealing with the more horizontal, consensus-based decision-making structures of NGOs.

² In Tohoku, Japan Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces recorded difficulties in communication and knowledge of capabilities. See Chapter IV.

³ Senior USAID official, personal communication, 3 October 2012.

Particularly in the early stages of partnership, the differences in structural styles can be unclear and off-putting to both parties. Still these differences are not insurmountable, particularly when partners share key values and goals.

One of the most important aspects of building partnerships is practical experience working together in disasters and having pre-disaster opportunities to understand respective organizations, leadership, and priorities. Consistently the strongest alliances are those born of relationships established in the pre-disaster phase. For example, World Food Programme's (WFP) ongoing partnerships with AP Möller-Maersk and DHL for logistics operations exemplify how pre-disaster cooperation and planning can overcome key differences in basic organizational structure and mission.⁴

Establishing **organizational decision points, including “go/no-go” decisions** is the next step in effective preparedness. Decision points during all stages of an HA/DR operation vary widely across organizations. These points are the set of variables that determine basic HA/DR deployment decisions as well as more nuanced facets of a response, such as how to deploy, with what assets, along what timeframe, and with which partners. Gaining basic knowledge about how all major international responders make their deployment decisions is a difficult challenge, but is nonetheless a vital aspect of preparedness.

Preparedness is heavily reliant on the extent to which organizations know and understand one another's **unique primary capabilities and relationships**, rendering joint preparedness training essential. The ability to establish bi- or multilateral HA/DR partnerships that make optimal use of unique capabilities is predicated on doing so prior to a disaster. The example of the Pakistan floods is instructive. Short on helicopters as a result of ongoing U.S. regional security operations, U.S. advisors in Pakistan pointed out Japan's ability to provide such assets. Japan has the second largest CH-47 Chinook medium lift helicopter fleet in the world.⁵ Knowledge of this fact was instrumental to U.S. and Pakistani officials responding to the floods. Japan SDF units additionally pride themselves on their cultural awareness and ability to mesh with local populations, a skill utilized in peacekeeping operations. Such capabilities are HA/DR assets that can be shared widely before disasters. U.S. military representatives repeatedly stressed their own unique capabilities such as expeditionary airfield operations, information gathering sorties, heavy lift, and seaport clearance.

In March 2011, the Japan Self-Defense Forces became so focused on organizing its own troops for the Tohoku response that it may have been inadequately prepared to absorb support from U.S. forces. Due to joint trainings,

⁴ The WFP Logistics Emergency Teams are run by four private sector partners: AP Möller-Maersk, UPS, TNT and Agility. The LETs have deployed to most recent major humanitarian crises and are a case in point for the ability of an NGO or multinational to leverage the unique capabilities of the private sector.

⁵ Senior defense official, remarks at the Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 29 February 2012. Japan's variant, the CH-47J, is a medium lift helicopter as opposed to the standard heavy lift CH-47.

connections, and mutual trust, however, Japan welcomed the support, even as it struggled to integrate U.S. assistance. Lieutenant Colonel Koichi Arie observed in *Liaison*, “In the future, the Japan Ministry of Defense (MOD) should anticipate that U.S. forces will *react quickly* to support Japanese efforts both during wartime or peacetime disaster relief operations.”⁶ Furthermore Japan National Defense Academy Professor Colonel Nozomu Yoshitomi stated, “JSDF had *insufficient understanding* about U.S. forces’ capabilities in intelligence, transportation, medical services, etc. in disaster relief operations. The Japan Ground SDF especially had little understanding about the capabilities of the different U.S. military branches of service. Consequently JSDF did not utilize the U.S. forces’ capabilities quickly and effectively.”⁷

The example of NGOs International Medical Corps and Samaritan’s Purse using military transport assets in Tohoku is illustrative for two reasons; (1), prior relationships were central in facilitating these partnerships; (2), these partnerships were largely exceptions to the rule. The military, private sector, and aid agencies all have expertise transporting goods and personnel. Enhanced NGO and host nation knowledge of organizational capabilities and operations can help narrow and target requests for assistance and collaboration.

What the NGO sector might lack in technical and logistics expertise can be overcome or compensated by its speed and flexibility. NGOs have the ability to deploy unilaterally, generally with far fewer restrictions than those a host nation might place on military or aid agency teams. NGOs, with their understanding of local languages and cultures, are also often the best positioned **international bridges to host nations, local communities, and inhabitants**, especially if they have an established country office and a long presence in a host nation. Those assets were clearly demonstrated in the case of Cyclone Nargis where Save the Children was well situated to respond because of its long humanitarian involvement in Myanmar. It responded quickly while OFDA and JICA staged in Thailand awaiting permission to enter the country. Kenro Oshidari, the WFP Regional Director for Asia, noted that NGO-military partnerships become critical when the military requires a local partner to help it to adapt its specialized combat capabilities to HA/DR situations.⁸ The localized capacity of NGOs also becomes important during the disaster needs assessment phase when speed is critical.

Another comparative advantage of NGOs is that they can deploy quickly and that they can remain in the field for much longer than militaries and national assistance agencies. NGOs can use their longer time horizons to make a smooth transition from relief to recovery operations and even into development and

⁶ Lt. Col. Koichi Arie, “Disaster Relief Provided by U.S. Forces,” *Liaison V*, 2012, 27. Emphasis added.

⁷ Col. Nozomu Yoshitomi, “Bilateral Coordination Between JSDF and U.S. Forces,” *Liaison V*, 2012, 25. Emphasis added.

⁸ Kenro Oshidari, “WFP Emergency Activation,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 27 September 2011).

disaster risk reduction assistance. This allows them to design programs for affected populations that comprise potential needs across the whole of the disaster cycle.

A discussion of unique **organizational limitations** is essential. Limitations affecting actions can be financial, mandate-related, logistic, temporal, and/or cultural. Partnering organizations are often reluctant to share their limitations, yet this knowledge is critical to building a functional, multi-partner response coalition. In Initiative events – both workshops and forums – HA/DR participants were generally forthcoming about inherent constraints within their respective organizations. Competition is and will remain a reality of the humanitarian world, particularly among NGOs competing for funding or media access. Some organizations may never be fully open about weaknesses and limitations. Still, the transparency displayed by workshop participants was encouraging and bodes well for improved collaboration and trust.

The experience of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami demonstrated that **time frame** is a clear limitation associated with U.S. military participation. The “clock on the welcome mat” is running as both host nation governments and foreign military commanders seek to minimize the time spent with boots on the ground. Participants voiced concerns about this aspect of U.S. military HA/DR deployments, noting that multilateral, NGO, and host nation partners must pick up relief and recovery operations where military responders have left.

U.S. military officials took pains to discuss their comparative weakness in “retail operations,” i.e., distributing basic relief goods like food, water, and blankets. Many of the participating USFJ and III MEF representatives heavily stressed that the experience in Operation *Tomodachi*, where U.S. troops undertook some basic relief roles, should be viewed as the exception rather than the rule. The U.S. military also wishes to limit its construction role to erecting temporary structures. One III MEF representative summed it up as follows: “Build one thing and you’ll never get out.” Knowledge of these limitations should serve as a guideline for how to engage the U.S. military as an effective partner in HA/DR. As host nations better understand what militaries will and will not do, they can find alternative partners to conduct required activities.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces faces a more discrete but nonetheless similar set of restrictions in its disaster relief operations. JSDF freedom of action is even more constrained than that of the U.S. Department of Defense, both by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. Timetables for the JSDF are also different. For JSDF participation in an overseas operation, authorization must first be granted by the Minister of Defense following consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Deployment orders, therefore, can only be issued with some delay. Once a deployment order is

⁹ Lt. Col. Michael Curtin, “Disaster Response – III MEF and Pacific Area of Operations” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

given, advance JSDF units can depart within 48 hours, with the main body departing roughly five days after the order.¹⁰ These delays limit the ability of the JSDF to be involved in initial relief phases. MOD cannot unilaterally order troop deployments. Nor can JSDF troops engage in activities beyond their set tasks of providing transportation, water supply, medical assistance, and aviation support. Because “Japan’s military is not designed as an expeditionary force,” it lacks many of the amphibious and air deployment capabilities possessed by the U.S. Moreover, it does not own military cargo planes larger than the C-130.¹¹ These limitations do not preclude the JSDF from HA/DR participation, but rather, they underline the need for partnership and specialization in areas of comparative advantage.

Within the NGO sector, limitations and capabilities vary considerably by organization. In general, NGOs are frequently constrained by financial considerations, by their ability to be self-sufficient on the ground, and by the difficulties they encounter establishing connections with governmental coordinating bodies. **Financial limitations** may constrain the NGO sector in two ways. The lack of funding or uncertain access to funds influences the speed and scope of any response as well as all decisions made regarding the recovery phase. NGOs may be challenged if they accept “restricted funds,” impairing the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. Additionally NGOs “may come in with an **unclear mandate**, despite assurances to the contrary.” This may cause friction with the host nation and with other responders.¹²

With the exception of the largest international NGOs, **transport and logistics** remain a recurrent obstacle. Transport and logistics partnership arrangements worked out in advance can provide NGOs with greater access to disaster-affected areas and a larger stock of humanitarian supplies.

Another challenge to military-NGO partnerships is that NGOs frequently lack basic knowledge of military capabilities for HA/DR. A UNOCHA survey taken after the Pakistan floods noted that “94 percent [of NGOs] said global guidance on [civil-military coordination] issues was insufficiently known or disseminated.”¹³

The Initiative case studies demonstrate a wide range of USAID/OFDA capabilities through its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs). Most

¹⁰ Ministry of Defense International Operations Division, “International Disaster Relief Operations of Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF)” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 27 September 2011).

¹¹ Senior MOD official, remarks at the Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 29 February 2012.

¹² Kevin Noone, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012, stating that NGOs may have their own agendas for providing relief.

¹³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Meeting of the Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA),” (Meeting report, Geneva Switzerland, 1 December 2010). Emphasis added.

of the USAID/OFDA disaster responses are financial only, i.e., funding the implementing NGO and UN partner agencies. USAID/OFDA East Asia-Pacific Principal Regional Advisor Al Dwyer noted, “100 percent of OFDA’s mission is partnership, whether providing funds or disbursing relief goods shipped from warehouses.”¹⁴ The DARTs are reserved primarily for assessing and responding to the largest disasters, but in all other cases OFDA leverages the operational capabilities of humanitarian actors on the ground.¹⁵ JICA operations are similar—generally providing financial assistance or relief goods in the declared disasters, and providing its Disaster Response Teams (DRTs) in more severe cases.

Opportunities for augmented preparedness are manifold. USAID tends to draw on a relatively small pool of USAID-registered international NGOs and/or UN agencies. USAID stressed throughout the PWA Civil Military Initiative that it is open to expanding the range of those partnerships. The time to establish these cooperative relationships is in the preparedness phase as assistance agencies do not have the time to vet new partners during an emergency.

The experience of the 2004 and 2011 tsunamis in Asia revealed the greatest limitation of the private sector to be its **lack of knowledge in forming effective connections and partnerships for response**. Once a large disaster strikes, the chaos on the ground and coordination difficulties inevitably forestall many potentially useful private sector businesses from doing more than making financial contributions. Some businesses may wish to establish *ad hoc* partnerships and discover via trial and error what goods and skills are needed. Private sector representatives that participated in the PWA Civil-Military Initiative stressed their inability to function independently, necessitating connections within the NGO community before a disaster strikes. Based on these inputs, private sector involvement in HA/DR will only increase with additional opportunities for networking and joint training.

In preparedness (and response), attention must be on **the pivotal partner—the host nation**. Host nation knowledge of needs, infrastructure, and on-the-ground networks far exceeds that of international responders. International responders must empower the host nation by accurately conveying their capabilities, operational limitations, and information sharing resources. Host nations that have lost critical personnel to the disaster require this information to pair with their needs assessments. In nearly all of the PWA case studies examined, host nation requests to the international community suffered from inaccuracies (Sumatra), failure to specify the type of relief needed (Japan), or lack of timeliness (Pakistan). If the host nation were better informed about the HA/DR actors

¹⁴ Al Dwyer, remarks at Peace Winds America “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.

¹⁵ PWA’s analysis showed that in the period from 2000-2009, three percent of OFDA’s total Asia-Pacific responses included a DART dispatch, whereas 100 percent included financial assistance of some form and 21 percent involved the dispatch of field officers or experts.

and their capabilities, they could target their requests and better coordinate the assistance. Improved knowledge of Japan and U.S. HA/DR capabilities could result in quicker, targeted assistance to affected communities (e.g., search and rescue, transport, logistics, medical care, etc.) and alleviate some host nation reservations about accepting external aid.

The host nation has a central role during a disaster in interacting with foreign embassies, international NGOs, and assistance agencies. In order to prepare for disasters, the host nation and the embassies, USAID, and JICA should compile lists of **capable domestic NGOs** in order to facilitate matchmaking or partnering among international responders and the domestic NGOs. Host nations should proactively promote better utilization of domestic resources in addition to partnering with known international providers.

The former Japan Disaster Relief Team Director-General Kae Yanagisawa noted that developing nations often tend to be more skilled in effective interaction



Kae Yanagisawa, then JICA Japan Disaster Relief Team Director-General, discussing the roles of the host nation and domestic NGOs at the PWA Civil Military workshop held in Tokyo in June 2012. (Photo Credit: Peace Winds America.)

with the UN and the international community than more developed nations are.¹⁶ The experience of Tohoku (and the U.S. in Hurricane Katrina) aptly demonstrated developed nations' lack of frameworks for soliciting, managing, and receiving international aid. In nations with a relatively strong rule of law, the domestic legal system can also prove to be a barrier, raising the issues of insufficient certification, quarantine, food and drug control and legal liability. The delays experienced by Korea's search and rescue team in Japan are an example of this challenge. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has conveyed that during the 2011 tsunami response, the Korea Disaster Relief Team's search and rescue dogs were initially quarantined and vaccinated on arrival in Japan, delaying deployment to affected areas in Tohoku.¹⁷ These experiences would indicate that *all* potential host nations should focus on improving frameworks, guidelines, and communications, through preparedness training.

Pre-disaster training should **profile and share organizational structures, capacities, capabilities, limitations, and decision points—all leading to mutual trust and cooperation.** The specific ways to attain this goal vary considerably. In the case of NGO-military cooperation, apprehension and organizational opposition may limit the possibility of formal partnerships. In these instances, the best outcome is a broadened knowledge of HA/DR policies and capabilities in the development of informal working relationships. This is a particularly important strategy in Japan, as the JSDF and the NGO community recognize the need for improved working relationships based on the experience of *ad hoc* partnerships in the Tohoku response.

For organizations willing to commit to stronger ties, joint preparedness training can serve as a precursor for more formal **memoranda of understanding (MOU), exchange of liaison officers (LNOs), establishment of civil affairs units, and the drawing up of acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs).** The advantage of MOUs is that generally they are not legally binding, thus providing a platform of cooperation that does not infringe on sovereignty or mandates. Where NGOs, local government leaders, and military officials are willing to work jointly, MOUs are effective tools. Memoranda can be drafted flexibly, allowing for cooperation short of legally binding obligations.

International NGO response is significantly strengthened by working agreements with a host nation NGO (as mentioned in the Nargis case study). The best time to develop MOUs is during preparedness, in order that both agreeing parties understand the organizational structure, capabilities, limitations, and

¹⁶ Kae Yanagisawa, "Host Nation Capabilities/Complexities," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition," Tokyo, 5 June 2012). Yanagisawa noted that for host nation preparedness, after the creation of a disaster management agency, the next most critical step is training in the Incident Command System and with regional multilateral partners.

¹⁷ So Rie Lee, "Korea's Response to Great East Japan Earthquake/Tsunami," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures, and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

constraints of the other. An example of effective MOUs between NGOs and governments is the Japan Civic Force agreements to provide disaster relief services to the two prefectures of Hiroshima and Shizuoka. Another is the preparedness and planning MOU signed by the U.S. military and Kanagawa Prefecture.¹⁸

The exchange of liaison officers between organizations can also foster closer coordination. The lack of permanent or rotational liaison officers is particularly pronounced in the realm of Japan-U.S. civil-military relations. One U.S. military officer highlighted these challenges, noting “it’s difficult for commanding officers to pick up civil-military cooperation in HA/DR without liaison officers to teach and instruct.”¹⁹ JICA officials have also acknowledged that neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains permanent civil-military liaisons for HA/DR. Given their importance, the lack of liaison officers is an issue that should be rectified.²⁰

The potential role of civil affairs units also needs highlighting. Colonel Yoshitomi has noted that both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps have “civil-affairs” units that provide military commanders with advice on the civil component of the operational environment. Colonel Yoshitomi has recommended that the JSDF consider developing a “civil affairs capability.”²¹ Finally, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements signed prior to a disaster can help to bridge logistics and supply chain shortfalls when they arise. Because ACSAs are processes, not procedural agreements, they are flexible and adaptable to the unique circumstances of a particular crisis situation.

INFORMATION/RESOURCE HUBS AND HA/DR COORDINATION PLATFORMS

Information hubs, logistics centers, and coordinating platforms are widely recognized as key infrastructure for the dissemination and exchange of information in a disaster. PWA workshop participants discussed at length whether the Asia-Pacific HA/DR system should establish new disaster preparedness and response coordination centers. Various proposals for new HA/DR response and coordination mechanisms ranged from bilateral information sharing facilities to multinational logistics and supply centers.

PWA Initiative participants tended to support **integrating and strengthening existing Asia-Pacific HA/DR management and training architecture** rather than establishing new hubs. Their reasons were several.

¹⁸ Senior U.S. State Department official, remarks at the Peace Winds America Policy Forum, 29 February 2012.

¹⁹ U.S. military officer, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.

²⁰ Senior JICA official, personal communication, 11 May 2012.

²¹ Col. Yoshitomi, “Bilateral Coordination,” 26.

New logistics, information sharing, and coordination hubs require significant buy-in as well as a “champion,” usually at the national level, that can provide adequate funding and sell the hub to the wider HA/DR community. In recent years, U.S. and Japan officials have periodically explored the possibility of creating a joint Japan-U.S. military HA/DR hub in the Ryukyu Islands. Civil society stakeholders remain unconvinced of its potential effectiveness, citing its remote geography and its military character. A JICA representative raised doubts about his agency’s ability to manage assets and relief teams from a location far from the Tokyo headquarters. NGO leaders were also hesitant, noting that a distant hub in the Ryukyus would elicit only limited civil society and private sector participation.

Japan and U.S. militaries have both praised the Bilateral Coordination Centers (BCCs) that functioned in the immediate aftermath of the Tohoku disaster. (See Chapter IV.) JSDF and U.S. forces have a basic procedure for establishing coordination centers when a disaster occurs. However, effective responses require a detailed bilateral coordination mechanism *before* a disaster strikes. The Japan National Defense Academy has proposed a permanent, standing BCC be established that would consist of staff from both forces and would be engaged in information sharing and planning, and could expand to fulfill other functions in the event of a disaster. Strong Japan and U.S. buy-in for such a BCC would go a long way toward alleviating PWA participant concerns about new HA/DR centers.

Although PWA participants favor using existing resources, there is significant momentum toward establishing this new Japan-U.S. BCC. If Japan and the U.S. were committed to constructing a new preparedness and coordination hub, two logical sites would be the Yokota Air Base or the MOD headquarters in Ichigaya (Tokyo). Since both locations are military facilities, the GOJ and USG would need to take steps to ensure that the venture was not overly dominated by armed forces. Such steps would entail the posting of JICA, MOFA, and USAID representatives. These liaison officers would complement, not replace, those already active, such as those at PACOM and MOD. The officers at this new center would focus on Japan-U.S. cooperation, bilateral coordination, and HA/DR. The center would have civilian leadership.

Writing in *Asia Policy*, Deogsang Ahn, John Bradford, and colleagues pointed out the many roles such a coordination center could fill:

A disaster relief facility in Northeast Asia could expand response capabilities in three functional areas. First, it could serve as a logistics center. Second, it could provide facilities for command and control of civil-military disaster relief operations. Third, it could serve as a center of excellence for civil-military disaster relief, strengthening

regional capacity by cataloging expertise, training relief actors, developing best practices, and incubating opportunities for future cooperation.²²

The proposed center could provide a training venue for responders and a platform for cross-sector information exchange and collaboration. A center could house after-action reports, case studies, guidance documents, and pre-plans in an open and accessible fashion. Such capacity does not currently exist within Japan nor the U.S., and thus would fill an important role for Japan-U.S. partners as well as other regional participants. The center would do well to maintain a broad focus, avoiding becoming limited to immediate response only, so that experts in recovery and disaster risk reduction, e.g., the Asian Disaster Reduction Center, could serve the center as well. The combined offering of training, knowledge management, and networking would allow the center to become a “center of excellence.”

The center could provide central communication and information sharing tools to training and to deploying units.²³ Although military and government responders will not likely cede their command-and-control operations to a third-party center, they would surely benefit from a new resource for training, information, needs assessments, and a platform for identifying potential partners. NGOs could access information on deploying government assets and means of partnering. A liaison with UNOCHA would help to convey information and situation reports from disaster sites. The center could also provide an entry point for businesses looking to gain critical information about JICA, OFDA, and UN coordination systems and funding needs.

Preparedness discussions also highlighted **increasing access to established and stockpiled resources**. For instance, warehouse resources like the UN Humanitarian Depot (UNHRD) in Subang, Indonesia, or coordination facilities like Singapore’s Command and Control Center at Changi International Airport can play an important role. A constellation of HA/DR supply depots with better training on local sourcing is favored over establishing new (and costly) physical sites.

Multilaterals—Guidelines, Coordination, and Training

Multilateral organizations provide an essential framework for collaborative training and information sharing for disaster response. The UN benefits from its deep experience in every facet of HA/DR. Through its specialized agencies, the UN is able to tap into a range of NGO and private sector actors, national disaster

²² Deogsang Ahn, et al., “The Case for Establishing a Civil-Military Disaster-Relief Hub in Northeast Asia,” *Asia Policy* 14, 62.

²³ In Cyclone Nargis, the lack of a specific national stakeholder in the Tripartite Core Group likely increased Government of Myanmar willingness to cooperate. Given possible host nation sensitivities, bi- or multinational preparedness hubs might facilitate HA/DR agreements in the response phase.

management centers, assistance agencies, military representatives, and other regional multilateral organizations. General Assembly *Resolution 46/182* provides the framework for UN coordination of international humanitarian assistance, laying out core responsibilities such as humanity, neutrality, impartiality, sovereignty, and host nation responsibilities. The *Oslo Guidelines* complement the *Resolution* by codifying the use of military and civil defense assets in disaster relief. These documents, although non-binding, lay out a platform for cooperative humanitarian work across a range of sectors.

The UNOCHA Regional Office Asia and the Pacific has spearheaded an initiative called the Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO). The APC-MADRO has developed guidelines that postulate that “a comprehensive and collaborative framework for preparedness and response is essential—one in which guiding principles and concepts and clearly defined collaborative roles and responsibilities between national and international elements and between civilian and military organizations.”²⁴ The APC-MADRO framework, which includes the U.S. and much of the Asia-Pacific, promises to provide a useful basis for joint HA/DR training and preparedness. The guidelines reinforce the principles of the *Oslo Guidelines* and complement other regional regulatory documents on the use of military assets in HA/DR.

Because of the UN’s strong relationships with host nation institutions, it can bring to the table key domestic responders in a short period of time. The UN also has contacts with the major regional HA/DR providers. As a training platform the UN system is scalable, able to host a range of efforts from an in-country NGO workshop to a major multinational conference. Given the UN’s centrality in all phases of the disaster cycle, civil-military training (i.e., for both the militaries and the UN agencies) is vital.

The UN is limited in several ways. It can be slow to arrive, leaving a void during the crucial first days following a disaster. In several cases it has had only a minimal role as a coordinator or direct relief provider due to host nation restrictions. Host nation governments and NGOs alike may fall prey to dependence upon the UN, yielding gaps in leadership or funding when it withdraws. “Bureaucratic creep” may go hand-in-hand with dependence. A lengthy UN presence can slow UN agencies, host nation offices, and partner NGOs as bureaucracy takes hold. In Initiative events UNOCHA and WFP representatives detailed the difficulties of forming new and more flexible partnerships.

Due to these limitations, the UN system should be complemented by other HA/DR collaboration or coordination mechanisms. Both UNOCHA and WFP have discussed the need to widen training and partnership arrangements with the U.S. and Japanese militaries and the NGOs, but these efforts are still nascent.

²⁴ UNOCHA, “The Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO)”, accessed 21 December 2012, <http://ochaonline.un.org/roap/APCMADRO/tabid/7303/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.

Coordination and training can also be provided by sub-regional intergovernmental organizations. Following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) prioritized finalizing an Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) that – among other measures – established the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center) in Indonesia with a primary mission to promote regional collaboration on natural disaster management.²⁵ ASEAN also empowered its own Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) to enhance cooperation in all aspects of disaster management, and that committee continues to function as a means to implement HA/DR-related agreements made by ASEAN and by the East Asia Summit.

The AHA Center became functional in December 2011, later followed by the establishment of a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN. The AHA Center special emergency stockpile hub in Subang, Malaysia (operational in 2013), will become a member of the UNHRD system. The AHA Center will need to address several significant obstacles, not least of which are concerns that sovereignty issues might preclude the sharing of necessary disaster information among ASEAN nations. The jurisdiction of the AHA Center is also limited to the ten ASEAN nations. Still the AHA Center could provide an important regional complement to the UN by facilitating the entry of relief workers to ASEAN nations and by advocating host nation presence at regional training events.

Through the ASEAN+3 (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) platform, Japan could integrate itself into ASEAN sub-regional preparedness and coordination efforts. Australia is currently seconding several AusAID capacity building experts to the AHA Center. The Government of Japan has also contributed significant funding for these initiatives through its Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) set up in 2006. (It is important to note that Japan contributed about 400 million USD to JAIF between 2006 and 2010.)²⁶

The Assistance Agencies— Information, Coordination, and Training

Assistance agencies such as JICA and USAID could also play a greater role in preparedness. The convening position that both agencies hold as a bridge between civilian government responders, the military, and the NGO sector make JICA and USAID ideal agencies to lead policy and procedure sharing processes that are necessary for “whole of society” responses. These assistance

²⁵ See “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response,” (Vientiane, 26 July 2005), <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-agreement-on-disaster-management-and-emergency-response-vientiane-26-july-2005-2>.

²⁶ See Desy Nurhayati, “ASEAN, Japan set up 2011-2015 cooperation schemes,” *The Jakarta Post*, 27 November 2010, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/11/27/asean-japan-set-20112015-cooperation-schemes.html>.

agencies are highly experienced responders with deep talent pools and a strong understanding of the variables affecting HA/DR response. Both JICA and USAID run regular training courses aimed at improving collaborative responses. USAID/OFDA facilitates periodic Joint Humanitarian Operations Courses (JHOCs) that are designed to educate U.S. military responders about civil-military operations during HA/DR. PACOM military officers have informed PWA that they find these courses very useful. As one officer noted, “too few military officers understand UNOCHA or its system and OFDA courses are helping to bridge that gap.”²⁷ JICA also runs preparedness training courses, though it currently has no equivalent to the JHOCs.

Though JICA and USAID recognize the need for better civil-military cooperation, neither currently has a mechanism to bring together NGOs, businesses, and military assets for increased dialogue. As important as JHOC and similar trainings are, they need to be complemented with a broader focus on building relationships across HA/DR organizational sector lines. Officials from both agencies have voiced the need for improved USAID-JICA cooperation. As one JICA official noted that, outside of INSARAG, there are no regular JICA-OFDA meetings.²⁸ Informal JICA-OFDA meetings could be expanded to include other actors such as Japan Platform NGOs. Several PWA Civil-Military Initiative participants pointed out that OFDA DARTs possess a much broader mandate and skill set than Japan Disaster Response Teams. JICA-OFDA joint training could help JICA to expand its capacities and serve as invaluable training for any NGO, private sector or military participant.

Joint training would be highly useful for enhancing interoperability and expanding NGO partnering opportunities. JICA acknowledges that Japan NGOs are weak at soliciting USAID funding. Building greater understanding of USAID-Japan NGO partner opportunities should be a priority of joint trainings. USAID/OFDA can consider *any* capable NGO in HA/DR situations. Accordingly JICA and USAID should build the capacity of Japan NGOs, focusing on readying them to partner with USAID during disasters. According to one OFDA official, NGOs registered with USAID are preferred, but for those that are not, there is a method: “What we try to do is to fund a registered NGO that can partner with a local NGO that is not registered if its expertise is needed.”²⁹ International NGOs should also consider sub-contracting with local NGOs for their local expertise.

Participation in joint training should not be confined to only the assistance agencies. As an HA/DR leader in the region, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs should maintain active involvement in training and outreach activities. The Japan

²⁷ Senior U.S. DOD officer, personal communication, 6 June 2012.

²⁸ JICA official, personal communication, 14 November 2012.

²⁹ OFDA official, personal communication, 4 January 2013.

MOFA representation should be broader, including the Foreign Policy Bureau and the North American Affairs Bureau (for cooperation and coordination with regional U.S. disaster managers) and the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division. Select members of the MOFA United Nations Policy Division and the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau should also be included as appropriate. Japan MOFA and U.S. Department of State participation in training events can improve their preparation as donor nations. It can also allow them to learn lessons from disaster-prone nations requesting international assistance.

JICA and USAID/OFDA may be helpful engaging the private sector in preparedness activities. To date, neither JICA nor USAID, the Japanese nor U.S. military, have been particularly proactive on this front. Cross-sector training exercises, such as the Japan Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) or USAID/OFDA Joint Humanitarian Operations Course, may invite HA/DR responders from the civilian, military and NGO sectors, but rarely include interested and willing businesses. Inclusion of the private sector is primarily led by NGOs such as Peace Winds America. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Department of State could use their resources to connect businesses at home or abroad with HA/DR organizations for improved logistics, transport, relief goods sourcing, translation, and telecommunications among other areas of activity.

Japan Platform— Information, Coordination, and Civil-Military Liaisons

The umbrella organization Japan Platform merits further consideration as an important instrument for preparedness and response within Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. Presently comprising 36 humanitarian NGOs plus liaisons with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the business consortium *Keidanren*, Japan Platform is a funder, advocate, and coordinator for its NGO members. Japan Platform is similar to the U.S. NGO umbrella organization InterAction, but differs in several significant ways. Because JPF funnels MOFA funding to NGOs, it maintains a closer relationship with its members and has greater say in their activities. JPF can leverage its funding position to encourage member NGOs to undertake new approaches or attend trainings, seminars, and workshops. Japan Platform has experience in domestic disasters (Tohoku and the 2007 Niigata earthquake) as well as overseas responses.

Because of its unique relationship with member NGOs, Japan Platform is more than just a donor for overseas emergencies. JPF's ability and willingness to foster better civil-military preparedness can be a significant boon to the Japan NGO sector. JPF could increase interoperability training and overall readiness in several ways. During PWA Initiative interviews, the JPF leadership identified several target areas for member training. Navigation of the UN system was noted

as a high-value topic. While many of Japan Platform staff are broadly familiar with the roles of UNOCHA, UNDAC, and the UN cluster system, this is less true of its member NGOs. This unfamiliarity with the UN seriously hampers the NGOs in their overseas response, limiting their ability to participate in collaborative UN-led responses. Japan Platform, in partnership with the UNOCHA country office, should undertake joint trainings to increase the NGO knowledge base.

JPF is also well positioned to boost civil-military preparedness both within Japan and overseas. JPF does not currently have a formal agreement with the Japan Ministry of Defense and is interested in crafting one or more. Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the Japan Central Readiness Force (CRF) removed debris for the construction of schools. JPF had linked the CRF with the Japanese NGOs undertaking school construction. Yet JPF Executive Director Shiina noted that Japan Platform and the JSDF met only once, in 2012, at the Multinational Cooperation in Asia Pacific workshop.³⁰ JPF/JSDF dialogue and training could improve significantly. JPF could do more to take the lead initiating these trainings.

Given JPF's long-standing experience and role coordinating its member NGOs, it should consider using its authority to establish collaborative relationships with host nation entities. JPF leaders have discussed the possibility of establishing cooperation platforms in host nations such as the Philippines. Essentially, Philippine NGOs could form an organization analogous to Japan Platform, allowing for more coordinated and streamlined response agreements with the Government of the Philippines. In this way, JPF could play a role in linking NGOs with host nations in the region beyond Japan.

In summary, Japan Platform has the opportunity to significantly increase the capabilities of its members and better establish the Japanese NGOs as highly capable HA/DR responders across the Asia-Pacific.

Militaries in HA/DR Exercises— New Trainings, New Opportunities

Military-military (and civil-military) training opportunities have flourished in the Asia-Pacific over the past decade. National and regional organizations interested in HA/DR have increasingly sought military participation to bolster their training activities, given the militaries' growing role in large-scale disaster response and the resources they offer.

The explosion of HA/DR training opportunities in Asia is a blessing and a curse. Mil-mil and civil-military HA/DR cooperation in Asia has been vibrant and constructive, involving the widest possible range of countries and organizations, including NGOs and international organizations. Regional networking and capacity has come a very long way from where it was at the time of the Indian

³⁰ Noriyuki Shiina, personal communication, 15 November 2012.

Ocean tsunami in 2004. The problem, however, is that this growth of bilateral and multilateral military-military HA/DR activity has overwhelmed policy makers and responders. Rationalizing activity and capturing and internalizing lessons learned are the greatest challenges moving forward.

The U.S. used its membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to help establish the first-ever field exercise (i.e., Voluntary Demonstration of Response) in 2009, co-sponsored with the Philippines. Twenty-six countries from around the region including 500 military and civilian personnel participated in the first civilian-led, military-supported HA/DR demonstration involving multiple countries, to deliver assistance to local communities in the Philippines.³¹

Every two years, follow-on iterations, now called ARF Disaster Relief Exercises or DiREx, occur. In 2011, Japan and Indonesia co-led a DiREx that involved over 4,000 participants from 26 countries (including the European Union) and seven international organizations. South Korea and Thailand will co-manage the DiREx in 2013. Designed to enhance civil-military coordination and cooperation, the DiREx features five days of training, including academic sessions, a table-top exercise, a field training exercise, and a humanitarian civic action.

The ARF has had difficulty developing a DiREx model for other security issues, such as maritime security or non-proliferation. Instead another ASEAN-related grouping established in 2010 developed expert working groups to facilitate practical cooperation across five priority areas. This is the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM+) approach, with its five working groups covering maritime security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, and HA/DR.³²

The HA/DR working group, in collaboration with the military medicine working group, is paving the way for the ADMM+ exercises. The two working groups are holding their first major exercise in Brunei Darussalam in June 2013, which is being scheduled to occur back-to-back with an ASEAN-only event, the 2nd ASEAN Militaries HA/DR Exercise. Interestingly, this will bring together China (HA/DR) and Japan (Military Medicine) precisely at a time when territorial disputes have made other mil-mil and diplomatic interaction nearly impossible. This demonstrates the value of convening these multilateral frameworks in the region.

Each of these major mil-mil exercise activities (DiREx, ADMM+, and the ASEAN Militaries event) involve hundreds – at times thousands – of people and

³¹ See “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Exercise a Significant Milestone,” (U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, 15 July 2009), <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/2009/126073.htm>.

³² The ADMM+ consists of ASEAN’s ten members plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand, Russia and the United States (i.e., the same grouping as the East Asia Summit). This is a subset of the larger ARF, which includes the European Union, Canada, North Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.

can take up to two years to plan. During this time, several other bilateral and multilateral planning meetings take place, which also help foster multilateral collaboration and information sharing. These exercise activities can create a significant drain on HA/DR-related resources among the countries involved, particularly when these exercises become more complex and involve a growing number of participating nations' militaries.

The largest multinational mil-mil exercise involving the U.S. in Asia is Cobra Gold, led by PACOM and conducted in partnership with Thailand each year for over three decades now. The exercise has grown over time, involving about 13,000 military personnel from participating countries (including Japan) and several observer nations. The mil-mil exercise involves both traditional and non-traditional security cooperation activities, including HA/DR activities. It is this latter category that often becomes the entry point for new participants. Myanmar, for example, sent observers to Cobra Gold for the first time in 2013 to view the HA/DR and military medicine segments. It was the first regional security interaction ever for Myanmar that also involved both Japan and the U.S.

Cobra Gold is just one of eighteen major joint mil-mil exercises that comprise the PACOM training program in the region, where the trend is toward increased multilateral engagement.³³ As the desire for engagement has grown, so has the impetus to add HA/DR components to the U.S. military program. The U.S.-led RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise held every two years, for example, has grown to include over twenty nations and 25,000 personnel. It now includes HA/DR as a stand-alone portion, as opposed to an "add-on," as it was before.³⁴ Further expansion of the exercise should continue in 2014. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced in 2012 that China would be invited to participate in RIMPAC for the first time in 2014.³⁵

A similar dynamic is underway with the U.S.-Philippines annual mil-mil exercise named Balikatan, which involved five countries as foreign observers in 2012 and six in 2013. Additional countries in 2013 widen the network of military partners that are able to address challenges of common concern in the region such as piracy, terrorism, transnational crime, and coordinated disaster relief activities.³⁶ Notably, the 2012 mil-mil exercise involved participants from beyond the U.S. and Philippine militaries including from the Philippines civilian

³³ Donna Miles, "PACOM Exercise Program Integrates Disaster Response Preparation," *American Foreign Press Service*, 5 September 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117750>.

³⁴ U.S. Defense Department official, interview, 17 January 2013.

³⁵ Karen Parrish, "Panetta: Navy will invite China to Pacific Rim Exercise," *American Foreign Press Service*, 18 September 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117902>.

³⁶ Alexis Romero, "More Countries Eyed in War Games," *Philippine Star*, 15 December 2012.

bureaucracy, USAID, UNOCHA, WFP, and the IFRC.³⁷ While it is widely agreed that interagency preparedness coordination is important for effective response, the planning of civil-military training events is complex and their frequency must be rationalized.

In addition to the major regional mil-mil exercises co-sponsored by the U.S., other countries carry out similar activities. Some of these include the Five-Powers Defense Arrangements joint planning exercise (Ex Suman Protector) featuring Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. Their 2012 mil-mil exercise focused on an HA/DR scenario and did include for the first time ever several NGOs. The Japan annual Tokyo Defense Forum mentioned above frequently features HA/DR as a topic for discussion among the twenty-plus participating nations. Annual trilateral mil-mil dialogues such as the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Trilateral Talks and the U.S.-Japan-Australia Security Dialogue and Cooperation Forum also feature civil-military cooperation. In 2012, HA/DR was used to enhance U.S.-China mil-mil dialogue, as the two countries carried out their first bilateral tabletop exercise between the U.S. Army and the People's Liberation Army.

Clearly there is a need to organize these overlapping mil-mil exercise events more effectively. One U.S. official noted that "we're getting real close to HA/DR fatigue in the region." However, the curtailing of these activities should be done in a way that retains the current atmosphere of dynamism and continues to experiment with new combinations of partners and interagency participants.³⁸ Creating tighter linkages between trilateral initiatives and the emerging ASEAN-led regional architecture might be the best approach. Including non-military partners as full participants would greatly strengthen the HA/DR exercises. Connectivity, trust, and effectiveness during response and recovery would increase greatly.

³⁷ "2012 Balikatan Exercise to Simulate Earthquake Response," *Philippine News Agency*, 11 March 2012, and "Balikatan 2013 Exercises Set in April," *Philippine Information Agency*, 14 March 2013, <http://www.pia.gov.ph/news/index.php?article=241363244799>.

³⁸ U.S. Defense Department official, interview, 17 January 2013.

PREPAREDNESS RECOMMENDATIONS

Information and Communication

- Future civil-military HA/DR training should work towards establishing *a common body of knowledge of HA/DR organizations*—structure, mandate/mission, decision-making methods, points of contact, rank equivalencies, and basic partnering requirements. Civil-military HA/DR preparedness training should highlight the need for solid cross-sector understanding of *unique capabilities, limitations, timelines, and funding*.

This body of knowledge should be made broadly accessible. Specific focus should be placed on information exchange among military and civilian responders, NGOs, and the private sector.

- Trainers should distribute regulatory and procedural documents essential for cooperation, e.g. UN General Assembly *Resolution 46/182*, the *Oslo Guidelines*, the *Hyogo Framework for Action*, the USAID *Field Operations Guide*, and the *U.S. Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief: Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below*.¹
- HA/DR preparedness efforts should emphasize the study of interactions in recent disaster cases. This would include *education on organizational policies and procedures* and enumerate the *possibilities for joint cooperation*.
- Preparedness training should seek to understand and establish the full range of *possibilities for joint action*, many of which can boost operational effectiveness while still maintaining organizational independence.

Militaries and NGOs frequently express the difficulty of establishing partnerships, yet as one senior Japan MOD official stated, “The important thing is better understanding of each actor’s capability, responsibility and limitations, and establishing communication and coordination channels by grasping points of contact.”²

¹ This last document is unrestricted and can be accessed at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/disaster.pdf>.

² Senior MOD official, personal communication, 25 December 2012.

- Civil-military HA/DR training must include host nations with representation from central government, disaster management centers, foreign affairs departments, and military entities responsible for HA/DR as well as select NGOs and private businesses. UN and regional multilateral organizations such as ASEAN and APEC should also be included.³
- The ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Center) should be more rigorously supported as a viable training/coordination resource, and as it is strengthened, should be phased into a training/coordination role.
- Asia-Pacific host nations should work cooperatively with U.S. and Japan HA/DR responders to create and disseminate a disaster communications architecture, encompassing host nation communications plans, equipment stockpiles, and capabilities.

Militaries and Assistance Agencies

- Responding militaries should partner with capable businesses, agencies, and NGOs, allowing them to focus on areas of unique capability and comparative advantage.

The *Oslo Guidelines* should remain the primary guidance for military involvement in HA/DR.

- The Japan Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should expand participation in civilian-led trainings in order to increase education about GOJ resources and capacities in overseas HA/DR.
- Preparedness training should target the transition phase and exit strategies within HA/DR operations as opportunities for information exchange and partnership.
- Japan and U.S. civilian, military, and NGO HA/DR leaders should begin formal talks toward conceptualizing and planning a bilateral civil-military HA/DR coordination facility.

³ In certain situations, a phased approach of civil-military training may be necessary, building on core existing relationships before all partners are included.

- Military and foreign ministry leaders should evaluate and merge as needed the many mil-mil exercises proliferating throughout the Asia-Pacific.
- USAID and JICA should increase joint preparedness training and informal cooperation.
- Both USAID/OFDA and JICA should expand outreach efforts to NGO and private sector partners outside the pool of standard HA/DR partners.
- Officials from Japan and U.S. foreign affairs ministries and assistance agencies should facilitate training in requesting, managing, and limiting international humanitarian assistance, targeting needs assessments, best practices, and lessons learned from recent disasters.

Japan Platform and NGOs

- NGOs should plan proactively to continue tasks from outgoing responders (e.g., militaries) constrained by their timeframe. NGOs should be prepared to respond to an extended relief phase and possibly into recovery.
- Preparedness training should include the private sector.
- Japan Platform should foster widened NGO-military trainings and partnerships (with the JSDF and U.S. and host nation militaries).
- Japan Platform should reach out beyond donations to the private sector for operational partnerships.
- JPF could uniquely assist to train its member NGOs and increase its internal capacity regarding needs assessments, the UN system, and establishing civil-military partnerships.
- Japan Platform should assist its members to formalize partnerships through pre-disaster agreements such as memoranda of understanding with other NGOs, military units, municipalities, overseas governments, and businesses.

The Host Nation

- As the sovereign host nation is the pivotal decision maker in HA/DR relief and recovery, the host nation should prepare flexible mechanisms for requesting and receiving external assistance.
- Host nations must strengthen their national disaster management centers in preparedness and response. These centers should train to reach out proactively to international responders.
- Host nations in the Asia-Pacific should focus on disseminating internally the capabilities and limitations of the various HA/DR providers.

The HA/DR Deployment Decision

HA/DR organizations face several fundamental choices during the short period between the onset of a disaster and relief deployment. Organizations must decide whether they will respond and what the extent and nature of their response will be. Training prior to a disaster can significantly influence these early decisions. In particular, it can enhance “go/no-go” decision-making by improving knowledge and information sharing and by widening access to established or potential partners.

MEDIA AND EXPOSURE

A number of factors influence “go/no-go” decision-making. One of these is the media response to a disaster. Every potential responder factors in the media when making the “go/no-go” decision. The instantaneous nature of news coverage in today’s world only heightens the centrality of the media to the decision-making process. In a large-scale disaster, the media does not simply report on the latest developments. It exerts pressure on stakeholders to respond. Television or online images of affected populations and devastated areas can be a powerful influence. National governments may quickly find themselves under pressure to respond in rapid and highly visible manners. Foreign affairs ministries are especially sensitive to how their efforts are being portrayed at home and abroad. In the Wenchuan earthquake, both the Chinese and Japanese media highlighted the fact that the Japan urban search and rescue team was the first international help to arrive in China. The portrayal of the Myanmar government’s resistance to international aid during Cyclone Nargis reportedly influenced Beijing’s posture vis-à-vis international assistance, making it more open to accepting aid in response to its own crisis. In Haiti, geographic proximity and non-stop news coverage prompted an immediate and robust U.S. government response.

When it comes to media pressure, NGOs are particularly susceptible because they rely so heavily on public financing. The media coverage of an overseas disaster – even on the massive scale of the 2004 tsunami – spikes and diminishes very quickly after the event. To capitalize on this short window, NGOs must expedite their “go/no-go” decision, and the ability to raise funds quickly for a response may outweigh all other operational considerations.

From the perspective of the PWA Initiative participants, media involvement in disasters is very much a double-edged sword. News coverage can play a role

both in persuading host nations to accept disaster assistance and in encouraging immediate responses by NGOs and others. The UN can utilize widespread media coverage to bolster support for its flash appeals and to pressure donor nations to contribute to its Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The ubiquity of real-time television, online, and social media reporting means that disasters in marginal or undeveloped areas are able to reach a global audience as never before.

Robust media coverage, however, also has its drawbacks. For NGOs, the relentless pressure to convert media coverage into financial support can sometimes precipitate hasty and unwise deployments. If the need to capitalize upon the newsworthiness of a disaster is the primary factor for “go/no-go” decision-making, NGOs can find themselves in an on-the-ground situation where they are actually not providing additional value to the HA/DR response. Television news cannot replace real humanitarian needs assessments. In the case of Haiti, for instance, many responders would have been better served delaying their deployment until issues around the crowded airport had been resolved. However, organizations realize that the attention span of the media is short. Once a disaster is no longer newsworthy, raising awareness and funds for recovery become extremely difficult.

ASSISTANCE AGENCIES AND MOFAS

The policies of the Japan and U.S. foreign assistance agencies, JICA and USAID, require them to receive a request or an acceptance of aid from a sovereign host nation in order to act. In general U.S. humanitarian assistance is more aggressive, with the U.S. tending to offer assistance in a wider variety of cases than Japan does. The U.S. decision to deploy HA/DR resources is codified in the USAID *Field Operations Guide* and offers the following three criteria in order for an Ambassador or Chief of Mission to make a formal declaration of a disaster:

- The magnitude of the disaster exceeds the affected country’s capacity to respond;
- The affected country has requested or will accept U.S. Government (USG) assistance;
- It is in the interest of the USG to provide assistance.¹

Prior to USAID/OFDA involvement, the U.S. Embassy may allocate up to 25,000 USD from its own emergency funds for an immediate period of

¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, *Field Operations Guide For Disaster Assessment and Response* (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2005), xix.

sixty days after the disaster; any further disaster spending must be channeled through USAID.²

Several variables must be considered before the U.S. government provides disaster relief. A determination that a disaster exceeds the host nation's ability to respond can be somewhat subjective, affording USAID and the U.S. Department of State considerable leeway in crafting a response. In the 2010 floods in Pakistan, for example, the Government of Pakistan's assessment of its own response capabilities fundamentally differed from that of the international community. In such cases, a concerted push by a coalition of potential responders may help to modify the host nation's outlook. U.S. government policy further requires that the host nation either request *or be willing to accept* USG aid. The latter clause gives the Embassy and local/regional USAID staff flexibility in asserting the need to provide assistance. These conditions clearly reveal the political element of overseas HA/DR.

The "go/no-go" decision points for the dispatch of Japan HA/DR resources are less broadly and explicitly documented than those of the U.S. The relevant legal guidance on deployment arises from the Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDRT). The guidance states that a JDRT will be sent, "upon receiving the request of the Japan Disaster Relief Team from the Government of a disaster-stricken country, etc."³ According to this law, the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) must consult with other relevant GOJ ministries before dispatching the JDRT. Japan must receive a host nation request to render assistance. The MOFA legal framework for sending relief personnel differs from that of the U.S. in that the JDRT law explicitly singles out *disasters in developing areas as being a priority* for sending resources for relief and "the promotion of international cooperation."⁴

JICA follows the MOFA lead in HA/DR. In so doing, JICA has the authority to implement MOFA orders but not to dispatch resources on its own. MOFA is bound by law to send resources only when directly requested, but there is still latitude within the Japanese system for consideration of other "go/no-go" factors. The JDRT law leaves the decision to the Minister of Foreign Affairs "when he or she finds it appropriate to do so" after a request from the host nation.⁵ MOFA does have some leeway regarding decisions about aid deployments.

While not codified in policy, MOFA nonetheless recognizes the political aspects of HA/DR dispatch. It notes that: "Effective utilization of this JDR scheme is very useful in improving the presence of Japan in the disaster-affected

² U.S. Department of State, "2 FAM 060, Foreign Disaster Emergency Relief," in *Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 2*, accessed December 31, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/84372.pdf>, 2.

³ *Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team*, (Diet of Japan, 16 September 1987), Annex 1, 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*

countries. Therefore, it is certain that the JDR scheme is very effective for contributing to the *promotion of international cooperation* by Japan and to *promotion of a positive image of Japan*.⁶ MOFA recognizes Japan's unique contributions to this field as a disaster-affected state itself: "As Japan has extensive knowledge on disaster reduction based on its own experiences from domestic natural disasters, it will continue to lead international efforts for disaster reduction."⁷

The "go/no-go" decisions of the U.S. and Japan civilian HA/DR bodies are multi-faceted, and are influenced by issues that go well beyond whether a request is received. Requests for assistance can be initiated by the host nation government; they can also derive from external pressure for such a request. Request in hand, deployment decisions then rest upon political considerations and logistical factors such as staff already present in the disaster-affected area. In all cases, USAID/OFDA or JICA responses are strengthened through partnership. USAID/OFDA remains well ahead of JICA in developing NGO partnerships in likely host nations. By expanding relationships in-country, JICA and MOFA could gain more tools to draw upon as they consider how and whether to send HA/DR resources overseas.

MILITARIES

On the surface, the "go/no-go" decision-making processes of U.S. and Japan armed forces are similar to their civilian counterparts. Deployment decisions are contingent on a request from the U.S. Department of State or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively. Both nations take pains to emphasize that their **overseas humanitarian efforts are civilian-led, with military forces supplementing**, but never replacing civilian capabilities. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5100.46 states that, "It is the policy that the [Department of Defense] Components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by the Department of State that foreign disaster relief shall be provided."⁸ The Department of Defense can provide HA/DR assistance to the Department of State when three criteria are met:

- The military provides a unique service to the host nation and U.S. civilian capacity;

⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Third Party Evaluation, *Evaluation Study on Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Scheme, Summary Report* (Tokyo: MOFA, 2004), x. Emphasis added.

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Outline of Humanitarian Aid Policy," August 2011, accessed 31 December 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/emergency/pdfs/outline_hap.pdf.

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive Number 5100.46*, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 4 December 1975), 2. This directive was updated on 6 July 2012 and added clarification on foreign disaster relief, including the *72-hour rule*.

- The U.S. and host nation civilian capacity is overwhelmed; and,
- U.S. and host nation civilian authorities have requested or are willing to accept military aid.⁹

Similar to U.S. law, the JDRT law stipulates that JSDF will be deployed only after consultation with MOFA. JICA does not have the authority to dispatch any Japan SDF personnel. The 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law further broadened the Ministry of Defense mandate, allowing JSDF forces to serve in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief. However, this Japan Peace Cooperation Law stipulates that peacekeeping operations must take place under the aegis of a UN mission, and approval is still required from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Where the U.S. and Japan militaries differ significantly is in the way that timing influences the “go/no-go” decision and the civil-mil relationship. The U.S. employs something called the *72-hour rule* stipulated by Executive Order 12966. Executive Order 12966 states that DOD may render disaster assistance, “in emergency situations in order to save human lives, where there is not sufficient time to seek the prior initial concurrence of the Secretary of State.”¹⁰ DOD Directive 5100.46 adds that, “Nothing in this Directive should be construed as preventing a military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so.”¹¹ The *72-hour rule* affords regional combatant or component commanders the ability to act without prior approval by U.S. State Department. As the rule is widely applicable and the distribution of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific is broad-based, it could have far-reaching ramifications, and U.S. military involvement may occur alongside, or even in spite of, Department of State leadership in disaster response.

The *72-hour rule* comprises two important components that relate to deployment decisions. The first component guarantees that U.S. military decision-making is not hampered or slowed by a delayed Department of State invitation. The U.S. military will weigh its own variables, including the disposition of its forces, its abilities in the region, its first assessments of the situation, and its political considerations in determining whether to deploy or not. The DOD Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated furthermore that military involvement “is predicated on the severity of the humanitarian situation and the perception of

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief: Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2011), 1-15.

¹⁰ William J. Clinton, “Executive Order 12966—Foreign Disaster Assistance,” 14 July 1995.

¹¹ DOD, *Directive Number 5100.46*, 3. The Directive stipulates that, “In cases in which this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the host nation and U.S. Chief of Mission of the affected country before committing forces. Also, the Combatant Commander shall follow up as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after the start of relief operations, to secure Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense approval for continuing assistance.”

U.S. interests. It is important to remember that political factors drive military decisions and planning at every level.”¹²

The *72-hour rule* also reinforces the critical need for civil-military preparedness training. In situations where the U.S. military deploys, it generally must support an even broader civilian response. This requires the military to develop effective partnerships on the ground. Even relatively self-contained military operations such as airfield clearance or mobile hospital construction must be done in tandem with host nation and U.S. civilian authorities so that operations can be handed over at a later date. When regional commanders are making decisions about deployment, they will consider any U.S. civilian presence as well as host nation collaborators, knowledge of regional assets, and the ability to access and utilize cooperation frameworks. The reality of the *72-hour rule* calls for **enhanced understanding by all parties of the potential for civil-military cooperation in disasters.**

NGOS

Among NGOs, a multitude of variables determine a “go/no-go” decision. Some NGOs, particularly the larger international ones, have codified policies and a clear decision-making process for humanitarian action. Far more numerous, however, are the smaller NGOs that make “go/no-go” decisions on a case-by-case basis, weighing multiple factors before reaching a decision. For NGOs, “no-go” situations tend to be characterized by anticipated implementation, funding, and/or logistical difficulties.

Even the large NGOs with clearly delineated decision trees are influenced by subjective factors. Consider the example of the International Medical Corps (IMC), which uses a six-point rubric for determining whether to deploy. The criteria are:

- The host nation (internal disaster declaration and request for international assistance);
- Needs (credible reports of relief gaps);
- Host nation response capabilities (a disaster beyond the host nation ability to mitigate);
- Impact (the ability of IMC to make a meaningful impact in its relief work);

¹² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 2009), xxii.

- Resources (funding availability); and,
- Staff security.¹³

These seemingly straightforward criteria are nonetheless highly contingent on initial needs assessments, situation reports, and rapid and subjective judgment calls regarding host nation capabilities. Even a large, well-established, international NGO such as IMC may misjudge a situation by deploying too rapidly and committing finite (and costly) resources to a disaster where its presence is neither needed nor adequately coordinated.¹⁴

For NGOs without clearly defined decision trees, the “go/no-go” decision is made on a case-by-case basis, with eligibility criteria that may change from disaster to disaster. While certain factors may remain constant – such as the availability of funding – others fluctuate considerably. Needs on the ground, language barriers, personnel security, logistical hurdles, and access to local partners are all separately evaluated in each disaster, usually with varied perspectives coming from headquarters and the field. For small and mid-sized NGOs, a small obstacle at any point in this complex decision-making process may be enough to tip the balance towards “no-go”, i.e., not responding.

The results of the initial needs assessment are among the most critical determinants of deployment because once that decision is made, it is difficult to turn back. If an assessment is incomplete or inaccurate, the success of the whole mission may be compromised. Therefore **NGOs should be proactive in building networks that permit access to complete and validated needs assessments.**

Access to the earliest and most comprehensive needs assessments entails improved liaisons with coordination mechanisms such as UNOCHA/UNDAC or a DART. Better knowledge of and access to online resources such as the UNOCHA Virtual OSOCC, ReliefWeb, and the DOD’s All Partners Access Network (APAN) are also critical. A mid-sized NGO with significant capabilities but no on-the-ground resources will need to take advantage of a combination of these resources to make an effective “go/no-go” decision. For this task, the UNOCHA Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) approach can be a useful tool. In its initial phase (the first 72 hours post-disaster), UNOCHA, in partnership with first-responding agencies, compiles information on the scale and severity of the disaster as well as the sector-specific needs of affected

¹³ Kevin Noone, “Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR): Presentation to Japan-US-South Korea Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Workshop,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

¹⁴ In the case of the 2010 earthquake in Chile, IMC sent two assessment teams, which concluded that a full-scale response was not necessary. This approach should be a model for avoiding over-commitment of resources.

populations.¹⁵ MIRA assessment findings are available to NGOs and should be utilized when considering whether to deploy.

A connection with local partners is essential to making informed deployment decisions. Many small U.S.-based NGOs did not participate in the Tokohu relief efforts, for example, as they did not have a capable local partner. Without local partners, NGOs can arrive on the scene without adequate language capabilities, knowledge of local relief resources, or transportation and telecommunications solutions. The NGOs that did arrive in Japan without local partners had considerable difficulties. Peace Winds America had a solid relationship with its sister NGO, Peace Winds Japan, which allowed them both to work smoothly during both the disaster response and recovery phases.

Even for the largest international NGOs, local connections are critical in making a sound “go/no-go” decision. Despite its heavy Tokyo presence, IMC found that cultural differences between the Tokyo and the Tohoku region were difficult to bridge without a local partner.

NGO coordinating bodies play an important role in supporting the deployment decisions of their members. This is particularly the case in Japan. Japan Platform (JPF), as both a funder and a coordinator, could contribute more to support its members’ deployment decisions. JPF Executive Director Shiina has noted that while MOFA makes disaster assessment funding available rather quickly, Japan Platform is still slow in putting emergency response personnel on the ground to conduct assessments.¹⁶ Because JPF assessments are delayed, JPF members may sometimes have to make deployment decisions without JPF assessment information. Japan Platform must strengthen its immediate response and needs assessments capabilities while, at the same time, expanding partnerships and training. More rapid deployment and better on-the-ground integration with the UN would elevate Japanese NGO profiles in Asia-Pacific HA/DR.

MAJOR THEMES IN RESPONSE DECISION

Several commonalities determine how HA/DR organizations make “go/no-go” decisions.

- The nature of the host nation’s request for assistance;
- The availability of accurate needs assessments;
- The match between organizational capabilities and needs on the ground;
- The response and coordination capabilities of the host nation;

¹⁵ Masaki Watabe, “On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC),” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012). See also http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/mira_final_version2012.pdf.

¹⁶ Noriyuki Shiina, personal communication, 14 November 2012.

- Knowledge of other HA/DR responders and their deployment capacities and plans;
- The availability and capacities of local partners;
- The expected outcome if the decision is made *not* to deploy; and,
- The ability to plan and implement an exit/transition strategy.

All of these factors can be assessed to some extent prior to making a “go/no-go” decision. Information about organizational capabilities and methods of accessing needs assessments can improve the speed and appropriateness of deployment decisions. A successful deployment is one that adds value to the relief effort without burdening either the host nation or other responders. For the U.S. and Japan militaries, each of which tend to consult with one another prior to HA/DR missions, shared information concerning assessments and capacities during the decision period raises the likelihood of an appropriate and collaborative response.

Among all of the factors noted above, the **need for strong connectivity with the host nation is paramount**. From assessing on-the-ground needs to crafting assistance requests to tracking incoming relief, the host nation must lead the “go/no-go” calculus. This was a dominant theme emerging from PWA Civil-Military Initiative events. Participants strongly asserted the necessity for the host nation to be actively involved in deployment decisions. Organizations with an on-the-ground presence and channels of communication with the host nation can make their decision with much greater certainty.

Ultimately, the gold standard or most important element in making a “go/no-go” decision will be a deep engagement with a diverse and triangulated constellation of trusted partners. The 2009 Sumatra case is illustrative of the dangers of relying on a single source of assessment information. There, the host nation’s assessments overestimated the need for urban search and rescue. Basing decisions from UN sources only is also not highly recommended. Several PWA Initiative participants noted that UNOCHA’s Phase 1 MIRA is mostly culled from secondary sources, raising questions about the accuracy and timeliness of the data. In short, HA/DR responders should be incorporating many sources of information into their “go/no-go” deployment decisions.

In the June 2012 preparedness workshop, PWA conducted a disaster simulation that illustrated the complexity of several “go/no-go” decision-making processes. PWA simulated a notional typhoon that struck Luzon in the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan’s Ryukyu Islands.¹⁷ The participants assessed how and whether their organizations would respond if assistance were requested. The responses were widely varied, indicating the diversity of factors

¹⁷ The simulated typhoon track was based on aggregated paths of several historical storms.

considered in these decisions. Among these were damage assessments, prior country presence, UN coordination, political factors, geographic proximity, funding status, other responders and their capacities, and time frame. Japanese participants, for instance, generally agreed that the JSDF would need to focus mostly on the Ryukyus, whereas civilian aid from JICA could go to the Philippines. Participants similarly concluded that the Okinawa-based U.S. III MEF should remain mostly in the Ryukyus, while U.S. Navy officers raised the possibility of deploying to the Philippines or Taiwan (if political considerations allowed). Korean officials indicated they would focus primarily on the areas of greatest need in the Philippines. Private sector representatives pondered their ability to partner and the kinds of resources they might make available for the different host nations.

In very few cases were the decisions clear-cut. Throughout, respondents stressed the need for decisions based upon accurate needs assessments. The simulation also underscored individual agency limitations leading participants to discuss how their organizations could partner with one another to provide response in the three affected areas. PWA deliberately designed this simulation as a multi-nation disaster. In multi-nation disasters, communications, coordination, deployment choices, and chains of command are highly complex, making “go/no-go” decisions difficult.

DEPLOYMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

- The request of the host nation should in all cases be the starting point of “go/no-go” decision-making processes.
- The criteria for “go/no-go” decisions should be based on accurate needs assessments.

At a minimum, the decision should stem from at least one verified report from an entity at the scene of the disaster. Secondhand and media reports can augment but should not replace an accurate, validated needs assessment.

- An evaluation of an organization’s ability to meet requested needs, either unilaterally or through a partner, is a prerequisite to deployment.
- HA/DR responders with large “footprints,” including disaster response teams, militaries, and large NGOs, must exercise particular care in coming to a thoughtful “go/no-go” decision.
- An exit/transition strategy is required even prior to deployment. This should cover expected needs for the transfer of funds, the movement of goods and personnel, local partnerships, and transition to recovery.
- Potential responders must be cognizant of the fact that a “no-go” decision may actually be more beneficial to a host nation than a “go” decision.
- In the “go/no-go” decision process, HA/DR responders should liaise with established coordination resources, e.g., USAID, the UN, JICA, and Japan Platform.

All responders should also establish communications with host nation foreign ministries and disaster management centers.

- Unique organizational capabilities, e.g., the U.S. military *72-hour rule*, should be factored in the deployment and partnering decisions.

Disaster Response

The cornerstones of successful disaster response are need-based relief efforts driven by accurate on-the-ground assessments, effective coordination, and robust prior knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of other responders. The active participation of the host nation is critical and can determine the efficacy of the entire operation. Relief organizations are always more effective when their staff arrive trained and educated on the skill sets, mandates, and unique capacities possessed by responders in the government, private, NGO, and military sectors.

NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

The initial needs assessments should drive an organization's decision whether to deploy. Continued disaster assessments and situation reports can then guide all subsequent elements of a response.

In PWA Initiative workshops and senior forums, participants divided assessments into several categories. **Baseline assessments** provide a broad picture of fundamental conditions on the ground such as development status, major infrastructure like hospitals and ports, major risk factors, and local/regional government resources. These assessments are ideally performed before the onset of disaster. WFP and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) have been making important strides in developing baseline assessments, generating hazard maps, and identifying likely needs in the case of disaster. The maps are able to overlay numerous datasets and include seismic risk, population density, airstrips, telecommunications equipment, and power supply.¹ As part of the UN's Vulnerability Analysis Committee, WFP produces a wide spectrum of reports that cover many disaster scenarios beyond its traditional focus on food security issues. HA/DR organizations without these capabilities, notably smaller NGOs, should concentrate their efforts on obtaining these assessments in the preparedness phase.

Complementing the baseline analyses are **logistics assessments**. These types of assessment must be conducted anew in every disaster given the distinct geographies and logistical challenges in host nations. As former JICA Disaster Relief Team Secretariat Director-General Kae Yanagisawa has concluded, "Risk

¹ Kenro Oshidari, "UNHRD Network: Humanitarian Response Depots," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

assumptions based on hazard maps are not always correct.”² Baseline data alone provide insufficient information for an evolving disaster. Logistics assessments comprise important additional information on roads and air transport, water, fuel, food and power supplies, the location of central or local coordinating bodies, of local government offices, of ports and airfields, and the availability of translation services. Few responding organizations will have the capacity to quickly survey all of these separate variables, so these assessments are particularly valuable to responding organizations. Even among military forces and larger humanitarian organizations, there is a clear need to share logistic assessment information between different branches. One Tohoku analysis found that “logisticians in each Japan SDF service operated *independently* of one another for fuel and other supplies rather than *in collaboration* to ensure that all three JSDF services were adequately equipped to the extent possible.”³

Initial and ongoing security assessments are another dataset that can be shared during the relief phase. Although the general security dynamics of a region can be provided in a baseline assessment, the picture may change dramatically at the onset of a disaster. This could be due to political or social instability exacerbated by the disaster (as feared in Aceh in 2004), or due to secondary manmade disasters such as the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. If there are force protection issues, responding organizations must address them prior to arrival. These arrangements will differ according to each organization’s willingness to accept risk, but a security plan based on a sound assessment is a must. Ongoing security assessments are essential to effective response, given that the initial security picture may change rapidly and dramatically in the aftermath of a major disaster.

The baseline, logistics, and security assessments combine with more focused **sector-specific needs assessments**, including medical, search and rescue, shelter, food, and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene). In all sector-specific needs categories, having multiple complementary initial and continual assessments always benefits effective response efforts. UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams are key instruments and sources of secondary assessments. Still, the usefulness of their findings may be limited by the time it takes to compile them (often up to a week). UNDAC lacks the ability to generate its own primary assessments. Host nation and/or bilateral assessments improve the efficacy of the response.

Diverse sources of assessment information can help address persistent issues of **assessment verification or validation**. Particularly in geographically inaccessible areas, initial assessments can sometimes be overly broad or plainly

² Kae Yanagisawa, “DRR and JICA,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

³ Tatsumi, *Lessons Learned*, 26. Emphasis in original.

inaccurate. Reference to multiple situation reports help remedy the problem of potentially inaccurate information.

The need for greater **standardization of needs assessments** arose throughout the PWA Initiative. Needs assessments shared among organizations must be mutually intelligible and interpreted in similar ways. Especially among organizations that rely heavily on the assessments of others, standardization is crucial in promoting effective resource management. An Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) needs assessment analysis captures the problem:

There is not so much a lack of assessment information as a lack of capacity to validate and analyze the information necessary to determine priorities and guide planning of the humanitarian response. Likewise, certain populations or situations are over-assessed while others are never measured at all. Also, assessment data is all too often insufficiently shared or used, and data sets from different assessments are not comparable.⁴

Several multilateral agencies, including the UN and ASEAN, are currently undertaking standardization efforts. Those of the UN are notable. The IASC established the Needs Assessment Task Force in 2009 to address issues of coordination around assessments. The *Operational Guidance* of the Task Force primarily targets government policy-makers, cluster agencies, host nations, and NGOs. Militaries and private businesses should be targeted as well. The document identifies several key areas for assessment standardization, including:

- Geographic and temporal synchronization of assessments;
- Use of a consistent set of common operational datasets;
- Use of a consistent set of sectoral indicators (e.g., shelter, security);
- Establishment of a process for collating data from multiple assessments;
- Establishment of a process for conducting intra- and inter-sectoral data analysis.⁵

The common operational datasets and sectoral indicators use standardized, open-access key indicators for each sector. In WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), for instance, indicator W4 addresses the percent of the affected population with access to 15 liters of water per person per day.⁶ By standardizing assessments in each category and using synchronized, shared datasets, all

⁴ Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Operational Guidance for Coordinated Assessments in Humanitarian Crises* (Geneva: IASC, 2012), 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶ OneResponse, “Indicators and Guidance,” accessed 3 January 2012, <http://onerresponse.info/resources/NeedsAssessment/Pages/Indicators%20and%20Guidance.aspx>. The Sphere Project, a voluntary initiative, has also been an important source for setting humanitarian standards for assessments. It can be accessed at <http://www.sphereprojects.org>.

responders – not just those in the UN system – can work towards better assessment and program harmonization. Especially for emerging Japan HA/DR responders, these tools can guide program design and implementation.

Even for organizations with relatively self-contained focus areas (e.g., medical care), it is imperative to avoid so-called “path dependence.” “Path dependence” refers to a situation in which decisions made early in a response then commit a responder to a particular course of action regardless of its appropriateness. “Path dependence” can manifest itself geographically (deploying to the wrong area), functionally (deploying with the wrong goods or capabilities), or chronologically (arriving too soon or too late). When the GOJ utilized incorrectly sized trucks to deliver Tohoku relief it committed itself to a decision based on incomplete logistics assessments. The GOJ dispatched resources before it had assessed whether debris was cleared from the roads. In Sumatra, the combination of exaggerated damage assessments and insufficient coordination triggered a flood of unneeded relief in the form of urban search and rescue teams, when other needs such as shelter, were more dire. Accurate updated needs assessments remain the best means of avoiding path dependence in a response.

MAJOR THEMES IN DISASTER RESPONSE

Throughout the PWA Initiative several themes emerged in the discussion of on-the-ground relief. One fundamental theme was **civil-military HA/DR guidelines**. The non-legally binding *Oslo Guidelines* are the main international guide in this regard. These *Guidelines* follow the standard UN core principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality, and enshrine the host nation as the final arbiter on the decision of their use. They also posit an unambiguously secondary role for military and civil defense assets, in support of and complementing a civilian lead:

Military and civil defense assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged “humanitarian gap” between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.⁷

The *Oslo Guidelines* specify that military assets be used only in situations of *last resort*, that they be employed on the basis of humanitarian criteria, that they be limited in scale, and that they support civilian leadership. Civil society entities have affirmed these *Guidelines* and elaborated on their interpretation of them. The U.S. NGO consortium InterAction released a policy brief on military

⁷ United Nations, *Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief—“Oslo Guidelines”* (Oslo: UN, 1994, Updated November 2006, Revision 1.1, November 2007), 8.

operations in HA/DR which warns that militaries tend to lack specialized humanitarian personnel and may become too focused on “winning hearts and minds.” It cautions:

The military should not consider NGOs as “force extenders” or assume their willingness to collaborate, and should leave humanitarian and development activities to civilian agencies and NGOs as much as possible. NGOs recognize that communication with military actors is mutually beneficial when conducted in a neutral space, and guidelines exist to help improve NGO-military relations when they operate in a common area.⁸

The NGO CARE echoes these sentiments. In a policy brief, it accepts that “the involvement of armed contingents in aid operations is probably an irreversible trend,” but emphasizes that, “civilian leadership is essential to ensure the primacy of humanitarian action, based on needs, over military objectives derived from political strategic goals.”⁹ CARE usefully divides its engagement with the military into three levels. Level one is context analysis and emergency preparedness, level two is dialogue, and level three is coordination and cooperation.

The primacy of the *Oslo Guidelines* in guiding civil-military relationships in humanitarian response is firmly established. The Guidelines provide a solid legal and operational platform on which all nations can base civil-military operations. They are particularly important for Japan. Because of the restrictions of Article IX of the Constitution, using military assets overseas can be difficult. A set of UN guidelines legitimizes military use for HA/DR.

The PWA Initiative nonetheless revealed an undercurrent of opinion among HA/DR professionals that alternate or complementary guidance may be needed for the Asia-Pacific. The voluntary guidelines of the Asia-Pacific Conference on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO) are a tangible reflection of this opinion. Additionally, several assistance agency professionals have opined that unique conditions in Asia raise the need for an alternative regional mechanism. One USAID official suggested that the *Oslo* framework, “may not be entirely appropriate for the region.”¹⁰ This attitude reflects a culture among Asia-Pacific nations that is more open to the use of military assets in HA/DR. Ultimately civil-military guidance tailored to the Asia-Pacific may be useful, provided need-based, impartial, and host nation-directed aid remain at their core.

How responding organizations address their limitations was also a recurring theme in PWA workshops. Few responders, particularly NGOs, can provide all

⁸ InterAction, “The U.S. Military’s Expanding Role in Foreign Assistance,” (Policy brief. Washington, D.C.: InterAction, January 2011), 2.

⁹ CARE International, *Policy Framework for CARE International’s Relations with Military Forces*, (Geneva: CARE, 2009), 2.

¹⁰ Senior USAID official, personal communication, 3 October 2012.

the needed relief goods, establish a supply chain, provide telecommunications, transport, medical care and staff protection, as well as generate needs assessments. Deployment in-country without these arrangements pre-established was expressed by PWA Initiative event participants as one of the biggest drains on shared resources in a disaster scenario.¹¹

Collaboration with self-sufficient responders, such as the Japan or U.S. civilian assistance agencies and militaries, can address many operational limitations. **Integrated or collaborative efforts** can help organizations bring their skills to bear. In the case of PWA's Tohoku response, this kind of integrated response entailed securing transport (a private helicopter company), lodging (partner NGO facilities), and telecommunications assets *prior* to departing for Tohoku. Failure to have made these arrangements through partners would have placed additional burdens on already overstretched local resources. The need to make these arrangements prior to deployment is amplified considerably when there are security risks in the disaster zone. Host nation resources, foreign military units, and UN agencies should not be implicitly expected to provide protection services.

Communication among HA/DR responders is paramount. Regular and open lines of communication mean that responders can access needs assessments and reports without submitting to a coordinating body. This lesson is important for NGO responders, as many do not want to be coordinated, instructed, or ordered. NGOs will be strengthened in response if preparedness training emphasizes the importance of communications compatibility among responders. Open lines of communication can also help responders to avoid isolation, which can pose security risks. Without a two-way flow of information, certain changes in security conditions on the ground can go unnoticed by the response system. Political instability, civil unrest, follow-up natural disasters, or the spread of man-made disasters obligate responders to establish basic communications mechanisms with one another.

Workshop discussions around self-sufficiency raised the issue of how organizations obtain supplies. The default option for *all* HA/DR responders should be to purchase relief goods locally to the greatest extent possible. **Local sourcing and procurement of goods** is known as a well-established humanitarian best practice for over a decade, and yet the problem of bringing goods from overseas persists. Images of basic relief goods such as bottled water, blankets, and cots being unloaded from expensive cargo planes have been highlighted by the media in numerous disasters, including both Tohoku and Aceh. When responders

¹¹ Responders arriving with relief items and good intentions but no transport arrangements can clog airfields, reception/departure centers and command centers. The Pakistan floods, where access to the affected areas often hinged on helicopter transport, exemplify this issue. So too does the Haiti earthquake, where the overwhelmed Port-au-Prince airport overflowed with newly arrived responders without adequate means of reaching the victims.

(oftentimes NGOs) arrive with basic supplies, it decreases their efficiency, to say nothing of the costs incurred. Although there are exceptions to this rule, responders to Asia should assume that local sourcing is available. As Kevin Noone of International Medical Corps (IMC) noted, “There is nothing you can’t get in Indonesia.”¹² IMC has developed a system of “smart prepositioning” that should be widely adopted by other organizations. IMC prepositions certain critical stocks and establishes pre-existing service agreements with local providers for everything else. Rather than pay for warehouse medications that expire before needed, they have created a local supply network that can be activated during a crisis. There is no reason why smaller NGOs cannot develop similar systems or partner with other organizations to share existing “smart prepositioning” systems.

The rise of military resources in Asia-Pacific disaster management in the last decade has not gone unnoticed among residents of disaster-prone areas. Images in the media of iconic U.S. ships such as the USS *Abraham Lincoln* or the USNS *Mercy* or JSDF medical workers on the scene of a disaster are potent reminders of military capabilities in this realm. The Humanitarian Policy Group notes that “Some humanitarian actors have cautioned that joint contingency planning may raise expectations that humanitarian actors will use military assets or will support increased coordination with the military, noting that greater clarity is required on the purpose of such processes.”¹³ That caution should not be taken as an argument against civil-military disaster cooperation. Rather it is a call for a more detailed delineation of roles and responsibilities prior to deployment and in the early response phase.

Military responders should also recognize the imbalance between their technology and that of other HA/DR actors, specifically most Asia-Pacific host nations. U.S. military and JSDF responders in particular field sophisticated assets such as helicopters, medical facilities, telecommunications equipment, and heavy engineering machinery. A senior Indonesian official in an interview with PWA cautioned that visible inequality in relief-related technology runs the risk of breeding resentment by host nation responders.¹⁴ This resentment could be exacerbated by the fact that once a military force withdraws, unwanted equipment, abandoned infrastructure, and waste are often left behind for the host nation to remove. Military forces overseas can take steps to address these concerns. One approach is to engage in cooperative, integrated response efforts that include host nation aviation, medical, and technical assets during their operations.

As an additional theme for consideration, PWA Civil-Military Initiative participants stressed the **need for transitional exit strategies** in HA/DR

¹² Kevin Noone, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 15 February 2012.

¹³ Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2012), 12.

¹⁴ Senior Indonesian official, personal communication.

situations. Within the military context, a static exit strategy can sometimes result in an isolated operation as it can be perceived as a lack of commitment or even a peremptory departure. Middle ground can nonetheless be found as there is an optimal range of action somewhere between a rapid exit and a fully open-ended deployment.

A transitional strategy takes a holistic approach to disaster deployment. It considers the pressing needs on the ground as well as the capacities of other responders. The transitional strategy also considers what the host nation might need as it moves from relief to recovery. For military HA/DR responders, this latter point is of paramount importance. Because U.S. military timeframes are so constrained, commanders and operations officers should identify likely host nation partners (be they military or civilian) to whom they can hand off tasks at withdrawal. The possibilities for military-NGO cooperation are numerous and, until this point, have remained largely unexplored. Because NGOs tend to maintain a longer presence than military counterparts, they may be ideal transitional partners for the military. In a PWA Initiative forum, IMC Vice President Torbay stated simply to the military, “NGOs can be your exit strategy.”¹⁵

COORDINATION MECHANISMS AND RESOURCES

The UN

The United Nations remains the most important multilateral entity in Asia-Pacific HA/DR. A UN presence provides a framework for response that complements direct bilateral requests.

In disasters the initial task of providing coordination is conducted by UNDAC, which can deploy teams in as little as 12 hours following a request by the host nation. UNDAC breaks down its on-site mission into *strategic* and *operational* coordination components. The former takes a broad view of the humanitarian picture and attempts to formulate overall goals, while the latter looks at sector specific needs, coordination of HA/DR actors, and the provision of common services. UNDAC core functions in disaster are:

- Identifying critical needs and targeting resources for those needs;
- Ensuring access to populations-at-risk;
- Developing and adopting a unified response approach that eliminates gaps and duplications;
- Promoting an appropriate division of responsibilities between actors;

¹⁵ Rabih Torbay, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

- Promoting accountability through the use of monitoring and evaluation information;
- Promoting emergency assistance that is supportive of recovery and long-term development;
- Advocating for humanitarian principles and concerns as well as the security of humanitarian aid personnel;
- Monitoring events, conditions and trends to provide sufficient early warning;
- Establishing and maintaining an effective information collection, analysis, and dissemination capacity.¹⁶

The comprehensiveness of this list speaks to UNDAC's central role in major disasters. However, UNDAC's timeframes are quite short. As it withdraws, these tasks are assumed by UNOCHA units on the ground. Some host nations (e.g., New Zealand in 2011) may refuse UNDAC teams because they do not see added value in their deployment. In the 2011 tsunami, Japan finally did accept an UNDAC team, though Japan negotiated the Terms of Reference dictating their role in response. During the 2011 floods, Thailand did not accept an UNDAC team. Even organizations that can offer these services for specific actors or specific sectors, such as USAID/OFDA through its DARTs, do not generally have the mandate or capacity for such a comprehensive mission.

Once deployed, UNOCHA can establish an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). The OSOCC has three primary objectives: to support host nation coordination efforts; to coordinate international relief (particularly urban search and rescue teams); and, to provide a platform for coordination and communication among responders. The OSOCC will typically be complemented by a Reception/Departure Center (RDC) to coordinate the arrival and briefing of USAR teams and their immediate deployment to affected areas. Field officers may decide to open sub-OSOCCs as needed. The OSOCC works to "compile and analyze the information input from outside sources (RDC, assessment reports, situation reports, media, etc.) and convert it into appropriate output format for dissemination to stakeholders."¹⁷ Information is then compiled into the Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) and disseminated to field responders. (A downside of MIRA is that it can become overwhelmed by the volume of information and struggle with issues of confirmation and validation.) One UN participant in the PWA Initiative stated that, "We need a mechanism for sifting through

¹⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, *UNDAC Handbook* (New York: UNOCHA, 2006), B5.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, E18.

and determining high-priority assessments, and the ability to share these determinations.”¹⁸

As international providers arrive on the scene of a large disaster and UNDAC begins to compile needs assessments and coordinate tasks, UNOCHA generally initiates the implementation of the cluster system.¹⁹ Divided into eleven sectors, each led by a designated UN agency, NGO, or government agency, the cluster approach adopts a need-based methodology for the coordination of humanitarian relief. The clusters convene regular meetings of participating organizations (UN agencies, host nation agencies, NGOs, and private sector partners) and provide updates on needs, response priorities, and anticipated gaps.

The OSOCC and cluster approach have been tested in numerous disasters and proved to be effective mechanisms. Accordingly the PWA Initiative has focused on ways that it can contribute to the reinforcement of the OSOCC and cluster approach. The Initiative highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of these UN and Inter-Agency Standing Committee systems and sought out potential new partnerships in coordination. Within the context of UN-NGO relations, the largest international NGOs tend to be proficient in interacting with UNDAC and the clusters. That is less true for smaller NGOs, particularly in Japan. Despite the UN mantra that its system is open to all, NGOs do not simply show up to either OSOCC or cluster meetings. For this reason, better training in international systems is necessary for local and less experienced NGOs. With better understanding, these NGOs can be integrated into the elements of the on-the-ground UN coordination system. In PWA workshops, U.S. military participants also acknowledged that too few operational officers know or understand the UNOCHA system. Overall, there is widespread agreement regarding the value of UN coordination, but it is incumbent upon leaders from all sectors to increase liaison and training opportunities.

A major focus for UNOCHA should be on joint preparedness training for contingencies where there is minimal UN presence. Such a training could ideally be tailored to support the coordination of domestic response agencies, foreign affairs ministries, likely military responders, NGOs, and the private sector in instances where UNOCHA may not have a presence.

The need for an expanded role for UNOCHA has been observed as relates to its online coordination system, the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center (VOSOCC).²⁰ By analyzing information and resources posted to VOSOCC concerning several recent major disasters, it becomes clear that

¹⁸ Samir Wanmali (Senior Regional Programme Advisor, WFP, Regional Bureau for Asia), remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution Transition,” Tokyo, 5 June 2012.

¹⁹ According to Masaki Watabe, UNOCHA Japan Head, the clusters will generally take over from UNDAC approximately 10-14 days after the disaster.

²⁰ This resource can be accessed at <http://vosocc.unocha.org/>.

UNOCHA plays a dominant role as an urban search and rescue coordinator. The Virtual OSOCC can also track other emergency assets such as logistics, telecoms and health teams, needs assessments, and disaster maps. UNOCHA may broaden the scope and inclusiveness of the Virtual OSOCC to offer expanded information that goes beyond USAR deployments. Its generalized situation



A firefighter of Los Angeles County and his dog are members of the USAID/OFDA dispatched urban search and rescue team in Ofunato on 15 March 2011. (U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sgt. Daniel St. Pierre/Released.)

reports can be located on ReliefWeb, but centralizing this information for times of emergency is needed.

Senior UN representatives at PWA Civil-Military Initiative workshops and forums highlighted the need for UN improvements in civil-military interaction and in private sector outreach. UN-military arrangements are still primarily *ad hoc* and characterized by circumspection both sides. There is, however, a growing UN recognition of the importance of the military role in Asia-Pacific disasters.

In highlighting the need for more advance UN-military planning, WFP regional director Kenro Oshidari pointed to the significant aviation assets possessed by the militaries in the region, noting that within the UN family, only WFP and UN peacekeeping missions have significant numbers of aircraft.²¹ Oshidari highlighted that military assets could make up for shortfalls in these kinds of resources, especially during the first weeks of a response. UN participants also stressed the need for better UN-private sector partnerships as well, pointing to the successful partnerships between WFP and private business for logistics operations. Various UN agencies have expressed interest in similar operational partnerships, but require assistance in connecting and communicating with potential private sector partners.

The Military

By virtue of their mandate and organizational command structure for HA/DR operations, military forces often have narrow views regarding cooperation. They tend to focus on coordination with host nations and assistance agencies only. In the case of the U.S. and Japan, military forces prioritize collaborative responses with their lead government partners. Military participation in wider coordination platforms such as UNOCHA tends to be informational in nature. Military forces will generally not consent to coordination by any entity other than their own government (one exception is in the case of a peacekeeping force under the command of a UN mission). There are, however, methods of “plugging in” to military operations and improving the two-way flow of information between armed forces and other stakeholders in HA/DR.

The military has several tools at its disposal to foster greater civil-military collaboration in response. Within the U.S. system, one of these tools is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). A CMOC, which can be established by a regional commander, is designed to work alongside USAID/OFDA resources, integrating inputs from local assets, NGOs, other militaries, and the private sector. The U.S. military acknowledges the limitations of a CMOC, pointing out that, “Despite its name, the CMOC generally does not set policy or direct

²¹ Kenro Oshidari, “WFP Emergency Activation,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 27 September 2011).

operations. Conceptually the CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders.”²² This role is an appropriate one for a military entity, given the widespread apprehension among NGOs regarding active collaboration with the military. CMOCs add great value, but are not well known among private sector actors and smaller NGOs. The military should emphasize broadened awareness about CMOCs, highlighting their roles and introducing means of interacting with them.

For HA/DR organizations that wish to partner more directly with the U.S. military, a mechanism also exists in the Mission Tasking Matrix (MiTaM), a system jointly used by the U.S. military and USAID/OFDA to collect, evaluate, and assign tasks in an operational setting. An entity requesting a military capability can submit a MiTaM request via OFDA. “Should the Department of Defense (DOD) possess a unique capability and have available assets to fulfill this need, then USAID/OFDA representatives will request DOD support. The USAID/OFDA representatives in coordination with the civil-military operations staff (J-9) will develop the MiTaM request.”²³ In PWA workshops, DOD officials pointed out that NGOs or the host nation may access the MiTaM system directly, allowing for on-the-ground partnerships. Like CMOCs, this system is not well known outside the military and USAID. USAID and the U.S. military should prioritize greater awareness of the system.

The U.S. military has a system for host nation interaction as well. A Joint Requirements Review Board is a useful tool for channeling host nation requests to military providers. In Tohoku, the Review Board was created by USFJ’s planning office in cooperation with USAID. It routinely tracked, validated, and routed requests from the Government of Japan. According to USFJ’s Operation *Tomodachi* after-action report:

This process provided a disciplined approach to validate requirements and reduce redundant purchase of [humanitarian] type items by the components... The routing and vetting process became better understood over time. This board provided a responsive way to leverage competitive use of operational assets/requirements.²⁴

Because the JSDF role in response is confined to medical operations, water supply, and transport, field commanders have fewer opportunities for creating civil-military partnerships. In all three, however, better communication with host nation, NGO, and private sector sources could augment the military’s participation and impact in these roles. As Haiti revealed, it is especially important to consider and explore transitional strategies. For example, as the JSDF relief deployment departed, it was replaced by the SDF Central Readiness Force in

²² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, II-21.

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Support to Foreign Disaster Relief: Handbook for JTF Commanders and Below* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2011), C-1.

²⁴ U.S. Forces Japan, “Operation Tomodachi After Action Report,” (Unpublished document, 2011).

a peacekeeping function, and civil-military cooperation with several NGOs did occur.

In PWA Initiative workshop and forum discussions, officers of both U.S. and Japan militaries explained that they have been exploring stronger military-private sector relations. However, both emphasized that they are still feeling their way forward in this area. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized the necessity of these partnerships by noting that:

Many large private sector companies maintain disaster/crisis response teams that can respond and add value to USG operations by providing infrastructure and other supporting services. DOD mechanisms that plan for, train and implement emergency responses to disasters should include the private sector.²⁵

Military-private sector partnerships within the context of HA/DR could be strengthened for both nations. Although some businesses may also harbor a reluctance to engage, i.e., be reluctant to engage too closely with the military, there is room for enhanced dialogue and information exchange regarding policies, procedures, and capabilities for cooperative agreements.

The overarching conclusion from the Peace Winds America Initiative was that civil-military cooperation mechanisms are in place, but could be strengthened through improved bilateral communication, “whole of society” training, and robust information sharing in the preparedness phase. For instance, according to U.S. General Crowe, DOD can share classified satellite imagery with partner nations in the context of an HA/DR operation.²⁶ This and other tools for joint disaster response are still not well known among potential host nations and their partners.

USAID/OFDA and JICA

USAID/OFDA and JICA have highly experienced, technically capable field teams in HA/DR. In major disasters, the DARTs and JDRTs are the focal points for coordinating efforts for their respective countries. The PWA Civil-Military Initiative goal was to examine these assistance agencies’ current operations and to generate ideas for improvements.

OFDA DARTs are highly capable, self-sufficient, rapidly deployable, and maintain a high level of cooperation with U.S. military responders. They continue, however, to struggle with integrating new partners. Much like the UN OSOCCs, the DARTs are open coordination platforms, although better training is required for new actors to know how to access them. Once on the ground, NGOs may decide whether and to what extent to reach out to a DART.

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, II-17.

²⁶ Brig. Gen. William Crowe (Deputy Commander, USFJ) remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedure and Partners,” Tokyo, 27 September 2011.

A prerequisite for this outreach is knowledge of DART capabilities and roles. More could be done to instruct host nation and non-U.S.-based NGOs how to interface with DARTs.

OFDA can initiate partnerships that go beyond DART. OFDA Regional Advisor Al Dwyer maintains that OFDA will consider any capable global partner. To that end, OFDA has introduced a fixed obligation grant, which can quickly award up to 500,000 USD at the scene of a disaster.²⁷ Unfortunately, small NGOs are not aware of these tools nor do they realize that they are eligible to apply for funding through them. The best way to broaden the recipient base, according to USAID representatives, is to provide better training to NGOs on how to solicit funds from OFDA. Those that receive such assistance are likely to continue communicating, building a bridge to local resources throughout the operation, sharing information and assessments. Soliciting assistance agency funds and subcontracting for large NGOs are crucial capacity-building steps for small HA/DR NGOs, particularly those from Japan.

JICA differs significantly from OFDA in its ability to fund NGOs directly. While JICA is the implementing agency for the Disaster Relief Teams, direct NGO disbursements come from MOFA through Japan Platform. In contrast, USAID/OFDA both manages the DARTs and funds NGO partners. Japan's ability to run a broad, well coordinated HA/DR mission would be significantly enhanced if NGO funding authority were given to JICA. That agency could then expand its training and outreach efforts, and more quickly augment the capabilities of its DRTs. Senior JICA officials noted that NGOs currently must submit detailed and cumbersome requests to MOFA, slowing the entire HA/DR response. Although MOFA could still wield overall authority over NGO funding for development and disaster risk reduction activities, authorizing JICA to make HA/DR field grants would result in a net benefit for Japanese foreign policy. USAID/OFDA would be an obvious resource and partner for the know-how to make and manage "fast money" field grants of this kind.

JICA also has potential to assist civil-military relationships. It would not necessarily have to actively coordinate these relationships, but it could serve as a platform for bringing together JSDF, NGO, private sector, and host nation resources. A senior JICA official pointed out to PWA that an entity that is neither military nor NGO would be ideal for this role.²⁸ USAID and United Kingdom Department for International Development civil-military cooperation offices would be excellent models for JICA. MOFA should grant JICA the authority to establish and staff such a civil-military coordination office.

²⁷ Al Dwyer, remarks at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition," Tokyo, 6 June 2012. OFDA lays out certain benchmarks and milestones to grantees, and additional monies are provided as these are met. While MOFA, JICA, and Japan Platform fund Japanese NGOs, these recipients work with OFDA infrequently.

²⁸ Senior JICA official, personal communication, 14 November 2012.

NGOs and Japan Platform

Preceding sections illustrate the range of multilateral, national, and bilateral coordination options available in the response phase of a disaster. Some NGOs may disdain *all* of these options, preferring to work independently. Others may work exclusively with pre-set partners or local affiliates. All are acceptable options—with two important caveats. First, the emphasis on using need-based assessments in deployment decisions is as important for NGOs as it is for government response teams. NGOs may be particularly prone to limiting their services to the areas in which they have the most expertise, regardless whether that capability is urgently needed. Second, without at least a nominal connection to the wider response effort, NGOs may miss important signals that they are overburdening the host nation, providing unneeded aid, or operating in harm's way. NGOs must at least be cognizant of the needs on the ground, the priorities of the host nation, and the simultaneous activities of other responders.

In the response phase, the availability of a compromise option between total integration and total isolation is an added bonus for NGOs. For Japan NGOs, the existence of Japan Platform (JPF) helps to achieve this balance. Japan Platform does not provide coordination to the same extent as UNOCHA. However, JPF provides a channel for MOFA funding to NGOs, offers assessments, manages information, and creates important connections among Japan NGOs on the ground.

Several suggestions for strengthening Japan Platform arose as a result of the PWA Initiative workshops and interviews—suggestions for both the preparedness and response phases of action. According to Executive Director Noriyuki Shiina, Japan Platform does not currently perform its own assessments, relying on the UN and other sources.²⁹ It needs to hasten assessment staff deployment. (JPF staff generally arrives at an affected area three days following the onset of disaster.) Strengthening Japan Platform's rapid assessment capabilities would in turn empower its member NGOs to deploy more quickly. For Japan NGOs not yet fully capable of interacting with international responders, Japan Platform should be the go-between, profiling the capabilities and priorities of its members to others in the disaster area. With JPF proactively communicating NGO capabilities to the host nation, Japan NGOs can better demonstrate their added value.

Japan Platform leadership is increasingly aware of the many possibilities for coordinating resources prior to a disaster. In particular, JPF is working to strengthen its private sector-NGO linkages. Its current partnership with the *Keidanren* is rather nominal. More useful to its members is training directed at interoperability and partnership with specific businesses. A proposed JPF-Softbank agreement discussed in mid-2012 to provide telecommunications solutions is an ideal example of how the private sector could be better integrated

²⁹ Noriyuki Shiina, personal communication, 13 November 2012.

into NGO networks. Japan Platform can act as a facilitator for these kinds of partnerships, helping its members explain their needs and capabilities to private corporations. JPF should work more closely with its NGO members, facilitating opportunities to learn skills such as proposal writing, how to utilize a UN OSOCC, and how to make connections with the JSDF.

The Private Sector

Although the private sector seldom participates independently in relief operations, the potential to integrate private businesses into disaster response efforts is considerable. The majority of private sector representatives engaged in the PWA Initiative expressed interest in greater participation in response. Some added the caveat that their companies have a considerably lower risk tolerance than civilian or NGO responders and that their “go/no-go” decision-making processes were highly subjective. Successful private sector contributions to disaster, such as WFP’s partnerships for logistics with DHL, make use of unique capabilities in a clearly defined manner. The case of the Tohoku disaster showed that while businesses can be flexible and craft *ad hoc* relief agreements with willing partners, they are far more at ease with agreements worked out in advance of a disaster.

A unique model that occasioned discussion during the course of the PWA Initiative was that of South Korea’s public-private disaster response mechanism. In large-scale disasters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) convenes a Public-Private Joint Committee chaired by the Prime Minister.³⁰ This Joint Committee receives input on the type, scale, and coordination of the response from relevant ministries (including National Defense, Strategy and Finance, and Public Administration and Security), the National Emergency Management Agency, and from civil society and private sector stakeholders. The Ministry of Knowledge Economy will coordinate with Korean corporations in the disaster area to ascertain business continuity and to encourage them to participate in larger relief efforts.³¹ The framework provided by this Joint Committee is a positive model and can help “to encourage the private sector to participate in the relief effort.”³²

The South Korea model is important for a number of reasons. Proactive linkages between Korean businesses and government HA/DR agencies encourage greater readiness and knowledge of emergency contacts within agencies. The

³⁰ The legal framework for Korea’s overseas HA/DR is provided by the Overseas Emergency Relief Act, No. 8317. In particular, it notes, “Since public-private partnership is one of the guiding principles in Korea’s overseas emergency relief, the Act ensures the participation of the civil sector in both decision making processes and implementation.”

³¹ So Rie Lee, “Korea’s Overseas Emergency Relief,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

³² *Ibid.*

emphasis on public-private readiness provides MOFAT and its implementing agency, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), more “eyes on the ground” that can help to provide and validate initial reports and assessments. By including the business community in a substantive way in all phases of HA/DR, the Korean system allows businesses to be an integrated actor in response. This framework could be reproduced in contexts beyond HA/DR.

Throughout the PWA Initiative, the desire for better integration with the private sector was a constant refrain. U.S. military representatives, the JSDF, international assistance agencies, U.S. and Japan NGOs, Japan Platform, UNOCHA, and WFP all independently agreed on this point. The participants cited confusion over capabilities, inadequate points of contact, few joint training opportunities, and lack of precedent as the biggest obstacles to establishing these kinds of new partnerships. In general, those barriers can be removed with better opportunities for cooperative planning. Corporations can establish set frameworks for joint response in the preparedness phase to avoid being seen as profiting from disaster. In this way the lead partner – whether NGO, military, or multilateral – can drive the effort, delegating roles to various stakeholders depending on their unique capabilities. At a PWA policy forum, an international NGO senior representative stated that, “there is a huge amount of unused capacity” when it comes to the private sector in HA/DR.³³ The key to harnessing this unused capacity is through better linkages in preparedness and need-based partnerships.

The Host Nation

Even as Japan and the U.S. HA/DR responders work towards increased capacity and better collaboration, the ultimate goal must be to boost the efficacy of the host nation response. The maxim that all international responders should internalize is provided succinctly by JICA: “International assistance should provide added value.”³⁴ Rather than looking to impose a given set of capabilities in each and every disaster, potential HA/DR responders must work cooperatively with the host nation to determine where – and if – these capabilities are needed. The host nation, in addition to its coordination of domestic relief efforts, must obtain timely and validated needs assessments and provide them to international responders. The end goal for the host nations should be to send tailored requests to specialized agencies that address specific needs, avoiding blanket appeals for assistance to the UN.

³³ Kevin Noone, remarks at Peace Winds America Policy Forum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2012.

³⁴ Kae Yanagisawa, “Case Studies- Sichuan, Padang, Christchurch—What Made Differences?” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

Many vulnerable Asia-Pacific host nations still struggle with making requests for international assistance. That struggle in turn is exacerbated by the large number of HA/DR responders pushing for entry to the disaster zone. The host nation ability to redirect or refuse assistance is critical and is an area where even developed countries such as Japan and the U.S. struggle. Host nations may attempt to delay requests for assistance as it is often politically difficult to refuse unneeded offers altogether. Delaying or denying aid has inevitable political ramifications, and in the absence of widely disseminated, accurate needs assessments, does run the risk of turning away needed resources.

Host nation representatives from cabinets, foreign affairs ministries, and disaster management agencies should participate in HA/DR domestic training to gain the knowledge needed to vet – and if necessary to deny – incoming offers of assistance. Multilaterals like UNOCHA can help provide this training, but so too can capable NGOs, JICA, and USAID.

RESPONSE RECOMMENDATIONS

Coordination Centers and Multilateral Agencies

- Coordination centers should provide a common operating picture, essential to the host nation and all responders.
- Responders must communicate and inform host nation coordination centers, UNOCHA, and the OSOCC of their actions throughout the response in order that their efforts are not duplicated and gaps do not arise.
- When responders observe needs they cannot address, informing the coordination center is essential. Other capable providers can be tasked to meet those needs, e.g., logistics, telecoms, or heavy lift.
- Acknowledging the capacity of Japan as an Asia-Pacific HA/DR leader, UNOCHA should encourage its Kobe office staff to nurture the potential of Japan NGOs, assistance agencies, and other civil-military assets.
- UNOCHA should increase and expand training on the cluster system, OSOCCs, and on-site coordination tools, particularly to under-represented providers such as small NGOs and the private sector.
- UNOCHA should work more closely with Japan Platform to improve needs assessment capabilities and to provide training for JPF member NGOs concerning the UN humanitarian system.
- UNOCHA should prioritize acquiring personnel with experience in civil-military partnerships as well as staff with military backgrounds to help design and implement civil-military partnerships at domestic and international levels.
- UNOCHA should expand training and utilization of its online coordination tools, including the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center with the goal of broadening their usage beyond national USAR teams. Integration of NGO, private sector, and military resources into the website would facilitate buy-in and aid responders in decisions and commitments.

- ASEAN should be strengthened, and then phased in to serve as an additional coordination mechanism, especially in cases where there is limited UN presence.

Japan in Response

- The role of JICA as a coordinator and facilitator of civil-military cooperation in disaster relief should be strengthened.
- Leaders from JICA and MOFA should re-evaluate roles, funding streams, coordination mechanisms, and the utilization of Japan NGOs for overseas HA/DR response.
- To enhance its ability to represent Japanese NGOs, JICA should be given a wider and more flexible mandate to directly fund NGOs operating in relief and recovery.
- The JSDF – and particularly the Central Readiness Force – should increase outreach to civilian partners whose partnership could strengthen its HA/DR mission.
- The JSDF mandate to provide services in relief should be expanded. In addition to water supply, medical care, and transport, JSDF units should be empowered to bring other unique capabilities, such as engineering support, to the disaster area.
- The JSDF, in collaboration with MOFA and JICA, should increase its joint preparedness measures with vulnerable Asia-Pacific host nations, e.g., disaster management centers.
- Japan Platform is an unparalleled, valuable resource for Japan humanitarian NGOs. JPF funding should be increased with the goal of strengthening its in-house needs assessment capabilities and training resources.

The U.S. in Response

- The U.S. military should expand its understanding of how to interface and partner with USAID/OFDA in disaster relief operations.
- USAID should increase its efforts to fund capable local and unregistered international NGOs at the disaster site. USAID should

encourage the large NGOs to explore subcontracting partnerships with local NGOs.

- The U.S. military and USAID should convene hands-on, open-access training on facets of the U.S. military civil-military mechanism, including CMOCs, the MiTaM system, and other appropriate points of contact.
- USAID, the U.S. Department of State, Japan MOFA, and JICA should convene trilateral training programs with South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to discuss public-private partnerships in HA/DR preparedness and response and to devise better models for all countries.

The Host Nation in Response

- The host nation should always establish a coordination/operations center as a standard operating procedure. The center should manage the dispatch and coordination of host nation resources, incoming international responders, and create communications channels among all parties.
- UNOCHA should expand its host nation outreach efforts in preparedness and response. Increased training is necessary regarding UNOCHA on-site coordination tools, the cluster system, and UN-host nation interaction.
- Empowering Asia-Pacific host nation resources for response is a pressing ongoing need. Through collaborative training, case study review, and guideline/policy formation, capable HA/DR organizations can help strengthen host nation capacities.
- Host nation governments should create and make available to international HA/DR responders the information concerning capable local partners, facilitators, and liaisons.
- To foster collaborative partnerships in response and recovery, host nations should increase local capacity by enacting guidelines for overseas providers. Requiring international stakeholders to partner with locals can increase capacity and build lasting preparedness.

Disaster Recovery

Many HA/DR responders have little training and limited skills providing recovery assistance. Responders who have fulfilled their HA/DR relief phase roles generally move on, passing tasks, goods, and services to the host nation and to those organizations remaining through recovery. Organizations continuing into the recovery phase need funding, plans, and partners. The key actor must be the host nation, assisted by international providers capable of partnering with it.

The host nation must provide the coordination platform for organizations moving into recovery. The pivotal role and responsibility of host nation (and its disaster stricken prefectures/states and communities) are to identify recovery needs and transmit them to the organizations continuing into recovery. Otherwise, an imbalance between the responders “push” and the host nation “pull” may arise. Through a host nation-led coordinating platform, responders can pair assets with specific needs. Coordinated recovery efforts can prevent the exit or withdrawal of useful partners and stop responders from embarking on unnecessary, “make-work” projects. The PWA Civil-Military Initiative has concluded that empowering the host nation by improving its abilities to plan and coordinate recovery activities is essential to an overall, effective recovery.

NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

The disaster recovery phase requires comprehensive and targeted **needs assessments specific to recovery activities**. Recovery needs are unique and the on-the-ground situation has generally changed sufficiently that initial humanitarian assessment information is of limited value. Once the relief tasks of search and rescue, medical care, WASH, food distribution, relocation, and shelter have been completed, HA/DR responders are faced with a different set of demands. The recovery phase is typified by multifaceted needs that relate to multiple sectors. Restoring housing and primary sources of livelihood, for instance, are recovery activities that should occur in tandem. Otherwise residents may find themselves housed without jobs or working with no options for shelter. The work of recovery requires a holistic and cross-sector approach.

Central to achieving a holistic approach to recovery is conducting new needs assessments, aimed at identifying the complex variables underlying the task of recovery. WFP advisor Samir Wanmali points out the advantages of conducting assessments specific to the recovery phase:

Assessments are key for recovery. It's easy to do quick and dirty assessments of needs in the relief phase, but in recovery, prioritizing resources is key, so assessments have to be better.¹

The case studies reviewed during the PWA Initiatives strongly support the notion that new recovery assessments are required for sustainable and holistic planning. In January 2010 the immediate needs following the earthquake in Haiti were overwhelming. Tasks for HA/DR responders on the ground were ubiquitous. In the Port-au-Prince region, the relief phase was complex and lengthy. Yet once the demand for basic relief services began to wane in March and April, HA/DR responders often found themselves at a loss. With the Haitian government largely non-functional and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) still overwhelmed by the disaster, responding organizations confronted a bewildering recovery picture. Without host nation direction or input, and without local coordinators, the ability to initiate recovery programs was severely hampered. The situation was so uncertain that many NGOs found themselves unable to spend the funds that they had raised immediately after the earthquake.

When assistance agencies and military forces leave a disaster-affected area, comprehensive coordination and strong direction often leaves with them. This creates a vacuum in which the host nation and the UN need to lead. The success of recovery hinges on whether the host nation has been able to identify and prioritize longer-term needs.

Without the identification and prioritization of recovery needs, HA/DR organizations may “waffle” or struggle, not having an inherent capacity and expertise to assess recovery needs. Moreover HA/DR responders may have very limited experience in providing assistance for specialized recovery tasks such as the reconstruction of housing, infrastructure, psycho-social counseling, livelihood creation, work grants/loans, etc. The result is often competition among the remaining providers on the ground for the easily identifiable and often low priority projects.

HOST NATION AND DOMESTIC PRIVATE SECTOR

In the absence of timely host nation needs assessments, HA/DR organizations often attempt to conduct their recovery programs based upon their own priorities and skill sets, which may not necessarily be those of the host nation. In some instances, needs identified by HA/DR organizations may compete or even conflict with those of the host nation and other implementing organizations. Without

¹ Samir Wanmali, remarks at panel discussion, Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.

knowledgeable and capable host nation partners to fill the coordination gap, HA/DR organizations may waver in their recovery efforts.

The need for a host nation-led recovery is further supported by the difficulty that international actors often have in identifying feasible projects. Few overseas responders have local partners or in-depth knowledge of local communities necessary to guide recovery investment. As the host nation recovers its governance capabilities it should increasingly provide leadership in prioritizing recovery projects. Coordination with local authorities and communities is needed to select focus areas, rank their importance, and tailor them to the capabilities of different responding entities, maximizing the efficacy of recovery efforts. A proposal for rebuilding a major port, for instance, should not be directed to a small/medium NGO that does not have the necessary resources or skills.

Experiences in Tohoku are illustrative of the difficulties NGOs may face finding appropriate projects in recovery. When Peace Winds Japan and PWA arrived in the coastal town of Kesennuma in Miyagi Prefecture immediately after the 2011 tsunami, they met with the city mayor to learn his priority needs. Relief cooperation between PWA and the local officials of Kesennuma was open-ended: others could join in or select other geographic areas. This approach was well suited to PWA's capabilities and budget.

When PWA began initiating recovery projects, it again met with the Kesennuma mayor and staff as well as with city Chamber of Commerce and Industry officers to discuss recovery needs and priorities. PWA's focus at the time was on livelihoods. The city officials provided a list of 18 recovery projects with budgets ranging from two to 40 million USD. Those included on the list were nearly all major construction projects and well outside PWA's budget and expertise. The city officials were also seeking funding from the prefecture and central government at the time and had no project proposals appropriate for a small NGO concentrated on livelihoods.

"Vision" has prominence in a host nation's management of the recovery. No international actor can provide a compelling vision of the full scope of recovery, from immediate needs through long-term revitalization. Even entities with extended in-country operations such as the UN cannot provide this vision. It must come from the host nation. The **host nation vision of recovery** is essential for international recovery providers, who otherwise will be operating with little overarching guidance. The host nation must make basic decisions as to which institutions, industries, and residential areas should be prioritized for reconstruction.

The ability of a host nation to develop a recovery vision generally reflects its strength and internal capabilities. The Wenchuan earthquake is illustrative of this point. At the beginning of the recovery phase in Sichuan Province, the Chinese central government embarked on an ambitious reconstruction plan that not only envisioned the rebuilding of damaged areas, but substantially re-imagined the

urban area of Chengdu. With a population relocation target of 900,000 people, the GOC laid out a two-year reconstruction plan.² This plan laid out options for rebuilding destroyed homes (through private or government builders), but also went further, soliciting proposals to radically change the layout of Chengdu city. The plans of the Chinese government combined recovery with new urban design and also considered disaster risk reduction best practices in the enterprise. Although this recovery plan did not involve international actors, lessons from Chengdu are applicable to other disasters nonetheless. Host nation plans must incorporate short and long-term priorities and take a broad and forward-thinking view of recover. Such an approach raises the potential for organizations to “plug in” to a wider, government-directed effort.

In recovery central government, prefectures, cities, and communities should each have complementary recovery visions and priorities that are regularly communicated with one another. When Kesenuma city could not provide appropriate projects, PWA staff met with local communities and businesses that stated that their main priority was the revitalization of Tohoku’s main industry—fishing. They sought help rebuilding and re-staffing fishing cooperatives, providing equipment and work sheds to fishing families. Regaining their livelihoods was critical to the fishing communities. Business and fishing cooperative leaders sought to partner with PWA while they waited to receive government assistance.

Social capital, community, and culture are immensely important during the recovery phase. Even if the role of social capital is less pronounced in relief, stakeholders in recovery cannot afford to ignore underlying societal factors. Growing literature in the disaster management and recovery field posits a causal relationship between the strength of social networks and the efficacy of recovery. The underlying thesis is advanced by scholars such as Purdue University’s Daniel Aldrich:

High levels of social capital – more than such commonly referenced factors as socioeconomic conditions, population density, amount of damage or aid – serve as the core engine of recovery. Survivors with strong social networks [i.e., social capital], experience faster recoveries and have access to needed information, tools, and assistance. Communities and neighborhoods with little social capital may find themselves unable to keep up with their counterparts with these deep networks.³

During the recovery phase of several recent disasters in the Asia-Pacific, PWA staff has observed this principle in practice. Funding for recovery may come from

² Dr. Kabilijiang Wumaier, “Analysis on the Status of Revitalization of Rural Areas Before and After the Wenchuan Earthquake in China,” (presentation at ADRC Conference: Regeneration of Local Economy From the Great East Japan Earthquake: Applying Lessons on Recovery from Mega Disasters, Sendai, Japan, 8 November 2012).

³ Daniel P. Aldrich, *Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 15. Emphasis in original.



Takahashi Kuranosuke of Minamisanriku, Miyagi Prefecture, stands before the PWA-built fishing shed. PWA aids fishing families to regain their livelihoods by providing work sheds and equipment lost during the tsunami.

overseas and the implementers may be international organizations, but the drive for recovery has to come from local populations. For this reason, linking local populations with central government entities making recovery decisions is key. Speaking at an Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) conference on disaster recovery, PWA CEO Aanenson highlighted the importance of consultation with local populations during the recovery phase:

The civil society – ordinary citizens, neighborhoods, private associations, churches, temples, charities, and civic organizations – is critical to decision making and action taking in response and recovery. Those neighborhoods with strong social capital respond and recover fastest.⁴

Communal support for projects is crucial given the importance of social capital in recovery. Civic organizations such as religious and community groups or professional cooperatives serve a number of important roles. In the early stages of recovery, they highlight what kinds of projects are needed most, providing crucial input about priorities and cost effectiveness. Once programs are underway,

⁴ Dr. Charles Aanenson, “Recovery: Lessons Learned from U.S. Mega Disasters,” (presentation at ADRC Conference: Regeneration of Local Economy From the Great East Japan Earthquake: Applying Lessons on Recovery from Mega Disasters,” Sendai, Japan, 8 November 2012).

civic organizations can marshal local support and manpower, update needs assessment data, and offer key feedback.

Host nation governance structures and approaches to recovery can determine the extent to which social capital plays a role. In the Wenchuan case, the highly structured, top-down decisions to rebuild the Chengdu area permitted few opportunities for local civil society to contribute. Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami provided more opportunities to harness social capital in recovery. With central government oversight and with a focus on community-driven recovery, social capital was central to rebuilding Aceh.

The private sector plays an important part in recovery. Local businesses can strengthen the community's social capital. A given project may be initiated by a city Chamber of Commerce and Industry, with its principal partners being a NGO, professional cooperative, or school group. The project may be led by a coalition of NGO volunteers and city businesses. If a local business can provide needed services faster or more effectively than an NGO, it should be supported. Major aid organizations remain reluctant to make private businesses the recipient of recovery assistance. Funding should be based upon prioritized needs and how quickly and effectively those needs can be met.

In recovery as well as preparedness, businesses can also take the lead in teaching and implementing business continuity plans (BCPs). The 2011 Tohoku disaster and Thai floods are two disasters that underscore how critical such business measures are. As businesses revitalization can drive economic recovery, the need to support the private sector post-disaster is paramount. The existence of a BCP can mean the difference between a disaster as a disruption and a disaster as a complete demise of a business. The World Bank documented this fact post-Tohoku:

The [Great East Japan Earthquake] caused 656 private companies to go bankrupt within a year...A BCP is essential regardless of where a business is based. According to a recent survey, between 80 and 90 percent of medium-sized and large companies indicated that their BCPs had been effective during the response and recovery phase.⁵

The Cabinet Office of Japan recorded that in 2009, only 12.8 percent of medium and 27.8 percent of large businesses had fully formulated BCPs.⁶ This number has increased significantly since the Tohoku disaster, and Japan is now recognized as a leader in BCP, along with the U.S. The formulation of BCP planning can be a powerful component of recovery, one that fully involves the host nation's private sector.

⁵ The World Bank, *The Great East Japan Earthquake: Learning from Megadisasters – Knowledge Notes* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), 13.

⁶ Shoichi Hasegawa (Deputy Director-General for Disaster Management, Cabinet Office of Japan), "Experiences and Lessons Learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 28 September 2011).

LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS

The NGO sector is central to recovery. The NGOs can identify and serve community needs often overlooked by national authorities or work in communities with little social capital. NGOs are often more agile than governments and their knowledge of local communities and their flexibility regarding time frames can facilitate recovery work. In most instances, NGOs lack the resources to engage in major capital projects such as infrastructure construction. Instead their role tends to concentrate on contributing to a larger, host nation goal with targeted and punctual project management at community levels. The NGO mission is summarized by a Peace Winds Japan staff member:

From the Peace Winds Japan perspective, in the recovery phase the most important priority is encouraging self-help and ownership on the part of the survivors, and partnering with locals. Peace Winds Japan sees itself as filling a gap between the local communities and the central government.⁷

Filling a gap between local actors and host nation governments is an important one. In relief, mismatches occur routinely between disaster-affected populations and service providers on the ground. In recovery this can also be the case. **Effective local NGOs can help to bridge the divide between different levels of government and civil society groups**, explaining local needs to officials who are often removed from the affected area. NGOs can also advocate for resources from national, regional, or city authorities. Local NGOs can also accept overseas support and direct international personnel to appropriate projects.

Flexibility characterizes the approach of NGOs in recovery. NGOs with too narrow a skill set will find themselves proposing projects to communities that are perhaps not needed. Just as NGOs re-evaluate needs through new assessments, they should also reconsider whom they partner with as well. Said Yumi Terahata, Japan country director for International Medical Corps, “I would point out as well that the partner in the relief phase does not have to be the same people we partner with in recovery.”⁸ NGOs should consider including host nation stakeholders, not just as aid recipients but as implementing partners as well.

In relief, establishing on-the-ground partnerships is fairly straightforward. In recovery, this is not generally the case. Difficulties integrating with local communities and finding local partners are particular challenges in the context of disasters that occur in peripheral or outlying areas. In these situations, the learning curve is steep, as personnel are required to learn the local dialect, cultural norms, and socioeconomic makeup of unique communities. Conducting recovery

⁷ Tetsuto Binnaka, “From Emergency to Recovery,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012).

⁸ Yumi Terahata, remarks at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.

work in partnership with local actors is necessary if international NGO are to work effectively. A local partner will boost buy-in for recovery projects and can allay suspicions and mistrust vis-à-vis international actors.

It is incumbent upon international NGOs to enhance the capacity of their local partners. Many NGOs participating in the PWA Civil-Military Initiative listed capacity-building as one of the most important contribution that overseas NGOs can make towards recovery. Skills such as effective project reporting, monitoring and evaluation, grant proposal writing, international fundraising, and web development are in high demand among local NGOs. International NGOs should allocate resources for primary recovery projects *and* for creating partner capacity development opportunities.

The interplay between local and international NGOs raises the wider issue of incentives, feedback, and continuity of presence in disasters. In relief, incentives are immediately apparent. Relief is where the initial rush of funding is, together with round-the-clock media coverage. The feedback is also immediate. Passing out humanitarian daily rations or pulling a child out of collapsed structure provides an instant sense of purpose. The many feedback streams in relief allow HA/DR responders to change strategies rapidly, shifting personnel and assets to areas with greatest need.

In recovery, the lack of immediate feedback coupled with less readily identifiable sources of funding and expertise can be strong disincentives to transition to the recovery phase. For NGOs, the stronger the linkages with local providers, the better the quality of the feedback received. NGOs that forge relationships with local government, businesses, and domestic NGOs generally collect the best feedback data that they can then share with potential donors. Local, provincial, and national organizations will remain vested in recovery even as overseas providers begin to depart. The PWA Civil-Military Initiative revealed that many international providers feel more secure working on their own or exclusively with international partners. This is certainly not best practice in recovery.

THE UN

The UN role in recovery is strongly linked to host nation development status. In the case of the earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand, neither nation requested recovery support from the UN. In developing nations there are fewer lines between relief and recovery phases. In Haiti for instance, the response to the earthquake was dramatic, and relief and recovery efforts were often subsumed within ongoing UN development programs.

Several UN agencies can support recovery if requested. WFP, UNICEF, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) often maintain a long-term country presence. UNDP leads the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER),

a consortium of 24 UN and NGO stakeholders that aims to coordinate partner agencies during this important phase. The CWGER focuses heavily on the role of coordination in recovery.

The UN has made important strides in positioning itself in a supporting role vis-à-vis the host nation for recovery. According to the UN's working group on disaster transition, "First and foremost, early recovery should be owned and led by national actors. As far as possible, depending on the context, *government structures/line ministries* should lead coordination for early recovery."⁹

The UN ability to remain in-country during the whole of the disaster cycle is both an asset and a limitation. UN representatives speaking at PWA workshops and forums highlighted the continuing work of UN response agencies and in-country missions to fundraise and build their capacities for recovery. It should be also noted that UN deployments can be prone to "mission creep." In one case, a planned three-month WFP deployment to storm-ravaged Mindanao turned into twelve months because WFP found that in affected urban areas, its wage and construction programs were essentially the only drivers of the local economy. Similarly the Office of the UN Coordinator for Aceh and Nias saw its mission extended for years and its budget balloon in part due to encouragement from the Government of Indonesia which benefited from the UN recovery and development programs. Host nations must balance the benefits of an extended UN presence with the real danger of becoming overly dependent on overseas development dollars.

The UN disaster relief cluster system often remains in effect during the early recovery phase, but individual UN agencies will tend to return to core programs. WFP, for instance, which leads the UN relief logistics cluster, will generally return to nutrition and food security during recovery. Despite strides made by the CWGER to improve coordination, there is really no analogous system to the broad-based UN coordination platform available during response. The CWGER frankly notes this issue:

The challenges of implementing early recovery are numerous. Most stakeholders pay little attention to early recovery in the first stages of an emergency. No procedures exist for immediate planning of early recovery, and agencies may tend to develop *ad-hoc*, quick impact, highly visible activities. There is little time for updating or conducting comprehensive needs assessments at national and local level, nor for engaging with all relevant stakeholders. Various approaches are used to ensure that data collected on damage and losses informs early recovery planning and the economic impact assessments necessary to secure reconstruction financing, but there is no unifying framework.¹⁰

⁹ UN Development Programme, *Guidance Note on Early Recovery (in cooperation with the UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition)* (Geneva: UNDP, 2008), 16. Emphasis in original.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

The difficulty in establishing a “unifying framework” for recovery underscores the importance of having the host nation assume the leadership and coordination role. The inherent limitations of UN actors – or any other would-be coordinator of recovery – are such that work with host nations reaps the greatest rewards in the long run.

THE ASSISTANCE AGENCIES

USAID/OFDA and JICA are both active during recovery. They partner with local or international implementing agencies, but provide less coordination than the UN. Both assistance agencies take a long view of recovery, linking it to their existing development programs and disaster risk reduction (DRR) initiatives. In addition to providing ongoing support for basic sectors such as housing and nutrition, USAID/OFDA has a sector focused on economic recovery and market systems (ERMS). ERMS projects are market-based and focus on increasing purchasing power, business viability, and financial services in disaster-affected areas. Typical OFDA projects in recovery include cash-for-work, vouchers, and grants to small businesses, and the establishment and support of community savings groups. In recovery OFDA typically partners with known local institutions or large established partners such as Mercy Corps.

USAID stresses that the optimal method of guiding recovery is empowering local partners through funding, capacity-building, and/or staff support. USAID/OFDA Principal Regional Advisor Al Dwyer emphasized this point during a PWA workshop. He noted the recurring lesson for recovery providers should be more widely disseminated:

Cash is king in early response and recovery. This has been said by others, but I want to reiterate it. We should allow market forces to guide the recovery and avoid too many top-down decisions on how it will progress. Cash and vouchers are not prescriptive, so they give locals power in determining how the recovery will be shaped.¹¹

Lacking in-depth knowledge of the overlapping social, economic, and political variables of the affected area, international responders should offer the host nation the tools to shape its own path of recovery.

JICA and MOFA both invest significantly in international development. As a result, both are strong in recovery and disaster risk reduction. The JICA and MOFA development work pre-dates their role in providing humanitarian assistance. JICA emphasizes a “community-based recovery and reconstruction” approach, one that draws heavily from the lessons learned during the response

¹¹ Al Dwyer, remarks at panel discussion, Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo, 6 June 2012.

to and recovery of Japan's own disasters in 1995 and 2011.¹² JICA prioritizes partnerships with community groups, whereas in the early 1990s, virtually all of its projects were with government partners. The share of community groups as a percentage of total recovery and DRR partners has risen steadily over the years.

Although competent as recovery providers, both USAID/OFDA and JICA would benefit from increased cooperation and training in this important area. Both agencies have much to share with each other and with others in the areas of recovery and DRR. Cooperative recovery training could include outreach to under-utilized yet capable partners (domestic and international), techniques for transitioning from relief to recovery, partnering with host nations, and coordination. JICA and OFDA both have extensive connections with local authorities and NGOs. Both agencies could increase their capacities as coordinators, connecting overseas resources (NGOs or private sector) and willing implementers on the ground.

For efficacy in the recovery phase, assistance agencies should work more proactively with the U.S. and Japan embassies and national-level resources prior to disasters. Particularly in nations such as the Philippines that suffer recurrent events such as typhoons, the embassies should strive to become clearinghouses of recovery information. This would empower embassies to better direct interested parties to worthwhile recovery projects. For organizations without extensive in-country experience or a significant presence during the relief phase, this service would expand host nation options for expediting recovery.

THE MILITARIES

Military representatives at PWA Civil-Military Initiative workshops stressed repeatedly that they are not major actors in recovery. Military timetables are too short and the political burden too high to stay on during the recovery phase. The expeditionary nature of most U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific means they are poorly suited to the tasks of recovery. The unique capabilities of the U.S. military lie in emergent tasks such as reconnaissance, heavy lift, airfield operations, and emergency medical care. Both the U.S. and Japan must contend with the fact that military deployments are expensive—much more in nearly every case than an equivalent civilian dispatch.


The most useful way to approach military involvement in recovery is to focus on the transition phase. Military forces can provide critical assistance as the host nation transitions out of relief.

To improve transition, militaries should factor recovery operations into their deployment plan. In designing their transition strategy, i.e., an exit plan,

¹² Kae Yanagisawa, "Disaster Risk Reduction and JICA" (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

military planners can draw on baseline assessments and anticipated needs.¹³ Since military forces withdraw quickly, they should use host nation military partners to ensure officials are prepared for their exit. To the extent possible, the military can use medical operations as capacity-building exercises with host nation providers and armed forces.

While no military wants to leave property behind, it does happen. The DOD *Support to Foreign Disaster Relief* handbook reads that the Humanitarian Assistance Act permits non-lethal excess property to be transferred to NGO partners. The handbook further establishes that, “Materials, supplies and equipment determined to be excess to the DOD will be available for transfer to the Department of State without reimbursement.”¹⁴ In anticipation of any excess property, it is incumbent upon military liaison officers to confer with USAID and NGO officers and explore how best to transfer needed property to groups staying through the recovery stage. This would be a particularly useful function for a CMOC or similar center, in collaboration with host nation officials.



Hachinohe city officials discuss harbor debris removal and restoration with U.S. 7th Fleet Salvage Officer on 18 March 2011. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Devon Dow/Released.)

¹³ Specific needs in recovery, such as working airfields, seaports, and radio towers can be addressed during relief by military forces.

¹⁴ U.S. DOD, *Support for Foreign Disaster Relief*, 7-19.

In cases with a military presence in a host nation or a peacekeeping operation (PKO), military forces may find themselves functioning in a recovery role. In the preparedness workshop simulation conducted by PWA, U.S. Army Japan representatives raised the idea of having U.S. forces in the Philippines play a more central recovery role in terms of medical support, engineering, and security for humanitarian workers. PKO also affords provider nations the opportunity to provide significant recovery services, as occurred with the JSDF in Haiti. The duration of PKO missions can allow military forces to commit to recovery projects not otherwise feasible.

The JSDF may be well positioned to support recovery efforts. The JSDF role in HA/DR and the timing of its deployment are not well suited for immediate relief activities. The timelines of MOD HA/DR deployments in Haiti and Pakistan (see Chapter III) clearly demonstrate that other entities are better positioned to operate in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Yet this limitation on the part of the MOD can be viewed as a response asset or capability if one takes a longer term view. Numerous Japan government officials have pointed out that JSDF skill sets – and those of the Central Readiness Force (CRF) in particular – are well suited to recovery, disaster risk reduction, and peacekeeping operations. These skills include considerable engineering expertise (including vital capabilities such as mobile bridging and debris removal), which are a necessity in recovery. The JSDF has already demonstrated its aptitude for transitioning from relief to recovery operations. International Operations Division Deputy Director Yutaka Sekito informed PWA workshop participants regarding the deployment to Haiti:

On the ground, the disaster relief and PKO teams operated separately but shared information, logistics, and same stakeholders in both cases. For both teams the priority was on understanding and meeting the needs at the scene.¹⁵

Japan should assertively expand its military role in the transition from relief to recovery and in peacekeeping operations. Under the auspices of a UN mission, JSDF forces can add value and continue to emerge as a leader in this sector. The Central Readiness Force should spearhead these efforts as it has already amassed significant expertise and experience. Since JSDF overseas missions typically comprise the CRF and one additional unit, its experts can help inculcate HA/DR best practices more widely within the Japan military.

The JSDF's limitations for relief, transition, and recovery require no significant statutory or policy changes. Nor do Article IX considerations detract from this scheme. To continue expanding Japan's HA/DR capacity, increased training, refined doctrine, and further collaboration are needed. MOD officials

¹⁵ Yutaka Sekito, "Transition from Relief to Recovery Case in Haiti by JSDF," (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition," Tokyo, 6 June 2012).

have raised doubts about JSDF's authority to use force to safeguard engineering detachments. Within the context of a UN mandate and bilateral host nation agreement, this task could be shared by JSDF, the host nation, and partner forces such as the U.S. Force protection does not provide a barrier to expansion of this JSDF role.

INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE SECTOR

While the private sector in a host nation is a major player in recovery, international businesses have a role to play as well. As in response, the private sector often enters recovery relying on the government or NGO partners to facilitate entry. The private sector, including international businesses, can be readily be involved in situations where businesses have operations near the disaster site. In recovery, a national system that compiles and tracks private sector capabilities in this field could help to match interested companies with recovery implementers.

Even in cases where a multinational business does not have a branch or factory in the disaster area, there are still a number of possibilities for involvement. Following the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the technology company Cisco Systems began a multi-year, multi-partner rebuilding effort in Sichuan Province. Over the course of four years the company provided 45 million USD to support the recovery. The Cisco initiative focused primarily on sustainable development in education and healthcare and enlisted the support of the Chinese government, business partners, and local NGOs.¹⁶ The advantage of involving the private sector in recovery is its broad pool of resources and its long-term interests. Companies may embark on recovery programs with a view toward future markets, but there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this. If a company meets the needs of affected people without draining resources from the local/national government, there is no harm in having a long-term interest in the economic revitalization of the area.

RECOVERY IN TOHOKU

One year after the tsunami, there were still 340,000 people officially listed by the GOJ as evacuees. According to Director General for Reconstruction Policy, Masakatsu Okamoto, these individuals were living in government-provided temporary housing units, government-rented apartments and homes,

¹⁶ Ben Hemingway, "Community-Centered DRR Strategy for the Pacific Rim" (presentation at Peace Winds America, "Disaster Preparedness Workshop: Policies, Procedures and Partners," Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

and with friends and family.¹⁷ Although the vast amounts of debris created by the disaster had been cleared after one year (though not yet fully eliminated), a chronic shortage of permanent housing persisted. Where entire villages had been destroyed, the inability of national, prefectural, and local authorities to implement a rebuilding strategy was a problem. The lack of “vision” for many towns left many displaced persons in total limbo. The toll for the hardest-hit towns was often exacerbated by bureaucratic gridlock and a lack of local officials as so many were killed in the tsunami. In Rikuzentakata (Iwate Prefecture), fully a quarter of city officials died in the disaster.

While challenged by the reconstruction of residential housing, the government was much more successful in rebuilding basic infrastructure. Director General Okamoto noted that one year after the disaster, basic infrastructure (roads, power/electricity, water/sewage, and telecoms) was nearly 100 percent restored (with the exception of the exclusion area of Fukushima prefecture). Mining and manufacturing infrastructure reconstruction stood at 90 percent, agriculture at 36 percent, and fishing at 70 percent. The progress was attributed to the strong role of the Japan central government, in this case utilizing existing resources as well as the new Reconstruction Headquarters and Reconstruction Agency. Together with capable leadership and a broad “vision” for this segment of recovery, the restoration of basic infrastructure is among the most pressing needs in recovery and serves as a foundation for other recovery activities. This recovery lesson extends beyond Japan. In developing nations, government leaders should begin focusing on infrastructure almost from the beginning. This can allow host nations to use short-term resources, e.g., national and overseas militaries, to position themselves for quick infrastructure recovery. Using overseas HA/DR assets for tasks such as heavy debris removal, seaport clearance, and engineering thus serves a dual purpose, benefitting both relief and recovery efforts.

Some recovery issues that surfaced in Tohoku may be problematic for other nations. In interviews with local Tohoku governments, community leaders and NGOs, PWA has identified several trends. In both the law and culture of Japan, equity holds an important place. Communities and local leaders are highly attuned to discrepancies in recovery, a phenomenon that stems from the deep-seated emphasis on fairness in Japanese society. Admirable in normal life, this concept can actually work against progress in recovery. For small to mid-sized NGOs, volunteer groups, or businesses, the “equity” concept is a difficult challenge. Given limited funding, an organization may opt out of implementing a project if every individual in a community must be a recipient.

¹⁷ Masakatsu Okamoto, “Government Responses Against the East Japan Great Earthquake – Taking Advantage of Lessons Learnt in the 1995 Great Hanshin/Awaji Earthquake” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Deployment, Execution, Transition,” Tokyo,” 6 June 2012). As of December 2012, Japan’s Reconstruction Ministry counted 321,000 people as evacuees.

Privacy has posed additional hurdles. In its own recovery work, PWA encountered instances where owners of damaged homes were not offered reconstruction assistance because strict privacy laws did not allow the NGOs to contact them. At the same time, residents in temporary housing often have no method of contacting former friends and neighbors because relocation records are kept confidential. Given the necessity of a community-centered recovery effort, communities become sundered due to privacy laws. Japan – and other nations – must proactively work to interpret existing laws in the context of the new realities during disaster situations. Without compromising core societal values, nations must develop recovery mechanisms that do not stifle best recovery practices.

Recovery in Tohoku has also suffered from competing visions and priorities. Several local sources recounted to PWA in 2012 that conflicting approaches to recovery between Miyagi Prefecture authorities in Sendai and the Sendai City leadership hindered rebuilding efforts. In contrast, the physical distance of Iwate Prefecture's seat in Morioka provided its damaged towns greater leeway to implement their own vision of recovery. These conflicts, combined with the third vision of recovery advanced by the central government, remain difficult to overcome and threaten to slow the process altogether.

Many of the problems that have been encountered in Tohoku were also issues in the aftermath of the Kobe and Niigata earthquakes. Unfortunately, lessons learned in recovery are often not documented or consulted. The failure to build upon the lessons of recent disasters is widespread among nations. Japan is not the only nation to suffer from it. Within the humanitarian community, training tends to address the two ends of the disaster cycle: immediate relief and long-term development. A greater joint focus on early recovery would help to institutionalize many of the best practices that have been learned.

RECOVERY AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION

Disaster recovery cannot be discussed without reference to the concept of disaster risk reduction. Disaster risk reduction spans the fields of recovery, sustainable development, risk management and disaster preparedness. The field of DRR has attained considerable prominence in the last twenty years, especially in Asia where recurrent disasters have raised the issue of regional vulnerability. DRR seeks to build proactively on recovery from past disasters as well as lessons learned in development and multi-hazard risk mitigation. The UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) leads this effort, with current guidelines embodied in the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015*.

The *Hyogo Framework*, like the *Oslo Guidelines*, is non-binding but represents a general consensus of collective DRR approaches.¹⁸

Ideally there is a disaster continuum from relief to early recovery to long-term revitalization efforts, including future preparedness and DRR. UNISDR has highlighted the importance of the recovery phase, encouraging host nations and international stakeholders to “use opportunities during the recovery phase to develop capacities that reduce disaster risk in the long term, including through the sharing of expertise, knowledge and lessons learned.”¹⁹ In reality it can be difficult for struggling host nations to divert any resources away from the immediate needs of infrastructure, housing, and economic recovery.

DRR is an area where international HA/DR providers can contribute significantly. While host nations focus on the core tasks of recovery, NGOs, assistance agencies, and the private sector can strategize how ongoing recovery efforts can be augmented with preparedness and DRR components.

From the Initiative and PWA firsthand experience, it is evident that there is a tension between immediate recovery and the concept of “build back better.” The latter concept is a nebulous one but implies a rebuilding plan that considers future hazards as well as environmental factors and best practices in urban planning. “Build back better” is a forward-looking concept, drawing in concepts like “green design” or “walkability” in tandem with measures aimed at mitigating future disasters. The issue that often arises with the “build back better” concept is its slow pace. For recovery providers on the ground, it can be difficult to convince local residents to embark on an expensive, unproven, and lengthy rebuilding process when affected populations are still living in evacuation shelters without jobs. In this situation, there is often a disconnect among the priorities of the national or international providers, and those of local communities. The ideal solution will be a compromise in every case. What is most important in the process is full enfranchisement: local government and civil society leaders must be consulted because they have the pivotal role in the future of their community.

Japan is a major proponent of disaster risk reduction provider in the region. The Japan government and NGOs alike have significant DRR experience. Throughout the Asia-Pacific the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) provides important disaster recovery and risk reduction services, complementing

¹⁸ Among the major methods for promoting DRR, the document highlights:

- The transfer of knowledge, technology and expertise to enhance capacity building for disaster risk reduction
- The sharing of research findings, lessons learned and best practices
- The compilation of information on disaster risk and impact for all scales of disasters in a way that can inform sustainable development and disaster risk reduction
- Appropriate support in order to enhance governance for disaster risk reduction, for awareness-raising initiatives and for capacity-development measures at all levels.

UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters* (Geneva: UNISDR, 2007), 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 11.

similar work being performed by JICA and Japan Platform NGOs. ADRC collaborated with PWA throughout the Civil-Military Initiative, providing expert representation at workshops and forums and subject matter consultation.

ADRC was established in 1998 in Kobe as that city still reeled from the earthquake it suffered three years prior. Among its 29 Asian and five observer countries, ADRC has worked to promote DRR strategies, build capacities in disaster preparedness and response, and promote technical cooperation. It has led efforts to develop new tools, such as the Global Identifier Number (GLIDE Number), a mechanism for identifying unique disasters.²⁰ ADRC has partnered with JICA and UNOCHA to develop disaster risk reduction profiles of all its member nations. On the ground, ADRC has worked with host nation partners to tailor DRR efforts to area-specific hazard profiles, and in 2008 launched a three-year project to build disaster management and DRR capacity among ASEAN members, in partnership with the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund.²¹ ADRC also partnered with Sentinel Asia in 2006 to provide high-resolution satellite imagery to member nations.

ADRC is an important resource for Japan – and Asia-Pacific HA/DR as a whole – precisely because it is not a relief organization. A multitude of organizations are centered around providing immediate relief and early recovery, but a dearth of stakeholders are active in the later stages. ADRC activities with its member nations demonstrate the capacity of civil society to add significantly to recovery, disaster risk reduction, and technical cooperation. In this area Japan is poised to lead the way within the region.

²⁰ See <http://www.glide-number.net/glide/public/search/search.jsp?>

²¹ Atsushi Koresawa, “ADRC’s Activities to Reduce Disaster Risks and Enhance Disaster Resilience in Asia,” (presentation at Peace Winds America, “Disaster Preparedness Workshop – Policies, Procedures and Partners,” Tokyo, 29 September 2011).

RECOVERY RECOMMENDATIONS

The Host Nation, Coordination Platforms, and the UN

- The host nation must establish a recovery coordination headquarters.

A recovery coordination headquarters would allow for communications between field providers and host nation managing authorities. The host nation recovery coordination center would also collect and review ongoing situation reports and needs assessments. Throughout recovery, providers must continue to generate and share updates and assessments with one another.
- Anticipated host nation needs in the recovery phase should be central to civil-military HA/DR operations and trainings. Transitional strategies should be formulated to maximize long-term benefit to the host nation.
- UN Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (CWGER) leadership should inform Japan and U.S. responders of their goals and priorities for the purpose of unifying efforts in the recovery phase.
- The UN CWGER should connect cluster working group members with local host nation partners.
- UN recovery agencies should take the lead on joint recovery planning with Japan Platform, U.S. and Japan NGOs, and private sector, and militaries (particularly the JSDF Central Readiness Force).

Militaries, Foreign Affairs Ministries, Assistance Agencies, and the Private Sector

- Military HA/DR providers should factor anticipated recovery needs into their planning and preparation of relief phase deployments.

This entails close consultation with host nations and with civilian providers, particularly the UN organizations and OFDA/JICA. A holistic view of the operation can help commanders plan their relief operations with recovery factors in mind.

- Military commanders, J4-planning personnel, and operational leaders should be further educated on the main tasks, priorities, and stakeholders of the recovery phase.
- JICA and USAID/OFDA should emphasize establishing continuity between relief and recovery operations.
- JICA and USAID should lead in engaging with critical host nation resources; Japan and U.S. embassies should build and maintain databases of information on recovery resources.
- Assistance agencies should expand their knowledge of businesses within the host nation and approach them in the preparedness phase to ascertain their capabilities, limitations, and procedures in recovery.
- JICA and OFDA should make recovery a focus for regularly scheduled joint meetings.
- Japan should share best practices in business continuity planning to regional Asia-Pacific nations. This effort could be spearheaded by JICA and MOFA, and should include experienced small, medium, and large Japanese businesses.
- MOFA, JICA, and Japan Platform should jointly provide JPF member NGOs with additional resources and training specific to recovery.

These should include training on forging host nation partnerships on the ground, utilizing UN resources, identification of funding outside of MOFA, and current best practices in DRR.
- Periodic liaison and training opportunities within and among JICA, MOFA, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, should be encouraged in order to facilitate information exchange during recovery.
- The JSDF (led by the Central Readiness Force) should develop its ability to provide engineering services to a host nation in both the relief and recovery phase. This unique capability would significantly increase the value added of a JSDF deployment and further strengthen Japan's recovery expertise.

- Relief phase exercises, simulations, and tabletops should include issues relevant to the recovery phase.¹
- The private sector should be included in identifying, prioritizing, and addressing recovery needs, especially in the areas of business continuity, livelihoods, and infrastructure restoration.
- The Government of Japan should continue supporting the work of ADRC in disaster risk reduction.

¹ The disaster recovery simulation run by PWA revealed that many stakeholders, e.g., U.S. military or the private sector, have rarely participated in similar relief-recovery trainings. Including these actors provided them a venue for exploring new ideas about their potential contributions to recovery. This finding is equally applicable to trainings of assistance agencies, civil-military and mil-mil exercises, NGO workshops, and UN events.

Toward Strengthening HA/DR and the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Better preparedness yields better response. This axiom was confirmed repeatedly throughout the course of the Peace Winds America Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative. Case study reviews, hands-on workshops, and meetings with bureau directors emphasized this precept. Experience mitigating natural disasters is invaluable, but in the face of a devastating catastrophe it is not enough.

The essence of preparedness is training, response planning, information, communications, and connectivity *among* the many responders to a major crisis. This Report dispels the notion that a single disaster responder, even a technologically advanced nation, can address the full range of needs after a disaster. Tohoku and Hurricane Katrina amply demonstrate this point. Nor is sheer manpower sufficient. Although China mobilized a vast army of responders after the earthquake in Sichuan Province, few of these soldiers or paramilitary officers were trained for disaster response. In large disasters, the host nations' needs are overwhelming and require civilian experts complemented by the military, civil society (NGOs and community groups), and the private sector. Without host nation "whole of society" preparedness and response, relief and recovery are lopsided: lives are lost, livelihoods are not regained, communities and businesses do not recover, political stability is eroded, and economies falter.

The role of a "whole of society" host nation response is absolutely critical during disaster preparedness and response. Effectual response and recovery are directly dependent upon the ability of the host nation to prepare. Within the past decade, most Asia-Pacific nations have established national disaster management centers with varying authorities and capabilities. The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in this time has made great strides, establishing itself as a model to emulate. FEMA is applying lessons learned from recent disasters and is launching initiatives to improve risk assessments, to speed disaster declarations, and to build a "whole community" approach to emergency management. These efforts are vital for responses and recoveries that embrace the "Cuny principle" of local leadership in disasters.¹

Climate change, urbanization, population growth, and increased economic interdependence – trends highlighted in Chapter I – will only exacerbate the

¹ See Chapter III.

need for a “whole of society” response. Many of the newly created host nation disaster management centers remain under-staffed and lack the political and statutory clout to mitigate major emergencies. Internal affairs ministries, assistance agencies, militaries, police and fire departments, NGOs, the private sector—each responder is needed as all are limited by the extent to which they can manage the totality of the disaster.

International “whole of society” responses are also critical because they beget “whole of society” cooperation within the host nation. In a “whole of society” response, host nation militaries work jointly with overseas militaries, and local NGOs work with international NGOs. The result is better cooperation between the host nation and international responders *as well as* improved coordination among stakeholders within the host nation. International responses that unite and empower all sectors, from foreign affairs ministries to private corporations, can yield a corresponding integrated response in the host nation. Host nation capacity and communications among all stakeholders are thus improved for the next disaster.

The positive implications of strengthening a joint Japan-U.S. “whole of society” HA/DR model are enormous. The lasting beneficial effects of such responses go far beyond disasters, and become a “public good” in their own right. Japan or U.S. responders have two powerful reasons to cooperate with NGOs, companies and aid agencies. First this cooperation is effective. More importantly this cooperation can influence how the host nation manages future disasters. In preparedness, in response, and in recovery, the experience of integrating and empowering all stakeholders may be the greatest service a strong Japan-U.S. response can provide.

Operationally, the “whole of society” approach to managing major natural disasters is demonstrably efficient. Few studies exist that show the total cost of a disaster response to the responders from all sectors. Individual numbers crop up, such as the USS *Abraham Lincoln*’s daily operating cost of six million USD. Through its studies, meetings, and events, Peace Winds America has concluded that the breadth of response correlates positively with cost efficiency. It is apparent that utilizing a corps of NGO staff and volunteers to distribute food, blankets, cookware, and WASH supplies costs less in aggregate than utilizing troops for the same task. Conversely the militaries can efficiently clear roads, build bridges, and transport goods and people. Military air assets already deploying can save NGOs or assistance agencies the cost of chartering separate flights. In Tohoku for example, the NGOs prepared to share cargo space on U.S. Pacific Air Force C-130s were more effective at reducing costs and planning joint response strategies.

Asia-Pacific host nations have seen firsthand the efficacy of the Japan and U.S. joint response. Their recent disasters partnerships point the way to best practices for regional disaster management. In these responses the constellation

of partners engaged by both nations – comprising UN agencies, international and local NGOs, the private sector, and host nation ministries – has proven highly effective. Potential qualms regarding impartiality, sovereignty, or neutrality have been relieved. The ground for continued progress on this front is fertile. To fully seize this tremendous opportunity, however, requires training, connectivity, and networking.

The Peace Winds America Civil-Military Initiative made the most of this opportunity. The duration of the program – nearly two years – enabled Japan and U.S. HA/DR providers to form and deepen cooperative relationships. Serial workshops, forums, and meetings ensured this occurred. PWA was also careful to avoid imbalances in its training focus and participation. Among the many extant HA/DR trainings, militaries tend to dominate.² In PWA events, neither militaries, government responders, nor NGOs were the center of trainings. The egalitarian nature of the events empowered all stakeholders.

The interactive workshops and forums complemented the analytical side of the Initiative. Providing networking time, panel discussions, expert presentations, and simulated exercises deepened understanding, enhanced connections, and moved towards the goal of collaborative partnership. Within this framework, providers such as Japan Platform member NGOs and Japan Self-Defense Forces representatives could meet on equal footing to discuss interoperability and future trainings. The periodic policy forums provided overall direction to the Initiative and highlighted key focus areas. The result was an Initiative that was neither strictly academic nor entirely operational. Its methodology is replicable and should be embraced by trainers including UNOCHA, assistance agencies, militaries, and NGOs. PWA is demonstrating replicability with a new Initiative, one encompassing Japan and the U.S., as well as the Philippines as a host nation and responder to ASEAN neighbors.

KEY THEMES IN HA/DR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

The need for **improved and broadened communications** emerged throughout the Initiative. This need persists in all phases of disaster management. Better channels of information are needed prior to disasters. This remains the case within the international response community, within host nations, and between host nations and international responders.

The UN ReliefWeb platform is an invaluable resource, and compiles numerous situation reports, humanitarian assessments, evaluations, data surveys, and press releases. Yet it fails to include material from most military providers, many of the host nations, smaller NGOs, the private sector, and others. There must be more tools for organizations to share points of contact,

² See Chapter V.

liaison information, after-action reports, and lessons learned. Where ReliefWeb orients primarily towards the major international donors, other tools are needed to focus more on host nations and smaller providers.

All disaster phases require much better **on-the-ground communication, coordination, and networking**. Senior U.S. military officers noted communications among U.S. forces and between Japan and U.S. forces were often inadequate. Japanese military commanders pointed the inability of the Maritime, Ground and Air SDF to communicate and share information about capabilities and resources during the Tohoku response. Military and central government units operating within the Fukushima exclusion zone lacked sufficient radios or common frequencies, a persistent problem in the early days of that emergency. Responding NGOs had no primary embassy point of contact, and frequently deployed blindly to the affected area. Throughout the case studies, discussions with partner organizations, and even through its own experiences, PWA found insufficient on-the-ground communications.

Attempts have been made to level the barriers to adequate communication in disaster areas. The France-based NGO Télécoms Sans Frontières provides communications equipment and support in disasters. Significantly more work in this area is needed, however. Particularly in the preparedness phase, the unmet need for communications training spans the civilian, military, and civil society sectors. This training should not be solely technical, confined to shared radio frequencies, satellite communications, or broadband global access networks. It should begin with basic information sharing, acquainting host nations and international responders with each others' abilities and limitations. The natural clearinghouses of information – embassies, host nation foreign affairs ministries, assistance agencies, and UN HA/DR organizations – must improve their efforts at collecting, validating, and standardizing these data.

Better organizational interoperability implies better ability to share needs assessments. The distribution of **accurate and validated needs assessments** is paramount. The operational hurdles raised by inaccurate or inadequately distributed assessments were a running theme in the case studies. High-quality shared assessments could help alleviate major relief problems. In the 2009 Sumatra earthquake, the over-abundance of urban search and rescue teams was not in itself detrimental, though there was little work for them. However the dispatch of these USAR teams delayed the deployment of urgently needed housing and shelter resources.³ Similarly, lack of ongoing health and sanitation assessments can lead to disease outbreak. The absence of updated assessments can place humanitarian workers in danger due to secondary building collapse or

³ See Chapter III, Sumatra case study.

changing security conditions.⁴ The ultimate goal must be improving host nation assessment capabilities. Accurate, updated host nation disaster assessments are and will remain the gold standard for all responders.

Disseminating accurate needs assessments opens access to a greater variety of responders. Large responders, e.g., USAID/OFDA, the Japan SDF, and the Red Cross can conduct their own assessments; smaller providers do not have this luxury. Without access to the host nation and/or other responders' assessments, potential providers may opt not to deploy, depriving the response effort of their unique capabilities and manpower. In the case of a multi-nation disaster, e.g., the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, "no-go" decisions can accumulate quickly. In that emergency, the combined civilian and military responders being coordinated from Utapao restricted themselves to the most severely hit regions of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India. In a similar disaster, an open, easily accessible, and continuously updated central repository of needs assessments would empower smaller NGOs, national teams, and businesses in areas without the major civil-military focus. These smaller providers could then submit timely updated reports, which could forestall dispatching unneeded specialized resources such as search and rescue.

The Chapter III case studies all featured use of military assets. Within the Asia-Pacific community, there is an established **recognition of military capabilities in HA/DR**. The UNOCHA Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations and the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response are a reflection of this dynamic. The key for policy-makers will be to legitimize the appropriate use of military assets in HA/DR operations while still enshrining the concept of **civilian leadership**. Within regional multilateral organizations, donor nations, and Asia-Pacific host nations, policy-makers should continue to expand and clarify roles, responsibilities, mandates, and functions for military forces in HA/DR scenarios. Better clarification on use of military assets can increase willingness to accept such resources in times of disaster. The Japan and U.S. militaries are widely trusted in the region. Ensuring they stay within the *Oslo Guidelines*, boosting partnerships, and establishing their use as a "public good" will enhance this trust.

PWA approached militaries as a critical tool available for numerous needs present during a disaster, not simply as a last resort. Non-traditional partners to the military, including many NGOs, saw in PWA trainings the multiple skill sets militaries can bring. New partners can approach the military to strategize cooperation that acknowledges each responder's independence and unique mandates. For their part, U.S. and Japan military responders must continue

⁴ This very scenario occurred in Turkey. On 9 November 2011, an aftershock from a previous earthquake collapsed a hotel where a Japanese HA/DR NGO's staff were staying, killing one and injuring another.

substantive host nation outreach. Events like Cobra Gold are important, but must be broadened, encompassing a wider array of host nation partners.

Ultimately the most effective advances in preparedness will originate from the increased capacity of host nations. Host nations must more actively participate in trainings. They must be pushed to strengthen mechanisms by which they assess and manage disasters, and learn how international responders can best fill gaps in their capabilities. Host nation foreign ministries should collaborate with provider nation embassies to roster and document effective local NGOs and branches of international corporations with HA/DR expertise. Host nation militaries should train and engage with overseas militaries, both upholding the mandate for civilian leadership and the host nation sovereignty. Collaborative host nation and international provider engagement from the outset in disaster planning will yield rich rewards in times of crisis.

THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE—PARTNERS PAST AND FUTURE

The Tohoku disaster clearly demonstrated the **trust between Japan and the U.S.** The response to the tsunami was the greatest outreach from the people of the U.S. to the people of Japan in recent memory. The two militaries showed unprecedented unity. NGOs of the two nations remain in partnership, and funds for recovery continue to flow to Tohoku. Now Japan is reciprocating, teaching U.S. communities, agencies, and businesses how to improve preparedness. Both nations ardently wish to help others in Asia-Pacific, through direct HA/DR response, training, development, and multilateral cooperation. Japan and U.S. investment in Asia-Pacific nations is considerable and growing.

Historically the Japan-U.S. alliance has been an unequal one, even in HA/DR. The U.S. is unencumbered by Article IX and is less restricted on defense spending. U.S. troops deployed throughout Asia have much greater leeway to respond. The U.S. international assistance agency, USAID, is considerably larger in budget and staff than its Japanese counterpart, JICA. U.S. NGOs are larger, more capable, and have a wider range of capacities than their growing Japan counterparts.

However, the disparity between the U.S. and Japan in HA/DR is rapidly shrinking. The Civil-Military Initiative found conclusively that the **two partners increasingly approach the field as equals.** While mismatches of capabilities remain, the U.S. and Japan have achieved a striking balance on the subject. In high-level dialogues, field interactions, and joint planning, the coequal nature of the relationship has become clear. At ministerial meetings such as the Defense Trilateral Talks and the Security Dialogue and Cooperation Forum, the U.S. and Japan are reaching parity on HA/DR issues. Senior defense and foreign affairs officials from both nations have attested to this new

dynamic. The new Japan-U.S. balance in HA/DR will prove self-supporting. As Japan sits at the table on equal terms, it will devote more resources and political capital to HA/DR, which in turn will increase its capacities.

The response to the Tohoku disaster and cooperation on other recent deployments confirmed the hypothesis that **Japan is ready to lead with civilian and military assets, with the U.S. as a partner.** Top officials from both countries have drawn similar conclusions from Tohoku. As Japan's trial by fire, the Tohoku response caps off nearly a decade of successful civilian-led disaster responses. Japan has assumed a leading role in regional HA/DR. Its overseas HA/DR operations rest firmly on the foundation of the Law Concerning Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team, the elevation of Defense to ministry level, and the experience of numerous successful overseas dispatches. As Japan conducts dialogue and plans on equal footing with U.S. counterparts, it will be further strengthened.

Japan has become a major player in Asia-Pacific HA/DR because of its embrace of civilian leadership and "whole of society" approaches. Japan works through its capable providers in MOFA and JICA, assisted by civil society responders such as Japan Platform and its member NGOs. When the JSDF does deploy, it does so under MOFA, and reports to civilian leaders. The history and **structural similarity of HA/DR in both countries enables joint operations.** At each level, a responding agency can turn to its corresponding partner from the other nation.

Increased confidence within Japan and with its U.S. partner will yield positive results for regional engagement. This confidence is the foundation of the HA/DR relationship and permeates other facets of the alliance. Yet the relationship must be strengthened. Both nations must increase capacity among their own providers, especially the private sector. Japan and the U.S. both can field a full spectrum of response and recovery providers – civilian, military, NGO and private sector – and must engage collaboratively to share roles, capacities, and limitations. In Initiative events it was evident that significant gaps exist that prevent a common operating picture in times of disaster. These gaps exist both within and among the two nations' resources.

Maintaining the "whole of society" approach to Japan-U.S. HA/DR cooperation entails first improving communication and information sharing among the two nations' civilian disaster leaders. At the bureau director and policy-maker levels, MOFA, JICA, the Department of State, and USAID should **craft a policy framework for future HA/DR cooperation.** Much like the military Defense Cooperation Guidelines, this framework would set Japan and the U.S. as equals, shouldering together the tasks of a broad response to an Asia-Pacific disaster. These guidelines would mandate close training and cooperation and set the parameters for a joint response. They would also codify at the highest levels the importance and support of "whole of society" responses. Mandating partnership and cooperation with the Red Cross movement and the

NGO and private sectors would empower these actors as they also prepare for future emergencies.

At the procedural level, several avenues for **improved and expanded USAID-JICA cooperation** were detailed in the operational chapters (V-VIII). Better assistance agency interaction and training are sorely needed to complement growing DOD-MOD HA/DR cooperation. There are currently ample opportunities for better exchange of capabilities and skill sets between USAID and JICA. These efforts must dovetail with similar communication between the State Department and MOFA designed to prepare for and envision the future of joint Japan-U.S. cooperation in disaster relief and recovery.

Simultaneously **both assistance agencies should expand their ties to the militaries**. USAID representation in DOD is inadequate, in terms of seniority and in light of the military's growing role in that agency's traditional areas of responsibility. JICA-MOD liaisons are also ripe for expansion. Better coordination is needed between the two responders to plan joint deployments and to consider – at a high level – their roles and responsibilities. Where roles overlap, such as in disaster medical care, dialogue is needed to avoid duplication in deployment. MOFA must be involved throughout this effort. As the ministry that authorizes both JICA and JSDF overseas missions, it is incumbent upon MOFA to take the lead bringing the two operators together.

Within the “whole of society” approach, information sharing among the military, NGOs, and private sector is a major target of opportunity in joint Japan-U.S. HA/DR. Put simply, too few NGOs or businesses on either side know how and to what extent they can lean on the militaries for assistance. The reverse is true as well. The potential offered by civil society remains a major blind spot for both militaries. The case studies did recount areas of military-NGO cooperation in Haiti, but many more opportunities were missed. Fortunately attitudes on all sides are changing. The most critical requirement is for **more interoperability training** among responders. The Civil-Military Initiative has worked toward meeting this need, but more are necessary. NGO or multilateral-led trainings are required where the militaries, assistance agencies, NGOs, and private sector come together on equal footing.

There are ample opportunities for **improved military-military information sharing**, strengthening cooperation as partners in a civilian-led operation. As noted above, JSDF components had significant difficulty communicating in Tohoku. There were similarly information gaps between the JSDF and USFJ and no architecture at all for linking NGOs to the militaries. This area must be a high priority for future joint training.

Closing information and communication gaps is paramount for future Japan-U.S. HA/DR missions. In Tohoku, Japan and the U.S. established a Joint Support Force to bridge the two militaries and provide a unified communications system. The Japan-U.S. Joint Support Force relied heavily on the three Bilateral

Coordination Centers at Yokota, Ichigaya, and Sendai. A similar system could be utilized in response to a major Asia-Pacific disaster. (The Combined Support Force stood up in Utapao in 2004 closely resembles this system.)⁵ Japan and the U.S. can greatly enhance their partnership by addressing redundancies and blind spots in joint response and by broadening this system to additional stakeholders.

On 21 June 2011 the Security Consultative Committee consisting of Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, Defense Minister Takeaki Matsumoto, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates released a document titled “Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake.” The document suggested that the coordination for Operation *Tomodachi* has set a **model of the bilateral coordination mechanism** for various operations including those for defense of Japan as follows:

The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is engaging in the largest disaster relief operations in their history. To support this effort, the United States conducted humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and other activities under Operation *Tomodachi*. The success of this large-scale joint response has validated years of bilateral training, exercises, and planning.

The SDF and U.S. forces established bilateral coordination centers in Ichigaya, Yokota, and Sendai, which were manned by personnel from both countries and served as focal points for communication and operational coordination. This experience will serve as a model for future responses to contingencies of all kinds.

The response to the nuclear power plant incident involved experts from the public and private sectors of both countries, and multiple agencies of the Japanese and U.S. Governments. The experience demonstrated the importance of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to promote real-time information sharing, effective coordination, and comprehensive “whole-of-government” responses to complex emergencies.

The bilateral response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident demonstrated the importance of strengthening the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group as a venue for policy coordination and cooperation in such areas as information sharing, protection, decontamination, and consequence management.⁶

At the 11 November 2011 symposium co-hosted by *Nikkei Shimbun* and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the former Chief of Staff of MOD Joint Staff Admiral Takashi Saito talked about the “coordination mechanism for bilateral military operations for various contingencies.” The Admiral pointed out that Japan and the U.S. should “establish and maintain a reliable coordination mechanism from peacetime through crisis instead of one standing up on emergence of contingency.”⁷

⁵ See Chapter III, Indian Ocean Tsunami case study.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, “Security Consultative Committee Document: Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake,” (21 June 2011), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166598.htm>.

⁷ *Nikkei Shimbun*, 9 November 2011, 9.

PWA Board member General Noboru Yamaguchi remarked that, in fact, this is “overdue homework for the two governments” since they revised the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 1997. He noted that the guidelines describe the **establishment of two mechanisms for bilateral cooperation** as follows:

- 1) The two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the *establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces, but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments*; and,
- 2) The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving *relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies*.⁸

Among these two mechanisms, the former in short is a scheme for preparation and planning while the latter is for the two governments to respond to contingencies in a coordinated manner. The mechanisms were *designed to widen the scope of bilateral cooperation and coordination to include relevant ministries, agencies as well as local governments* compared with a purely military to military cooperation described by the guidelines’ predecessor adopted in 1978. Agenda items for *bilateral coordination will be wider than pure military aspects* such as operations and intelligence to include mutual assistance through transportation, medical support, and other non-military activities conducted by various actors such as police and firefighting authorities, local governments, and the private sector.

The mechanisms, however, have not yet been established. In the meantime, the plan for bilateral coordination after 3/11 could be a model for such coordination and be even more complete than what the 1997 Guidelines targeted. The drafting members of the 1997 Guidelines imagined bilateral coordination mechanisms for contingency response as a scheme centering on a single point of contact where the two governments share information and coordinate activities. Then the two sides would distribute the results of such coordination to various components within actors of respective countries.

Peace Winds America advocates that the lessons learned on bilateral coordination mechanisms from Operation *Tomodachi* be reflected in the **immediate establishment of a system for Japan-U.S. cooperation in case of various contingencies**, as suggested by the 21 June 2011 Security Consultative Committee Document.

The implications of the Tohoku disaster are enormous. Since 1997, guidelines have existed mandating bilateral cooperation that goes beyond the militaries.

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” (23 September 1997), <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html>. Emphasis added.

Although organizations have consistently advocated for broad, multi-agency cooperation within the alliance, few opportunities presented themselves. Tohoku has changed that. The viability of robust collaboration that extends beyond combat forces is now plain to see. With the backing of the Guidelines and the experience of Tohoku, the time has arrived to embrace these lessons and plan future Japan-U.S. civilian-led, civil-military operations in the Asia-Pacific region.

PWA and others are calling for a bilateral center where Japan-U.S. HA/DR could be coordinated, strengthened, and maintained.⁹ PWA has identified several key requisites for such a facility. It must be centrally located. A military-military HA/DR hub located in the Ryukyus might help coordination and interoperability between the two militaries, but will not receive buy-in from the assistance agencies or civil society by virtue of its remoteness. An HA/DR coordination center must also be truly “whole of society.” A center would likely be funded and run by a combination of the government and military. Yet it must remain open-access for civil society, host nation representatives, UN, and ASEAN staff. Finally it must be more than a warehouse.

PWA in this Report has advanced the case for a HA/DR preparedness and coordination center in the Tokyo metropolitan area.¹⁰ This center could operate from Yokota Air Base or Ichigaya MOD headquarters. This notional bilateral coordination center would be fully compatible with other civil-military or mil-mil centers elsewhere and would empower civilian (particularly civil society) participation. The center’s proximity to MOD would also enable military buy-in and create the opportunities for new civil-military cooperation that MOD is seeking. With increased experience, buy-in, and legitimacy, the HA/DR center would enshrine itself as an essential resource for any Japan-based HA/DR provider deploying overseas. As the host of such a center, Japan’s standing as the regional HA/DR leader would only be enhanced. It would concurrently improve its bilateral operational skills with U.S. government, military, and NGO responders.

JAPAN-U.S. HA/DR COOPERATION AND HOST NATION ENGAGEMENT

The Tohoku disaster and Operation *Tomodachi* signaled that the U.S. can occupy a subordinate role in response. Had the U.S. used its considerable in-country military presence in a non-subordinate manner, every Asia-Pacific nation prone to natural disasters would have noticed. Instead, the clear primacy of the Japanese civilian and military responders indicated the U.S. honors

⁹ See Chapters IV and V for Col. Yoshitomi’s proposals for bilateral coordination.

¹⁰ See Chapter V, “Information/Resource Hubs and HA/DR Coordination Platforms.”

national sovereignty. Although the Japan-U.S. relationship is unique, regional host nations can be reassured. **The inviolable sovereignty of the host nations is paramount within Japan-U.S. HA/DR cooperation.** This lesson is most important for military responders and for host nations alike. The Tohoku disaster will be a crucial case study when planning and training with vulnerable Asia-Pacific nations.

The **joint Japan-U.S. approach offers much to Asia-Pacific nations.** Disaster preparedness can be increased in all areas. Mil-mil HA/DR training is critical as these trainings build mutual trust. With Myanmar and Vietnam, mil-mil training is thawing tensions at a faster rate than diplomatic engagement.¹¹ In the civilian realm, joint JICA and USAID projects could be significantly broader and include U.S. and Japan NGOs, as well as host nation disaster management centers. The Japan and U.S. embassies should, through local embassy and USAID/JICA staff, expand their training missions as well. The embassies can play a critical role cataloging and rostering local response capabilities, sharing these with incoming responders in times of disaster. They could also be focal points for training host nations on initial assessments and requests for international assistance. Nearly every examined case study featured breakdowns in the request for assistance indicating more proactive work is needed.

To reflect the growing prominence of HA/DR within the Japan foreign policy, **disaster relief should have greater prominence within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.** Presently HA/DR is within the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division of the International Cooperation Bureau. The division has little stature or authority within this bureau. The MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau and North America Bureau has much greater vision and influence in HA/DR. Policy-makers and MOFA leadership should re-evaluate the mission of HA/DR, and its placement within MOFA. Policy-makers and MOFA leadership should also explore the overdue expansion of JICA's authority and roles. JICA should be given the statutory authority to fund HA/DR NGOs directly. JICA should also exchange high-level liaison officers with MOD, and particularly the Central Readiness Force, and be given more opportunities to help define and shape the JSDF deployment. As an HA/DR power, Japan's civilian providers should be empowered to accomplish their mission.

Japan Platform is also currently under-utilized. An expansion in staffing, funding, and mission would not only empower its member NGOs during response, it would provide more opportunities to train with host nation governments, NGOs, and coordinators such as the UN. **Japan Platform's unique mission renders it ideal for civil-military and host nation training.** JPF can link its member NGOs, the JSDF, the U.S. military, and critically, the host nations. It can also help foment the creation of similar platforms outside

¹¹ Evidenced by Myanmar's 2013 Cobra Gold invitation and its participation with the militaries of Japan and the U.S.

Japan. A “Philippines Platform” would help coordinate local NGOs and serve as a focal point for communications with Philippine authorities (military, local/central government, communities and private sector). This platform could liaise with and connect to responding overseas providers. Improved overall resource coordination would result.

HA/DR capacity building opportunities exist within the Japan and U.S. militaries as well. Without replacing the large exercises, the **militaries can conduct more targeted, inclusive HA/DR training.** The recent creation of the new Capacity Building Office within the MOD Defense Policy Bureau is an acknowledgement of this fact. This critical MOD office will train regional partners in HA/DR, peacekeeping, maritime security, and other non-traditional security threats. Japan, already a recognized peacekeeping operations expert, has logically taken the step to share its proficiency in capacity building. Ideally this new office will not restrict capacity building projects to military targets only, but will engage MOFA, JICA, and NGO partners, and even civilian counterparts in the host nation. Such trainings build patterns of cooperation and interoperability that may not arise from the large, 13,000-troop exercises. The “whole of society” approach is certainly better served by smaller and more inclusive trainings.

THE U.S., JAPAN, AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The PWA Japan-U.S. Civil-Military Initiative has concluded that improved cooperation at all levels of the Japan-U.S. security alliance can improve joint humanitarian assistance and disaster response. But the benefits of closer cooperation in HA/DR are wider than simply disasters. **The regional Asia-Pacific security architecture, of which Japan and the U.S. are the primary custodians, necessitates a solid alliance.** In Chapter II, Tsuneo Watanabe enumerated some of the challenges facing that alliance: the burdens of unmet expectations and the conflicting provisos of Article IX and the Mutual Security Treaty. The bolstered civilian and military relationships born of better HA/DR cooperation will resonate throughout the entire alliance. With this improved foundation, Japan and the U.S. can jointly address pervasive security threats in the region as well as non-traditional ones: disasters (natural and man-made), peacekeeping, climate change, pandemics, and maritime security. Cooperative work toward mitigating the non-traditional threats constitutes a powerful “public good” for the entire region.

Any one of these threats will require a proactive response from both the Japan and U.S. In the case of any non-traditional security challenge, this response may comprise more than just military forces. The added value of HA/DR collaboration emerges as in *any* civilian-military joint response, the bilateral coordination mechanism will be far stronger arising from the two nations’ disaster preparedness activities, their actions on 11 March 2011 and their commitment to future cooperation. HA/DR studies and analyses, comprehensive trainings,

and table-top exercises, as well as experience utilizing joint facilities extend into other contingencies as well.

The lasting benefit to the alliance from cooperation on disaster relief is described by General Yamaguchi:

The first set of lessons learned from rescue operations after the Great East Japan Earthquake is on the management of the Japan and U.S. alliance. The experience of bilateral cooperation for rescue operations after 3/11 clearly enhanced the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the minds of the Japanese. The reason why Japanese people found the U.S. as a trustworthy ally more clearly than before 3/11 does not involve the number of nuclear weapons dedicated for deterrence and defense for Japan, or the size of U.S. forces promised to reinforce the Self-Defense Forces in case of an armed attack. The close ties between the two nations, the two governments, the two militaries, and the two peoples made the perception on the alliance much stronger.

Such trust between the two nations however is not easy to keep intact. Mishandling the management of the alliance may cause serious deterioration of bilateral relations. We witnessed this at the beginning of the Hatoyama administration when it mishandled the issues related to relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the northern part of Okinawa. Such distrust may arise from the U.S. side by crimes committed by its military members, or by air and land accidents involving Japanese victims. A former Japan diplomat used to compare the alliance to gardening; the alliance like flowers in a garden could easily wither if not properly cared for. This is even truer when an alliance has serious troubles to tackle.

While the Great East Japan Earthquake caused unprecedentedly severe damage to Japan, the following rescue operations reminded the Japanese that the nation is a part of the international community that extended to them extremely warm assistance. The Japanese will never forget such warm help from various parts of the world, starting with the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific neighbors, i.e., from China and Korea and to those developing countries whom Japan has been providing development and financial support. Japan should never forget this experience of being helped and should be ready to help others whenever others have hardship with disasters.

The Great East Japan Earthquake was a wakeup call for Japan and the Japanese to possess a more outward-looking attitude again. For the last two decades since the collapse of its economy, Japan has been inward-looking. The Japanese seem to have lost not only confidence in their potential, particularly their economic capabilities, but also lost their sense of responsibility to the international community. Even with its troubled economy, Japan is still one of the world's largest economies that enjoys the fruits of peace and stability. Thus Japan is naturally obliged to contribute to this peace and stability.

General Yamaguchi's latter point is particularly apt. Japan has the unprecedented experience and ability to put itself forward assertively in disaster coordination, communication, and management. Japan can build upon this wakeup call to advance the public good of the Asia-Pacific. There would be no more fitting way of turning the trauma of 3/11 into meaningful action than to assume demonstrably the role of regional HA/DR leader.

An additional wakeup call for Japan is the increasing need for strong leadership at all levels, especially within the political parties. The changes of political leadership mentioned by Tsuneo Watanabe result from disenchantment on the part of the Japanese people with their leadership.¹² There is a palpable demand for bold, progressive action from political leaders and the bureaucracies alike. Providing for the public good of the Asia-Pacific and partnering with trusted allies and friends is a strategic move and a popular one. The time for Japan to exercise its commitment to the nation and the Asia-Pacific is now.

Deepening the Japan-U.S. alliance through HA/DR cooperation assists both nations, and builds capacity and outreach to regional partners and multilateral organizations. Working with Asia-Pacific foreign ministries, militaries, private sector, or NGOs will readily improve assistance requests, communications, and the “whole of society” response. HA/DR cooperation within the Asia-Pacific benefits the governance and economies of the region as a whole. Diplomacy coupled with trust allows Japan and the U.S. to advance regional preparedness, security, and stability.

The soft power arising from HA/DR preparedness provides an added benefit to trilateral engagement with major regional partners: Australia, South Korea, India, and ASEAN. This lesson is being learned at the highest levels as foreign affairs and defense ministers build HA/DR components into trilateral dialogues and forums. It is imperative that HA/DR remain a continued focus of trilateral discussions. The Asia-Pacific nations (and all ASEAN member states) will remain vulnerable. Strengthening HA/DR allows for dialogue and joint cooperation at the ministerial levels and throughout society—a public good that must be spearheaded by Japan and the U.S.

Within the Japan-U.S. alliance, within ASEAN, and within the Asia-Pacific as a whole, there are uncounted challenges ahead. They are political and economic, traditional and non-traditional security threats. Far more than typhoons and tsunamis menace the region. Yet with a firm Japan-U.S. HA/DR foundation, each of these challenges becomes more manageable. A strong cooperative investment in lessening the impact of tomorrow’s catastrophes will be repaid many times over.

¹² See Chapter II.

HA/DR (人道支援・災害救助活動) および日米同盟強化にむけて

「優れた対応(response)は、優れた支援対策(preparedness)から」—ピースウィンズ・アメリカ(PWA)による「民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブ(Civil-Military Disaster Preparedness Initiative)」を実行していく過程で、この格言の正しさは幾度となく証明されてきた。ケース・スタディのレビュー、実践ワークショップ、当局責任者との会合において、この認識が強調されてきた。自然災害を緩和することは非常に貴重な経験であるが、想像を絶するような大災害に直面した場合、それだけでは十分ではない。

「支援対策」の核となるのは、訓練、対応計画、情報、コミュニケーション、大きな危機的状況に対する多くの対応要員間のネットワークである。本報告書では、技術先進国であれば災害後のニーズにすべて対応可能である、という考えを一掃したい。東日本大震災およびハリケーン・カトリーナを振り返れば、このことは十分に実証できるだろう。また、人数が揃っていればよい、ということでもない。中国・四川省大地震後、中国政府は多数の陸軍兵士を救助隊として巧みに動員したが、災害対応訓練を積んでいた兵士、民兵将校はわずかに過ぎなかった。被災国(host nation)のニーズは非常に大きく、民間専門家を補助する軍隊、市民社会—NGO、コミュニティグループ、民間部門—が必要である。被災国における「社会全体(whole of society)」による支援対策及び対応が無ければ、救援および復興には歪みが生じる。命が失われ、生活は元通りになることはなく、コミュニティも企業も復興せず、政治的安定はゆらぎ、経済は低迷する。

被災国が「社会全体」による対応を図ることには、災害支援対策および救援において極めて重要な意味を持つ。効果的な対

応及び復興を進められるかどうかは、被災国の支援対策能力次第である。過去10年間に、アジア太平洋諸国の大部分が、様々な権限と能力を有する国家レベルの災害対応または危機管理センターを設立している。米国では、米連邦緊急事態管理庁(Federal Emergency Management Agency of the United States: FEMA)が、最近の災害から得た教訓を生かし、リスク評価の改善、災害宣言の迅速化、そして緊急事態の管理における「コミュニティ全体」による緊急事態管理手法の整備に向けたイニシアチブを開始している。これらの取り組みは、災害時、被災地のリーダーシップを唱えた「カニーの原則(Cuny Principle)」を念頭に置いた対応や復興に欠くことのできないものである。¹

気候変動、都市化、人口増加、高まる経済的相互依存と、第1章で取り上げた世界の動向により、「社会全体」による対応の必要性は増すばかりである。アジア太平洋諸国全体にわたり、被災国の災害管理センターは、まだ資金不足であり、大規模な緊急事態を緩和するだけの強い政治的、法的影響力にも欠けている。総務省、支援機関、軍隊、警察・消防局、NGO、民間セクターといった各対応部署・団体のそれぞれが災害全体に対処できる範囲は限られている。従って、そうした部署・団体すべての力が必要になる。

国際社会全体による対応も、極めて重要である。何故なら、そこから被災国内部の「社会全体」による協力が生まれるからである。「社会全体」による対応において、被災国の軍隊が外国の軍隊と、地元のNGOが国際NGOと協力活動を行う。これによって、被災国関係者間の調整が改善されるだけでなく、被災国のよりよい国際協力にもつながる。外務省から民間企業まで、あらゆるセクターを結びつけ、力を与える国際対応は、被災国において、そうした対応に呼応した統合的対応力を生み出し得る。被災国の能力、そして全ての関係者間のコミュニケーションが、次の災害に向けて改善されていく。

日米共同の「社会全体」によるHA/DR(人道支援・災害救助活動)モデルの強化が意味するところは非常に大きい。「社会全体」

¹ 第III章を参照

による対応がもたらすプラス効果は、災害後も継続し、それ自体が「公益(public good)」となる。日本の自衛隊あるいは米国軍の救援部隊は、NGO、企業、支援機関と協力すべき2つの重要な理由がある。まず第1に、こうした協力は効果的である、という点が挙げられる。そしてさらに重要なのは、こうした協力は、被災国の将来的な災害対応策に影響を与えるものだという点である。支援対策、対応、復興、統合において、全ての社会的関係者を統合し、力を与えることが、日米による強力な対応から生まれる、最大の貢献と言ってもよいだろう。

実施面からしても、大規模自然災害に対する「社会全体」によるアプローチが効果的であるのは明らかである。あらゆるセクターの対応者に対する、災害対応費用全額を示した調査はほとんどない(例えばエイブラハム・リンカーン(米航空母艦)稼働費は一日あたり600万USドルといった個々の数字はあるものの)。ピースウィンズ・アメリカでは、研究、会合、イベントを通じて、対応力の幅広さとコスト効率性には、正の相関関係があるという結論に達した。NGOスタッフおよびボランティアの集団を活用して、食料、毛布、調理器具、水補給を実施した場合の費用は、同様の任務を軍隊に依頼した場合よりも、全体として安く済む。逆に、軍隊は道路の復旧、橋の建設、NGOでは不可能な地域のモノ、ヒトの移送を行うことができる。空軍機を利用すれば、NGOや支援機関が、別途チャーター便を用意するコストが省ける。東日本大震災を例にとると、米太平洋空軍のC-130輸送機の積荷スペースを共同使用する体制を整えていたNGOは、より効率的にコストを削減し、対応および活動計画策定における軍との連携もとれていた。

今こそ、外国の支援提供者および被災国間において、「社会全体」による対応力を高める時である。アジア太平洋の被災国は、日米共同対応の効率性を目の前で見えてきた。公平性、主導権、中立性に関する不安は軽減されてきた。日米の関連団体、国連機関、国際・地域NGO、民間部門、被災国当局からなるパートナー集団は、非常に効率的であることが証明された。今後もこうした活動を推進していく土壌は整っているが、この大きな機会を十分に手にするには、訓練、連携、そしてネットワークが必要である。

PWAによる「民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブ」では、それらを提供してきた。ほぼ2年間に及んだプログラムにより、日米HA/DR提供者は協力的関係について理解を深め、関係を構築し、現在進行中のプログラムの状況においてそれらを深化させることができた。一連のワークショップ、フォーラムを通じて、そうした理解、関係の構築を後押ししてきた。PWAでは、訓練のテーマや参加について不均衡が生じないように注意を払ってきた。現在ある多くのHA/DR訓練において、民軍では軍の方が大きな立場をとることが多い。²しかし、PWAのイベントにおいて、軍、政府対応者、NGOのいずれかが訓練の中心となるようなことはなかった。イベントの平等主義的性質によって、すべての関係者に力が与えられたのである。

双方向的なワークショップおよびフォーラムが、同イニシアチブの分析的側面を補完した。互いの話し合いの時間や、パネルディスカッション、専門家によるプレゼンテーション、シミュレーション訓練などを提供することで、連携を強め、将来的な協力的パートナーシップという目標に向け進展することができた。PWA枠組みにおいて、ジャパン・プラットフォーム(JPF)のNGOメンバーや自衛隊代表者が、平等な立場で会合に参加し、相互運用や今後の訓練について話し合いを行った。定期的なポリシーフォーラムの場では、同イニシアチブの全体的方向性を提示するとともに、重点領域に焦点を当てた。その結果、同イニシアチブは、学術・実務どちらか一辺倒になってしまうことのない、バランスのとれたものとなった。今回のイニシアチブの手法は、反復することが可能であり、国連人道問題調整事務所(UNOCHA)、支援機関、軍、NGOなど、訓練提供サイドは採用すべきである。PWAでも、新たなイニシアチブでこうした反復可能性を実証している。日本、米国およびフィリピンが主催国となり、ASEAN隣国への対応を図るものである。

² 第V章参照

HA/DR支援対策と対応における重要テーマ

イニシアチブを通じて、コミュニケーションを改善し、拡大する必要性が浮かび上がった。これは、災害管理の全局面において当てはまる問題である。情報チャンネルの改善は、災害に先立って必要とされるものである。国際対応コミュニティ内において、被災国内において、そして双方間において当てはまる。

その意味で、国連リリーフウェブ (ReliefWeb) プラットフォームは非常に貴重なリソースであり、膨大な状況レポート、人道危機アセスメント、評価、データ調査、プレスリリースをまとめている。しかし、多くの軍部提供者、被災国、小規模NGO、民間部門などからの資料が含まれていない。連絡窓口や窓口に関する情報、活動終了後報告、教訓などを皆で共有していくための、更なるツールが求められる。リリーフウェブが、大きな国際的寄贈者を第一の対象としているのに対して、他のツールは、被災国やより小規模の提供者に焦点を当てる必要がある。

災害のあらゆる局面において、現場でのコミュニケーション、連携およびネットワークを大きく改善していくことが求められる。米軍高官は、米空軍内部や日米間のコミュニケーションが不十分なケースが散見されたと指摘した。また、自衛隊幹部から、東日本大震災時の対応において、陸・海・空自衛隊の間で、能力やリソースに関する情報共有やコミュニケーションが上手くいかなかったという指摘もあった。福島避難地域内で活動を行った軍および中央政府ユニットでも、無線通信機や共通周波数が不足していた。これは、緊急時の初期段階において常に付きまとう問題である。対応するNGOは、主要大使館との連絡窓口がなく、やみくもに被災エリアに展開するケースがよく見られる。ケース・スタディ、パートナー組織との議論、そして自らの経験を通じて、PWAは、現場でのコミュニケーションが不足していたという認識を得た。

被災地における適切なコミュニケーションの妨げとなる要素を取り除くための試みもなされてきた。フランスを拠点とするNGOであるTélécoms Sans Frontièresは、被災地に通信機器やサポートを提供している。この課題に関しては、多大な取り組みが必要であ

る。特に、支援対策段階において、民間、軍、市民社会において、コミュニケーションの訓練が不足している。こうした訓練は、無線周波数の共有や衛星通信、ブロードバンドグローバルアクセスネットワークといった、技術面に留まるものであってはならない。むしろ、基本的な情報共有や、被災国と国際対応者の間で互いの能力や限界を理解することから始めていくべきである。情報センターとしての役割を持つ機関—大使館、被災国の外務省、支援機関、国連HA/DR組織—は、情報の収集、検証、整備のための取り組みを改善していく必要がある。

組織的な相互運用性の改善は、ニーズ評価の共有能力の改善という意味合いもある。正確かつ有効なニーズ評価情報を提供することが何より重要である。不正確あるいは不適切な評価が提供されることにより、活動面で困難が生じてしまう、という問題が、ケース・スタディを通じたテーマであった。質の高い評価を共有することで、救援活動に関わる重要な問題の大幅な軽減につながる場合がある。例えば、インドネシア・パダン地震の際、都市型搜索救助(USAR)チームの数が過剰になってしまった。チームの作業量は非常に少なかったものの、それ自体は有害ではなかった。しかし、USARチームの派遣により、緊急に必要とされる住居、避難施設用リソースの輸送が後回しになってしまった。³ 継続的な保健衛生評価不足は、伝染病の集団発生 of 直接的原因となり得る。評価を更新していかなければ、建築物の二次倒壊や治安状況の変化により、人道支援者が危険に晒されかねない。⁴ 究極の目標は、被災国の評価能力を改善していくことに他ならない。正確かつ最新の被災国災害評価は、現在も、そして今後もすべての対応者にとって一番の基準であることに変わりはない。

正確なニーズ評価の発信により、より多様な対応者が参入可能になる。米国国際開発庁海外災害援助局(USAID/OFDA)や日本の自衛隊、赤十字といった大規模な対応者は、各自で評価を行う

³ 第III章スマトラ沖地震のケース・スタディを参照

⁴ まさにこのシナリオがトルコで発生した。2011年11月9日、余震で日本人HA/DR関連NGOスタッフが滞在中のホテルが倒壊し、一人が亡くなり、もう一人も負傷した。

ことができるが、小規模な提供者の場合は、そうした余裕がない。被災国あるいは他の対応者の評価を知ることができなければ、潜在的な提供者が現地に赴くことを止めてしまうかも知れない。その結果、そうした提供者が有している貴重な能力やマンパワーが対応活動に活かされないまま終わってしまうのである。2004年インド洋大津波など、多国間にわたる災害の場合、「中止」(No-Go)という判断が急速に蓄積する場合がある。災害発生時、ウタパオからやってきた民軍共同の対応者は、最も深刻な被害を被ったバンダアチェ(インドネシア)、スリランカ、タイおよびインドといった地域に活動を絞った。同様の災害時、オープンで簡単にアクセス可能で、継続的に更新されるニーズ評価の中央保管所のようなものがあれば、より小規模のNGOや国家チームや企業が、大規模民軍組織が焦点を当てていない地域で、力を発揮することができるだろう。こうした小規模の提供者が、適時最新の報告を上げていけば、先述したUSARのような、不要な特殊リソースを割くことを未然に防ぐことができるだろう。

第3章のケース・スタディでは、軍事資産の利用を取り上げた。アジア太平洋コミュニティ内において、**HA/DRにおける軍の存在についての認識**は確立している。UNOCHAの「災害支援活動における軍支援に関するアジア太平洋会議(Asia-Pacific Conferences on Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations)」や、ASEAN「災害管理及び緊急時対応に関する合意(Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response)」は、こうした動きを反映したものである。将来の政策決定者にとってカギとなるのは、**文民主導(civilian leadership)**という概念を重視しつつ、HA/DR活動における軍事資産の適切な利用を法制化することであろう。

地域内の多国間組織、援助国、アジア太平洋の被災国において、政策決定者は、引き続きHA/DRシナリオにおける、軍隊の役割、責任、任務、機能の拡大化、明確化に努めていくべきである。

軍事資産の利用についてより明確化することで、災害発生時にそうしたリソースを受け入れていく姿勢が高まっていく可能性がある。日米の自衛隊、軍隊は現在、同地域において広い信頼を

集めている。あくまで「オスロガイドライン」の範囲内で、パートナーシップを高め、「公益」としての利用を確立することで、こうした信頼は維持される。

PWAは、軍隊を単に最後の手段としてではなく、災害時の多くのニーズに利用可能な、不可欠のツールというアプローチをとっている。多くのNGOを含む、これまで軍隊のパートナーではなかった組織・団体は、PWAの訓練において、軍隊がもたらすことのできる数々のスキルを目の当たりにした。新しいパートナーが軍隊にアプローチし、各対応者の独立性と独自の任務を認める協力戦略を練ることもできる。日米の自衛隊、軍隊の対応者は、被災国への実質的なアウトリーチ活動を継続していかなければならない。「コブラ・ゴールド(Cobra Gold)」(多国間合同軍事演習)のようなイベントが重要であるが、被災国の幅広いパートナーにまでこうした活動を広げていく必要があるだろう。

結局のところ、支援対策の最も効果的な進展は、被災国の能力が高まることにより生じるのである。被災国は、参加型訓練において存在感を発揮しなければならない。また、被災国に対して、災害を評価し、管理するためのメカニズムを強化するよう強く求めているとともに、国際対応者の協力によっていかに自国に足りない能力を埋めるのがよいか、明確にしなければならない。被災国の外務省は、提供国の大使館と協力し、有効な地元のNGOやHA/DR専門能力を有する国際企業の支店のリストを作成し文書化するべきである。また、被災国の軍隊は、外国軍との合同訓練、演習を行うべきである。ただし、両軍とも、文民主導という前提や、被災国の主権の境界を忘れてはならない。災害対応計画の初期段階から、被災国を積極的に参加させることにより、有事の際、優れた成果が生み出される。

日米同盟 – 過去と未来のパートナー

東日本大震災では、日米間の信頼関係が実証された。最近の記憶をたどる限り、津波への対応は、米国人から日本人への最大の支援である。両国の軍隊はかつてないほどの団結を見せ、両国の

NGOは協力関係を続け、復興資金の東北への流入も続いている。そして現在、日本は、米国のコミュニティ、諸機関、企業に防災体制のあり方を教えるというかたちで支援に報いている。両国は、直接的なHA/DR対応、訓練、開発、多国間協力を通じて、アジア太平洋の他の国々を支援したいという熱意に満ちている。日米によるアジア太平洋諸国への投資はかなりの額に及び、今も増えつつある。

従来、日米同盟はHA/DRにおいてさえ平等性を欠いていた。米国は憲法第9条の制約を受けることなく、防衛支出の制約も比較的少ない。アジア全体に前方展開する自由は、米軍の方に遥かに多い。USAIDは、予算も人員も独立行政法人国際協力機構(JICA)を大きく上回っている。米国のNGOは、日本の成長しつつあるNGOと比べても、大規模で能力も優れており、より幅広い対応が可能である。

しかし、HA/DRにおける日米の差は急速に縮小しつつある。民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブは、パートナーの双方がこの分野に対等にアプローチしていると結論づけた。依然として能力の隔たりはあるものの、日米はこの部門で著しい均衡を達成している。高いレベルでの対話、実地での対話、共同計画において、関係の同格的な性質が明らかになってきた。3カ国防衛協議や安全保障対話、協力フォーラムなどの閣僚会議において、日米はHA/DRなどの問題で対等の関係を構築しつつある。こうした新たな動きについては、両国の防衛・外務関係の高官も認めている。HA/DRにおける新たな日米の均衡は、自立的なものであると証明されていくだろう。日本が対等の条件でテーブルに着けば、HA/DRに投入する資源・政治資源が増え、結果的に対応能力が引き続き増していくことになる。

東日本大震災への対応とその他の最近の配備に関する協力から、日本は米国のパートナーとして民生・軍事資産を用いてリーダー的役割を果たしていく準備ができているという想定が正しかったことが確認された。両国高官は、東日本大震災から同様の結論を導き出している。日本にとって過酷な試練となった東日本大震災への対応は、良好に進められてきた10年近くにわたる民間主

導の災害対応を締めくくるものであった。日本は地域HA/DRにおいて主導的役割を担ってきた。日本の海外での働きは、国際緊急援助隊の派遣に関する法律、防衛庁の「省」への格上げ、多数の海外派遣を成功させてきた経験といった土台にしっかりと根差したものである。日本が対等の立場で米国の諸機関と対話し、計画を立てていくならば、その働きは一層強化されるだろう。

日本は、文民主導を暗黙のうちに採用し、「社会全体」によるアプローチを取ることで、アジア太平洋地域のHA/DRにおいて、主導的役割果たすようになっている。旧日本帝国時代の先軍的風潮はもうどこにも見られない。むしろ日本は、JPFとその会員をはじめとする市民団体の活動家に支えられ、外務省とJICAの有能な援助者を通じてHA/DRに取り組んでいる。自衛隊の派遣は外務省の下で行われ、文民リーダーへの報告義務もある。日本の海外におけるHA/DR制度には歴史のおよび構造的な類似性があるため、米国との共同活動が可能になる。対応にあたる省庁は、相手国における同部門のパートナーを頼みにすることができる。

日本国内とその米国のパートナーにおける信頼が深まっていることは、地域での取り組みにおいて肯定的な結果につながるだろう。この信頼がHA/DR関係の土台であり、同盟の他の面にも浸透していく。だが、この関係は強化する必要がある。両国は、民間部門も含め、自国の提供者の対応能力を高めるように努力する必要がある。日米両国は、ありとあらゆる対応と復旧の提供者(民生、軍事、NGO、民間部門)を配備することができる。また、役割、能力、限界を共有できるように協力し合って取り組む必要がある。民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブのイベントでは、災害時にひとつになって活動することを妨げる深刻な隔たりがあることが明らかだった。そうした隔たりは、両国の人的資源の中にも両者の間にもある。

日米のHA/DR協力に対する「社会全体」によるアプローチを維持するにはまず、両国で災害時の指揮を執る民間人リーダー間のコミュニケーションと情報交換を改善する必要がある。外務省、JICA、米國務省、USAIDは、当局責任者と政策立案者のレベルで、将来のHA/DR協力の政策的枠組みをつくるべきである。軍

事面での防衛協力ガイドラインと同様、この枠組みは、アジア太平洋で起こる災害への広範にわたる対応の任務を日米が対等の立場で、共同で担うようにするためのものである。ガイドラインは、緊密な体制での訓練と協力を義務付け、共同で対応するための諸条件を設定するものとなる。また、「社会全体」による対応の重要性とその支援を最高レベルで成文化することにもなる。さらに、赤十字運動、NGO、民間部門との提携と協力を義務付けることで、これらの関係者は将来の緊急事態に備える上でも力を得ることになる。

手順レベルで、USAIDとJICAの協力改善と拡大のための手段について、活動を記した第V～VIII章に詳述している。深まりつつある国防総省と防衛省のHA/DR協力を補完するためにも、USAIDの対話と訓練の改善は、是非とも必要である。現在、USAIDとJICAの間で能力とスキルの交流を促進する機会が十分にある。そうした努力は、災害救助と復旧における今後の日米協力計画策定のために行われている、国務省と外務省コミュニケーションと足並みを揃える必要がある。

双方の支援機関は軍隊との連携を拡大すべきである。年功の点からも、USAIDが従来から担っている担当領域で軍の役割が増えている点を考慮しても、USAIDは国防総省に十分な人員を送り込んでいるとはいえない。JICAと防衛省の連携も拡張すべき時が来ている。共同配備を計画し、それぞれの役割と責任について高いレベルで検討するには、両者の連携を改善する必要がある。災害医療など、両者の役割が重なり合う分野では、配備が重複しないように対話が必要とされる。この取り組みに関しては、外務省が一貫して関わるべきである。JICAと自衛隊の両方の海外任務を認可する立場にある省として、両者の足並みを揃えるように指揮を取ることには外務省の責務である。⁵

「社会全体」によるアプローチにおいて、NGOと民間部門の情報共有は日米HA/DR協力の機会として重要である。端的に言うと、どちらのNGOにも企業にも、軍隊に支援を頼る方法や、どの程度の支援を頼ることができるのかを知っている人材が非常に少

⁵ 第V～VII章を参照

ない。また、その逆もまた言える—すなわち、市民社会が持つ潜在能力は、両国の軍の視界からは抜け落ちてしまっているのである。ケース・スタディには、ハイチの場合など、軍とNGOが協力できる分野について確かに詳述されているが、網羅されていない機会の方がはるかに多い。あらゆる方面で姿勢に変化が表れつつあることは喜ばしいことであるが、具体的な活動が必要である。すべての対応者の間で**相互運用の訓練を充実させることが最重要課題**である。民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブはこのニーズに向けて努力してきたが、さらなる努力が求められる。軍、支援機関、NGO、民間部門が対等の立場で協力し、NGOまたは多国間の指導で行う訓練が鍵である。

大規模な民生的活動を支えるパートナーの役割には、**軍同士の協力をより緊密にする機会**がまだ十分にある。上で述べたように、自衛隊の構成部隊には、東日本大震災でコミュニケーションに大きな難点があった。自衛隊と在日米軍の間にも同様に情報ギャップがあった。また、NGOと軍の間には連絡機構が皆無である。今後の統合訓練ではこの分野を優先する必要がある。

今後の日米HA/DR任務においては、**情報とコミュニケーションのギャップを埋めることが最優先事項**である。東日本大震災では、日米が統合支援部隊(Joint Support Force)を編成して両軍の架け橋とし、統合コミュニケーションシステムを提供した。日米統合支援部隊は、横田、市ヶ谷、仙台にある3箇所の日米共同調整所に依存するところが大きかった。アジア太平洋で大災害が発生した場合にも、同様のシステムを活用して対応することができそうだ(2004年にウタパオで起ち上げられた統合支援部隊(Combined Support Force)は、同システムに類似している⁶⁾)。日米は共同対応での無駄を省き、盲点をなくし、このシステムを別の関係機関にも広げること、提携関係を大幅に強化することができよう。

2011年6月21日、日本側からは北澤俊美外務大臣と松本剛明防衛庁長官、米国側からはヒラリー・クリントン国務長官とロバート・ゲーツ国防長官で構成される日米安全保障協議委員会が、

⁶ 第三章 ケース・スタディを参照

「東日本大震災への対応における協力」という文書を発表した。同文書には、「トモダチ作戦」で行われた連携は、以下のような日本の防衛に関するものも含め、さまざまな活動のもとになる二国間連携機構のモデルを定めることになったと記されている：

現在自衛隊は、その歴史上最大の災害救助活動に携わっている。米国はこの働きを支援するために、「トモダチ作戦」の下で、人道的支援、災害救助、その他の活動を実施した。この大規模な共同対応の成功により、長年にわたる二国間の訓練、演習、計画の有効性が確認された。

自衛隊と米軍は、市ヶ谷、横田、仙台に二国間協力センターを設立した。同センターには両国の人員を配置し、コミュニケーションと作戦協調の中心として用いた。この経験は、今後あらゆる種類の有事に対応するためのモデルとなる。

原子力発電所事故への対応として、両国の公的・民間部門、日米政府の複数の省庁から専門家を招いた。今回の経験により、リアルタイムの情報共有、効果的な協調、複雑な緊急事態に対する包括的な「政府全体」による対応を推進するために、二国間および多国間の機構が重要であることが証明された。

福島第一原子力発電所事故に対する二国間の対応を通じて、政策協調および、情報の共有、保護、除染、被害管理といった領域における協力の場として、化学・生物・放射線・核(CBRN)防護作業部隊を強化することの重要性が証明された。⁷

2011年11月11日、日経新聞と米戦略国際問題研究所(CSIS)の共催によるシンポジウムで、齋藤隆前統合幕僚長が「さまざまな有事を対象とする二国間軍事作戦のための協調メカニズム」について語った。日米は「有事が発生してから対応するのではなく、平時から有事に至るまで対応できる信頼性のある協調メカニズムを確立し、維持」⁸すべきであると齋藤氏は指摘した。

⁷ 米務省、“Security Consultative Committee Document: Cooperation in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake,”(2011年6月21日), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166598.htm>.

⁸ 『日本経済新聞』2011年11月9日、p. 9

山口昇元陸将、PWA理事は、1997年に「日米防衛協力の(ガイドライン)指針」が改正されたため、事実上これは「両国政府にとって期限切れの宿題」だと述べた。山口元陸将は、ガイドラインには二国間協力の2つのメカニズムの確立について次のように説明されていると述べた。

1. 両政府は、二国間で計画を立てるための包括的なメカニズムを策定する。また、米軍と自衛隊に限らず、両政府のその他の関連機関も含めた共通の基準と手順を確立する。
2. 両政府は平時下に、有事の際に運用する関連機関を含めた二国間協調メカニズムを確立する。⁹

上記2つのメカニズムのうち、前者は一言で言えば支援対策と計画のためのスキームであり、後者は両政府が協調して有事に対応するためのものである。これらのメカニズムは、1978年に採用されたガイドラインの前身で説明されていた、純粋な軍同士の協力という概念とは対照的に、二国間の協力と協調の範囲を拡張して、関連省庁だけでなく、地方政府も含めることを狙いとしていた。二国間協調の議題項目は、軍事作戦や諜報などの純粋に軍事的な面よりも幅広い、輸送、医療支援、および、警察・消防当局、地方自治体、民間部門など、さまざまな関係者が行うその他の非軍事活動による相互支援が含まれる。

しかしながら、こうしたメカニズムはまだ確立されていない。他方、3・11以降の二国間協調計画がそうした協調のモデルになる可能性もあり、1997年のガイドラインが目標としていたものよりも一層複雑化することも考えられる。1997年ガイドラインの起草メンバーは、有事対応の二国間の調整メカニズムを、両政府のあらゆるポイントで情報共有と双方の調整活動がひとつの窓口を通して行われる、スキームとして想定していた。そして、双方は、調整の結果決まった事項を、それぞれの国の関係当局に伝えるのである。

⁹ まさにこのシナリオがトルコで発生した。2011年11月9日、余震で日本人HA/DR関連NGOスタッフが滞在中のホテルが倒壊し、一人が亡くなり、もう一人も負傷した。

PWAは2011年6月21日付「安保協議委員会文書（Security Consultative Committee Document）」で示唆したように、「トモダチ作戦」の二国間協調メカニズムで学んだ教訓を、さまざまな有事の際に適用される日米協力制度を直ちに確立する、という形で活かすことを提唱している。

東日本大震災が意味するところは非常に大きい。1997年以来、軍事の領域を超えた二国間協力を命じるガイドラインは存在していた。諸団体は、同盟の枠組みの中で広範囲に及ぶ複数機関の協力を一貫して提唱してきたが、その機会はほとんどなかった。だが、東日本大震災によって状況は変化した。かつての戦闘部隊を越える強固な連携が可能であることが明らかになっている。ガイドラインと東日本大震災の経験を裏付けに、教訓を活かし、アジア太平洋地域で日米の民間主導による未来の民軍活動を計画する時が到来したのである。

PWAその他の間で、日米のHA/DRを協調・強化・維持する二国間センターの設立を求める声が上がっている。PWAはそうした機関の主要な要件を定めた。まず、両国にとって中心となる場所に設置する必要がある。自衛隊と米軍のHA/DRハブを琉球に設ければ、両国の軍同士の協調と相互運用には役立つ可能性があるものの、遠隔地にあるため、支援機関や市民団体の協力は得づらくなる。HA/DRの協力センターは、本当の意味で「社会全体」を対象とするものでなければならない。政府と軍の組み合わせで出資と運営がなされる可能性も高い。だが、市民社会、被災国の代表者、国連、ASEANの職員がオープンにアクセスできる状態を保つ必要がある。最後に、単なる倉庫であってはならない。

本報告書のPWAは、HA/DRの準備・協力センターを首都圏にすることを提唱した。このセンターは横田空軍基地または市ヶ谷の防衛省本部を本拠地として運営することも可能である。この概念上の二国間協力センターは、別の場所にある他の民生・軍事センターまたは軍と軍のセンターと完全に両立するものであり、民間人（特に市民団体）の参加を促すだろう。防衛省に近いことも軍関係者には魅力となり、防衛省が求めているような新たな民間・軍の協力

を生じさせる機会となろう。経験・人気・正当性が増したHA/DRセンターは、日本に拠点を置いて海外に展開するすべてのHA/DR提供者にとって不可欠な資源として君臨することになる。そのようなセンターのホスト国として、地域のHA/DRリーダーとしての日本の地位は高まるばかりであろう。日本は、米国政府、軍およびNGOの対応者とともに二国間の運用スキルを向上させていこう。

日米HA/DR協力と被災国の取り組み

東日本大震災とトモダチ作戦は、米国が災害対応において従属的役割を担い得るとことを示すものであった。米国が、国内に駐留するその多大な軍事力を非従属的なやり方で利用していたとしたら、自然災害を受けやすい地域のどの国もそのことに気付いていただろう。そうではなく、日本の市民と自衛隊の対応者が明らかに主導権を握っていたことは、米国がそうした被災国の主権を尊重していることを示していた。日米関係は独特なものではあるが、地域の被災国は安心してよい。**被災国の不可侵の主権は、日米HA/DR協力と相容れるものなのである。**この教訓は、軍の対応者にとっても被災国の国民の双方にとっても同様に、最も重要なものである。東日本大震災は、被害を受けやすいアジア太平洋諸国と計画立案および訓練を行う時に決定的な重要性をもつケース・スタディとなるだろう。

日米の共同アプローチが、アジア太平洋諸国に資するものは大きい。災害支援対策は、あらゆる分野で増強することが可能である。軍同士のHA/DR訓練がきわめて重要なのは、こうした訓練が相互の信頼構築につながるためである。ミャンマーおよびベトナムとの場合では、軍の共同訓練が外交的取り組みよりも速いペースで、両国の緊張を緩和している。¹⁰ 市民レベルでは、JICAとUSAIDの共同プロジェクトの幅を大幅に広げ、被災国の災害対応管理センターだけでなく、米国と日本のNGOを含めることが可能である。日米の大使館は、現地の大使館やUSAID/JICAのスタッフ

¹⁰ 2013年にミャンマーがコブラ・ゴールドの多国間共同訓練に招かれ、日本および米国の軍隊とともに参加したことがその証拠となっている。

を通じて、訓練のミッションを拡大すべきである。大使館は、現地の対応能力の一覧表や名簿を作成し、災害時に入来する対応者とそれらを共有する上できわめて重要な役割を果たすことができる。また、初期評価に関しての被災国の訓練や国際援助の要請の中心点ともなり得る。検討の対象としたケース・スタディのほぼすべてが、援助要請がうまく機能しなかったことを大きく取り上げていた。つまり、より積極的な取り組みが必要である、ということである。

日本の外交政策におけるHA/DRの認知度の高まりを反映させるために、**外務省の傘下という現在の位置付けを超えて災害救援を拡大すべきである**。現在は国際協力局の中にあつてごくわずかな威信または権限しかもたない課である災害救援は、外務省の総合外交政策局または北米局の中に設置されれば、大幅に高い権限を有することになろう。HA/DR課を国際協力局内に留めるのであれば、政策決定者はその権限と行動の自由を拡大させるための措置を講じなければならない。同様に、JICAがその役割を拡大すべき機もまさに熟していると言える。JICAには、HA/DRのNGOに直接に資金を提供する法定権限を与えるべきである。また、防衛省(加えて、ことに中央即応集団)とも連絡担当高官を交換し、自衛隊の部隊展開の範囲の確定と具体化を支援する機会をより多く与えるべきである。日本の文民サイドでのHA/DR提供者は、HA/DRを提供する力として、使命を達成するにふさわしい手段を与えられるべきである。

JPFも、現在は十分に活用されていない。スタッフ、財源、ミッションを拡充すれば、災害対応時に加盟NGOに力を与えるだけでなく、被災国の政府、NGOや、国連などのコーディネーターとともに訓練を行う機会をより多く提供することになろう。**JPFはその使命の独自性ゆえに、民軍訓練や被災国訓練に理想的といえる**。JPFは、加盟NGO、防衛省、米軍の間における、また特に重要なことであるが、被災国との橋渡しとしての役割を務めることができる。日本国外で類似のプラットフォームの設立を助長するのも役立ち得る。「フィリピン・プラットフォーム」があれば、加盟NGO間の調整を助け、フィリピン当局(軍および政府、コミュニティや民間セクター)とのコミュニケーション、ひいては対応を行う外国の政

府や軍、他のNGOとのコミュニケーションの中心点としての役割を果たすだろう。

HA/DRの能力強化の機会は、日米の自衛隊、軍隊の中にも存在する。軍隊は大規模演習に代わるものとしてではなく、より焦点を絞り込んで、より様々な人を受け入れる訓練を実施することができる。防衛省の防衛政策局の中に最近能力構築支援室が新設されたのは、この事実が認識されているということである。このきわめて重要な防衛省の部局は地域のパートナーに、HA/DR、平和維持、海上安全保障、および従来とは異なる安全保障上のその他の脅威の訓練を行うことになっている。平和維持活動の専門家としてすでに広く認められている日本は、論理上の必然としてこうした段階を踏んできた。この新設部局が、能力構築プロジェクトを軍事上の目標だけに限定せず、外務省、JICAや提携NGO、さらには被災国の対等部局をもこのプロジェクトに取り組みせることが理想である。こうした訓練は、13,000部隊が参加する大規模演習からは生じ得ない協力や相互運用のパターンを築き上げる。「社会全体」によるアプローチには、より小規模でより様々な人々を受け入れる訓練の方が役立つことは確実である。

米国、日本、そしてアジア太平洋

PWAの発案による日米民軍災害支援対策イニシアチブは、日米安保体制のあらゆるレベルにおける協力の向上により、共同HA/DRを強化することができると結論付けている。だが、HA/DRの協力緊密化のもたらす利益は、災害分野にとどまるものではない。日米が主となり守っているアジア太平洋の地域安全保障体制は、堅固な同盟関係が必要である。渡部恒雄東京財団上席研究員は、第II章において、この同盟が直面しているいくつかの課題として、期待が満たされないことの負担や、憲法第9条と相互安全保障条約の条件が相容れないことなどを列挙した。軍・文民双方の指導者間の関係改善を土台にして、HA/DR分野での協力を深めれば、同盟全体に波及効果が及ぶ。このようにして土台が増強されれば、日米は地域に広がる安全保障上の脅威と、災害(天

災および人災)、平和維持、気候変動、伝染病、海上安全保障など、従来とは異なる形をとる脅威に、共同で対処することができる。災害などの非従来型の脅威を軽減することを目指す協力作業は、地域全体にとって強力で威嚇的でない「公益」となる。

これら脅威のどれひとつを取ってみても、日米双方による積極的な対応が必要となるだろう。非従来型の安全保障上の課題の場合、対応には軍事力以外の要素も必要となる可能性がある。民軍によるあらゆる共同対応同様、HA/DRの付加価値が現れ、日米両国の災害支援対策活動、2011年3月11日に取られた措置、そして今後の協力へのコミットメントにより、二国間の調整メカニズムは大幅に強化されるだろう。HA/DRの研究と分析、包括的訓練と机上演習、共同設備の活用を通じて得た経験は、他にも緊急事態にも用いることができる。

災害救援協力がもたらす永続的な利点は、山口昇元陸将によって以下のように述べられている。

東日本大震災後の救援作戦から最初に学んだ一連の教訓は、日米同盟の管理に関するものである。3・11後の救援活動のための二国間協力の経験により、日本人の心の中における日米同盟の信頼性は明らかに高まった。日本人が3・11以前よりも明確に、米国は信頼に値する同盟国であると判断したのは、米国の核抑止力でも、日本の防衛に充てられる核兵器の数でも、武力攻撃を受けた際に自衛力を強化すると約束されている米軍の規模でもない。日米両国、両政府、米軍と自衛隊、そして両国民の緊密な絆が、同盟に対する認識を大いに強めたのである。

しかし、こうした二国間の信頼を無傷のまま保つことは容易ではない。同盟の管理を謝れば、鳩山政権始動時に米海兵隊普天間航空基地の沖縄北部への移転計画に関する問題で目の当たりにしたように、両国の関係に深刻な悪化を引き起こす可能性がある。こうした不信は、米兵の犯す犯罪や、日本人に被害を及ぼす航空事故や地上事故がきっかけとなる可能性もある。日本のある元外交官はかつて、同盟を園芸になぞらえた。同盟は花壇に咲く花に似て、きちんと世話をしないとすぐ萎れてしまう、というのである。同盟が取り組むべき深刻な問題を抱えている場合など、この喩えは特に当てはまるだろう。

東日本大震災は日本に未曾有の深刻な被害をもたらしたが、それに続いて行われた救援作業は日本人に、日本は、きわめて温かい援助の手を差し伸べてくれた国際社会の一員であることを思い出させた。日本人は、米国やアジア太平洋の近隣諸国、すなわち中国、韓国から日本が開発援助や資金援助を行ってきた発展途上国まで、世界の様々な地域からこうした温かい援助が寄せられたことを決して忘れるはしないだろう。日本は、助けられたというこの経験を決して忘れるべきではなく、他国民が災害で苦勞している時には、いつでも援助するという心構えをもつべきである。

東日本大震災は日本と日本人にとって、世界に目を向けていく姿勢を取り戻すべきだという警鐘となった。バブル崩壊後の20年間にわたって、日本人は内向きであった。日本人は自分たちの潜在力、特に経済的能力に対する自信を失ったばかりか、国際社会に対する責任感も失った。経済が苦境にあつてさえ、日本はいまなお、平和と安定の果実を享受している世界最大の経済国の1つである。従って、日本がこの平和と安定に貢献することは当然の義務なのである。

山口元陸将の後半の論点は、特に適切である。日本には、災害対応の調整、コミュニケーション、管理に積極的に打って出るだけの、前例のない経験と能力がある。日本はこの「警鐘」を踏まえて、地域の公益を推進していくことができる。3・11のトラウマを有意義な行動へと変える上で、地域のHA/DRのリーダー役をはっきり引き受けること以上に適切な方法はあるまい。

日本にとってもうひとつの警鐘となっているのが、あらゆるレベルにおいて、ことに政党内で強力なリーダーシップの必要性が高まっていることである。渡部恒雄上席研究員が言及した政治的リーダーシップの変化は、日本国民が彼らのリーダーシップに幻滅した結果である。¹¹ 大胆で進歩的な行動が、政治指導者にも官僚にも同じように要求されていることが明らかに実感できる。信頼できる同盟や友人と手を組んでアジア太平洋に公益を提供することは、戦略的で、なおかつ人気のある動きである。今こそ、日本が国民とアジア太平洋への約束を実践すべき時なのである。

¹¹ 第II章を参照

HA/DR協力を通じて日米同盟を深化させることは、両国双方に役立ち、能力を増強し、地域のパートナーや多角的機関への支援活動を強化する。アジア太平洋諸国の外相、軍隊、民間セクターやNGOと協力すれば、援助要請、コミュニケーション、そして「社会全体による対応」は容易に改善されよう。アジア太平洋域内でのHA/DR協力は、地域全体の統治と経済にとってプラスとなる。威嚇的でない災害外交に、信頼が加われば、日米は地域の備え、安全保障と安定を推し進めることができる。

HA/DR支援対策のもつソフトパワーは、オーストラリア、韓国、インド、そしてASEANという地域の主要パートナーとの三ヶ国協定にもメリットをもたらす。外相や防衛相が三ヶ国対話やフォーラムにHA/DRという要素を組み込むにつれて、この教訓は最高級レベルで学ばれつつある。HA/DRが今後も三ヶ国議論において焦点であり続けることが至上命題である。アジア太平洋諸国(そして例外なしにASEAN加盟国)は今後も、災害に対して脆弱であり続けるだろう。HA/DRを強化すれば、閣僚レベルおよび社会全般における対話と協力が可能になる。このことは、日本と米国が提供しなければならぬ公益である。

日米同盟の中、ASEANの内部、そしてアジア太平洋全体の中においては、行く手に無数の課題がある。政治経済の課題、従来型、そして非従来型の安全保障上の脅威である。台風や津波を大幅に上回る脅威が、同地域を脅かしている。だが、日米間に確固たるHA/DRの基盤があれば、こうした課題の一つひとつは、より対応しやすくなるだろう。日米両国は、大災害が及ぼす影響を軽減するために、強力な投資を行なっていくことで、将来的には何倍もの見返りを得られるだろう。

